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Preface to the 2016 Creative Commons Edition

This book initially was published by Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press in 1998. In
2014, at my request, the publisher returned to me all publication rights. Not surprisingly, Palgrave Macmillan concluded that the book no longer had any profit
potential. Given that, why would I want to recover publication rights? Well, certainly not for economic profit (after all, I’ve placed the book into the Creative
Commons). But I do believe the book can still profitably be read by environmental
policy makers in China and other countries for whom this book’s lessons remain
relevant.
Ostensibly, it is a book about the failure of environmental protection in Communist Poland. But it was never just a book about Poland. Poland was merely the
object case to illustrate more general, systemic impediments to pollution control in
single-party states with socialist economic systems. Those impediments include,
most prominently, endemic soft budget constraints of state-owned enterprises, conflicts of interest faced by environmental regulators attempting to control emissions
from enterprises in which the state has a direct financial stake, and bureaucratic
career incentives that always seem to favor economic production over environmental protection in single-party states.
Consider China. For decades now, China has proclaimed improved environmental protection as a high-level national goal. New policies are announced, which
receive widespread media attention. And it is taken as an article of faith that China’s Communist Party can more or less easily accomplish whatever policy goals it
enunciates. That is simply not the case.
This seventeen-year-old book about Poland provides an ongoing cautionary
tale for China. It shows that even well-intentioned environmental policies of totalitarian states are likely to face substantial, systemic impediments. The combination
of soft budget constraints and regulatory conflicts of interest presents a formidable
obstacle that Communist Poland was unable to overcome, and so far has stymied
China’s Communist Party/state.
Of course, China in 2016 is not Poland in 1985. The differences are too
numerous to mention, ranging from the cultural to the structural. For instance,
most sectors of China’s economy have been opened to competition among private
producers—something that did not happen in Poland before the fall of the Communist Party. To the extent China’s markets are subject to market competition, the
xiii

xiv

Preface to the 2015 Creative Commons Edition

problems identified in this book have little relevance. But, and this is the crucial
point, several of the most heavily polluting sectors of the Chinese economy, including for example energy production and steel manufacturing, remain dominated
by state-owned enterprises, which are not subject to competitive pressures. With
respect to those sectors—the last vestiges of China’s socialist economic system—
there is every reason to believe that the experiences of Communist Poland have
at least some relevance. The Chinese Communist Party has, in fact, found it difficult to make environmental penalties stick against its biggest polluters and to
create career incentives for the bureaucrats that manage big polluters (China’s version of Poland’s nomenklatura) to implement official state environmental policy.
When push comes to shove, China’s economic production and growth imperatives
always seem to override environmental protection mandates, however sincerely
intended. In that respect, China suffers from precisely the problems I write about
in this book.
Poland in 2016 does not suffer from those problems, which is not to say that
it has ‘solved’ all of its environmental problems—no country can claim to have
accomplished that feat. Poland today has similar pollution problems to other industrial democracies with similar per capita incomes. The environmental improvements that began virtually as soon as the socialist economic system fell (as
recounted in Chapter 7) have continued as the country’s economy (and industrial
output) have grown. Poland is no longer mentioned as among the most polluted
counties on earth, even if its environmental performance still lags (marginally) that
of more affluent EU member states. At a personal level, I no longer worry, as I did
in 1989 or 1990, of returning from every visit to Poland with a case of acute bronchitis. (By contrast, I would worry about the respiratory consequences of a trip to
any major city in China today.)
I have made no substantive changes to the original text. Several typographical and other minor errors have been corrected. My Ostrom Workshop colleague,
Patty Lezotte, has done a brilliant job redesigning and typesetting the text. And I
am grateful to Palgrave Macmillan for returning to me the publication rights.
When I initially completed the book, I dedicated it to my wife Izabela and our
daughter Marysia. By the time the book was in print, Marysia’s brother Stefan had
joined the family. He is now eighteen years old and preparing to start college at
Indiana University. I am very happy to have the opportunity to dedicate this Creative Commons edition of the book to him along with his sister and mother.
Daniel H. Cole
Bloomington, Indiana
March 2016
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Introduction

A Failed Promise: Socialist Environmental Protection
In 1971, during an environmental conference sponsored by the United Nations
in the former Czechoslovakia, Mayor Zdeněk Kupka of Ostrava (that country’s
second-largest city) proclaimed socialism to be superior to capitalism in environmental protection. Pointing first to the old capitalist-era factories belching plumes
of black smoke and then to the newer and apparently cleaner factories built by the
Communist Party/state, the mayor declared that ‘the new system is solving the
city’s environmental problems’ (New York Times, May 16, 1971).
Mayor Kupka’s proclamation met with little dissent on either side of the Berlin Wall. No one denied the ecological failings of capitalism, which were well and
frequently publicized by the American and European media. Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s reports of environmental problems in Communist Eastern Europe were few and far between. For some (including a fair number
of Western economists) this simply confirmed the inherent environmental superiority of the socialist system. It stood to reason: socially owned industries did
not operate from an environmentally harmful profit motive; and central socioeconomic planning presumably ensured the rational utilization and conservation of
natural resources. As Karl-Heinrich Hansmeyer and Bert Rürup (quoted in Zweigert and Gessner, 1976, 93) suggested, ‘[i]ndustry working under an ideal central
plan for the economy should not create any specific environmental problems.’ In
the Communist Party states, this became an ideological truth as certain as any
Aristotelian syllogism. From the premise that environmental problems stemmed
from capitalist relations and modes of production, Party/state leaders logically
deduced that pollution could not even exist under socialism.1 But, as with all logical proofs, the conclusion was only as sound as the premises.
During the 1970s, mounting evidence of substantial and increasing pollution
levels in the socialist economies eroded the premise that environmental problems
arose only under conditions of industrial capitalism. By the late 1970s, Party/
state officials were compelled to concede that environmental problems existed
but, they maintained, such problems were not endemic to socialism, as they were
to capitalism; on the contrary, only the progress of scientifically planned socialism could and ultimately would eradicate pollution and other negative effects
1
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of industrialization and economic growth. In other words, pollution in socialist
economies was viewed, in Charles Ziegler’s (1987, 26) words, as a ‘temporary
anomaly, a deviation from the environmentally benign norm that will be resolved
as socialism advances.’ But that claim exploded in 1986, along with the nuclear
power plant at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Ukraine. After Chernobyl, the
environmental policies and practices of Communist countries came under intense
domestic and international scrutiny. Apparently government ownership, control
and planning did not guarantee environmental preservation after all.
Three years after Chernobyl, all remaining myths of socialism’s inherent environmental superiority fell along with the Berlin Wall. Behind the iron curtain stood
another curtain of poisonous smog so dense that in some places sunlight could not
pierce it.2 Between 1971 (when Mayor Zdeněk Kupka declared that the socialist
system was solving all of Ostrava’s environmental problems) and 1985, sulfur
dioxide concentrations in the region increased by more than 50 percent (Vavroušek
1990, 23, table 3). By the late 1980s, Ostrava was a poisoned city located within
the most heavily polluted region on earth, the ‘Black Triangle’ of southeastern East
Germany, southwestern Poland and the northern Czechoslovakia.
In the Black Triangle and throughout the former Soviet Bloc, severe pollution
had (and continues to have) catastrophic impacts on natural resources, national
economies and public health. During the late 1980s in Poland, for example, half
of all river water was unfit for industrial use, let alone for human consumption; in
Kraków, Poland’s medieval ‘city of kings,’ acid rain was literally dissolving one
of the greatest collections of Renaissance architecture in Europe; 60 percent of all
food produced in the Kraków region was considered unfit for human consumption because of massive concentrations of metals that contaminated the soil; in
the industrial region of Katowice, 40 miles to the west of Kraków, two-thirds of
all 10-year-olds suffered from mental and physical disabilities as a result of pollution; and some Polish scientists predicted that by the year 2000, one-quarter of
the country’s population would develop some form of pollution-related cancer.3
Meanwhile, Poland’s ecological crisis was costing the Polish economy between
10 and 20 percent of gross national income (see Radio Free Europe/Report on
Eastern Europe, October 5, 1990). These shocking, almost inconceivable statistics
may appear to make People’s Poland an extreme or unique example, but its experience was, in fact, representative of the former Soviet Bloc as a whole. From all
appearances, the extent of environmental devastation in the socialist East at least
matched, and probably exceeded, anything ever experienced in the capitalist West.

Subject and Object
This book’s purpose is to explain the failure of environmental protection under
socialism. This purpose has both positive and normative components. The positive goal is to describe comprehensively the causes of the failure of environmental
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protection in People’s Poland. The normative goal is to derive some lessons from
this failure about systemic or institutional prerequisites for more effective environmental protection. The thesis underlying both goals is that the environmental
failure of socialism was inevitable given certain features of the Marxist-Leninist
ideology, the socialist economic system and single-party rule.
Although Poland is the object of study, the book’s subject is Marxist socialism,
a political-economic system that precipitated similar ecological problems throughout the former Soviet bloc. Indeed, this book might have been written about any
country in Eastern Europe. It could not, however, have been written about any
country in Western Europe. And that distinction gives this book its impetus. The
thesis is that system-specific features of real existing socialism caused or exacerbated ecological crises in People’s Poland and throughout the socialist world. This
is not to say that the Communist system functioned in precisely the same way in
Poland and all other countries of the former Soviet bloc. Although those countries
are often lumped together for the sake of academic expediency (and to some extent
this book is no exception to that), each developed its own socioeconomic and cultural idiosyncrasies. Few (perhaps only Hungary and the former Yugoslavia) were
more idiosyncratic than Poland, which was always among the least doctrinaire and
most political unstable. For that reason Poland may seem a poor choice for a case
study of environmental protection under socialism. However, for this type of study
Poland’s exceptional characteristics make it particularly apt. It is, as John Clark
and Aaron Wildavsky (1990, 5) have written, ‘the toughest test case.’
People’s Poland had (relatively speaking) the most sophisticated environmental
protection regime of any Soviet Bloc country (see Juergensmeyer et al. 1991; Cummings 1993). At the same time, Communist ideology and Stalinist institutions were
only weakly established there (again, relatively speaking). The Polish Party/state
failed to collectivize agriculture; it suffered a powerful oppositionist Church; and
it did not repress its population, including environmentalists, nearly as much as did
other Communist regimes. Orthodox Marxist ideology (the Marxism of Marx and
his most influential Russian interpreters) did not dominate Poland’s legal system to
the same extent it did others in the former Soviet bloc (see Biernat and Wasilewski
1992, 9). So, if environmental protection failed for systemic reasons in Poland,
where environmental protection was relatively well developed and the ‘system’
relatively weakly established, then what holds true for Poland certainly should hold
true for the other former socialist countries. Nevertheless, this book does not focus
exclusively on Poland; the analysis (particularly in Chapters 5 and 6) compares and
contrasts the experiences of other socialist and non-socialist countries.

Marxist Ideology and the Socialist System
Already, in the first few pages of this Introduction, I have referred to the subject
by various names: ‘socialism,’ ‘the Party/state,’ ‘Marxist socialism,’ ‘real existing
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socialism’ and ‘the Communist system.’ There are, in fact, many labels for the system (or systems) implemented in Marx’s name, all of them somehow controversial.
People’s Poland was, of course, established on the Soviet model of Marxist ideology. Marx, as is well known, wrote little about the socialist system he
espoused, perhaps because he saw it as only a transitional phase between capitalism and stateless communism (so argues Pashukanis 1951, 270–1). He did not
provide a recipe for the socialist state, only a partial list of ingredients: (1) the
socialist state should be a workers’ state, led by the ‘revolutionary dictatorship of
the proletariat’ (Marx 1938, 18); (2) the ‘anarchy’ of the free market should be
replaced by a scientifically planned economy;4 and (3) the state should control the
means of production, including property, until the process of re-socialization (that
is, de-alienation) is complete and the state withers away.5
From Marx’s occasional statements about socialism, Lenin elaborated an
entire political-economic system. In substantial accordance with Marx’s incomplete directions, Lenin’s system (1) established the workers’ state under the
‘leading role’ of the vanguard Communist Party, (2) abolished (most) private
ownership of land and the means of production, and (3) instituted central planning
as the mechanism for ordering economic relations in socialist society. The result,
however, was a totalitarian state that Marx might not have recognized as his own
design. Inevitably perhaps, political and economic expediency altered Marxist
theory on its way to becoming practice. Or were Lenin’s interpretations of Marx
simply vulgar and self-serving?
This is not the place to decide, once and for all, whether Lenin was faithful
to Marx. From the perspective of this book, the answer is not important. What
is important is the fact of Marxism–Leninism. It is worth noting, however, that
the debate is by no means one-sided. On the one hand, Lenin seemed to collapse
Marx’s entire theory of history into two simple goals: secure power and maintain
Party rule. Before the Communists came to power, Lenin judged all ideas good or
bad according to their impacts on the revolutionary struggle; after the revolution,
the primary criterion for decision making became the good of the Party. However,
Lenin’s myopic focus on revolution and Party was not clearly inconsistent with
Marx’s writings. As Leszek Kołakowski (1978b, 383) has noted, Lenin may have
been even more faithful to Marx’s theory of historical materialism than Marx
himself was.
Stalin’s conception of ‘Marxism–Leninism’ was for the most part a ‘perfection’ of Lenin’s principle of the Party-above-all; his dictatorial rule was the logical
conclusion and ultimate manifestation of the totalitarian system Lenin conceived.
It was a short and direct trip down the road of ‘democratic centralism’ from Lenin’s
conception of Party infallibility to Stalin’s ‘cult of personality.’6 Stalin’s Marxism
was both an ideology and the antithesis of ideology. Under his rule, ‘Marxism’
came to mean ‘nothing more or less than the current pronouncement of the authority in question, that is, Stalin himself’ (Kołakowski 1978c, 4). At the same time,
Stalin institutionalized within the political-economic structures of socialism what
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might be called the architectural principles of Marxism, as specified by Marx
or derived from his writings by Lenin. These principles included ‘the workers’
state,’ ‘nomenklatura,’ ‘socialist democracy,’ ‘democratic centralism,’ ‘socialist
legality,’ ‘central planning,’ ‘socialist property’ and ‘technological determinism.’
I address each of these institutions at various points in this book, as they relate to
environmental protection. Together, they determined the design and function of
the socialist system and its organizational units, and they continued to do so long
after the ideology on which they were based had fallen into disrepute. It may be,
as some have said, that no one in Poland, including the Communists, believed in
Marxism after about 1970. But the institutions and organizations founded (rightly
or wrongly) on his theories persisted.7
‘Socialism,’ in any case, is more than just an ideological label; it signifies
‘certain formations in existing societies’ (Kornai 1992a, 9). These formations
share economic systems constructed on an administrative, rather than a market,
model, which assumes social ownership and control of the means of production,
and entails centralized resource allocation, with prices and production targets
established by commands from above, rather than by demand from below. The
formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe all conformed to this model, albeit
to different extents and with idiosyncratic variations. This book is about environmental protection within that model.

Socialist Legal Analysis
A cursory glance at the Table of Contents of this book might leave some traditional legal scholars scratching their heads in dismay. The book ostensibly is about
environmental law and administration, but the majority of the chapters seem to be
about subjects other than law, such as history, politics, economics and philosophy.
Fortunately, legal scholars are no longer constrained to write about the law as if
legislators, judges and lawyers operated within a social vacuum. I seriously doubt
any legal scholar now living would be shocked to discover extensive treatments
of history, politics and economics in a legal study. But there is a finer point to be
made here concerning the nature of socialist law and legal studies. An examination
of environmental law under socialism that restricted itself to narrowly doctrinal
legal analysis would be thoroughly unilluminating because in the socialist system
the law had no autonomy; it was little more than a manipulable set of politically
and economically determined rules.8 The socialists viewed law as an instrument
of social engineering; it was an integral and integrated part of the sociopolitical
superstructure constructed upon the economic base of socialist society to support
the aims of the ruling class and their vanguard party. Distinctions between law,
politics and economics were blurred and sometimes obliterated. Consequently, in
studying socialist law, political and economic conditions are at least as significant
as literal statutory requirements.
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This remains, however, a work of legal scholarship in a meaningful sense.
Law and the legal system were central to the socialist regime for environmental
protection. As I explain in Chapter 4 (§4.2), to the extent there was any meaningful environmental protection in People’s Poland, it resulted from legislation and
the enforcement of legal rules. But, as we shall see, the failure of environmental
protection in People’s Poland was not so much a legal failure as a wider systemic
failure.
My law-oriented analysis distinguishes this book from earlier works on environmental protection under socialism, written predominantly by political scientists who have tended to treat law (if at all) as something peripheral or incidental
to the subject. I do not mean to disparage their works, all of which have contributed significantly to our understanding of socialist environmental efforts and
problems. I believe, however, that this book’s law-oriented analysis fills a void.
Paradoxically perhaps, my focus on environmental law and its enforcement may
facilitate a more comprehensive analysis than earlier works have provided, for it
must address all of the social and systemic forces that combined to render environmental protection efforts (such as they were) ineffectual.

The Parameters
The Communist Party ruled in Poland from the end of the World War II until
1989. This book will treat that entire time period and beyond. Chapter 2, which
presents a history of Polish environmental law and administration, begins with
pre-socialist environmental protection efforts. At the other end of the time line,
Chapter 7 addresses the important systemic changes that have occurred since the
fall of communism in 1989, and their implications for environmental protection in
the democratic Republic of Poland. The analysis focuses, however, on the enactment, implementation and enforcement of the 1980 Environmental Protection and
Development Act (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6), People’s Poland’s first and only
comprehensive environmental protection statute.
Dating the end of socialism in Poland is problematic because at least five
different dates could be chosen. First, in December 1988 Poland’s Parliament
enacted a Law on Economic Activity (1988 Dz.U. No. 41, item 324) which, upon
taking effect on January 1, 1989, freed most of the economy from central planning and centralized resources allocation. As I suggest in Chapter 7, this change
may have been even more radical than the ‘Balcerowicz Plan’ of ‘shock therapy’
reforms that were introduced at the beginning of 1990. If the 1988 Law on Economic Activity did not, in itself, mark the end of socialism in Poland, it certainly
marked the beginning of the end. Second, we might date the end of socialism to
April 1989, when the Party/government signed the ‘Round Table’ accords with
the previously outlawed Solidarity trade union. Those accords called, among
other things, for free elections, which led directly to the demise of Communist
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Party rule. Third, the elections themselves, which were held in July 1989, might
be taken to date the end of the Communist era in Poland. Despite the fact that
the ‘Round Table’ accords reserved 65 percent of seats in the Sejm (the lower
house of Poland’s Parliament) to members of the Polish Communist Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza or PZPR), the elections constituted a public
referendum on Party rule in Poland. Solidarity-backed candidates won every seat
open to them (except for one seat, which won by an independent candidate), placing the outcome of the referendum beyond dispute. Still, the Communists held on
to power for a few months following the elections. Fourth, the Communist era in
Poland could be said to have ended when the first post-Communist government of
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki took office in September 1989. Shortly after
that, the PZPR dissolved itself. Even then (as I suggested earlier), many institutions of the socialist system remained in place. The final plausible date for the end
of the Communist era in Poland would be January 1, 1990, the date the ‘Balcerowicz Plan’ (named for Mazowiecki’s Vice-Premier and Finance Minister Leszek
Balcerowicz) of economic reforms took effect.
For purposes of this book, socialism is treated as if it ended on the final day
of 1988 (the day before the 1988 Law on Economic Activity took effect). This
selection makes the most sense from the perspective of environmental protection,
where only few and mostly minor changes were introduced between 1985 and the
end of 1988, but a good deal of legislative and administrative activity ensued in
1989.

A Road Map to the Analysis
Chapter 1 begins the book with a description of Poland’s ecological crisis circa
1988. That crisis signified a failure of environmental protection under socialism.
Chapter 2 then presents a history of environmental law and administration in
Poland, which demonstrates that the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland was not a matter of benign neglect or malign intent. The Polish Party/
state undertook serious efforts to design and implement stringent environmental
policies. But, as the story of environmental devastation presented in Chapter 1
illustrates, those efforts all failed. Chapters 3–6 seek to explain that failure. Chapter 3 focuses on problems in the laws themselves, including ambiguous legal mandates, lax standards, weak penalties and discretionary exceptions from liability.
I consider these to be problems of law enforceability, as distinct from problems
of law enforcement, which relate to exogenous political and economic considerations. Chapter 3 concludes that, despite certain problems, Poland’s environmental laws were not the primary cause of the failure of environmental protection. The
laws certainly might have been better drafted, for instance to be less ambiguous,
but they were not patently unenforceable; they might have been more effectively
enforced to provide greater environmental protection.
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The primary cause of the failure of environmental protection under socialism
was the chronic underenforcement of environmental laws. Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the political and economic causes, respectively, of that underenforcement.
In Chapter 4, the focus is on four interrelated political impediments to environmental protection in the ‘rule of Party’ state: (1) the continual friction between the
needs of environmental protection and certain legitimacy principles, such as the
commitment to full employment and maximal production, that served to justify
Party rule; (2) the structure of the Party/state’s administrative hierarchy which
provided leverage to industrial ministers and economic planners over environmental protection officials; (3) the structure of law enforcement and the judicial
system in the Party/state, especially the broad discretion of prosecutors and the
relative incompetence of environmental investigators; and (4) the Party/state’s
control over, and manipulation of, environmental information. Those political
impediments to environmental law enforcement were complemented by structural impediments in the socialist economic system, addressed in Chapter 5, most
notably the lack of scarcity pricing for natural resources (under the influence of
Marx’s labor theory of value), which obstructed conservation efforts, and the
socialist property rights system, which created an endemic conflict of interest for
the Party/state as environmental regulator and nominal owner of regulated industries. That regulatory conflict of interest led the Party/state to soften budget and
law constraints on enterprises, reducing the overall effectiveness of environmental fees and fines.
Many of the systemic impediments to effective environmental protection discussed in Chapters 3–5 had roots in so-called ‘orthodox’ (or ‘classical’) Marxist
theory. Chapter 6 examines elements of that theory with implications for environmental protection, including (1) the Marxist–Leninist attitude toward nature, (2)
the conception of socialist property, (3) Marx’s labor theory of value, and (4) the
Marxist–Leninist conceptions of state and law. Regardless of whether Marx was
in any way ‘responsible’ for the implementation of his ideas in the former Soviet
Bloc, the point remains that orthodox Marxist theory is fundamentally incompatible with environmentalism; and, as a matter of fact, the institutions and organizations Marxist theory gave rise to (with or without Marx’s approval) under
Soviet-style communism impeded effective environmental protection. The normative implications of this for neo- and post-Marxist theories of socialism are
addressed, along with other implications of the analysis, in Chapter 8.
The analysis in Chapters 3–6 suggests that features of the socialist system
and even elements of Marxist theory are to blame for the poor environmental
performance of People’s Poland (among other former Soviet bloc countries). If
so, we might reasonably expect Poland’s environmental performance to improve
once those institutions were eliminated or substantially altered. Chapter 7, which
examines environmental protection in post-Communist Poland, confirms that
expectation. Poland’s environmental performance has improved dramatically
since 1989, and much of that improvement is due to systemic reforms that have,
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among other things, hardened budget constraints on polluters and reduced the
state’s regulatory conflict of interest, resulting in more active and effective environmental law enforcement.
In light of that analysis, Chapter 8 adduces some normative implications for
an institutional theory of (effective) environmental protection. Specifically, I outline three institutions that Poland’s case suggests may be necessary (though, perhaps, not sufficient) for effective environmental protection: (1) a property rights
structure that minimizes regulatory conflicts of interest by disaggregating the
interests of polluters and government regulators; (2) a pricing mechanism that
values resource scarcity, thereby inducing economic actors to conservation; and
(3) an institutionalized rule of law ideology to support environmental regulation.
To the extent these are truly institutional prerequisites for effective environmental
protection, they raise serious issues for environmental protection under any form
of neo- or post-Marxist socialism. They may even signify what Lewis (1992) calls
a ‘capitalist imperative’ for environmental protection.

Notes
1. As stated in a report by the Czech Republic Ministry of the Environment (Vavroušek
1990, 15), ‘the official ideology . . . held for a long time that nothing like a polluted environment can exist under socialism.’
2. Indeed, in the late 1980s the heavily polluted city of Kraków, Poland, received
approximately 20 percent less sunlight than other parts of the country (see Reuters North
European Service, August 23, 1985).
3. Chapter 1 presents a more complete and detailed picture of Poland’s crisis at the
end of the Communist era.
4. In The Civil War in France (1940, 61), Marx wrote that in the socialist system
‘united cooperative societies are to regulate national production under a common plan; thus
taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical
convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production.’ Marx certainly seems to have in
mind here precisely the kind of central planning system that Lenin institutionalized, rather
than some more Utopian conception of unalienated people organizing their lives together
in peace, harmony and goodwill.
5. Marx and Engels (1978, 484) wrote that ‘the theory of communism may be summed
up in a single sentence: Abolition of private property.’ State control over property was also
implicit in Marx’s call for a planned economy; after all, the state could not effectively plan
economic relations if it did not control property.
6. Kołakowski (1978c, 4) draws the connection from Marx’s epistemology through
Lenin to Stalin this way: ‘trust = the proletarian world-view = Marxism = the party’s
world-view = the pronouncement of the party leadership = those of the supreme leader.’
7. I have much more to say about the relationship between Marx’s writings and socialist institutions relating to environmental protection in Chapter 6.
8. In effect, socialist legal theorists were operating at the opposite end of a single
continuum from traditional (Langdellian) American legal scholars. Where American legal
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scholars traditionally treated law as a thoroughly autonomous discipline, completely ignoring its political and economic content, socialist legal scholars treated law as if there were
nothing more to it than political and economic content. Few legal scholars today would
subscribe to either view of law. Most have come to recognize that the law contains substantial political and economic content, but that it is not wholly reducible to politics and
economics. I take up the subject of socialist law and legality in detail in later chapters,
especially in Chapters 4 (§4.2) and 6 (§6.5).

Chapter 1
POLAND’S ECOLOGICAL CRISIS
Wokulski reached the Vistula bank, and looked about in surprise. Here, occupying several acres of space, was a hill of the most hideous garbage, stinking,
almost moving under the sun, while only a few dozen yards away lay the reservoirs from which Warsaw drank.
‘Here,’ he thought, ‘is the center of all infection. What a man throws out of
his house today he drinks tomorrow. Later he’s moved to the Powazki cemetery,
and then again from the other side of the city he infects those of his dear ones
who are still alive. . . . A boulevard here, drains and water from the hill-top—
several thousand people could be saved from death, and tens of thousands from
diseases. . . . Not much work, but an inestimable profit; nature would know how
to compensate for it.’
Bolesław Prus, Lalka ([1890] 1972)

1.1. Pollution and Communism in Poland
Poland suffered from pollution before it suffered communism. In the late nineteenth century, like most other European capitals,1 Warsaw struggled with the
combined environmental effects of rapid population growth and industrial development. Prus’s dreary description of unsanitary conditions in Warsaw resembles
nothing so much as Friedrich Engels’ earlier descriptions of London’s workingclass boroughs (1958, 64–5).2 The most that can be said about Poland’s environmental problems in the era before communism is that they were little better, but
no worse, than those of most other countries in Europe.3
Although the Communists did not invent pollution in Poland, they may be
said to have perfected it. By the 1980s some were calling Poland the most polluted country in the world (see, e.g., UPI, Feb. 9, 1986 and Sept. 13, 1986). During the four-plus decades of Communist rule, industrial development and full
employment were virtually exclusive priorities; environmental problems, at least
initially, were ignored. This neglect was rational because, according to social-
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ist theory, pollution was a phenomenon of industrial capitalism that would simply vanish once the means of production were brought under social ownership
and central socioeconomic planning (see Zweigert and Gessner 1976; Fullenbach
1981; Kabala 1985). Meanwhile, air and water quality in People’s Poland rapidly
deteriorated. It did not take Poland’s Communist rulers long to realize that socialism was not immune, after all, to environmental problems, and beginning in the
1960s they undertook substantial efforts to protect the environment; the Party
made environmental protection a national priority and the legislature (Poland’s
Sejm) enacted stringent laws. Nevertheless, environmental problems proliferated.
By 1989, when the Communists relinquished power, pollution posed a serious
public health threat; according to some commentators the ‘biological existence’ of
the Polish nation was in jeopardy (Dagens Nyheter, Jan. 28, 1982; Marcinkiewicz
1987, 42; Bochniarz and Bolan 1991, 337).
What follows is a verbal snapshot of the almost indescribable ecological conditions in People’s Poland in the late 1980s, just before the fall of communism.4

1.2. Poland’s Geography, Climate and Resource Base
Poland is East-Central Europe’s largest country with a land area of 120,350 square
miles (about half the size of Texas). It is a vast fertile plain running from Germany
in the west to the republics of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine in the east. Its
main river, the Wisła (Vistula), meanders the entire length of the country from the
Tatras mountains on Poland’s southern border with the Czech and Slovak Republics, through the historic capital of Kraków and the modern capital of Warsaw, to
the Baltic Sea near Gdańsk.
Poland’s natural resources base combines a unique mix of plenty and scarcity. The country is rich in mineral resources, including hard and brown coal, oil,
natural gas, copper, zinc and lead ores, halite, phosphate and building stones, but
water poor; among European countries, it ranks 20th in available water per capita (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992,
8–9).5 In years of low rainfall, certain areas of the country, including Upper and
Lower Silesia (in southwestern Poland), Łódź (in central Poland) and Lublin (in
eastern Poland), suffer acute shortages of drinking water.6 Forests, predominantly
coniferous, cover about 28 percent of the country. They include the last remnant of the primeval European forest at Białowieża (in eastern Poland, bordering Belarus), which is home to more than 3,000 plant and 8,500 animal species,
including rare mammals like the European bison. All told, Poland provides habitat
for 30 percent of Europe’s mammals, 16 percent of its bird species, and 40 percent of its higher plants. And as a lowland country, subject to the influence of both
continental and oceanic climates, Poland is especially inviting to many migratory
species (see PAP Polish Press Agency, Aug. 28, 1992).
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During its brief period of independence between the wars, Poland was a predominantly agricultural country with a widely dispersed populous. After World
War II, it developed rapidly (pursuant to Soviet industrial policy) into one of the
most industrialized countries in the world. By the late 1980s, 61 percent of its
38 million inhabitants lived in the major industrial centers of Warsaw, Kraków,
Katowice, Gdańsk, Łódź, Szczeciń and Wrocław. And half of that number were
imperiled by severe air and water pollution.

1.3. Ecological Danger Zones
In 1983, Poland’s Communist government listed 27 official ‘ecological danger
zones,’ encompassing 11 percent of the nation’s territory and 35 percent of its
citizens (UPI, Feb. 9, 1986). The worst of these danger zones were in southern
Poland, in the neighboring voivodships (administrative regions) of Katowice (in
the area historically known as Silesia or Śląsk) and Kraków (in western Galicia
or Małopolska). Katowice is Poland’s largest industrial province. Though it comprises only 3 percent of Poland’s land area, it is home to more than 10 percent of
the nation’s people, and its 1,700 industries, mining operations and other enterprises generate almost a third of the country’s total annual income (see Hinrichsen
1987, 14). The region coincidentally produces an immense share of Poland’s pollution. Forty miles to the east of Katowice and Poland’s industrial heartland lies
Poland’s jewel, Kraków, the medieval city of kings. In 1978, the United Nations
declared Kraków (Poland’s third-largest city with a population of over 700,000)
a World Heritage Site to be preserved as a cultural treasure for all mankind (Hinrichsen 1987, 13). Founded in the eleventh century, Kraków served as Poland’s
capital for nearly 500 years (until 1596). Its Jagiellonian University, established
in the fourteenth century, is Eastern Europe’s second oldest (after Prague), and its
town square is among the largest in all of Europe. The quantity and quality of its
Gothic and Renaissance architecture rival those of Italian cities. In the words of
Czesław Miłosz (1983, 353), Poland’s Nobel Prize winning poet, Kraków is ‘one
solid museum.’ Indeed, it was ‘solid’ enough to survive World War II virtually
unscathed, but by the 1970s it was literally dissolving in acid rain. Kraków sits
in a damp valley in south-central Poland, with Katowice to the west, the Tatras
Mountains to the south, and the huge Lenin Steelworks in neighboring Nowa
Huta (‘New Steelworks’) to the northeast. In the late 1980s, about 50 percent of
Kraków’s air pollution was home grown; the rest was carried on the prevailing
winds from Katowice, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (Fura 1985, 4; Reuters
North European Service, June 20, 1985). Airborne chemicals lingered in the stagnant, humid air above Kraków until the rains carried them to earth, turning the
city, in the words of one Polish scientist, into a virtual ‘chemical cauldron’ (quoted
in Hinrichsen 1987, 14).

14

Chapter 1

1.4. Sources of Pollution in Poland
Pollution in People’s Poland primarily came from four sources: (1) industry; (2)
mining operations; (3) inadequate sewage treatment; and (4) agricultural chemical runoff.

Industrial Pollution
Industry was the largest source of pollution in Kraków and throughout People’s Poland, producing 65 percent of the nation’s air effluents. Transportation
yielded most of the other 35 percent.7 The vast majority of Poland’s industries
ran on domestically mined, high-sulphur coal, which supplied fully 80 percent of
Poland’s energy. Oil and natural gas imports from the Soviet Union and domestic
small-scale hydropower development made up most of the remaining 20 percent
(see Kabala 1985, 10). Unfortunately, fewer than 10 percent of Poland’s 1,362
major industrial facilities had any kind of pollution-control equipment (Bochniarz and Bolan 1991, 338). During the late 1980s, they emitted nearly 13 million tons per year of air pollutants, including 3.4 million tons of dust, 4.2 million
tons of sulphur dioxide, 1.5 million tons of nitrogen oxides, and 3.2 million tons
of carbon oxides (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and
Forestry 1992b, 12, table 1). The majority of these emissions came from smokestacks in Silesia, where most of Poland’s coal, a third of its coke, half its steel,
and a third of its electricity were (and are) produced (Bochniarz and Bolan 1991,
338). Katowice’s industries emitted five times more sulphur dioxide per square
mile than the industrial belt of West Germany’s Ruhr Valley, one of most heavily
industrialized, and highest polluting, areas in Western Europe (Hinrichsen 1987,
14). Nationwide, Polish industries emitted up to 4 million metric tons of sulphur
dioxide each year, more than four times total US sulphur dioxide emissions per
square mile (Kabala 1985, 11).8 And People’s Poland was among the world leaders in carbon dioxide emissions, producing two to three times more per unit of
national income than other countries with well-developed economies. In 1988,
Polish industries emitted 457 million tons of carbon dioxide, accounting for 2.3
percent of the world total (PAP Business News from Poland, Aug. 28, 1992). Polish industries also emitted dusts containing heavy metals, including lead, cadmium, zinc, uranium and copper, which contaminated food and water supplies. In
1979, Kraków’s huge Lenin Steelworks alone emitted dust containing 7 tons of
cadmium, 170 tons of lead, 470 tons of zinc and 18,000 tons of iron (UPI, Feb. 9,
1986).9 Measurements of lead and cadmium taken from soil in the region were the
highest ever recorded anywhere in the world, up to 200 times the maximum considered safe by the Polish government (Kabala 1985, 12; Hinrichsen 1987, 14).
In addition to air pollution, Poland’s industries also produced tremendous
quantities of solid wastes—more than 170 million tons and over 46 million cubic
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meters per year. Only about 60 percent of those wastes were recycled; of the rest,
approximately 1.5 percent was considered hazardous (Ministry of Environmental
Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992b, 21–3).

Pollution from Mining Operations
Coal mining created special environmental problems in People’s Poland. In the
effort to supply the nation’s energy needs, miners continually pumped untreated,
highly salinized water from coal pits into local rivers. Each year during the 1970s
and 1980s, they dumped up to 9,000 tons of salts into Polish rivers, ‘enough to fill
450 20 ton railway wagons’ (Nowicki 1993, 23). The salts interfered with the process of water self-purification, caused river vessels and plants to corrode, and lowered the water table, causing area farmlands to dry up and subside. In the six years
between 1975 and 1981, 300,000 parcels of land were destroyed by subsidence.
Land in some places sank as much as 20 meters (about 70 feet). Mining operations
also were responsible for about 40 percent of all industrial wastes produced and
dumped in Poland (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and
Forestry 1992b, 21). And old abandoned mining sites resembled lunar landscapes.
Existing environmental regulations required that they be returned to pre-mining
conditions, but reclamation activities proceeded at a snail’s pace. By 1988, only
3,714 hectares (about 1,486 acres) had been reclaimed out of a total of 100,000
hectares (40,000 acres) where mining operations had been completed (Bochniarz
and Bolan 1991, 338).

Inadequate Sewage Treatment
Poland’s foremost ecological problem at the end of the Communist era was water
quality (Kabala 1985, 9). The Wisła, which for centuries carried Polish products
to the world, became a ‘garbage carrier from Silesia to the Baltic Sea’ (UPI, Feb.
9, 1986; also see Daily Telegraph, Nov. 18, 1989). Forty-four percent of Poland’s
800 cities had no sewage treatment facilities (Nowicki 1993, 22), and 30 percent
of Polish factories were not connected to a sewer system (Przegląd Polski, Sept.
14, 1989). Consequently, almost half of the more than 4 billion tons of sewage disgorged annually into Polish rivers was entirely untreated; and most of the rest was
only partially treated (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources
and Forestry 1992, 16–17). Amazingly, until 1989 the nation’s capital and largest city, Warsaw, had no sewage treatment facilities. Each day Warsaw’s factories
and residents dumped 1 million cubic meters of untreated sewage directly into
the Wisła. When Warsaw’s first sewage treatment plant finally opened in 1989 to
serve about one-third of the city on the east bank of the Wisła, it had to be shut
down almost immediately because of operating difficulties. It reopened in 1990.
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Agricultural Chemical Runoff
For three decades the Polish Party/state sought to modernize agriculture in order to
increase food production to meet the needs of the vast urban workforces spawned
by its development programs. One aspect of modernization, the increased use of
chemicals in farming, polluted every river in the country, as well as the Baltic
coastline, with nitrogen and phosphorous-contaminated runoff. During the 1960s
and 1970s, the Polish government attempted to reduce the surface runoff by burying pesticide wastes in concrete containers at special burial sites called mogilniki.
More than 100,000 metric tons of pesticides, including more than 50,000 metric
tons of highly toxic organochlorides, were buried in mogilniki around the country,
with little or no regard for long-term environmental threats, including soil and
groundwater contamination (BNA International Environment Reporter, Oct. 21,
1992).

1.5. The Environmental Consequences
The environmental consequences for Kraków of Poland’s development policies
were not different in kind from the experiences of American cities, such as Los
Angeles or New York; it was simply a matter of degree. But differences in degree
can be, and in Kraków’s case were, profound.

Air Quality
Like Los Angeles, the city of Kraków (and hundreds of square miles around it),
became blanketed with a veil of poisonous smog that exacerbated health problems
and caused aesthetic blight (see Daily Telegraph, Nov. 18, 1989). But, unlike Los
Angeles, the smog in Kraków often grew so dense that sunlight could not pierce
it. In fact, Kraków received 20 percent less sunlight than other parts of Poland
(Reuters North European Service, Aug. 23, 1985). Each day, water trucks would
drive about the city, spraying the streets to keep the dust down (Timberlake 1981,
249). But the dust continued to fall at a rate of 550 tons per square kilometer, more
than twice the maximum safe limit set by the Polish Party/government (Przegląd
Polski, Sept. 14, 1989). Kraków’s air was also filled with sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and other gases, which fell to earth in the form of acid rain. The rain in
and around Kraków was so acidic that it corroded railway tracks—trains passing
through Silesia and western Galicia were not allowed to go more than 40 km per
hour (25 mph) (Timberlake 1981, 249). The acid rain also inflicted tremendous
damage on Kraków’s historic legacy, its art and architecture. The great Wawel
Castle, once the home of Poland’s kings, was literally burned away at a rate of 2.5
millimeters per decade. The gold roof on Wawel Cathedral had to be completely
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replaced after it was transformed into soluble chlorides by acid rain and fluorine gas, which combined to form a highly corrosive mixture of hydrochloric and
hydrofluoric acids (Timberlake 1981, 249). Throughout Kraków, centuries-old
statues lost their faces; steeples fell off churches; and, by 1989, ‘the view down
every street [was] disrupted by the scaffolding of workers trying to hold the buildings together’ (Timberlake 1981, 249). According to one report from the late
1980s (Radio Free Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Aug. 31, 1990), construction materials in Kraków decayed 40 times more rapidly than normal. All told,
by the end of the Communist era 80 percent of Kraków’s most valued buildings
required immediate renovation (UPI, Feb. 6, 1986). In addition to the purely aesthetic costs of Krakow’s rapid disintegration, the psychological effect on the Polish people was devastating. In the words of Dr. Piotr Gliński (conversation of Jan.
21, 1990), an environmental sociologist with the Polish Academy of Sciences,
‘[i]t hurt our feelings to watch the destruction of the nation’s cultural identity.’
Air pollution also had an immense impact on agriculture in the Kraków area
and throughout People’s Poland. Fifty percent of Poland’s forests were significantly damaged by exposure to air pollution and acid rain (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992b, 33); in the area
surrounding Kraków, 180,000 hectares (450,000 acres) of evergreen forests were
reported to be dead or dying, and scientists predicted a loss of up to 3 million
hectares (7.5 million acres) of trees over the next 20 years, at a cost of 120 billion zlotys (1.5 billion 1985 USD) (Kabala 1985, 12). The Nowa Huta Steelworks
alone were responsible for killing more than 25 percent of the trees in the 11,000
hectare (27,500 acre) Niepołomicki Forest outside Kraków (Kabala 1985, 12).
Area farmlands were in even worse shape. In 1980, the Polish Ecological Club
recommended that 17 percent of Silesia’s farmlands be taken out of production
because of the dangerous build-up of heavy metals in the soil and on vegetation.
On small farms near Kraków, ‘10 percent of the cattle suffer[ed] from fluorosis,
and the farmers had to give up growing sugar beet because the leaves, used as
fodder, poisoned livestock’ (Timberlake 1981, 248–9). Vegetables grown in the
area contained 2.4 times more uranium, 134 times more lead, 21 times more copper, 220 times more cadmium, and 165 times more zinc than ‘normal’ (UPI, Feb.
6, 1986). As a result, as much as 60 percent of all food produced in the Kraków
area was deemed unfit for human consumption (Rosik-Dulewska et al. 1991, 22).
Although Kraków, Silesia and many other industrialized regions of People’s
Poland were heavily damaged by air pollution, it is important to realize that other
parts of the country—most notably the northeast region—remained virtually
unscathed by industrial development. According to a recent report by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 27 percent of Poland’s
territory survived communism ‘in natural or close to natural state’ (OECD 1995,
88). This was due in part to Poland’s system of central socioeconomic planning,
which focused industrial development in highly populated urban areas. In 1980,
for example, 600 of 931 plants considered ‘especially harmful to the air’ were
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concentrated in 19 urban centers (Wiadomości Statystyczne, March 1980). Meanwhile, less densely populated regions, amounting to about 8.5 percent of Polish
territory, were left almost entirely undeveloped. In addition, by 1989, 17 percent
of Polish territory was under legal protection from development as national parks,
nature reserves, landscape parks or areas of protected landscape (Nowicki 1993,
28). These areas preserved (and continue to preserve) natural assets that other
European countries no longer possess (Żylicz 1995a, 65).

Water Quality
If that is possible, Kraków’s water pollution problems were even worse than its air
pollution problems. By the late 1980s, the stretch of the Wisła that flowed through
the city was ‘virtually devoid of biological life’ (Kabala 1985, 9). Like more than
60 percent of the rivers in neighboring Katowice voivodship, this stretch was unfit
for any use, except as a sewer. It was useless even for industrial purposes because
the chemicals and metals in the water corroded machinery (W. Brzeziński 1974,
80–1). Water quality was little better throughout the rest of Poland. In 1989, the
World Bank’s Director of East European operations, Eugenio F. Laris, reported
that 95 percent of Poland’s drinking water was polluted (New York Times, Dec. 12,
1989). And 70 percent of the water supply posed an immediate threat to human
health (Przegląd Polski, Sept. 14, 1989). Nationwide, more than 40 percent of
river water was too polluted for any use (Kabala 1985, 9); for 60 percent of its
length, the Wisła river was so polluted that it could not be used even for industrial purposes (Kurier Polski, Apr. 23, 1979). In addition, 300 of Poland’s 500
larger lakes were endangered by municipal and agricultural wastes (Bochniarz
and Bolan 1991, 337). Twenty percent of Poland’s groundwater supply was estimated to be contaminated by pesticide residues leaching from chemical burial
sites around the country; surveys taken at several sites detected concentrations of
toxic compounds in groundwaters that exceeded European Community standards
by 1,500 times. In the words of one Dutch researcher, these pesticide cemeteries
were (and remain) ‘chemical time bombs’ (quoted in BNA International Environment Reporter, Oct. 21, 1992).
With Poland’s rivers so highly polluted, it is no surprise to find that their
ultimate destination, the Baltic Sea, was also severely degraded. The Baltic was
(and is) ‘one of the most heavily trafficked and polluted bodies of water in the
world’ (Kabala 1985, 10). According to official government statistics from the
late 1980s, Polish rivers carried about 4.1 billion cubic meters of waste to the
Baltic each year (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and
Forestry 1992b, 16). As a consequence, Poland’s Baltic coast was virtually unusable for recreation. Some summers, up to 27 miles of the most popular beaches
along the Baltic were closed because chemicals in the water caused severe skin
infections (Reuters North European Service, Aug. 23, 1985). Indeed, according
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to a 1981 report appearing in the newspaper Głos Robotniczy (May 7, 1981), ‘[a]
bacteriological and epidemiological threat exist[ed] in the bay’s entire area.’

Health Consequences
The health effects of Poland’s pollution extended far inland from the Baltic Sea
coast. In the late 1980s, the physical and mental health of almost every Pole was
threatened by pollution-related diseases and conditions. The effects were most
pronounced in the highly industrialized regions of Kraków and Katowice.
In 1990, the average Pole could expect to live to age 71 or 72;10 and in the
more heavily polluted regions of Silesia and western Galicia, life expectancy was
a full two years lower (Jonderko 1990, 8, table 1). By contrast, life expectancy
in the former West Germany and the United States averages between 74 and 76
years. In the years preceding the fall of communism in Poland, 70 percent of Silesians and Krakovians lived in health-threatening conditions. They suffered from
‘15 percent more disease of the circulation, 30 percent more tumors and 47 percent more respiratory disease than other Poles’ (Timberlake 1981, 248). The cancer rate was 30 percent higher than the national average (Reuters North European
Service, Aug. 23, 1985).11 Twenty-four percent of Poland’s occupational illnesses
occurred in Kraków (Daily Telegraph, June 17, 1990). And inhabitants of Kraków
and Katowice suffered comparatively high rates of heart defects, pneumonia, premature births and miscarriages (Przegląd Polski, Sept. 14, 1989; Gazeta Wyborcza, June 21, 1990). The miscarriages and premature births, in particular, were
linked to chronic lead and cadmium exposure (Norska-Borówka et al. 1990, 49).
For the country as a whole, some doctors were predicting that one Pole in four
would contract some form of pollution-related cancer by the year 2000 (Daily
Telegraph, June 17, 1990).12
Even more frightening were the statistics concerning the very youngest members of Polish society, who were most susceptible to pollution-caused diseases.
At the end of the Communist era, infant mortality in Silesia was 17.6 per 1,000
live births, as compared with 16.1 for Poland as a whole, 7.7 in France and 5.8 in
Sweden (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry
1992b, 38). Two-thirds of all Silesian children suffered by the age of ten from
‘serious mental and physical disabilities’ (The Daily Telegraph, Nov. 18, 1989).
In all, some 60,000 Polish children suffered from pollution-related mental and/
or physical disabilities (Gazeta Wyborcza, June 21, 1990). As if to underscore the
correlation between pollution levels and disabilities, 54 of Poland’s 102 schools
for the disabled were located in Katowice (Timberlake 1981, 248). Indeed, the
highest levels of infant mortality and the highest rate of respiratory tract diseases
in children corresponded closely with the areas of the highest air and soil contamination in Silesia (Norska-Borówka et al. 1990, 49). For example, 300 children
living close to a single metallurgical factory near Katowice were diagnosed with
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clinical cases of lead poisoning (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural
Resources and Forestry 1992b, 38). In overall physical and mental development,
the children from Poland’s industrial belt were two to three years behind children
raised in areas remote from pollution sources (Reuters Library Report, May 20,
1988). Throughout Poland, the childhood leukemia rate doubled during the 1980s
(Daily Telegraph, June 17, 1990).
Poland’s ecological devastation also exacted a severe toll on the health and
stability of many plant and animal species. Of 714 registered mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian and fish species in Poland, 15 became extinct, 41 were ‘dying out’
and 174 others were threatened (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural
Resources and Forestry 1992b, 33). Only 10 percent of Poland’s 430 native (and
non-migrating) vertebrate species were not endangered (Bochniarz and Bolan
1991, 339).
These statistics, grim as they are, do not begin to paint a complete picture of
the unlivable living conditions in some parts of Silesia and western Galicia in the
final years of People’s Poland. During the late 1980s, residents of Kraków suffering from respiratory ailments took refuge in salt mines. Each day, hundreds of
men, women and children descended 650 feet below the earth’s surface because
it was the only place near Kraków with air clean enough to breathe deeply (see
New York Times, Apr. 8, 1990). The air pollution in Katowice grew so severe at
one point that the regional government actually considered issuing gas masks to
hundreds of thousands of area residents (see Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1990).
And whenever the rains fell in southern Poland, everything literally turned to
black—the sky, the streets, even the people.

Economic Consequences
The environmental and health effects of pollution in Poland entailed enormous
economic costs, though quantifying those costs is enormously tricky. A great deal
depends on the factors and criteria economists select to calculate.13 Economic
costs from environmental degradation can include, among others, pollution damages to infrastructure (plants, machinery, transportation and communications
systems, etc.), increased health care costs and lost worker-hours resulting from
pollution-caused illnesses, lowered standards of living, and depletion of the
country’s natural resource base. On any standard, the economic consequences
of Poland’s ecological destruction were severe. A 1987 government study set the
environmental price tag at 800 billion zlotys per year (approximately 3.4 billion
1987 USD) (Radio Free Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Oct. 5, 1990). That
study, along with several others that were conducted in Poland between 1986
and 1990, were synthesized by Professor Antoni Symonowicz, under auspices of
the Polish Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992b
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Table 1.1. Percentage share of environmental costs by sector
Sector
Agriculturea
Forestry
Corrosion
Natural resource management
Mining damage
Human health
Other lossesb

Percentage share of environmental costs
28
11
32
10
2
7
10

Including losses due to reductions in arable acreage, crop yields and fish stocks.
Including losses due to diminished water self-purification capacity, environmental
impacts of tourism, and effects of noise pollution.
a

b

Source: Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry (1992b,
41–2).

40–3). Symonowicz’s findings confirmed that environmental losses during the
1980s cost the Polish economy approximately 10 percent of annual gross national
income (see Famielec et al. 1991, 44).14 Professor Symonowicz was able to attribute 46 percent of these losses to air pollution, 39 percent to land degradation and
15 percent to water pollution. Table 1.1 allocates the pollution costs by sector.
These ecological damage figures do not include the costs of the tremendous
ecological damage that the Soviet Red Army inflicted during the four decades it
maintained bases in Poland. According to Poland’s State Environmental Inspectorate, the Red Army contaminated groundwater with petroleum-derived products,
set thousands of acres of forests ablaze during training exercises, and dumped
chemical, industrial and sewage wastes in industrial landfills. After 18 months of
inspections, covering all 173,000 acres of 59 former Red Army sites in Poland,
the Inspectorate estimated the total losses at 52.2 trillion (old) zlotys (about 2.5
billion 1994 USD) (PAP News Wire, Aug. 3, 1994), an amount equal to 8.4 percent of Poland’s 1994 budget (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 5, 1994).
The enormous economic and non-economic costs of environmental degradation in People’s Poland describe an ecological crisis unmatched in world history,
expect perhaps by other countries of the former Soviet Bloc. The purpose of this
book is to explain the systemic causes of that crisis, causes rooted in the socialist economic system, in the totalitarian political structures of communism, and in
the ideological principles of orthodox Marxism. Contrary to conventional understanding, the crisis was not caused by simple neglect or malign intent. In fact, as
the next chapter shows, successive governments in People’s Poland undertook
serious, if thoroughly unsuccessful efforts, to protect the environment.
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Notes
1. Warsaw was not, strictly speaking, a European capital at the time Prus penned
Lalka. Poland had been partitioned in 1795 by Russia, Prussia and Austria/Hungary, and
Warsaw came under Russian rule. Poland did not regain its independence until after World
War I.
2. On Engels’ attitude toward nature, see Chapter 6 (§6.2).
3. On pre-Communist environmental protection efforts in Poland, see Chapter 2
(§2.1).
4. Environmental conditions in Poland have improved remarkably since 1989. Those
improvements are discussed and explained in Chapter 7.
5. According to another report, Poland ranks 22nd among European countries in per
capita water availability (PAP Polish Press Agency, Aug. 28, 1992).
6. This problem was exacerbated during the Communist era by the low prices charged
for water use and consumption, which resulted in waste and insufficient investment in
water supply system maintenance (see PAP Polish Press Agency, Aug. 28, 1992). On the
relationship between natural resources pricing and environmental protection under socialism, see Chapter 5 (§5.4).
7. The Polish government has published annual pollution statistics since the early
1970s. I have relied heavily on the annual statistical surveys for 1989 and 1990 (GUS 1990,
1991). In subsequent textual citations and footnotes, I refer predominantly to secondary
sources, including periodicals, which, during the 1970s and 1980s, provided a good deal of
information that was unavailable from official sources. Two secondary sources in particular (Nowicki 1993 and Carter 1993) provide excellent overviews of Poland’s environmental problems at the end of the Communist era.
On the relative allocation of air pollution emissions between industry and transportation, see Fura (1985, 4). In addition, coal-fired furnaces used for heating houses and apartments were an important source of pollution in places like the Stare Miasto (Old Town)
section of Kraków. An estimated 230,000 stoves and 1,200 small boiler houses were used
to heat the apartments of Kraków. In winter, these sources helped to bring sulphur dioxide
concentrations in the old city to 3 to 4 milligrams per cubic meter, the highest in Poland
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1992a, 16; also see
Hughes 1990, 153).
8. In absolute terms, American industries emit far more sulphur dioxide into the
atmosphere—23 million tons (about 21 metric tons) in 1990—than Poland. However, the
United States is 30 times larger than Poland and has 6.5 times more inhabitants.
9. Emissions from Nowa Huta actually declined during the 1980s, however, after
the plant switched to low-sulphur coal and because of Poland’s decade-long economic
downturn.
10. Broken down by gender, mean life expectancy in Poland was 75.1 years for
women and 66.9 years for men.
11. To some extent, the geographical distribution of cancer in Poland can be explained
by lifestyle choices (e.g., cigarette smoking), patterns of reproduction, and professions,
all of which vary by region (see Zatoński and Tyczyński 1990). One study of the relationship between air pollution and lung cancer in Kraków concluded that cigarette smoking
remained the single strongest predictor of lung cancer risk (Jędrychowski et al. 1990).
Researchers, nevertheless, have found a positive statistical correlation between air pollu-
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tion and lung cancer rates in Kraków, especially among older residents (Jędrychowski et
al. 1990, 39).
12. It should be noted that ‘pollution-related,’ in this context, includes cigarette smoking, which remains something of a national pastime in Poland (conversation with Dr. Piotr
Gliński, July 19, 1993).
13. For a survey of research on the economic costs of environmental degradation
in Poland, and the methodological problems of calculating environmental damages, see
Śleszyński (1995).
14. Other studies put the cost higher, between 13 and 21 percent of GNP. Significant
discrepancies in cost estimates result from factor choices. For example, the studies with
lower cost estimates of around 8–10 percent of GNP typically did not incorporate public
health expenditures (see Radio Free Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Oct. 5, 1990).
I examine the economic costs of environmental degradation in People’s Poland in more
detail in Chapter 5 (§5.2).

Chapter 2
A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN POLAND
The balance of this book seeks to explain the ecological crisis described in Chapter 1. One obvious, but inaccurate, explanation is that the Communists simply did
not care about protecting the environment. There is a kernel of truth in that story:
Party leaders initially assumed that pollution problems, as endemic features of
capitalism, would simply disappear under scientific socialism (see Zweigert and
Gessner 1976, 93). But once it became apparent that pollution problems could
not be planned out of existence, the Party/state acted to protect the environment.
Those efforts, while obviously unsuccessful, were substantial and appear to have
been seriously intended.
What follows is a brief history of environmental law and administration in
Poland from pre-socialist times to the end of the Communist era.1 The history
demonstrates that the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland cannot be attributed to simple neglect. On the contrary, Poland’s Communist Party,
the Polish United Worker’s Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza or
PZPR), made environmental protection a national political priority and spurred
substantial legislative efforts. But those efforts were hindered by legal, political, economic and ideological attributes of the (real) socialist system, which are
treated, respectively, in Chapters 3–6. In the final analysis, the Party/state was
unable to overcome systemic obstacles, many of which were created for its own
preservation, to protect the environment.

2.1. Pre-Socialism
Just as pollution in Poland predated communism (see Chapter 1, §1.1), so did
environmental protection. Polish legal historians trace environmental protection
efforts to medieval statutes restricting hunting of foxes, bison and other animals.2
But these were not, strictly speaking, ‘nature protection’ laws, designed to preserve species for their own sakes—it would be anachronistic to impute a naturalist
or environmentalist intent to legislators of the tenth or fifteenth centuries. Early
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hunting laws were intended to secure the King’s property rights. Still, their practical significance should not be underestimated: today Poland is the only country
in Europe where wild herds of bison still roam free. In addition to restricting
hunting, Poland has for several hundred years regulated mineral extraction, timber harvesting and water use. Early sanitation laws regulated city sewer systems
(Deja 1992). During the Partitions (the period 1795–1918, when Polish territories
were divided under Russian, Prussian and Austrian rule), some Polish landowners took it upon themselves to preserve endangered species and a few unspoiled
forests (Szafer 1973, 12–13). Their efforts notwithstanding, the modern history of
Polish environmental protection realistically dates from the end of World War I,
when Poland regained its independence.
In 1919, the newly reborn Polish state created a Provisional State Commission for Nature Protection (Tymczasowa Państwowa Komisja Ochrony Przyroda)
within the Ministry of Religion and Public Education. Its purpose was advisory
and educational, rather than regulatory. It advised the government on matters
relating to nature protection, and promoted environmental awareness in the Polish educational system. The Commission influenced two important pieces of environmental legislation from the interwar period, the 1922 Water Law and the 1934
Nature Protection Act.
The 1922 Water Law (1922 Dziennik Ustaw [Dz.U.] No. 102, item 936) may
be considered Poland’s first environmental law, though its primary purpose was
to regulate water use—always an important issue in water-poor Poland. The statute specified that all waters, except those already recognized as privately owned,
belonged to the public (art. 2), and that all citizens had equal rights to use the
waters ‘in the ordinary way’ without any kind of prior approval or permit (art. 21).
However, the statute also included substantive provisions to protect water quality.
The scope of these protections marks the 1922 statute as an early example of pollution control legislation.
The 1922 Water Law regulated the discharge of industrial effluent into
water bodies. Any user wanting to discharge pollutants or waste water ‘in excess
of general usage’ had to obtain prior approval from the appropriate administrative authority (art. 25). The administrator could issue a permit only if the proposed drainage was in the ‘public interest,’ as ambiguously defined in article 48
of the statute: if the administrator found that a proposed discharge would have
a negative impact on water quality that could not be prevented by the installation of available and effective purification equipment, the administrator ‘should’
not permit it. This foreshadowed the technology-based standards that became a
prominent feature of American environmental laws in the 1970s. If the administrator determined that a proposed discharge did not contravene the public interest, that is, the discharge would not be unduly harmful or could be purified with
the use of existing technologies, a permit could be issued. The administrator
then could require compensation for any resulting water pollution damage (art.
47, sec. 5 and art. 51, sec. 1) or assess a fee for the mere privilege of using the
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public’s waters for the ‘non-ordinary’ purpose of discharging effluents (art. 32).
These fees and fines created, at least potentially, an incentive to conserve both
water quality and quantity.
Too little information exists about the implementation of the 1922 Water Law
to determine its actual impact on pollution discharges and water quality. Given
the state of environmental science, enforcement capabilities and environmental
awareness in the first decades of the twentieth century, its impact was probably
quite limited. As commentators have noted (for instance, W. Brzeziński 1974, 87),
the Act’s ambiguous terminology provided administrators with substantial leeway
to permit any amount of industrial discharges; the compensation and user fee provisions were discretionary. Despite these shortcomings, the 1922 Water Law was
clearly a pollution control statute ahead of its time, and it remained in force until
1962, when it was replaced by a new and, in some respects, regressive water law
(which is discussed later in this chapter, §2.3).
In 1925, the Provisional State Commission for Nature Protection was transformed into the State Council for Nature Protection (Państwowa Rada Ochrony
Przyrody or PROP), a group that survived the destruction of the interwar republic,
reappearing after World War II in People’s Poland as an officially recognized (i.e.,
Party-approved), though nominally ‘independent,’ organization. Like its predecessor, PROP was a quasi-governmental agency organized within the Ministry of
Religion and Public Education. From its headquarters in Kraków, the 22-member
Council advised the government on environmental policy and drafted legislation.
It also supervised the activities of branch units located in Lwów (today Lviv),
Warsaw, Poznań, and Wilno (today Vilnius).
PROP greatly influenced the history of nature protection in Poland through
its scientific, educational and legislative works. Between the wars, six national
parks were established on the Council’s plans. PROP also organized 180 nature
reserves and inventoried approximately 4,500 natural monuments (Szafer 1973,
14–15). Under the influence of PROP and early conservationist writers such as
Jan Gwalbert Pawlikowski (1927), the subject of nature conservation became a
mandatory part of the secondary school curriculum in 1933, and nature conservation lectures became regular features at universities in Warsaw, Kraków and
Poznań. Most importantly, PROP played a central role in drafting the 1934 Nature
Protection Act (1934 Dz.U. No. 31, item 274).
The 1934 Act closely resembled nature protection legislation enacted in
other European countries during the same decade. The law sought to protect
natural areas of special scientific, aesthetic and historic value, as well as endangered species of animals and plants (see Szafer 1973, 14–15). Article 1 of the
statute established a system for designating national parks: any area at least 300
hectares (approximately 740 acres) in size with special natural beauty or a wealth
of rare natural features could be designated a national park by order (dekret) of
the Council of Ministers. Article 2 prohibited activities that might damage protected areas or species, except as permitted by the appropriate state authorities.
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Among other things, the law banned the use, alteration or contamination of protected ‘objects,’ prohibited the hunting or killing of protected animal species and
prohibited the removal of protected plant species. These prohibitions applied on
private as well as on public lands (see W. Brzeziński 1949, 7–8). Violators were
subject to prison terms (art. 24) and fines (arts. 24 and 28), with proceeds earmarked for a special Nature Protection Fund (art. 15) created to finance a nature
protection police force.
Unfortunately, the 1934 Nature Protection Act was never implemented. In
the five years before Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, only two implementing decrees were issued, and they concerned administrative housekeeping
matters. Not only did state authorities fail to implement the law; they completely
ignored its restrictions and prohibitions. For example, in 1936 the Polish government began a campaign to develop the tourism potential of the Tatras Mountains
in southern Poland. As part of this effort, an aerial tramway was constructed in
a protected area, in clear contravention of the 1934 Act. The entire membership
of PROP resigned in protest. This suited the state authorities well enough; the
government did not bother to appoint new members, and the Council simply was
left unstaffed between 1936 and the end of World War II. PROP was not legally
abolished, but for all practical purposes it no longer existed. The same might be
said of Poland’s entire system of environmental protection.
During the Nazi occupation of World War II, nature protection obviously
was not anyone’s concern. The rapacious German and Soviet armies, along with
Polish civilians struggling to survive, felled whole forests, slaughtered protected
animal species and decimated nature preserves. However, the war’s most significant effect on nature protection in Poland may not have been the damage inflicted
on natural resources, but the loss of human lives. Many prominent leaders of
Poland’s nature protection movement were among the millions of Polish Jews and
tens of thousands of Polish inteligencja murdered by Hitler’s forces. Only ten of
PROP’s pre-war members survived to attend the Council’s first post-war meeting
in September 1945.

2.2. 1945–19603
Nature protection activities resumed quickly after the war. The 1934 Nature
Protection Act was still in force on paper, but it was considered a dead letter. That law had been based on a preservationist concept of nature protection
that was no longer acceptable in post-war Poland. The Communist Party/state
quickly came to own, by systematic expropriation, more than 85 percent of the
forests (1944 Dz.U. No. 15, item 82; also see Radecki 1990a, 93), and it planned
to manage these and other so-called ‘productive forces of nature’ rationally (i.e.,
economically), in accordance with Marxist–Leninist ideology. Since the prewar Nature Protection Law did not provide for economic exploitation of natural
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resources, a new nature protection statute was needed that would reflect the new
dominant ideology. This was made clear at PROP’s first post-war conference
in 1945, in a speech by the Minister of Education, Czesław Wycech. Noting
that nature protection was inextricably intertwined with the economic life of
the country, Wycech stressed that economic exploitation of natural resources
was vital to the nation’s economic well-being. This sent a clear message to the
traditionally preservation-oriented members of PROP. In a response designed
to reassure the government and the ruling party, Władysław Szafer, chair of the
conference, stated:
Because we, the nature protectors, were in the pre-war period sometimes unfairly
accused of acting in opposition to the country’s industrialization, I must declare
now that we were never opposed to national needs for transportation or industry,
and we will never object in the future. We think that our activity will be right in
line with the government of the Polish People’s Republic. (Quoted in Radecki
1990a, 94)

Although PROP’s first post-war conference signaled a dangerous (from the
point of view of environmental protection) change in focus from resource preservation to economic exploitation, it also provided some reason for optimism about
the future of environmental protection in socialist Poland. The very fact that the
new government paid any attention at all to issues of nature protection as it confronted the daunting task of reconstructing Poland’s decimated infrastructure
suggested that the Communist authorities might be more active protectors of the
environment than earlier governments had been. A more specific cause for optimism was PROP’s adoption at the 1945 conference of a resolution broadening the
concept of nature protection to include entire ecosystems (see Radecki 1990a, 95;
Sommer 1993a, 19). This resolution led ultimately to the enactment of new nature
protection legislation in 1949.
Local government activities following the war also provided nature protection advocates with reason for hope. In Zakopane (south of Kraków in the Tatras
Mountains), the People’s Council (local legislature) appointed a committee for
nature protection to prepare forest protection regulations. Meanwhile, the regional
governor (wojewoda) of Poznań (in west-central Poland) published a general
nature protection regulation. In fact, local regulation of nature protection became
‘a universal practice in the first years of the Polish People’s Republic’ (Radecki
1990a, 97).
In the midst of all these hopeful developments, however, the Party/government issued a 1947 decree establishing central economic planning, which was
silent on the issue of nature protection (1947 Dz.U. No. 64, item 373). This was
an ominous signal that the Party/state would design and implement economic
plans without regard for the natural environment. From the point of view of PROP
and other nature protection advocates, this made quick enactment of new nature
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protection legislation imperative. And within two years, the Sejm (Poland’s parliament) enacted a new nature protection law.
The 1949 Nature Protection Act (1949 Dz.U. No. 25, item 180) closely resembled its 1934 predecessor but, in keeping with the resolutions adopted at the 1945
PROP conference, it expressly broadened the focus of nature protection from protecting individuals to preserving entire ecosystems (Sommer 1993a, 19); article
1 specified that the goal of the statute was to protect not only ‘separate individuals’ but also ‘their complexes and communities.’ Also in keeping with the 1945
PROP conference, the new law contained an implicit but unmistakable shift in
philosophy reflecting the changed political-economic circumstances of the Polish
state following World War II. Whereas the 1934 Nature Protection Act spoke only
of resource protection, its 1949 replacement introduced ‘rational use’ as an equal
goal.4 Under article 1 of the 1949 Act, the purposes of nature protection included
‘preservation, restoration, and proper use’ of nature. It is important to recognize
that this did not reflect a uniquely socialistic approach to nature protection; it
was equally consistent with the conservationist (in contrast to preservationist)
approach to nature protection advocated by Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot
and the American Progressive Conservationists of the early twentieth century. It
is also worth noting that article 1 of the 1949 Act called for the establishment of a
general policy on environmental protection, though this mandate was not implemented before the 1960s.
Primary administrative responsibility under the 1949 Nature Protection Act
was removed from the Ministry of Education to the economically oriented Forestry Ministry (art. 2, sec. 1; also see W. Brzeziński 1949, 4). However, article 9
of the statute enjoined the administrator to ‘ensure that the management of natural resources is consistent with principles aimed at protecting and strengthening
nature’s creative powers.’ The Forestry Ministry thus was responsible for preserving and, at the same time, exploiting forest resources (much like the United States
Forest Service). In order to fulfill the nature protection mandate of article 9, the
Forestry Minister was obligated to appoint a Chief Nature Conservator within
the Forestry Ministry (art. 5, sec. 1); subordinate nature conservators were to be
appointed to deal with regional nature protection issues (art. 5, sec. 2). At the local
(gmina) level, the law required the local administrator (starost) to act through a
state forest inspector or national park director (art. 5, sec. 3). Article 6 provided
for the appointment, by the Forestry Minister, of regional committees for nature
protection to serve as consulting agencies.
The 1949 Act specified an important administrative role for PROP, extending
far beyond its quasi-governmental advisory and education role under the 1934
Act. According to article 9, section 2, of the 1949 Act, state authorities were ‘obligated to consult with the State Council for Nature Protection on matters which
could significantly affect the balance of nature.’ This mandate was similar to the
one the United States Congress enacted 20 years later in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.),5 with PROP in the role
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of the Council on Environmental Quality.6 However, this obligation may have
amounted to very little since, under article 3, section 3, of the Nature Protection
Act, the Minister of Forestry served ex officio as President of PROP. In effect, the
statute’s consultation mandate required the Minister of Forestry to consult himself
on forestry matters.7 PROP’s statutory role in the administrative process should
not, however, be underestimated. It had the right to offer its opinion on draft
laws, regulations and candidates for administrative positions. Any administrative
orders issued without a prior opinion from PROP expired automatically after three
months (see W. Brzeziński 1949, 6). But while PROP’s opinion had to be sought,
its opinions did not have to be followed; the Party/state authorities were always
free to ignore or reject PROP’s advice. In this regard, the 1949 Act was, again,
quite similar to the American NEPA, which is a purely procedural law.
The 1949 Nature Protection Act provided four different legal categories for
protecting natural resources: (1) natural monuments, defined as individual formations or groups of formations, could be initiated by regional authorities, that is,
the regional governor or People’s Council, and designated by court order (art. 11,
secs. 1 and 12); (2) nature reserves (or sanctuaries), relatively small areas with
natural features (including aesthetic considerations) worthy of protection, could
be designated by regulation of the Forestry Minister (art. 11, sec. 2); (3) national
parks could be established by the Council of Ministers8 in areas of special value to
the public interest at least 500 hectares (1,235 acres) in size (art. 11, sec. 3); and (4)
endangered species of plants and animals could be protected by order of the Forestry Ministry, in cooperation with the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform
and the Minister of Health (art. 11, sec. 4). Once areas or species were designated
through one of these legal mechanisms, they were protected in accordance with
article 18, which ‘prohibited’ activities, including hunting, fishing and development activities, that might harm protected species or pollute protected areas (art.
18, secs. 2, 3 and 6). In keeping with its broadened concept of ecosystem protection, the 1949 Act sought to protect the habitats of endangered plant and animal
species, for example by prohibiting water pollution or changes in water courses
in designated areas (art. 18, secs. 2 and 3). Criminal sanctions for violations of
article 18 regulations were provided in chapter 7 of the Act (arts. 28–32). Knowing violators were subject to arrest, imprisonment for three months and fines of up
to 150,000 zlotys (approximately 3,400 1980 USD) (art. 28). It should be noted
that these sanctions were transplanted from the 1934 Nature Protection Act. One
important difference, however, was that the 1949 Act did not continue the special
Nature Protection Fund established under the 1934 Act to finance the enforcement
of nature protection activities. Instead, all fines levied under the 1949 Act became
general revenues of the State Treasury (Radecki 1990a, 107).
The Party/state’s implementation of the 1949 Nature Protection Act was a
mixed-bag of real achievements and utter disdain for statutory directives. Achievements included the appointment of regional nature conservators (1950 M.P. No.
1–132, item 1646), the formation of regional advisory committees for nature pro-
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tection (1952 Dz.U. No. 16, item 99) and the establishment of a registry of natural monuments (1952 M.P. No. A–27, item 376). In addition, between 1949 and
1960, nine new national parks, a network of nature reserves and numerous natural
monuments were designated (Radecki 1990a, 110). However, many of the statute’s most important provisions were simply ignored. For example, the Forestry
Minister never appointed the Chief Nature Conservator as mandated by article 9
of the 1949 Act. This left the regional nature conservators without any connection
to central state authority, greatly limiting their potential effectiveness. What little
independent authority they possessed was stripped in 1950, when the Communist
Party/state curtailed local and regional autonomy in a new law designed to centralize regulatory decision making (1950 Dz.U. No. 14, item 130).
Although PROP was supposed to play an important procedural role in nature
protection matters under the 1949 Act, it was in practice isolated from nature protection policy making. Almost before the ink was dry on the new statute, PROP
members were notified that their organization’s role under the statute had been
abolished. Its advisory and educational functions were taken over by a new Nature
Protection Committee of the Polish Academy of Knowledge (Komitet Ochrony
Przyrody Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności).9 This ‘reorganization’ (‘co-optation’
may be a more appropriate expression) made sense given the Party/state’s political-economic priorities. As Wojciech Radecki (1990a, 108) notes, ‘[t]here was no
place in the new centralistic and increasingly bureaucratic administrative system
for an independent, self-governing organization such as PROP.’ As a result of
PROP’s disenfranchisement, the Forestry Minister never implemented the statutory provisions requiring government agencies to consult with PROP on matters
relating to nature protection. His inaction, which also reflected the Forestry Ministry’s own weak position in an administrative hierarchy dominated by industrial
ministries, permitted the Party/state’s industrialization plans to proceed unfettered
by nature protection considerations.
Despite the proliferation of national parks and nature reserves between 1949
and 1960, the period was characterized mainly by the Polish Party/state’s strong
emphasis on natural resources development over nature protection (Radecki
1990a, 110). In the same year that the new Nature Protection Act took effect,
Poland adopted wholesale the Soviet system of investment planning (see Montias
1962, 148), with its built-in bias toward heavy industrial development. From this
point on, concern for economic development eclipsed nature protection considerations, as evidenced by the few nature protection regulations issued in the wake
of the 1949 Act.
In 1952, the Polish government enacted a new hunting law designed primarily to protect state property from expropriation (1952 Dz.U. No. 44, item 300)
and new endangered species regulations (1952 Dz.U. No. 45, item 307). Both of
these enactments were based on the framework of the 1949 Nature Protection Act,
but they took entirely different approaches to the issue of protection. Whereas the
new hunting law focused on protecting state property rights in wild game against
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expropriation, the endangered species regulation focused on preservation. In comparing the two laws and the penalties they provided for violations, it is clear that
the Polish Party/state was far more interested in protecting its property interests
than in preserving endangered species: a violation of the hunting law constituted
a felony whereas killing an endangered species was only a misdemeanor. Thus, to
borrow Wojciech Radecki’s (1990a, 113) example, a poacher convicted of killing
an endangered mountain hare was punished much less severely than a poacher
found guilty of taking a common grey hare. The incentives created by these
laws obviously were not geared toward species preservation, but they accurately
reflected the Party/state’s priorities.
Following the 1949 Nature Protection Act, the Party/state for the first time
turned its attention to problems of pollution control. New water pollution discharge standards were issued in 1950 (1950 Dz.U. No. 41, item 371), but they
unfortunately did not include effective enforcement provisions. Meanwhile,
Poland’s forced industrialization drive proceeded in accordance with central economic plans that contained absolutely no environmental protection conditions.
This neglect led to increasing environmental degradation, which became the subject of studies and investigations as early as 1953 (see Nowe Drogi, July 1978).
According to a 1956 report by the State Council for Nature Protection (1957),
central economic plans permitted heavy industrial enterprises to be located without regard for environmental impacts, and industries were being allowed to dump
raw sewage directly into receiving waters with impunity. As so often happened in
the history of People’s Poland, the environmental regulations that did exist were
undermined by economic plans that had at least equal legal status, higher political
priority and greater compliance incentives. When conflicts arose, the economic
plans were sure to prevail over environmental requirements. Consequently, by the
mid-1950s, water and air pollution reached alarming levels.
On January 1, 1957, a State Inspectorate for Water Protection (Państwowa
Inspekcja Ochrony Wód) was established within the Ministry of Navigation (Ministerstwo Żeglugi).10 The Inspectorate became the chief water protection agency in
the state apparatus. Its job was to ensure that industrial enterprises and municipalities complied with the provisions of the still lingering 1922 Water Law. According to critics, however, the Water Protection Inspectorate’s sole concern was to
protect water quantities for the sake of further industrial development; sanitation
and nature protection considerations took a back seat (see Radecki 1990a, 114).
In May 1957, the Ministry of Navigation was transformed into the Ministry of Navigation and Water Management (Ministerstwo Żeglugi i Gospodarki
Wodnej) (1957 Dz.U. No. 31, item 130). This new ministry became the chief
administrative agency responsible for water resources management and protection in Poland. Its responsibilities included flood control, coastal zone management, long-term planning of water use and protection, management of municipal
sewer systems, and water quality monitoring. For the first time in People’s
Poland, a departmental minister with a seat on the Council of Ministers had some
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responsibility for environmental protection. Unfortunately, this did not portend
the emergence of pollution control and nature protection as political priorities of
the Party/state.

2.3. The 1960s
In 1960, three years after its creation, the Ministry of Navigation and Water
Management was stripped of its environmental protection responsibilities and
reconstituted as the Navigation Ministry. At the same time, a new Central Water
Management Board (Centralny Urząd Gospodarki Wodnej) was created to take
over the old ministry’s environmental protection responsibilities. The new Board
was instituted not as a ministry but as a lower-level government agency; its chief
did not sit on the Council of Ministers (1960 Dz.U. No. 29, item 163). This constituted a political demotion of sorts for environmental protection, which, at least
in theory, had been represented on the Council of Ministers between 1957 and
1960. As a ‘central’ but not ‘supreme’ organ of state administration, the Central
Water Management Board was subordinated to higher ministerial departments.
Nevertheless, it constituted the first central agency in the state with a distinct
pollution control mandate. As such, its creation marked a turning-point in the
history of environmental law in People’s Poland (see Radecki 1990a, 116). Initially the responsibilities of the Central Water Management Board included all
the non-navigation-related tasks exercised by the former Ministry of Navigation
and Water Management. It prepared and administered long-term water management and protection plans. It also had legal authority, delegated by the Council of Ministers, to coordinate activities of other state agencies relating to water
management. But conflicts arose whenever the Central Water Management Board
attempted to impose conditions on water-use activities governed by other central
and supreme Party/state organs. Industrial ministries in particular paid little attention to principles of environmental protection or to the Central Bureau.
Between 1960 and 1966, the Polish parliament was very active in the area
of environmental protection. First, on January 31, 1961, the Sejm enacted a new
Water Pollution Protection Act (1961 Dz.U. No. 5, item 33), which authorized the
Council of Ministers to set norms for water pollution discharges. That same day,
the Sejm enacted a land-use planning law that, among other things, expressly recognized the importance of natural resources, and established their protection as
one of the purposes of land-use planning (1961 Dz.U. No. 7, item 47).
In May 1962, the Water Pollution Protection Act was subsumed by a new
general Water Law that finally replaced the 1922 Water Law (1962 Dz.U. No. 34,
item 158). More than anything else, the 1962 statute subjected the management
and protection of water to central planning (arts. 22–24). Although certain provisions of the 1962 law ostensibly permitted state agencies to regulate pollution
discharges ‘independently’ of the central plan (art. 88, sec. 2; also see Tarasiewicz
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1965, 113–15), plan compliance alone determined whether or not a water-use
permit would be issued (art. 46). The permitting agency (which was the ministry
with jurisdiction over the particular development) was authorized to attach pollution control conditions to the permit, but the Central Water Management Board
had no independent authority to do so (W. Brzeziński 1974, 91). Industrial ministers almost never exercised their authority to impose environmental conditions
in permits; such conditions only added to the costs of construction and operation
without providing any ‘productive’ benefits within the socialist accounting system (which is discussed in Chapter 5, §5.4). And if a permitting agency ever did
impose water pollution conditions, compliance was not guaranteed. The permitting agency (or the Council of Ministers) could revoke the permit in case of a
violation, but revocation was neither automatic nor mandatory. In extreme cases,
violations of plan-based regulations or permit conditions could lead to criminal
sanctions, including fines and imprisonment, under chapter 10 of the 1962 Water
Law (arts. 151–160). But sanctions were rarely imposed for illegal discharges.
Most cases were dropped by either the prosecutor or the court on a finding that the
violations resulted from ‘activities dictated by higher reasons,’ namely fulfillment
of plan production targets (W. Brzeziński 1974, 111).11 It should be kept in mind
that economic plans were also promulgated as legal acts; in virtually every case,
compliance with planning mandates became a complete defense of violations of
water pollution control laws.
The same problem plagued Poland’s first air pollution prevention law, which
was enacted in 1966 (1966 Dz.U. No. 14, item 87). The Party’s newspaper, Trybuna Ludu (quoted in translation in Carter 1993, 122), referred to the 1966 Air
Pollution Act as ‘the best formulated and most progressive law of this sort in the
world.’ In reality, the law was virtually without normative content. It defined ‘air
pollution’ as emissions of substances ‘which may result in violations of permissible concentrations in the air’ (art. 1, sec. 2). On this definition, air pollution could
not exist in the absence of regulations defining permissible concentrations. And
the 1966 Air Pollution Act did not require the Council of Ministers to promulgate
‘permissible concentrations.’ It only enabled the Council of Ministers and other
state agencies to impose air pollution requirements and restrictions at their discretion. As it happened, the Council of Ministers did adopt fairly stringent norms for
air pollution concentrations (1966 Dz.U., No. 42, item 253), but not because of
any statutory mandate.12 It retained authority to rescind or suspend the regulations
at any time.
Once permissible concentrations were established, the 1966 Air Pollution
Act was potentially enforceable. Article 3, section 1, expressly required new and
expanding industrial facilities to install available emissions control equipment, if
their uncontrolled emissions would or could cause a violation of permissible concentrations. However, it was left to the administrator’s discretion to demand pollution abatement (art. 11, sec. 1). If emissions posed an imminent threat to human
life, the State Health Inspector could close down the industrial facility entirely
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(art. 11, sec. 3). However, this kind of administrative authority over industrial
production was only rarely exercised because of its potential effect on economic
production. The Polish environmental law scholar Wacław Brzeziński (1973, 87),
writing about the 1966 statute, noted the ‘frequent collisions’ between air pollution prevention and production that administrators had to solve on a case-by-case
basis ‘from the point of view of state policy.’ Thanks to the vast administrative
discretion afforded by the 1966 Air Pollution Act, administrators could in every
case decide that production concerns took priority over pollution control (see W.
Brzeziński 1974, 129).
Administrative responsibilities under the 1966 Air Pollution Law were vested
in a new Office of Air Pollution Control (Biuro do Spraw Ochrony Powietrza
Atmosferycznego) established within the Central Water Management Board,
which became, as a result, Poland’s first comprehensive environment agency
(albeit with substantial economic responsibilities, for example for water management). The Central Board promulgated emissions standards under the 1966 Air
Pollution Act and discharge standards under the 1962 Water Law. But under both
laws it had trouble enforcing its authority against central and supreme organs of
state authority. This foreshadowed a chronic problem for environmental protection in People’s Poland: the relative lack of authority of environmental ministries
over industrial ministries (a problem discussed at length in Chapter 4, §4.3).
While the Sejm enacted new legislation, Poland’s Party/government also was
active in environmental protection during the 1960s. The 1961 five-year socioeconomic plan, written by the Communist Party, adopted by the Council of Ministers
and ratified by the parliament, for the first time included provisions concerning
water and air pollution (see Bochniarz and Kassenberg 1988, 18). In the middle of
the decade, the Council of Ministers exercised its independent regulatory authority, issuing rules to protect, respectively, forests and agricultural lands against air
pollution (1966 M.P. No. 40, item 200; 1966 M.P. No. 50, item 247; 1970 M.P.
No. 4, item 35). Of course, Council decrees and socioeconomic plans carried a lot
more weight with industrial ministries than did environmental agency regulations,
but they too went largely unenforced. From the 1960s to the end of the Communist era in Poland, lack of enforcement, more than lack of regulation or the poor
quality of regulations, obstructed effective environmental protection.
In 1964, the State Council for Nature Protection attempted to reinvigorate
the concept of nature preservation by designing new categories of protected
areas, including landscape parks and areas of protected landscape. The Council
ultimately sought to amend the 1949 Nature Protection Act, but its proposals
were rejected summarily by the Party/government, which, by that time, was less
interested in setting aside protected areas and more interested in reducing levels
of pollution and waste (as evidenced by the two five-year socioeconomic plans
for 1961–70). But in one respect, 1964 was a landmark year for environmental
protection in People’s Poland. That year, the Sejm enacted a new Civil Code,
which, for the first time, permitted individuals to bring lawsuits to stop or control
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pollution (1964 Dz.U. No. 16, item 93).13 Under article 222 of the Code, property owners had the right to sue any person whose activities caused excessive
property damage. In addition, a plaintiff could sue to preempt prospective harm
(art. 439). These provisions remained potential sources of individual redress for
environmental harm even after comprehensive environmental legislation was
enacted in 1980. However, they were rarely utilized. Environmental lawsuits
under the Civil Code were infrequent and, of those that were brought, relatively
few were successful.
Finally, in 1969, a new Penal Code was adopted that provided criminal sanctions for specific environmental harms (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94).14 Under this
Code, individual persons (but not enterprises or organizations) could be fined or
imprisoned for environmental crimes. Specified offenses included air-, water- and
soil-polluting activities that endangered human life and health (art. 140) and illegal timber harvesting (art. 213). As with the Civil Code, few criminal cases were
ever brought, and many complaints received by prosecutors were summarily dismissed for reasons of ‘higher necessity’ (see Biernat and Wasilewski 1992, 44).

2.4. The 1970s
It is somewhat of a misnomer to speak of ‘environmental protection’ in Poland
before the 1970s. The concept of ‘nature protection’ had been well understood
since the 1920s (see Pawlikowski 1927) and pollution threats had been taken seriously since the 1950s. But there was scant understanding before 1970 of how
nature protection and pollution control fit together. This was not just a Polish
problem, of course; throughout the world, the concept of ‘environmental protection’ was just beginning to be defined in the early 1970s.
Between 1971 and 1972, two important events facilitated the development of
environmental protection in Poland. The first was the PZPR’s Sixth Party Congress in 1971, where for the first time environmental protection emerged as a
national political priority. In its resolution the Congress called for a complete
program of environmental protection to be prepared within two or three years (VI
Zjazd PZPR. Podstawowe materiały i dokumenty, 1972, 252). However, this proposed ‘environmental’ program was also to include, among other things, plans for
a national network of superhighways. The second important event for the development of environmental protection in Poland was the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. This may seem
odd since Poland did not actually attend the conference; it boycotted it, along
with all the Soviet bloc countries, ostensibly because non-members of the UN
were not invited to participate. However, the Polish government had prepared to
attend, and those preparations greatly influenced the theory, if not the practice, of
environmental protection in Poland. New scientific committees were appointed to
study environmental problems, and scholars began to explore potential legal solu-
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tions. In March 1971, the Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk or
PAN) Scientific Committee ‘Man and Environment’ (Komitet Naukowy ‘Człowiek
i Środowisko’) convened a conference of lawyers from around the country to discuss the methods and goals of what was just beginning to be called ‘environmental protection’ (ochrona środowisko15). Before the close of 1971, the Scientific
Committee issued a report entitled ‘Programme of environmental protection in
Poland to the year 1990.’ The Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the Politburo of the PZPR’s Central Committee adopted this report in 1975.
Meanwhile, member countries of the Soviet Bloc’s Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) began to cooperate more closely on matters of
environmental protection. From the start of the 1970s, one sees a great deal of
coordination in their environmental policies. New environmental legislation
began appearing in each country at roughly the same time, and one country’s
environmental statutes began closely to resemble another’s. However, Poland was
a bit out of step (as it was in so many respects) with its ‘fraternal allies.’ Its environmental laws were distinctive and, in many ways, more sophisticated than those
of other Soviet bloc countries (see Juergensmeyer et al. 1991, 832; Cummings
1993, 380).
Poland was poised at the start of the 1970s to pursue a fresh approach to problems of environmental protection. But almost immediately there were setbacks.
The first was in 1972 when the Central Water Management Board proposed to
transform itself into a new Ministry of Water Management and Environmental
Protection (Ministerstwo Gospodarki Wodnej i Ochrony Środowiska) in order to
give environmental protection a more prominent place in the agency’s mission
and to raise the status of the environmental agency to the ministerial level; the
proposed change would have given environmental protection advocates a voice
on the Council of Ministers for the first time since the late 1950s. Agricultural and
industrial ministries objected to the change, which they correctly perceived as
threatening their hegemony. And, as usual, the industrial interests prevailed. Not
only was the Central Water Management Board’s proposal rejected, but on March
29, 1972, the Board itself was abolished (1972 Dz.U. No. 11, item 79) and its various responsibilities were scattered among the Agriculture Ministry, the Navigation Ministry and a newly created Ministry of Local Economy and Environmental
Protection (Ministerstwo Gospodarki Terenowej i Ochrony Środowiska) (1972
Dz.U. No. 11, item 77). This new ministry became responsible for city planning
and development, urban land-use management, public utilities regulation, housing, property expropriation, and environmental protection of water, air and ‘green
areas’ (zieleń) within cities and towns. Interestingly, the diffusion of environmental protection responsibilities, which appeared to constitute a political defeat for
environmental protection interests, may have been purely coincidental: according
to one former official of the Central Water Management Board, the administrative reform resulted from a personal vendetta against the Board’s chief by other
high-ranking Communist Party members (conversation with Andzrej Deja, Chief
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of the Water Management Office, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural
Resources and Forestry, June 9, 1992).
The 1972 reorganization of environmental protection administration was not
the only administrative change during the 1970s. In 1975, the Ministry of Local
Economy and Environmental Protection was replaced by the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection (Ministerstwo Administracji, Gospodarki Terenowej i Ochrony Środowiska) (1975 Dz.U. No 16, item
90). The addition to the title was significant. As Wojciech Radecki (1990a, 122)
has noted, the new ministry’s duties were predominantly administrative, with
environmental protection responsibilities ‘added as an afterthought.’
The 1970s was also a busy decade of substantive legislative and regulatory
activity on environmental protection. In 1970, the Council of Ministers promulgated a regulation to protect forests from air pollution that required industrial
enterprises to compensate for forest damage caused by their emissions (1970 M.P.
No. 4, item 35). In addition, polluters could be forced to restore damaged forests
to their pre-existing state. In 1971, this regulation was subsumed into a new law to
protect agricultural and forest lands (1971 Dz.U. No. 27, item 249), which sought
to promote conservation of productive agricultural lands by preventing their conversion to non-agricultural uses (except in cases of economic necessity), limiting
soil erosion, reclaiming agriculture lands previously converted to industrial uses,
and reducing waste in land use (see Stełmachowski 1984, 347–8).
The most significant new environmental statutes of the 1970s were the Water
Law (1974 Dz.U. No. 38, item 230) and the Building Law (1974 Dz.U. No. 38,
item 229), both enacted on October 24, 1974. The Building Law contained a special ‘chapter’ (rodział) devoted to ‘[e]nvironmental protection in building construction.’ Article 113, section 8, provided that buildings should be designed, built
and used in such a way that ensured ‘water, air soil, nature and landscape protection, as well as protection against noise, vibrations, radioactivity, and electromagnetic radiation.’ The 1974 Water Law did not so much replace the 1962 Water
Law, as consolidate it with other statutes regulating various aspects of water use.
The 1974 Water Law more comprehensively treated all aspects of water management, including municipal and rural water supplies, irrigation and drainage (see
Surowiec and Deja 1978, 1738). The main focus of water management remained
the water supply, and the permitting process stayed much as it had been under the
1962 law. The 1974 Water Law did, however, make a substantial contribution to
water quality protection by requiring the establishment of protective zones around
water intakes (arts. 59–61) and authorizing the Council of Ministers to institute a
classification system for water quality (art. 62, sec. 3). Most importantly, the 1974
Water Law created for the first time in People’s Poland, and perhaps the world,
a system of fees for water consumption and disposal. This was significant for a
variety of environmental, economic and ideological reasons.16 The fees were to
be set (by the Council of Ministers) at levels exceeding the cost of water treatment in order to encourage water conservation and reduce waste, and they were

40

Chapter 2

to be paid into a Water Management Fund to finance water improvement and
water quality protection projects (art. 56). Finally, the 1974 Water Law attempted
to ensure greater compliance with its environmental requirements by beefing up
criminal sanctions for violations. The financial penalties remained the same as
under the 1962 Water Law (50,000 zlotys), but the possible term of imprisonment
was increased from two to five years (art. 122).
Despite the new laws and changes in administration during the first half of
the 1970s, the PZPR apparently was dissatisfied with the piecemeal approach to
environmental protection. At its Seventh Party Congress in December 1975, the
issue of environmental protection rose from third (in 1971) to first on the list of
political priorities. The 1975 resolution stated:
We must give more attention than before to the protection and shaping of the
environment. With this in view we must build our towns and villages and protect
the aesthetic values of the countryside. This should be an important part of development planning, investment programming and technology preference. Taking
into account the importance of the problem there should be prepared, with the
help of scientists, a bill regulating environmental protection. (Quoted in Sommer
1988, 26–7)

The 1975 resolution ultimately led to passage of the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act. It is significant that the increased focus on environmental protection in Poland during the 1970s did not result from any particular
catalytic event or grass-roots political movement. Rather, the impetus for increased
environmental protection came from the highest echelons of the PZPR. Thus,
claims that the Party did not concern itself with environmental protection are, at
the least, exaggerated.
As if to codify the PZPR’s 1975 resolution, the Polish Constitution was
amended in 1976 (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36) to include, among other new provisions, two articles raising environmental protection ‘to the highest level of law
and politics’ (Radecki 1990a, 122):
Article 12, paragraph 2: The Polish People’s Republic ensures the protection
and rational shaping of the environment.
Article 71: Citizens of the Polish People’s Republic have the right to utilize
the values of the natural environment and the obligation to protect it.
It is unclear just what these provisions were intended to accomplish. As Jerzy
Sommer (1988, 28–9) has pointed out, the very fact of their inclusion seemed to
elevate environmental protection as ‘one of the basic aims of the socialist state.’
However, Professor Sommer (1988, 33) also recognized that ‘[t]he real significance’ of the new constitutional provisions could not be determined before they
were implemented through subordinate legislation. In People’s Poland, as in all the
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former Soviet bloc countries, constitutional provisions were not self-executing;
they had to be given legal effect by parliamentary legislation (see Brzeziński and
Garlicki 1995a, 24). Unless and until the Sejm enacted a law specifically implementing articles 12 and 71, the constitutional rights they supposedly guaranteed
were, legally speaking, meaningless. Consequently, the provisions had no immediate impact on environmental protection in Poland. The real test of their legal
meaning had to wait four years for the enactment of the 1980 Environmental
Protection and Development Act. In the meantime, there was a great deal of conversation about what form new environmental legislation should take. Should it
be comprehensive (as argued, for example, by Radecki 1978) or should nature
protection be separated from pollution control (as argued by Łenkowa 1977 and
Jastrzębski 1979a)? Should it be in the form of a code (like the Civil Code, for
example), a general framework act with more specific legislation to be promulgated later, or something in between, such as an ‘omnibus’ act? As legal scholars
(including Łustacz 1980) debated these questions, drafts of the new law were prepared, beginning in May 1976. The first draft bill combined all elements of environmental protection, including nature conservation; it would have replaced the
1949 Nature Protection Act. Subsequent drafts from March and April of 1976 and
December 1977 refined the definition of ‘environment’ to make it more inclusive
in some respects but less inclusive in others. These later drafts excluded nature
protection, so as to maintain the 1949 Nature Protection Act.
In 1976, the Polish Academy of Sciences founded a Research Group on Environmental Law within its Institute of State and Law. This was the first officially
established environmental law bureau in the Soviet bloc and, perhaps, the whole
of Europe. It included many of Poland’s top environmental law scholars, including Jerzy Sommer, Wojciech Radecki and Jerzy Jendrośka. Over the years, they
and their colleagues have published literally hundreds of books and thousands of
articles in Polish, German, English and other languages about environmental law
and administration. This record has earned them considerable respect and influence, especially since the fall of communism.
Despite the legislative and administrative efforts of the 1960s and 1970s,
Poland’s pollution problems continued to mount. Air pollution emissions rose rapidly despite improvements in monitoring, the imposition of emissions limitations,
the application of available emissions reduction technologies, and increased penalties (see Aura, Nov. 1979; Gospodarko Planowa, Mar. 1980; and Wiadomości
Statystyczne, Dec. 1979). Water quality also deteriorated (see Wiadomości Statystyczne, Nov. 1979). In a resolution adopted on December 11, 1978, the State
Council for Nature Protection concluded that industries habitually were ignoring both the harmful environmental impacts of their activities and ‘the need to
respect binding law’ because government environmental programs were not being
adequately implemented (Nowe Drogi, July 1980). For environmental protection
advocates, this resolution underscored the urgent need for comprehensive new
environmental legislation.
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2.5. The 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act
Structure and Definitions
On January 31, 1980, the Sejm enacted the new Environmental Protection and
Development Act (EPDA) (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6).17 Its title, ‘Ustawa o
ochronie i kształtowaniu środowiska,’18 signified that its purpose was not only
protection but economic use of the natural environment. The Act consisted of
eight titles containing 118 articles:
Title I:
Title II:

General provisions.
Substantive provisions on air and water pollution, protecting
‘green areas,’ waste management, noise and radiation pollution.
Title III: General directives on land use and development, forest management, public works construction, building and other potentially
environmentally destructive economic practices.
Title IV: Liability provisions with reference to the Penal Code, Civil Code
and Code for Petty Offenses.
Title V:
Economic measures for environmental protection, including a
schedule of fees for resource use and pollution charges to finance
new state environmental protection funds.
Title VI: Organization and administration of environmental protection.
Title VII: Penal provisions.
Title VIII: Transitional and final provisions.
The 1980 EPDA was a comprehensive statute designed to deal with the whole
panoply of environmental media and their problems. Only specific nature protection responsibilities were excluded (art. 13, sec. 2; art. 35, sec. 1; and art. 39),
thereby preserving the 1949 Nature Protection Act. Otherwise, the new Environmental Protection and Development Act blanketed the entire field of environmental protection. Article 1, section 2, defined ‘environment’ broadly to include
‘the totality of natural elements, including the surface of the earth together with
the minerals, water, air, flora and fauna, and the landscape as found in its natural
state and as transformed by human activity.’ In keeping with this broad definition,
article 111 expressly preempted conflicting provisions of other resource-use statutes, including the 1974 Water Law, and economic statutes with environmental
mandates, such as the 1974 Building Law.
The 1980 EPDA defined ‘environmental protection’ broadly enough to cover
any activity having anything to do with nature and its resources, including all
‘actions or restraints necessary to restore or maintain the balance of nature’ (art.
2, sec. 1), which the Act defined as ‘equilibrium in the reciprocal influences of
people, the elements of living nature and the habitat conditions produced by elements of inanimate nature’ (art. 3, sec. 1). This general definition was followed

A History of Environmental Law in Poland

43

by a list of four categories of environmental protection activities: (1) rational
environmental ‘development,’ (2) rational natural resources management, (3)
measures to prevent harmful environmental effects causing damage, destruction,
pollution or changes in the physical features of character of its natural elements,
and (4) restoration of natural elements to their proper state (art. 2, sec. 1). These
categories clearly indicate that the 1980 EPDA’s focus was not preservationist;
use and development of the environment also constituted a major part of ‘environmental protection,’ as the Act’s title suggested. The apparent conflict in the
statute’s ultimate aims supposedly was minimized by language narrowly defining ‘rational use’ (eksploatacja) to cover only those uses consistent with both
economic and extra-economic values, such as quality of life. Any decision to use
natural resources was supposed not to diminish the quality of the environment
(art. 2, sec. 2). However, this language was merely precatory. The phrase ‘quality
of the environment’ is ambiguous, and most any ‘use,’ rational or otherwise, has
some detrimental impact on environmental values. It certainly was not a welldefined legal test for determining whether development activities could proceed.

Environmental Protection and Central Planning
The most significant new features of the 1980 Environmental Protection and
Development Act concerned the relationship between environmental protection
and central economic planning. Before 1980, socioeconomic planners paid no
attention to the environmental consequences of their decisions, and this obviously
hampered protection efforts. The new law required socioeconomic plans to give
due consideration to environmental protection:
Art. 5 sec. 1: Environmental protection constitutes an essential element of
national socioeconomic policy. Matters pertaining to environmental protection shall be included in the national socioeconomic plans, land use plans,
and normative statutes, and will be taken into account in the activities of
national organs, national economic units and social organizations.
Art. 5, sec. 3: The national socioeconomic plans shall take into account, as
an integral part of the planning provisions, tasks and means to ensure effective environmental protection and the effective elimination of activities with
negative environmental impacts.
In addition, environmental protection considerations were to become an integral
part of land-use plans that were the basis for development and investment location
decisions. Under the 1980 EPDA, land-use plans had to ‘guarantee conditions
for maintaining the balance of nature, rational economic management of natural
resources and protection of landscape and climatic values’ (art. 6, sec. 2). Admin-
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istrative decisions that violated land-use plan mandates were void automatically
(art. 7, sec. 2).
Although these provisions undoubtedly constituted a significant and beneficial addition to the planning process, it is important to note that the new restrictions on socioeconomic planners were purely procedural. The 1980 EPDA did
not shackle them with substantive environmental mandates, but required planners
only to ‘consider’ environmental protection in the planning process. Article 4 suggested that environmental protection standards were just as important as planning
mandates: ‘The resources of the natural environment may be used to serve socioeconomic needs to the extent permitted by the socioeconomic plans, land-use
plans, and environmental protection standards.’ On a plain reading of this provision, natural resources could be utilized only to the extent permitted by plans and
environmental standards. However, neither article 4 nor any other provision of the
1980 EPDA specified what would happen if the plan called for a use inconsistent
with environmental norms.
Additional provisions on environmental protection in planning activities
were located in articles 68–70 of title III, chapter 2, concerning environmental
aspects of capital investment.

Specific Environmental Protection Provisions
Title II of the 1980 EPDA included nine chapters dedicated to accomplishing specific environmental protection goals:
Chapter 1:
Chapter 2:
Chapter 3:
Chapter 4:
Chapter 5:
Chapter 6:
Chapter 7:

Protection of the earth’s surface and minerals (arts. 13–17),
Protection of waters and the marine environment (arts. 18–24),
Protection of the atmosphere (arts. 25–32),
Protection of flora and fauna (arts. 33–37),
Protection of landscape values and rest environments (arts. 38–41),
Protection of green areas in cities and villages (arts. 42–48),
Protection of the environment against noises and vibrations (arts.
49–52),
Chapter 8: Protection of the environment against waste and other forms of
pollution (arts. 53–58),
Chapter 9: Protection against radiation (arts. 59–63).
Generally speaking, these chapters restated for each environmental medium the
general goals outlined in title I, articles 1 and 2. Although they did not include
specific environmental norms, such as emissions standards or discharge limits, the
chapters of title II provided the framework for further regulation by appropriate
ministerial departments. Article 15 was the central provision of title II, chapter
1, on protecting the earth’s surface and minerals. It required anyone using land
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to ensure its protection against pollution. More specifically, article 15 obligated
farmers and forestry workers to use chemicals, such as pesticides, only in quantities that would not disturb the balance of nature, for instance by contaminating
the soil or water or poisoning plants, animals or ecosystems. Detailed controls on
chemical use were to be established by regulation of the Ministers of Agriculture
and Forestry, in consultation with the Minister of Administration, Local Economy
and Environmental Protection and the Minister of Health and Social Welfare.
Chapter 2, on protection of waters and the marine environment, required that
waters be managed rationally; responsible agencies and users were to ‘prevent or
control’ any changes rendering waters unfit for human consumption, plant and
animal life or economic use (art. 18). Measures for preserving ‘the balance of
nature’ had to be designed and implemented when a proposed water use threatened significant environmental harm (art. 19). Similar measures were required for
land-based activities (irrigation and drainage, among others) that, without protective measures, could have substantially affected water quality (art. 20, sec. 1). The
newly created (in arts. 94 and 95) State Environmental Protection Inspectorate
(Państwowa Inspekcja Ochrony Środowiska or PIOŚ) could impose mandatory
conditions on the construction and operation of waterworks in areas requiring
special protection from water pollution (art. 20, sec. 2). Article 22 provided that,
before any economic activity could proceed in such areas, an expert analysis of
environmental impacts was required. In order to preserve drinking water supplies, article 21 placed groundwater under ‘special protection’ from pollution, and
the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection
was instructed to restrict or prohibit the use of waters when necessary to protect
water quality (sec. 23, sec. 1). That ministry and others with authority over water
resources were to issue specific regulations implementing these statutory mandates (art. 24).
The goal of chapter 3 on protection of the atmosphere was to keep air pollution concentrations at or below levels established by regulation, and to limit
emissions from production facilities, automobiles, waste dumps and other emissions sources (art. 25). In regulating non-specific sources of air pollution, such as
landfills, the 1980 EPDA was ahead of its time. Article 26 of the Act defined the
phrase ‘air pollution’ inclusively as ‘the emission into the air of solid, liquid or
gaseous substances in quantities which may adversely affect human health, the
climate, flora and fauna, the soil or waters.’ This constituted a radical and progressive departure from the old definition under the 1966 Air Pollution Act.
The 1980 EPDA’s requirements for air-polluting activities were contained
in articles 27 and 28, which, respectively, obliged individuals and organizations
engaging in economic activities to take appropriate measures to control air pollution emissions and monitor them on site. Under article 29, the Council of Ministers
was authorized to promulgate regulations establishing permissible concentrations
of air pollutants and guidelines for measuring and monitoring pollutant levels in
the atmosphere. The regional (wojewódstwa) authorities also were given a sub-
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stantial role to play in air pollution control. Article 30 authorized them to regulate
categories and levels of air pollutants. Interestingly, under section 2 of that provision, compliance with established standards did not relieve individuals and organizations of civil liability for the environmental harm they caused.19 In the event of a
violation of air pollution norms (established in accordance with the 1980 EPDA),
the organ of state administration at the regional level could suspend indefinitely the
activities causing the violation until they were brought within the standards (art.
31, sec. 1). It is important to note, however, that the authority to suspend polluting
activities was discretionary. Only in cases where the polluting activities combined
with ‘especially disadvantageous atmospheric conditions’ to pose a direct threat to
human life or health were the regional authorities required to shut down polluters
(art. 32). In such cases, the agencies also could restrict the use of internal combustion motor vehicles; and they had discretion to suspend polluting activities where
necessary to protect designated monuments (art. 32, sec. 2). Finally, the Minister
of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection, in cooperation
with the Minister of Health and Social Welfare, was instructed to establish more
specific limitations for air pollutants emitted by internal combustion vehicles, and
was authorized to prohibit the use of fuels, raw materials and technological processes that produced health-threatening levels of air pollution.
Despite strong language in the air pollution provisions about suspending polluting activities that posed a direct threat to human life and health, it is important to note that the Environmental Protection and Development Act provided
administrators with a way to avoid imposing that sanction. Under article 71, if
the harmful environmental impacts of an activity could not be reduced by available technologies, but the activity ‘fulfills a social need,’ instead of shutting down
the facility the administrator could order that a ‘protective zone’ be constructed
around it.
Chapter 4 of title II of the EPDA contained measures to protect plant and
animal species through land-use planning (art. 34, sec. 1), proper forest management (art. 34, secs. 2–4) and the preexisting Nature Protection Act of 1949
(referred to in art. 35). The goals of these protective measures were to (1) create
conditions under which plants and animals could fulfill ‘their biological functions
for the benefit of the environment,’ (2) prevent or control harmful environmental
impacts on plants and animals, (3) prevent the intrusion of outside threats into
ecosystems that have exceptional social and scientific value, and (4) ensure the
balance of nature to preserve species from extinction and overexploitation (art.
33, sec. 2). Article 34, section 4, authorized the Council of Ministers to issue specific regulations for protecting forests from air pollution, and article 36, section 2,
empowered the Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental
Protection to establish rules for protecting botanical and zoological gardens. The
most legally significant provision of chapter 4, however, was article 37 which
‘prohibited’ the destruction of plants that bond to the soil and the destruction of
plants and animals contributing to a clean environment in general and water qual-
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ity in particular. This provision might have become a powerful tool for protecting
wetlands and other natural resources.20
Chapter 5 on the protection of landscape values and rest environments incorporated by reference the provisions of the 1949 Nature Protection Act, adding
only a few significant new features to landscape protection. Article 40 required
that landscape values and their protection be considered in socioeconomic and
land-use plans, and article 41 authorized the regional People’s Councils to prohibit or enjoin, as necessary, activities threatening destruction or deterioration of
regional landscapes.21
Chapter 6 concerned protection of ‘green areas’ in cities and villages, including urban parklands, lawns, workers’ garden plots, and small undeveloped spaces
between buildings (art. 42, sec. 2). The goal was to preserve ‘appropriate conditions of sanitation, climate and recreation’ for city dwellers and workers (art. 43,
sec. 1). Any decision to alter green spaces for other uses had to be consistent with
local land-use plans, and changes planned for areas containing old-growth forests
required approval from the regional governor and the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection. One important provision of
chapter 6 restricted the use of chemical substances in urban areas to prevent harm
to existing green spaces (art. 44). In villages, the People’s Town Councils were
authorized to designate rural parks, even on privately owned properties (art. 47,
sec. 2). Private property rights also were restricted under article 48, which required
landowners to maintain undeveloped properties ‘in their proper states.’ Before
removing living trees and other vegetation in the course of developing land, property owners had to receive permission from the local office of the regional organ
of state administration, which could require replacement or relocation of removed
trees (art. 48, sec. 2).
Chapter 7 of title II included provisions to protect the environment against
excessive noise and vibration. Article 49 required individuals and economic units
to protect the environment from excessive noise by refraining from noisy activities or by applying appropriate technologies to reduce noise levels. Article 50
called on the Council of Ministers to define ‘excessive noise’ by establishing permissible ambient noise and vibration levels. Authorities at the regional level were
authorized to assign noise limitations to specific facilities, and when violations
occurred, to suspend noise-generating activities (art. 51). Under article 52, local
authorities could even restrict the use of trucks and other means of transportation
at night to minimize noise pollution.
Chapter 8 concerned measures to protect against pollution from waste. This
marked Poland’s first ever attempt to regulate waste disposal and treatment (see
Jendrośka and Radecki 1991, 70). It required, among other things, that wastegenerating facilities and individuals take measures to reduce waste (art. 53). Any
wastes not amenable to recycling or reuse had to be destroyed, rendered harmless
to the environment, or collected and removed to designated disposal sites under
conditions ensuring environmental protection (art. 54). The methods of disposing
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of particularly harmful (contaminated or infectious) wastes had to be approved
by the appropriate regional authorities. Local governments were responsible
for ensuring appropriate conditions for waste disposal (art. 56), and they were
required to pick up and dispose of household wastes (art. 57).
Chapter 9, the last in title II of the 1980 EPDA, concerned environmental
protection against radiation. This was an interesting addition to Poland’s environmental law because the number of nuclear activities in Poland was quite low—
Poland had (and has) no nuclear power plants. There were a substantial number
of nuclear weapons in Poland, but these were under the control of the Soviet
Red Army and, thus, beyond the regulatory reach of the Polish government. The
Polish Party/state was appropriately concerned, however, with the environmental threat posed by low-level radioactive waste from sources including medical
institutions. Articles 59 and 60 on protection against radiation required the safe
generation, use and disposal of radioactive substances and equipment. Buildings
housing radioactive substances and associated activities were to be constructed,
maintained and decommissioned in a manner designed to protect public health
(art. 60). Regional administrators also could require the construction of protective
zones around the buildings (in accordance with art. 71 of chapter 3). Under article
61, radioactive wastes were to be recycled, when possible, under supervision of
the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate. Finally, article 62 provided that
all organizations utilizing or producing substances or equipment emitting harmful
radiation were obliged to monitor and measure radiation levels in the immediate
ambient environment.
As noted earlier, the various chapters of title II did not provide specific standards to accomplish any of the goals they established. That task was left primarily
to the Council of Ministers, which, before the end of 1980, issued more than one
dozen regulations implementing various provisions of the Act. By 1981, most
(though not all) provisions of the 1980 EPDA were implemented (see Radecki
1990a, 131n140).

Environmental Duties and Liabilities
Title III, chapter 1 of the 1980 EPDA established environmental protection duties.
All economic enterprises and persons engaged in economic activities were obliged
to ensure environmental protection (art. 64). Individuals also were responsible for
protecting the environment when using it for non-economic purposes, such as
tourism and recreation (art. 65). Under article 66, government agencies, enterprises and individuals all had a duty to ensure environmental protection by:
1. carefully siting production facilities to minimize environmental impacts;
2. taking protective measures during economic activities;
3. restoring environmental conditions damaged by economic activities;
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4. making use of new technologies to reduce environmental impacts of
economic activities, especially waste reduction and waste prevention
technologies;
5. constructing, installing and maintaining appropriate environmental protection equipment;
6. installing monitoring equipment and conducting necessary measurements;
7. complying with environmental protection requirements in planning,
designing and manufacturing machinery, equipment, etc.;
8. recycling wastes and effluents, or ensuring their effective neutralization or
disposal; and
9. making use of scientific and technical progress and legal, economic and
administrative means of environmental protection.
Section 67 specified additional duties of plant managers and workers. It is not at
all clear, however, that the term ‘duty,’ as used throughout chapter 1 of title III,
was meant to signify legal liability, which is addressed separately in title IV of the
EPDA (arts. 80–85). Those liability provisions are remarkable in that they were
premised on the so-called ‘polluter pays principle,’ which in 1980 was a relatively
new and untested concept of environmental policy.22 Unfortunately, the ‘polluter
pays principle’ was ill suited to a command economy in which the Party/state
was ultimately responsible for virtually all pollution. Nevertheless, according to
article 80 of the EPDA, the person or organization responsible for pollution damage was supposed to bear the cost. Article 82 reiterated the mandate of article 66
requiring enterprises and individuals engaging in economic activities to eliminate
environmental threats and to restore preexisting environmental conditions. The
regional authorities were authorized to specify requirements under these provisions, and could levy fines for non-compliance. In addition, article 83 required the
Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection to recommend that other ministerial departments with authority over specific economic
activities close down any plants causing serious environmental damage while in
chronic violation of administrative regulations.
In addition to economic penalties, polluters could be subject to sanctions
under the Penal Code of 1969 (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94) or the Petty Offenses
Code of 1971 (1971 Dz.U. No. 12, item 114). Under the Penal Code, polluters
who intentionally created a great threat to human life, health and property could
be imprisoned for up to ten years, or five years for negligently created threats
(1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94, art. 40, secs. 1 and 2). The 1980 EPDA added to
these provisions new offenses punishable by three years’ imprisonment for (1)
pollution causing ‘potential danger’ (art. 107), (2) negligence in the utilization
or maintenance of pollution control equipment (art. 108), (3) violation of duties
with respect to environmental protection of agricultural and forestry lands (art.
109), and (4) waste imports from abroad (art. 108a). For lesser offenses involving
mistreatment of animals (art. 62), water pollution (art. 109), contamination of real
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estate (art. 117), destruction of plants (art. 144) and damage to fields, forests or
gardens (arts. 148–157), the EPDA stipulated prosecution under the 1971 Petty
Offenses Code. Conviction for a petty offense could result in a three-month prison
term, plus fines. However, throughout the Communist era, penal sanctions were
rarely imposed on polluters (for reasons to be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6).

Administrative Fees and Fines
The liability provisions of the EPDA were not the only economic mechanisms
in the statute. Title V created a system of resource-use fees and title VII required
economic penalties for violations of environmental norms. The resource-use
fees mandated in article 86 were to be imposed on all resource-consuming and
polluting activities. Air pollution fees were to be exacted per unit of emissions,
including emissions within legal (i.e., permitted) levels. This was a novel mechanism for emissions reductions in 1980. At that time, few countries used effluent
taxes to control pollution; even today, American air pollution laws impose no
fees on emissions within legal limits. Poland’s Council of Ministers established
the fee schedule by regulation. Emissions exceeding legal limits were subject to
additional penal fines, under article 110. Regional authorities were to institute
schedules of fines for effluent discharges, pollution emissions, noise-producing
activities, chemical uses and waste-dumping activities that violated environmental conditions. The collected fines and fees were earmarked for a new Environmental Protection Fund (art. 87), which would finance construction of sewage
treatment facilities and other public environmental projects specified under article 88. Poland’s system of fees and fines became the Party/state’s primary tool
of environmental protection during the 1980s; civil and criminal liability were
only of secondary importance. Unfortunately, as already suggested, the EPDA’s
economic mechanisms were ill suited to the socialist economic system with its
endemic soft budget constraints.23

Administrative Responsibilities
We already have seen that article 66 of the EPDA imposed a general duty on
government agencies as well as enterprises and individuals to ensure environmental protection in implementing Party/state economic policy. Regulations
implementing these duties were to be issued by the Ministry of Administration,
Local Economy and Environmental Protection. Additional administrative responsibilities were set forth in chapter 1 of title VI of the EPDA on ‘[o]rganization of
environmental protection.’ The most important of these additional responsibilities
concerned the newly created State Environmental Protection Inspectorate (art.
94). Under article 95, the Inspectorate was responsible for (1) supervising compli-
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ance with environmental conditions established under the Act, (2) monitoring the
state of and changes in the environment, (3) initiating activities of environmental
protection and restoration, and (4) ‘popularization’ of environmental protection
principles. The Inspectorate was not, however, an ‘enforcement’ agency; it had
no independent statutory authority to levy fines or shut down harmful polluting
activities. The Inspectorate was subordinated to both the Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection and the Council of Ministers,
either of which could override decisions of the Chief Inspector. In addition to
the Inspectorate, a new State Environmental Protection Council was established
under article 97 as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers on environmental
protection matters.

Public Participation in Environmental Protection
Before the 1980 EPDA, non-governmental organizations in Poland had virtually
no role to play in environmental protection, such as it was. Even quasi-official
groups, such as the State Council for Nature Protection and the Nature Protection League, were reduced to playing only insignificant roles in the system. The
1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act was a first step toward giving independent ‘social organizations’ at least a limited role in the administrative
process. Article 100 authorized them to file lawsuits to suspend environmentally threatening economic activities and order restoration. In addition, before an
administrative authority could approve any new economic activity likely to have
substantial environmental impacts, the social organizations had to be informed
and their comments and objections had to be considered. As we shall see in Chapter 4, these provisions were never fully implemented, and to the extent they were
implemented their value was limited. Nevertheless, non-governmental environmental organizations became increasingly active in Poland, asserting considerable political, if not legal, influence.24

Environmental Research
Various provisions of the 1980 EPDA were designed to further scientific understanding and public awareness of environmental values and problems. Article 10
of the statute required educational institutions and research facilities to conduct
research into environmental conditions and ways to improve environmental performance in production through technological innovation. Article 11 mandated
that environmental protection be added to the curriculum in schools at all levels
and in worker training courses. Article 12 required the mass media to disseminate
information on environmental protection, but did not assure the media access to
environmental information.25
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2.6. The Administration of Environmental Protection
in Poland: 1980–8
The Birth of an Independent Environmental Movement
The enactment of the 1980 EPDA constituted only the first event of what was to
be a very active period for environmental protection in Poland. The year 1980
also marked the birth of Solidarity and a critical, if too brief, period of political
liberalization in Polish politics. Environmental information, traditionally guarded
as a state secret (see Chapter 4, §4.5), was more widely publicized, albeit in limited quantities. The government and the Sejm ordered detailed investigations
into the state of the environment, investigations which led, by the middle of the
decade, to official disclosures of widespread environmental devastation. In 1985,
for example, the official Communist Party daily, Trybuna Ludu (People’s Tribune), reported that 35 percent of Poland’s population lived in exceptionally bad
environmental conditions that would require at least 25 years to correct (Uncensored Polish News Bulletin, Aug. 8, 1985). Meanwhile, new ‘social organizations’
appeared under the banner of Solidarity, including the National Commission for
Environmental Preservation, established in July 1981, and the Polish Ecology
Club (Polski Klub Ekologiczny or PKE), which became the first truly independent
pro-ecological organization in People’s Poland.26
At its founding in Kraków in September 1980, the PKE was an illegal protest
organization, comprised of academics, journalists, scientists, farmers and workers. Thanks to its affiliation with Solidarity, by the middle of 1981 the PKE had
more than 1,000 members and was registered as a legal social organization. This
enabled the PKE to operate through official political and legal channels, as well
as through grassroots protest actions. The PKE became a force in Polish politics,
accomplishing real and lasting achievements for environmental protection before,
during and after the period of Martial Law (from December 1981 to December
1982). Among its notable early accomplishments was a series of protests and a
lawsuit against the Skawina aluminum works near Kraków, which, along with
the factory’s poor economic performance, led the government to close the plant
permanently in January 1981. This single event gave the PKE popular exposure
and credibility, which greatly facilitated its efforts to increase public awareness
of environmental issues. The PKE conducted scientific investigations, published
reports and newsletters, and held weekly public meetings in Kraków. These various information gathering and disseminating activities also helped to inform local
political leaders. On December 2, 1981, Kraków’s People’s Council passed a resolution with the following introduction:
The People’s Council of the City of Kraków has determined that the degradation
and devastation of the resources and assets of its natural environment have been
growing steadily worse over a period of many years. It has found in particular
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that the level of air pollution has reached a critical point, especially in the city of
Krakow, that there is a growing shortage of water for residential and agricultural
users, that lands under cultivation are being steadily degraded, that plant and animal life is in danger, that the landscape is being scarred, and, above all, that there
is a direct threat to human life and the historical monuments of the Old Town.

The resolution called for a review of local and regional socioeconomic and landuse plans. More specifically, it recommended revising the plans to provide for
the phased shut-down, by 1985, of the raw materials production divisions of two
large polluters, the Kraków Sodium Products Plant and the Kraków plant of the
‘Bonarka’ Inorganic Chemicals Industry (Walewski, Rada Narodowa Gospodarka
Administracja, May 17, 1982).
When Martial Law was declared in December 1981, the PKE was not outlawed, though its publishing and protesting activities were forced underground.
Unlike Solidarity, the PKE remained a legal, officially registered ‘social organization.’ The PZPR’s apparent tolerance of the PKE supports the view that the Party
was, at least to some extent, sincerely interested in improving environmental protection. When Martial Law was lifted in December 1982, the PKE emerged larger
and more influential than ever. By the mid-1980s, it had 3,000 members and 17
branches throughout Poland, and it continued to exert substantial influence over
the Party/state. Polluting factories built without facilities for waste disposal or
sewage treatment were forced to close by PKE protests. On one occasion, the
Club persuaded the Party/government to relocate a bitumen processing plant that
was polluting water used by another enterprise for making fruit juice (Fura 1985,
5). These successes spurred on other groups of what became, by the end of the
decade, a diverse environmental movement consisting of more than 135 (mostly
informal) organizations (Gliński 1996, 155–6), including the Party/governmentsponsored Social Movement for Ecology, the Catholic Church-affiliated Franciscan Ecology Movement, and the green–pacifistic Freedom and Peace group.
The few but remarkable successes of Poland’s environmental movement, particularly the Polish Ecology Club, were especially impressive given the political
climate in which they operated. People’s Poland was far from an open, pluralistic
democracy in which interest groups are not only tolerated but expected to participate in policy making. The members of the PKE and other environmental organizations risked their freedom and (infrequently) their lives in protest actions. Even
after Martial Law, police sometimes responded to protests with violence, as in
Kraków in 1987 when a crowd of about 500 members of the Freedom and Peace
environmental group gathered in the Market Square for a peaceful protest against
air pollution from the Lenin Steelworks in neighboring Nowa Huta. According to
published accounts, police dragged away several protestors, arrested ten, struck
one in the face and kicked another (Reuters North European Service, March
27, 1987). Environmental protestors were charged with taking part in an illegal
assembly, a misdemeanor under Poland’s Petty Offenses Code, which brought the
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case within the jurisdiction of Poland’s infamous lay courts, the kolegia. In these
thoroughly non-professional courts, the judges were untrained, the proceedings
were devoid of legal process and, not coincidentally, defendants had virtually no
chance of acquittal. Of 230 citizens tried before kolegia during November and
December of 1986, 229 were convicted. The kolegia were empowered to send
environmental ‘criminals’ to prison for up to three years; they levied stiff fines
and seized any property used in committing the offense—bad news for an environmental protestor caught distributing leaflets from her car.27
The threats faced by environmental protestors should not be exaggerated,
however. The Party/state in People’s Poland usually tolerated environmental protests, which often took place without incident, as in 1988 when 1,500 members
of Freedom and Peace staged a protest against a toxic chromium factory that was
contaminating Wrocław’s water supply (reported in Reuters Library Report, Sept.
16, 1988). By tolerating environmental protests and occasionally acquiescing in
protestors’ demands, the Party/state demonstrated a limited commitment to environmental protection. However, that commitment extended only so far. The Party/
state never acted to protect the environment at the cost of its own political authority or the ideological principles that legitimized Party rule (at least for the Party
itself), including the commitment to full employment and high rates of production
and economic growth.28 Coincidentally, enterprises closed following environmental protests always happened to be inefficient and obsolete. Enterprises that were
profitable or significant either for national defense or for the economy never were
closed or even significantly restrained following environmental protests. That
does not mean, however, that the environmental protests were irrelevant. On the
contrary, without them it is quite unlikely that any plants would have been closed.
The Communist authorities virtually never shut down plants simply because they
were economically inefficient or obsolete, so long as they met production targets.
Environmental protests did, therefore, play a significant role in closure decisions.

Environmental Protection in Socioeconomic and Land-Use Planning
Spurred by the emerging environmental movement, the Party/state continued to
move forward with its own agenda for environmental protection. In July 1981, at
the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, environmental protection concerns were once again at the top of the agenda. The Congress adopted a resolution
reiterating the ‘polluter pays principle’ for enterprises, and called for the increased
use of ‘legal-financial mechanisms’ to support the implementation and administration of the environmental laws (PZPR 1983, 676). Beginning in 1982, economic
reforms included substantial environmental components, and new laws enacted
to implement the reforms contained environmental provisions. The 1982 Law on
Socioeconomic Planning (1982 Dz.U. No. 7, item 51, art. 9, sec. 3), for example,
expressly required the inclusion of environmental concerns in planning processes.
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As a result, environmental requirements began appearing in socioeconomic plans.
The three-year plan for 1983–5 included a section on environmental protection
that ‘recommended’ actions to (1) avoid spreading contamination to still pristine
areas of the country, (2) preserve areas of special beauty and endangered species,
and (3) stop further degradation of already devastated areas. Even more significantly, this three-year plan, which had the force of law, designated four areas of
the country, including Gdańsk and Kraków, as environmentally ‘endangered.’ In
those areas, the plan banned further industrial development that might exacerbate environmental conditions, and instructed the Council of Ministers to develop
detailed plans for protecting and restoring environmental conditions. Nevertheless, as Ludwik Jastrzębski (1990, 82) noted, the 1982 Socioeconomic Planning
Law did not ‘create a balance between the interests of industry and environmental protection.’ It did not mandate the imposition and implementation of environmental protection conditions by economic planners, but mandated only their
‘consideration.’
Two years after the new Socioeconomic Planning Law, still more significant
environmental requirements were included in the 1984 Land Use Planning Act
(1984 Dz.U. No. 35, item 185). Land-use planning serves an important regulatory function in all countries to ensure that diverse activities in any given area are
compatible. In the socialist system, land-use planning was even more important;
indeed, it was unavoidable. Because the Party/state owned all the means of production and centrally planned the entire economic system, there was no way for
it to avoid responsibility for development decisions and other important land-use
considerations. Rather than deal with those issues as part of a single plan, People’s
Poland, like the other socialist countries of Europe, adopted a bifurcated planning
system. Socioeconomic plans set levels of production, resources allocation and
prices, while separate and distinct land-use plans determined where economic
activities and other developments could be located. In theory, land-use and socioeconomic plans had equal legal status, but in practice the bifurcated planning
scheme resulted in the subordination of land-use plans to socioeconomic plans,
with predictable results for environmental protection requirements.
The goal of land-use planning under Poland’s 1984 statute was the ‘comprehensive management of the territory of the entire country’ (art. 1). Land-use
plans were to be prepared at three different levels—national, regional and local—
and updated every five years (art. 7, sec. 1 and art. 19, sec. 3). National plans
included primary environmental protection safeguards, including conditions on
land use to ensure environmental protection and the ‘proper use’ of resources (art.
18). Regional plans were supposed to assure achievement, in a given region, of
the goals outlined in the national plans (art. 20, sec. 1), and local plans were to
be based similarly on regional and national plans (art. 25, sec. 3). The planning
process started with research into possible uses of a given area of the country,
including considerations of present and future needs, followed by preparation of
specific development plans, plan approval and, finally, project development. The
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process was supposed to be inclusive, but in practice the scope of participatory
rights depended on the type of plan under consideration. For national plans, only
associations had to be consulted; individuals had no right to participate and no
specific procedures were mandated (art. 19). At the regional level, administrative
authorities had to provide public notice of the planning process, and specified
individuals (experts and specialists) had the right to intervene at various stages.
The authorities had to give due consideration to all recommendations, comments
and objections before approving a final plan (arts. 21 and 22). The same was true
at the local level, where participatory rights were even greater—any interested
individual could intervene—and more detailed procedures were specified (arts.
27 and 28).29

Changes in the Administrative Structure of Environmental Protection
As environmental protection was being incorporated to a limited degree into
socioeconomic and land-use plans, the administrative organization of environmental protection underwent further changes. Responding to a perceived lack of
progress on environmental protection and pressure from academic and scientific
organizations, the Sejm in 1983 created a new Office of Environmental Protection
and Water Management (1983 Dz.U. No. 44, item 201). This agency took over
primary administrative responsibility under the 1980 EPDA, though not for long.
After only two years it was replaced by a new Ministry of Environmental and
Natural Resources Protection (Ministerstwo Ochrony Środowiska i Zasobów Naturalnych). This reorganization was significant because, for the first time, it vested
primary nature protection responsibilities (under the 1949 Nature Protection Act)
and environmental protection responsibilities (under the 1980 EPDA) in the same
ministry. This facilitated the coordination of pollution control and nature protection activities. There was a notable omission, however: silviculture activities in
national parks were controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food
Management (Ministerstwo Rolnictwa, Leśnictwa i Gospodarki Żywnościowej)
(see Radecki 1990a, 135). Consequently, there was some confusion about which
agency had primary responsibility for national park management (see Lachiewicz
1986, 9–10). Finally, in 1987 the two ministries agreed on shared responsibility
for national park supervision; the Forestry Ministry would be in charge of general
park management, while the Environment Ministry would be the lead agency for
all nature protection responsibilities within the parks (see Radecki 1990a, 139).
In 1984, the Sejm’s Commission for Administration, Town and Country Planning, and Environmental Protection conducted its first assessment of the implementation of the 1980 EPDA. According to reports broadcast on Polish television
(BBC Monitoring Service, May 31, 1984), the Commission found an ‘alarming
reduction in the quantity of pure surface waters throughout the country’ and noted
a 60 percent rise in ‘gas pollution.’ The Commission concluded that ‘the gov-
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ernment’s actions were insufficient and not completely successful.’ Nevertheless, from 1985 to 1989 the administrative structure of environmental protection
remained fairly stable, while the Party/state tried other methods for improving the
implementation, administration and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. In 1985, the Sejm issued a resolution committing regional People’s Councils to devote at least 7 percent of their total spending to environmental protection,
but by 1987 this mandate had been met in only 11 of 49 regions. Consequently,
the Sejm issued another resolution that year calling on the Council of Ministers
to improve environmental law enforcement (see Radecki 1990a, 136). Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources Protection prepared
a ‘National Program for Environmental Protection in Poland to the Year 2010’
(Narodowy program ochrony środowiska przyrodniczego do roku 2010, Projekt,
1988). When completed, this document became the subject of high-level meetings
organized at the Council of State (see Radecki 1990a, 136). Environmental interests were critical of the plan and, before the end of that year, new ecological political parties appeared, including the Polish Ecological Party and the ‘Green Party.’

2.7. Conclusion
Environmental protection remained a nominal political priority right up until the
end of socialism and the demise of the Polish Communist Party in 1989. But
for various reasons (described in Chapters 3–5) this did not translate into a high
level of environmental law enforcement. Violators were not consistently sanctioned, and the elaborate system of environmental fees and fines proved ineffectual. Despite the Polish Party/state’s regulatory efforts and its increasing financial
commitment to environmental protection toward the end of the 1980s, pollution
levels continued to rise, valuable natural resources increasingly were wasted, and
Poland’s ecological crisis intensified.
However, this chapter has demonstrated that these were not the consequences
of utter neglect and indifference. From the very beginning of the Polish People’s
Republic, environmental and nature protection concerns received official recognition and, increasingly, Party/state action. Unless we are prepared to claim that the
constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations were all intended to accomplish
nothing more than deception, we will have to look to alternative explanations
for the failure of environmental protection under socialism. And to claim that
Poland’s environmental laws were merely disingenuous attempts to deceive, we
would have to explain why the Party/state took such apparent pains to accomplish
such a meager goal. Specifically, why did the PZPR initiate many environmental protection efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, long before there was any apparent
domestic or international political pressure?
The next four chapters of the book attempt to fashion an alternative explanation that is more plausible, comprehensive and, I hope, persuasive. That explana-
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tion views the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland as a systemic
consequence of totalitarian socialism. Legal, political, economic and ideological
features of the (real) socialist system combined to impede effective environmental
protection. To be sure, Poland’s totalitarian rulers might have altered the system to
better facilitate environmental protection, but that would have required the Party
to sacrifice substantial political and economic authority.

Notes
1. This chapter is a revised version of Cole (1995a). Among the best sources on environmental law in Poland are Sommer (1993a), Jastrzębski (1990), Radecki (1990a), and W.
Brzeziński (1974, 1975). Post-Communist developments in environmental law and administration are treated in Chapter 7.
2. Early legislation and other historical documents relating to environmental protection in Poland are collected in Boć and Samborska-Boć (1994).
3. In this section and the two that follow, I rely heavily on Radecki (1990a).
4. On the socioeconomic implications of the 1949 Nature Protection Act, see Nowak
(1964, 24–30).
5. NEPA requires agencies of the federal government, when contemplating major
actions that could significantly affect the quality of the human environment, to consider
potential environmental impacts. For more on the similarities between NEPA and Poland’s
1949 Nature Protection Act, see Jendrośka (1996a).
6. Congress created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in NEPA to oversee
the statute’s implementation and administration. The CEQ issued regulations under NEPA
which specified the procedural requirements for fulfilling the statute’s mandates (40 C.F.R.
Part 1500).
7. On non-forestry matters, the 1949 Act required other ministers to consult with the
Forestry Minister, but not necessarily with any other representatives of PROP.
8. The Council of Ministers (Rady Ministrów) was the highest administrative organ in
the state, comprised of ministers from all the ministerial departments. The Prime Minister
served ex officio as chair of the Council. The Council of Ministers was analogous to the
President’s cabinet in the United States, only more powerful, since it could issue regulations and rescind ministry orders.
9. This new committee was reorganized in 1951 as the Nature Protection Works
(Zakład Ochrony Przyrody) located in the Ministry of Education. Two years later, the
Nature Protection Works was removed to the newly established Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk or PAN). Then, in 1957 a new Committee for Nature and
Natural Resources Protection (Komitet Ochrony Przyrody i jej Zasobów) was created in
PAN. In 1978, that committee was reorganized into the Commission for Nature Protection
of the Scientific Committee ‘Man and Environment’ (Komisja Ochrony Przyrody Komitetu
Naukowego ‘Człowiek i Środowisko’). In 1981, this last committee was officially acknowledged as the successor to the Nature Protection Committee, which had replaced PROP in
1949 (see Radecki 1990a, 108).
10. Actually, the available sources conflict about the location of the State Inspectorate
for Water Protection. Andrzej Deja (1992, 4), of the Ministry of Environmental Protection,
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states that it was established in the Navigation Ministry. Professor Radecki (1990a, 114),
in contrast, asserts that it was located in the Ministry of Public Utilities.
11. For a discussion of the ‘higher necessity’ defense in Polish environmental law
enforcement, see Chapter 3 (§3.6).
12. Another problem of the 1966 Air Pollution Act was that it spoke in terms only of
ambient concentrations (amounts of a pollutant in the atmosphere at a certain location, usually measured as a fraction of the total chemical make-up of the atmosphere, e.g., parts per
million or micrograms per cubic meter). The government was left to translate from ambient
concentrations to emissions levels (amounts of a pollution released into the atmosphere,
usually measured in tons per year, per day or per hour) for each individual source of air
pollution in the country. The problem was that Poland did not have the technical capability
to make these computations. Such technical restraints were a chronic problem of air pollution legislation and administration until the very end of People’s Poland.
13. On the utility of the Civil Code for environmental protection, see generally
Radecki (1987).
14. Chapter 4 (§4.3) discusses environmental litigation under the civil and criminal
codes, as well as under Poland’s environmental laws.
15. The Polish term ‘środowisko’ directly translates into the English word ‘environment,’ and it was first used in the context of ‘environmental protection’ (ochrona
środowiska) in the 1970 Academy of Sciences resolution appointing the Scientific Committee ‘Man and Environment’ (see Radecki 1990a, 119).
16. The use of economic instruments (fees and fines) in Poland is addressed in Chapters 3 (§§3.3 and 3.4) and 5 (especially §5.5); also see Mazurkiewicz (1986).
17. The first (and apparently only) complete English translation of the 1980 EPDA
was published in the Joint Publication Research Service, no. 75483, Apr. 11, 1980, at
34–67. Many commentaries on the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development
Act have been published (see Ochocki 1980a; Radziszewski 1987; Jastrzębski 1979a;
Jastrzębski and Rest 1982; Wałaszek-Pyzioł 1982; Jendrośka and Radecki 1991; Biernat
and Wasilewski 1992).
18. The Polish verb ‘kzstałtować’ literally means to shape, form or mold (see
Stanisławski 1969). As used in the title of the Environmental Protection and Development
Act, it has been variously translated as ‘shaping,’ ‘control’ and ‘development.’ I believe
‘development’ comes closest to describing the meaning of kzstałtować as used in the 1980
EPDA.
19. Article 30, section 2, did not change existing law. Long before the 1980 EPDA was
enacted, the Polish Supreme Court ruled that a glass factory was liable for damages when
its air pollution emissions destroyed vegetables in neighboring fields, even though its emissions were within permitted limits. Uchwała Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 7 kwietnia 1970 r.
[Resolution of the Supreme Court of April 7, 1970], Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich i Komisji
Arbitrażowych [Rulings of the Polish Courts and Arbitration Commission or OSPiK] 1971,
notebook, 9, item 169 (reprinted in Radecki 1991a, 59; also see Skoczyłas 1986, 167).
20. However, article 37’s potential as a source of wetlands protection was never
tapped; indeed, it was not even recognized by legal scholars in Poland. For example, Jerzy
Sommer (1991), in an article specifically concern wetlands protection in Poland, did not
even mention article 37 of the Environmental Protection and Development Act.
21. On the relationship between nature conservation and environmental protection in
the 1980 EPDA, see W. Brzeziński and Kulesza (1982).
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22. On the development of the ‘polluter pays principle,’ see Opschoor and Vos (1989).
23. For more on the misapplication of market mechanisms for environmental protection in a non-market economy, see Chapters 3 (§§3.3 and 3.4) and 5 (§5.5).
24. Poland’s independent environmental movement is introduced below in §2.6.
25. Chapter 3 provides a critical assessment of the 1980 EPDA and other environmental protection laws in People’s Poland.
26. On the history of the Polish Ecology Club, see Fura (1985).
27. For more on environmental protection in Poland’s courts, see Chapter 4 (§4.4).
For more on the kolegia, see Andrzejewski and Nowicki (1991).
28. I address these and other Communist Party ‘legitimacy principles’ in Chapter 4
(§4.2).
29. On public rights to participate in the land-use planning process, see Jendrośka and
Nowacki (1991, 41–2).

Chapter 3
THE ‘ENFORCEABILITY’ OF POLAND’S
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
This chapter begins the comprehensive explanation of Poland’s environmental
crisis, focusing on specifically legal problems of environmental protection. It is,
in a sense, a critical supplement to Chapter 2’s largely descriptive history of Polish environmental law. Subsequent chapters will address political, economic and
ideological impediments to environmental protection. This organizational schema
is admittedly artificial; in the socialist system politics, economics, ideology and
law were inextricably intertwined in fact and by design. It is no simple matter,
therefore, to segregate ‘legal’ issues from politics, economics and ideology. But it
does make some sense to address law as a separate object of analysis, if we distinguish between issues of law enforcement and law enforceability.

3.1. Law Enforcement and Enforceability
The relationship between enforceability and enforcement can be described this
way: enforceability is a necessary but insufficient condition for enforcement,
so that lack of enforcement may, but does not necessarily, signify unenforceability. Enforceability analysis asks whether a law could be enforced to achieve
its objectives, while enforcement analysis concerns whether the law is actually
being enforced to achieve its objectives. On my definition, a law that is perfectly unenforceable is incapable of actual enforcement. A law that is perfectly
enforceable still may not actually be enforced for political or economic reasons
extraneous to the legal text. There are, of course, degrees of enforceability; it can
be reduced as well as destroyed. Because some legislative ambiguities impair
enforceability more than others, some laws naturally are more enforceable than
others.
Enforceability is a function of what is written into the laws; it is internal
to the laws themselves. A statute that does not create binding obligations is, of
course, unenforceable; as a normative matter it might as well not exist (though it
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may have symbolic value). The same is true for a law that creates a binding obligation, but one that no law enforcement agency could possibly monitor, such as
thought-crime legislation. Even a law that creates a binding obligation capable of
oversight is unenforceable if it provides no sanctions for non-compliance; violation of the law constitutes a crime to be sure, but without consequence. The ultimate question for enforceability analysis is whether the law as written is capable
of enforcement to achieve its stated objective(s). This question goes not only to
the text of the statute, but also to the choice of legal strategy. For example, a decision to regulate with economic incentives rather than administrative commands
may (or may not) affect enforceability, depending on features of the politicaleconomic system in which the laws operate. However, on questions of legal strategy the distinction between law enforceability and enforcement tends to break
down, as we shall see.
Poland’s environmental laws generally were enforceable (see Kulesza 1988,
26). Despite many weaknesses, ambiguities, gaps and exceptions, they could have
been more successfully implemented and enforced than they were in fact. Many,
if not most, enforcement problems resulted from structural or incidental features
of the political-economic system—what Jerzy Wróblewski (1991, 259) has called
‘the sociocultural facts conditioning the origins and operation of statutory law’—
rather than from the laws themselves. That is not to say, of course, that Poland’s
environmental laws were perfectly enforceable; many features in the laws themselves at least hindered enforcement.
The enforceability problems in socialist environmental statutes can be divided
into five types, which are, in fact, common to virtually every modern legal system; they do not necessarily reflect the role of law in a given society. These problems include ambiguous drafting, lax standards, weak (or non-existent) penalty
provisions, limited (or non-existent) participation rights, and provisions creating
broad exceptions or exclusions from liability. Such ‘problems’ may or may not be
drafted intentionally into a statute. They may be manufactured, however, to serve
a variety of purposes, including propaganda. For example, a law that appears
quite tough may be weakened (intentionally or unintentionally) by lax standards
or ambiguous drafting.

3.2. Legal Ambiguities
Ambiguous drafting may impede or destroy enforceability, depending on the
nature or type of ambiguity. It can be intentional or result unintentionally from
sloppy drafting. And legislative provisions can be ambiguous in a number of
ways. A common ambiguity in Polish environmental laws concerns the assignment of legal obligations. Consider, for example, the almost unintelligible language in article 72 of the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act
(1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6):

The ‘Enforceability’ of Poland’s Environmental Laws

63

In the initiation of the protection of animate natural resources, certain natural creations or areas of landscape value, which protection is projected in regulations on
environmental protection, the principles of their utilization and necessary prohibitions and rules applicable to an object of protection and its domain, which principles enable the preservation of protective natural or landscape values, are defined.

This language has been interpreted to require that principles for utilizing protected resources be promulgated together with protective measures. But even if
this much can be gleaned from article 72 (and I am not sure it can), the provision still lacks any indication of the role that these principles are to play and how
they are to relate to the protective measures. In other cases the statutory language
may be simple and straightforward, expressing a clear legislative intent to create binding legal obligations, but the requirements are insufficiently specific. In
other words, there are legislative gaps. This was a common form of ambiguity in
Poland’s environmental laws. Most environmental laws in People’s Poland were
mere declarations; they did not set specific standards. As Jerzy Sommer (1986b,
206–7) has put it, parliamentary acts, not only in the environmental field, were
very general and of a non-specific character and sometimes vague. So, in practice,
the executive rule-making dominated.’ For instance, article 17 of the 1980 EPDA
provided the following instruction:
2. Organizational units and physical persons that undertake to exploit mineral
deposits or direct their exploitation have a duty to undertake necessary means
to protect resource deposits, and also to protect the ground, surface-, and
groundwaters, gradually to undertake reclamation of the area under exploitation and return elements of the natural environment to their proper states.
3. Rules for managing mineral deposits relative to environmental protection
in mineral exploitation shall be provided in specific regulations.
Mining enterprises could not possibly have known the extent of their legal obligations for environmental protection just from reading this language. They had
to await subsequent action by the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Mining
or the Minister of Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection. But such gaps in the law do not necessarily create enforceability problems.
In fact, it is a common practice of law drafters in virtually all countries to codify
goals, procedures and deadlines but to delegate to expert administrative agencies the task of setting specific norms. In the United States, for example, most of
the federal environmental laws enacted during the 1970s employed precisely this
approach. In the 1970 Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.), Congress established air quality goals—in the form of ambient pollution concentration standards
designed to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety (42 U.S.C.
§7409(b)(1))—and established procedures and deadlines for achieving that goal.
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But Congress delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the task
of setting specific emissions standards. As with Polish mining enterprises under
the 1980 EPDA, American industries subject to regulation under the 1970 Clean
Air Act could not know, just from reading the statute, what was expected of them;
they had to wait for the EPA to fill in the gaps. This did not impede enforceability, however, because Congress established clear goals, instituted procedures and
deadlines for agency action, and provided mechanisms for congressional and judicial oversight of the ongoing regulatory process. From this and numerous other
examples we can conclude that legislative ambiguities or gaps do not necessarily
impede enforceability. But they may impede enforceability if the legislature fails
to specify a responsible agency or to provide sufficient directions, procedures and
deadlines concerning what, how and by when the agency is supposed to regulate.
Unfortunately, gaps in Poland’s environmental laws often created enforceability problems because, unlike their American counterparts, Polish administrators frequently were not given sufficient directions about what, how and by when
to regulate. In addition, the laws failed to provide for administrative oversight;
there was no recourse if the agency simply failed to comply with statutory mandates. For example, when article 17, section 3, of the 1980 EPDA called for ‘specific regulations’ to ensure environmental protection in mining activities, it did
not specify (1) an agency responsible for promulgating those regulations, (2) a
deadline for issuing standards, (3) means of determining the sufficiency of standards, that is, whether they conformed to statutory goals, or (4) consequences for
failing to issue regulations under the article. Nor were there avenues outside of
the 1980 EPDA for effectively enforcing article 17’s mandate. Poland established
a High Administrative Court in 1980 to hear citizens’ complaints against specific
arbitrary and capricious state actions (1980 Dz.U. No. 4, item 8), but that court
was not authorized to hear complaints concerning agency failures to implement
laws or promulgate necessary regulations. Even if it had been authorized to order
agencies to comply with statutory mandates, the High Administrative Court could
not have salvaged article 17 of the 1980 EPDA because the statute did not even
specify a responsible ministerial department or set deadlines for regulations. In
fact, there was not a single instance in the history of People’s Poland where a
recalcitrant agency was forced by court order to promulgate or rewrite a regulation to comply with the requirements of any environmental law. As Richard Bolan
(1992, 304) has written, ‘[t]he court system [in People’s Poland] provided no
recourse. State agencies felt above the law, and a citizen’s right to bring state
agencies to court was at best a fiction.’
Ministries were actually accountable only to the Party/government (see
Rybicki 1984, 98–9), but that hardly constituted a check on administrative irresponsibility. Agency action or inaction presumably reflected government policy
to begin with, so limiting agency oversight to the government was tantamount to
no oversight. The lack of effective agency oversight in People’s Poland was confirmed by the vast number of cases where ministries avoided or ignored statutory
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environmental protection responsibilities without consequence. The most glaring
case concerned article 15 of the 1980 EPDA, which purported to regulate the use
of agricultural chemicals:
3. Organizational units and physical persons undertaking activities related to
agricultural or forestry uses can apply chemical and biological agents directly
or indirectly to the soil only in amounts and ways not injurious to the balance
of nature, and especially to avoid causing harmful contamination of the soil
or water, destruction of animals, plants or ecosystems, or deterioration of
their conditions for living, cultivation or breeding.
Article 15, section 4, further provided that the Agriculture and Forestry Ministries, in cooperation with the Ministry of Administration, Local Economy and
Environmental Protection ‘shall designate the procedures, the range and conditions for implementing the principles discussed in section 3, in accordance with
the needs of environmental protection.’ These were not particularly ambiguous
mandates; they designated responsible agencies and provided sufficient directions
for regulatory standards. However, no regulations ever were issued under article
15, leaving a gaping hole in the law. Despite the clear mandate in the 1980 EPDA,
there was ‘no environmental regulatory scheme to control pesticides’ in People’s
Poland (Jendrośka 1990, 31). Administrators also avoided statutory responsibilities under the public participation provisions of the 1980 EPDA. Article 99,
sections 2 and 4, and article 102 of that statute authorized the creation of new
institutions for public participation in environmental protection. Up to the end of
1988, however, these provisions remained, in the words of Jerzy Jendrośka and
Wojciech Radecki (1991, 67–8), ‘a dead letter’ because the necessary executive
orders never were issued.
Poland’s environmental laws were rife with unclear provisions, fuzzy mandates and far too many holes in administrative authorizations. They also suffered
from a special type of ambiguity resulting from two or more conflicting legal rules
(see Bochniarz and Bolan 1991). In some cases, such conflicts may have made it
difficult or impossible to tell, before the fact of actual enforcement, which (if any)
of the conflicting legal rules would prevail. But in many other cases, conflicts did
not create much confusion because the outcome was predictable from the circumstances. For example, when some provision in a socioeconomic plan conflicted
with an environmental regulation under the 1980 EPDA, it was clear, given the
political-economic facts of life in People’s Poland, that the plan would prevail.
But this was entirely a function of the politics of enforcement; it did not reflect on
the enforceability of environmental regulations. The story was different, though,
when the environmental law itself provided for exceptions or exclusions; that did
constitute a real limitation on enforceability, as we shall see later in this chapter.
There is no way to ‘keep score’ or draw conclusions about the percentage of
Poland’s environmental problems resulting from legal ambiguities or any other
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kind of enforceability problem. But an exhaustive survey of enforceability problems resulting from ambiguities and gaps in legal rules really is beside the point,
which is merely to identify and explain the nature and scope of various enforceability problems in Poland’s environmental laws. Ambiguities in the laws rendered specific provisions unenforceable and reduced the overall enforceability
of statutes, but they only rarely nullified entire laws—the non-existent pesticide
regulations were a glaring but uncommon exception. Even without express and
definite guidelines and directions, administrators for the most part did implement
the laws; they issued specific norms and, as the next section discusses, most of the
norms they established were not merely enforceable but fairly stringent.

3.3. Lax Environmental Standards in Polish Law
It somehow seems inappropriate to write of lax standards as contributing to problems of enforceability. All other things being equal, lax standards should be relatively easy to enforce—it is, after all, easier to do a little than a lot. Much depends,
of course, on the circumstances. Lax standards certainly relate to law enforceability to the extent they impede the achievement of environmental protection goals.
Assuming that the Polish Party/state enacted its environmental laws to achieve
some level of effective environmental protection (which seems warranted in light
of the history recounted in Chapter 2), then it makes sense to refer to lax standards
as potential drags on enforceability. In any case, lax standards are problems in the
laws themselves, rather than external features related to actual enforcement.
As noted in the preceding section, Poland’s environmental laws contained
few standards or norms. They mostly declared goals and aspirations that were to
be achieved in accordance with more detailed environmental regulations, land-use
plans, and socioeconomic plans.1 In order to judge the efficacy of environmental
standards, we must therefore look beyond the statutes themselves to the regulations issued under them. This does not alter the analysis, however, because those
regulations become part of the law and, as such, part of the enforceability analysis. Poland’s environmental standards (including ambient air quality standards
and water quality standards) provide little grounds for criticism. They certainly
did not impede whatever environmental protection goals they were intended to
achieve. And they compare quite favorably with environmental standards of other
Communist and capitalist countries, including the United States. For instance,
Poland’s air quality standards were more inclusive and more stringent than comparable American standards. Poland’s Council of Ministers issued air quality
standards under the 1980 EPDA on September 30, 1980, for 54 pollutants (1980
Dz.U. No. 24, item 89), compared with only six ‘criteria’ pollutants with national
ambient air quality standards under the American Clean Air Act. And, as Table 3.1
shows, comparable Polish standards were more stringent.2 Indeed, all of Poland’s
pollution standards were fairly stringent, and they were set pursuant to exemplary
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Table 3.1. Comparison of selected ambient air quality standards in People’s
Poland and the United States in 19803
Pollutant

Time average

Polish standards

American standards

Sulfur dioxide

Annual mean

64 μg/m3

80 μg/m3

24-hour

350 μg/m

365 μg/m3

Annual mean

32 μg/m3

100 μg/m3

Nitrogen oxides

3

Sources: Polish standards—1980 Dz.U. No. 24, item 89; American standards—Anderson
et al. (1990, 165, table 3.1).

procedures. For example, Poland established water quality standards, in the form
of maximum allowable concentrations of various pollutants, based on 49 indicators of water quality that accounted for biological properties of different water
bodies and projected uses (see Sommer 1984).
Maximum permissible ambient pollution levels do not, of course, tell the
whole story of pollution control. Ambient concentration levels are largely, though
not entirely, determined by emissions rates. So, in People’s Poland, as in the United
States, air quality standards become the reference point for determining necessary emissions limitations. Enterprises were not directly responsible for attaining
the ambient air quality standards; they were obliged only to meet the emissions
limitations (if any) included in their individual operating permits. Those limitations were based on the difference between the goals established in ambient standards and existing concentration levels. This entailed a complicated process of
translation. First, the administrators had to determine baseline pollution levels,
which meant monitoring and measuring existing pollution concentrations. They
then had to calculate the total amount of emissions reduction necessary to reduce
ambient concentrations to legal levels. Finally, administrators had to allocate necessary emissions reductions among various pollution sources. In other words,
they had to limit emissions of regulated pollutants from each individual source
so that emissions from all smokestacks would not cause ambient concentrations
to exceed permissible levels. For this process to work, environmental regulators
had to be able to determine some acceptable baseline concentration of each pollutant in the atmosphere (before setting emissions limits); they had to know the
chemical properties of pollutants, including how pollutants interact with other
constituent elements of the atmosphere; and they had to understand meteorological and topographical features in each region. In addition, the ability to determine
baseline concentrations of pollutants in the atmosphere required minimal measuring and monitoring capabilities without which neither ambient standards nor
emissions limits could rationally be set.4 In other words, a regulatory strategy
based on ambient air quality levels required a fairly high level of technological
sophistication. However, People’s Poland was operating under severe technologi-
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cal limitations; pollution-monitoring equipment was in short supply, and what
little equipment was available was faulty and not uniformly calibrated. Unlike the
United States, for example, People’s Poland did not possess elaborate computer
models to supplement its monitoring and to aid in relating emissions levels to
ambient concentration levels (under various atmospheric conditions). Under the
circumstances, the selection of a regulatory approach based on ambient concentration levels may have been impractical. But those same technological limitations likely would have rendered any strategy of pollution control more or less
unenforceable. On a purely textual analysis of the laws, however, there surely was
nothing inherently problematic about regulating emissions on the basis of ambient
concentration standards.
Lax pollution control standards were not, in any case, a big problem in People’s Poland; at least it cannot be maintained that Poland’s statutory requirements
were patently insufficient to accomplish minimal environmental protection goals.
Although the statutes tended to delegate (often in ambiguous mandates) responsibility for setting standards, administrators responded, as a rule, by establishing
fairly stringent standards, which, had they actually been enforced, could have
resulted in substantial environmental protection.
There was, however, a different kind of ‘standard’ (broadly understood) in Polish environmental laws that raised significant enforceability problems: the use of
resource and pollution fees. Poland first introduced pollution and resource charges
in the 1974 Water Law (1974 Dz.U. No. 38, item 230); regulations under that statute instituted a schedule of fees for water consumption and diversion (1975 Dz.U.
No. 33, item 181; also see Mazurkiewicz 1986, 36). Six years later, in the 1980
EPDA, the Party/state applied resource-use and pollution fees broadly across the
whole range of natural resources and economic activities. The EPDA mandated
per unit fees for air pollution emissions, waste storage, timber harvesting, water
diversion and consumption, waste water discharges, and the use of agricultural
lands for non-agricultural purposes. Fees were also charged for driving cars in
areas under special protection, such as national parks (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6,
art. 86). This broad application of user and pollution fees was progressive, and
not only for a Communist country. In the 1980s, other countries in Western and
Eastern Europe instituted similar fees. Many countries (including France, West
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the USA) charged for
noise generation; some (including Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands and the
USA) imposed waste production fees; a few (such as Australia, France, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) charged for the right to use or discharge effluent
into water; and only three (France, Japan and the former Czechoslovakia) instituted fees for air pollution emissions (see Opschoor and Vos 1989, 34, table 3.2;
Leden 1975, 67). None, however, imposed as many charges, covering as many
resources and pollution sources, as People’s Poland. Poland’s sweeping application of environmental charges was certainly unique in the Soviet bloc. Hungary’s
1976 Act on the Protection of the Human Environment (The Statutes of the Hun-
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garian People’s Republic, 1978), in contrast to Poland’s 1980 EPDA, introduced
no resource-use or pollution charges of any kind (see Enyedi and Zentai 1987,
213). Nor did the Soviet Union’s environmental legislation; on the contrary, up
to 1990 Soviet land and water laws reiterated the ideologically based mandate of
free use of socially owned land and water (see 1968 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No.
51, item No. 485, art. 8; 1970 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 50, item No. 564, art.
15).5 Perhaps more surprisingly, Poland’s use of market mechanisms for environmental protection exceeded (and still exceeds) the practice in the West. To this day
the United States, for example, exacts no per unit charges for air pollution emissions or water effluent discharges within legal limits.
Poland’s early and extensive use of pollution and resource-use charges under
the 1980 EPDA was unique and progressive, but it was not an effective policy
for environmental protection in the socialist economic system. For reasons to be
discussed in Chapter 5, market mechanisms for environmental protection require
markets to be effective. But as quasi-legal standards, Poland’s user and pollution
fees were clearly enforceable; nothing in the 1980 EPDA or administrative regulations created barriers to fee assessment and collection. The law clearly delegated
authority to the Council of Ministers to establish procedures and, most importantly, amounts for environmental charges (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 86, sec.
3). As we already have seen, such statutory delegations are common and do not
necessarily indicate enforceability problems. They may, however, if administrators are permitted to set fee levels so low that they cannot possibility achieve
their statutory purpose(s). Assuming the purpose of fees and fines under the 1980
EPDA was to create an incentive for enterprises to reduce pollution emissions and
increase conservation of natural resources,6 enforceability would seem to require
that fees be set at levels that would induce some degree of the desired behavioral changes. It is questionable whether fees at any level could have affected
enterprise behavior in the socialist economic system, however, given endemic soft
budget constraints. But that concern (which I address in detail in Chapter 5, §5.5)
relates not so much to the laws themselves as the choice of regulatory strategy.
For present purposes it is enough to ask whether the fee schedule, as established
in regulations under the 1980 EPDA, was sufficient to accomplish its ostensible
goal. In the case of People’s Poland, the answer seems to be that the fees were not
sufficient to induce pollution reductions and increased conservation of resources.
In his book on environmental fees and fines in People’s Poland, Marek
Mazurkiewicz (1986, 35) noted that ‘[f]ees for the economic use and transformation of the environment are thought to be a practical means of bringing the
production costs of single economic units into accord with social costs.’ But this
could happen only if fees were set high enough to reflect the social costs of the
economic activities. And to set fees properly required the ability, first, to determine social costs and, then, price resources accordingly. Arguably neither of these
conditions can be met successfully anywhere in the world, let alone in a socialist
country where costs and prices are arbitrary, that is, set by planners without regard
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for what someone actually is willing to pay for any given product or commodity.
No country in the world prices its natural resources (e.g., via user fees or pollution charges) at levels close to social costs. But is that strictly necessary for environmental charges to be useful policy instruments? Perhaps if the goal is some
Utopian conception of ‘perfect’ environmental protection. If, however, the goal
is merely to induce polluters and resource users to some incrementally higher
degree of environmental protection, it should be necessary only to set fees at
levels that make it too costly for polluters and resource users to continue their
present production and pollution patterns. In economic terms, fee levels must
be set higher than (average) abatement costs. This presumes, of course, that
firms operate in competitive markets where profit determines survival, that is,
where budget constraints are reasonably hard. And, as we shall see in Chapter
5, this presumption did not hold for socialist economies. Nevertheless, environmental fees theoretically might have induced the desired behavioral changes
in socialist enterprises had they impacted on the reward structure, by reducing
either worker and management bonuses or the production levels on which those
bonuses were based.7
It goes without saying that where natural resources fees are zero (or close to
zero), as they were for many years in Poland and throughout the socialist world,
they cannot affect production levels and, so, must fail to reduce rewards. Even
after the Polish Party/state introduced environmental fees, first in the 1974 Water
Law and more broadly in the 1980 EPDA, they tended to be nominal and insufficient to induce changes in patterns of resource use and pollution emissions (see,
e.g., Wajda 1992, 502; Jendrośka 1992, 533). For example, the charge in 1980
for emitting 1 kilogram of lead into the air was 40 zlotys (approximately 0.008
1980 USD); the fee for emitting 1 kilogram of sulphur dioxide was much lower,
only 0.2 zlotys (about 4/1000ths of one 1980 US cent) (1980 Dz.U. No. 24, item
93).8 These numbers alone do not tell us whether the fees were sufficient for purposes of environmental protection; we also need information concerning marginal
abatement costs. Once we knew how much it would cost polluters to reduce pollution emissions (through technological installations or process changes) to a certain desired level, then we would be in a position to judge whether the fees were
high enough to alter economic behavior. But even without that information, we
should recognize at least that Poland’s environmental charges were higher than
zero, which is what many countries, including the United States, charge today for
air pollution emissions and water effluent discharges within legal limits. Nevertheless, Poland’s pollution and resource use fees pretty clearly were insufficient
to induce the desired changes in economic behavior. Some evidence of this comes
from Polish statistics showing that Polish enterprises became less productive
throughout the 1980s, while investing more natural resources and emitting more
pollution.9 This is just the opposite of what we would expect to see from effective
environmental charges. There was, of course, a variety of systemic and incidental
reasons for the relative increase in natural resources use and pollution emissions
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in Poland,10 but among them surely was the fact that fee schedules for resource
use and pollution emissions were too low to accomplish the statutory goal of
reducing emissions and increasing conservation.
To be fair, fees under the 1980 EPDA were intended not only to induce
changes in economic behavior; another goal was to finance the new National
Environmental Protection Fund, established under title V, chapter 2, of the 1980
EPDA. As far as that goal was concerned, the system of environmental charges
created no enforceability problems. At any level, assuming actual assessment and
collection, the fees would (and did) accomplish the purpose. By 1983, fees totaling more than 10.5 billion zlotys (approximately 103 million 1983 USD) had been
paid into the National Environmental Protection Fund (Mazurkiewicz 1986, table
3). So, it cannot be said that the system of environmental charges created in the
1980 EPDA was completely unenforceable, that is, incapable of minimally fulfilling statutory goals.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between environmental fees and noncompliance fines under the 1980 EPDA. Both are economic mechanisms for
environmental protection, but from a legal point of view they serve different functions. Fees constitute quasi-legal standards for environmental protection; they are
charged on a per unit basis for resource use and pollution emissions at all levels.
Fines, by contrast, are not ‘standards’ in any sense. They are penalties charged
for violating standards. If an enterprise in People’s Poland exceeded its permitted
level of emissions, that constituted a violation resulting possibly in fines. While
fees were intended to induce behavioral changes independently of legal standards for pollution, fines were intended merely to induce compliance with the
legal standards. Despite these important differences, fees and fines under Polish
environmental laws suffered similar enforceability problems, as the next section
discloses.

3.4. Weak Penalties
If Poland’s environmental standards were fairly stringent and mostly enforceable,
the same cannot be said, as a rule, for the non-compliance penalties provided
in statutes and regulations.11 In the same batch of regulations that introduced
resource-use and pollution fees (1980 Dz.U. No. 24, item 99), the Council of
Ministers imposed administrative fines for violations of pollution control standards. The goal of the fines, of course, was to deter violations. However, in People’s Poland fines were not set with reference to the marginal costs of pollution
control or production; they were established in reference only to resource-use and
pollution fees. Fines were set at exactly four times the fees charged per unit of
emissions above permitted levels. They were doubled if the violation continued
unabated for three straight years or if the violation occurred in the more heavily
polluted regions of Kraków and Katowice (see Sommer 1990b, 36–9). But the
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most important question is whether they were sufficient actually to deter violations. The consensus is that they were not. As Jerzy Jendrośka (1992, 533) has
written, the ‘fines were low and offered a cheaper option than compliance with
environmental standards,’ so polluters not surprisingly preferred to pay the fines
rather than abate the pollution (see Mazurkiewicz 1986, 96). Actually, the penalties themselves were easy enough to enforce, but their low levels definitely undermined the enforceability of goals and standards under the 1980 EPDA and other
environmental laws. For enterprises it was a matter of simple economic sense:
why comply with stringent environmental norms when it cost so little to violate
them? The logic inherent to this question was compelling. Perhaps more than
any other features in the laws themselves, the low levels of environmental fines
undermined the enforceability of legal standards. But it was not just the low level
of fines that impeded effective environmental protection. Had the fines been 100
times higher, they still would not have accomplished their intended purpose of
inducing enterprises to comply with environmental standards. However, the reasons for this had nothing to do with the laws themselves (or with enforceability
as I have defined the term), and everything to do with the nature of the socialist
system, particularly the Party/state’s conflict of interest as environmental regulator and nominal owner of regulated enterprises, which exacerbated already soft
budget constraints (see the discussion in Chapter 5, §5.5). Arguably, it was the
use of market mechanisms per se rather than the level of fines that most hampered
environmental protection in the non-market economy.
Administrative fines were not, however, the only penalties provided for violating environmental rules. The 1980 EPDA incorporated provisions of the 1969
Penal Code (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94), which permitted prison terms of up to
ten years for violators (art. 40, secs. 1 and 2). I take statutory provisions authorizing imprisonment to be inherently enforceable; so long as the duty is clearly
delineated and a prison term, however long, attaches for specified violations, there
should be no problem of enforceability. The penal sanctions authorized under
Poland’s 1980 EPDA were high by international standards. For the sake of comparison, in Sweden the maximum term of imprisonment for violating the 1973 Act
on Products Hazardous to Man or to the Environment was one year (see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 1977, 54). The biggest problem with Poland’s penal sanctions was that they were not actually enforced, as
we shall see in Chapter 4. There were, however, two significant enforceability
problems related to penal sanctions under the 1980 EPDA and 1969 Penal Code.
First, only ‘persons’ could commit crimes, and enterprises were not considered
legal ‘persons’ (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94, art. 1). So criminal penalties applied
in environmental cases only when identifiable individuals, rather than corporate
entities, were responsible for the violations. This limited the utility of penal sanctions for environmental protection, and so reduced the enforceability of environmental standards. The second enforceability problem raised by penal sanctions
under the 1980 EPDA concerned exclusions from liability under article 23 of the
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1969 Penal Code. That and similar exclusionary or exculpatory provisions in the
1964 Civil Code, the 1980 Code of Administrative Procedure and the 1980 EPDA
are discussed in section 3.6.

3.5. Limited Citizens’ Participation Rights
The relationship between citizens’ participation rights and law enforceability is
not so obvious as that between enforceability and substantive legal standards or
non-compliance penalties. It is possible to conceive, at least, of an enforceable
environmental law that does not include provisions for citizens’ participation in
planning, decision making or enforcement. However, in many countries such citizen participation provisions are a regular feature of environmental legislation.
This reflects a widespread perception that environmental rules are more enforceable with citizens’ participation than without. And that perception stems from the
fact that there are so many polluters to be watched, while governmental enforcement capabilities necessarily are limited by fiscal constraints. In addition, there is
the question of administrative oversight: who regulates those charged with regulating the polluters? Public participation provisions serve both purposes. Citizens
can monitor and, when necessary, sue responsible administrative agencies for failing to comply with statutory directives, while, at the same time, supplementing
agency enforcement efforts by monitoring and bringing actions against polluters.
Besides facilitating law enforcement, public participation provisions can increase
the universe of available information for environmental policy making; by directing decision makers to seek public comments and suggestions on environmental
policy matters, the legislature can promote better informed decision making.
Exemplars of both types of public participation rights are found in American environmental laws.12 In the 1970 Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.),
Congress included a prototypical citizen suit provision to facilitate enforcement, that is, to enhance enforceability. ‘Any citizen’ was authorized to sue polluters for violating emission standards or administrators for failing to perform
non-discretionary duties (42 U.S.C. §7604). A different kind of public participation provision designed to improve environmental decision making is found
in the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et
seq.). NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare elaborate environmental impacts
assessments (EIAs) for all proposed major actions that could significantly affect
the quality of the human environment. The EIA process is designed to be open
and inclusive. Agencies must solicit comments from concerned individuals and
organizations, and consider all plausible alternatives (including the ‘no action’
alternative) to the proposed action. NEPA was intended to improve environmental decision making but not environmental law enforcement. The statute does not
mandate any substantive outcome; alternatives must be considered, but the agency
ultimately can select whatever alternative it prefers, even the most environmen-
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tally harmful. An individual citizen or group can sue for procedural failures under
NEPA, but they cannot sue the agency for its substantive decision. NEPA’s purpose, then, is not to ensure decisions that are best for the environment but to
improve the decision-making process by ensuring that environmental impacts
receive due consideration. The implicit presumption is that, even if NEPA does
not force certain results, a better-informed agency is likely to reach substantively
better decisions, including for the environment. Indeed, the information gained
through environmental impact assessments has led administrators to change and,
in some cases, drop planned actions (see Funk 1990, 759).
The widespread diffusion of such public participation provisions throughout
the industrialized world over the past 25 years suggests a common perception
that they significantly enhance the enforceability of environmental laws. People’s
Poland first provided limited public participation rights in environmental protection even before the 1980 EPDA, though these were mostly paper rights; citizens
could not (in any case, did not), try to make use of them. The lone exception was
the right to sue to prevent individual harm under the 1964 Civil Code (1964 Dz.U.
No. 16, item 93, arts. 222 and 439).13 However, that exception was never very
meaningful for purposes of environmental law enforcement mainly because citizens could sue only for their own harm; one could not sue to prevent or stop harm
to others. The 1980 EPDA increased the legal, if not the practical, ability of associations to sue polluters under the Civil Code. Article 100 of the EPDA provided a
limited citizen suit provision, which permitted legally recognized organizations to
sue in civil court to suspend environmentally threatening economic activities and
to order environmental restoration. As of 1985, six environmental associations—
the League for Nature Protection, the League to Combat Noise, the Polish Tourist
Association, the Polish Angling Association, the Polish Hunting Association and,
most significantly, the independent Polish Ecology Club—were on the Ministry
of Justice’s list of groups authorized to participate in civil proceedings. For a variety of political and economic reasons (to be discussed in subsequent chapters),
these groups rarely sued under article 100. In one rare case from 1975 (before the
1980 EPDA increased the participation rights of recognized environmental associations), the League for Nature Protection, an official (i.e., Party-approved) conservation association, sued a grocers’ cooperative for water pollution. The civil
chamber of the Supreme Court ruled without comment for the defendant (this case
is discussed in Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991, 46). Between 1973 and 1980, a total
of 4,754 civil lawsuits were filed in People’s Poland. Of these, only 117—approximately 2.5 percent—were for environmental harm. Plaintiffs won complete victories in only 5 percent of those 117 cases; they received partial compensation
in 56 percent (Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991, 46). Given their fiscal constraints
and poor prospects for success in court, it is not surprising that environmental
associations did not begin actively participating in civil proceedings against polluters until after the PZPR’s fall from power in 1989. Nevertheless, in the eyes of
most analysts, the public participation provisions of the 1980 EPDA constituted a
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potentially far-reaching and effective tool of environmental law enforcement (see
Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991, 42–3; Nowacki 1993, 73).
In addition to authorizing recognized associations to sue polluters in civil
court, Article 100 of the 1980 EPDA allowed them to ‘petition’ administrative
agencies to stop a polluting activity and bring suit in the High Administrative
Court. But before 1990, administrators retained unfettered discretion to grant or
deny association petitions. Thus, the ‘right’ of associations to participate in the
administrative process was far less substantial (if not completely insubstantial)
than their right to sue in civil court. The 1980 EPDA also included a (quasi-)
NEPA-like provision authorizing administrators to require that enterprise managers or developers submit ‘opinions’ on environmental impacts (1980 Dz.U. No. 3,
item 6, art. 70). But this provision was vacuous. Aside from the fact that administrators were free not to require environmental impact opinions, the statute failed
to stipulate content requirements or criteria for determining the sufficiency of an
environmental impact opinion. Even more importantly for present purposes, article 70 did not really constitute a citizens’ participation provision because, unlike
NEPA, it did not provide citizens or associations a statutory role in the process.
For this reason, Jerzy Jendrośka and Jerzy Sommer (1994, 169–70) have concluded that ‘Poland is a typical example of a country in which the legal concept
of EIA differs substantially from the NEPA process.’ The omission of public participation rights in Poland’s EIA process was partly rectified, however, in article
100 of the 1980 EPDA, which, in addition to authorizing environmental lawsuits
by recognized associations, included a NEPA-like requirement that administrative
authorities inform and consider the comments and objections of recognized social
organizations before approving any new economic activity likely to have substantial environmental impacts. Although this still did not amount to the broad public
participation rights guaranteed to American citizens under NEPA, the rights created in article 100 of the EPDA did enhance to some extent the enforceability of
environmental law in Poland.
In 1980, besides enacting the EPDA, the Sejm also amended the 1960 Code
of Administrative Procedure, providing, among other things, for increased participation in the administration of environmental protection (1980 Dz.U. No. 4,
item 8). These amendments did not go nearly so far, however, as article 100 of
the EPDA. Under the amendments to the Code of Administrative Procedure, recognized associations were permitted to intervene in administrative court suits
brought by others; but associations could not initiate administrative court suits of
their own (art. 31). This basically mirrored the right of associations to intervene
in civil suits under the 1964 Civil Code.
More important for public participation in environmental protection than the
provisions of either the Civil Code or the Code of Administrative Procedure were
the relevant sections of the 1984 Land-Use Planning Act (1984 Dz.U. No. 35,
item 185). Under article 29 of that statute, any interested individual or group had
the right to comment on or object to the contents of a local land-use plan within
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21 days after its promulgation. The law also ostensibly guaranteed public access
to regional plans (art. 14). Citizens’ comments on land-use plans were in no way
binding on local or regional authorities, but they were sometimes effective. Of
course, after the land-use plans were adopted, recognized organizations could
challenge them in court under article 100 of the 1980 EPDA. That the provisions
of the 1984 Land-Use Planning Act were only sporadically and incompletely
implemented did not negate their contribution to the enforceability of environmental protection requirements; they increased (at least in theory) citizens’ and
social groups’ access to and influence over the Party/state’s environmental protection apparatus.
Ultimately, however, the various public participation provisions discussed
in this section had only minor impacts on day-to-day enforcement (or lack of
enforcement) of environmental laws in People’s Poland. This is in stark contrast
to the experiences of other countries, including the United States, where citizens’ participation provisions have contributed significantly to environmental law
enforcement. There are at least two reasons similar provisions did not bring similar results in People’s Poland. First, Poland’s public participation rights were not
nearly so broad; citizens could intervene only in certain cases, in few forums, and
in limited ways. Most importantly, citizens were pretty much restricted to taking
action against polluters. Even after the 1980 amendments to the Code of Administrative Procedure, citizens had no real recourse against recalcitrant administrators.
They could sue ministers in the High Administrative Court for harm suffered from
specific administrative decisions in individual cases, such as industrial location
decisions and pollution permitting. But they could not sue for agency inaction,
including failure to implement the laws. In short, the public participation provisions in Poland’s environmental laws were insufficient to enhance enforceability
significantly. This conclusion should not come as a surprise, however, given the
totalitarian structure of the political system in People’s Poland (which is the subject of Chapter 4).

3.6. Exceptions that Swallowed the Rules
One final enforceability problem of environmental law in People’s Poland resulted
from the sweeping exceptions and exclusions from liability that were incorporated
into virtually every piece of legislation. These were political-economic ‘safety
valves,’ the legal means of last resort by which Party/state authorities could avoid
their own rules. It was not strictly necessary, of course, to provide such legal
mechanisms for avoiding environmental rules; the concept of ‘socialist democracy’ (discussed in Chapter 4, §4.1) gave the Party/state an extra-legal justification
for violating its own laws. But as the socialist system grew increasingly legalistic
in the years following Stalin’s death, it became common for the Party/state to provide strictly legal means for avoiding statutory mandates and regulatory norms.
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The relationship between legal exceptions and enforceability is clear. To the
extent laws provide exceptions from liability, they tend to undermine the purposes
for which liability was created in the first place. Every exception or exclusion in
a law affects enforceability; by its own terms, the law cannot be enforced against
activities or persons exempted or excluded by law from liability. But, of course,
every law has its limits, and enforceability analysis extends only so far as a law’s
intended application. We do not conclude, for example, that the American Clean
Air Act is ‘unenforceable’ because it does not regulate each and every air pollutant or polluter. Enforceability analysis is constrained by what the laws, as written,
actually set out to accomplish. That said, certain types of exceptions and exclusions from liability do affect enforceability.
We can distinguish between what might be called ‘simple’ exclusions on the
one hand, and ‘political’ exceptions on the other. An example of a simple exclusion is a statute that provides only limited coverage. For instance, a waste disposal law conceivably could apply to all waste producers, including individuals
or households. However, no country’s waste regulations require individuals or
households to obtain waste generation or disposal permits; permitting and licensing requirements are limited to industrial and commercial waste generators and
disposers. This kind of limitation obviously narrows the coverage of the regulation, but we would not say that it renders regulations ‘unenforceable’ with respect
to those who are not covered. With a political exception, by contrast, enforceability always is affected because such exceptions can be applied arbitrarily. Consider a hypothetical waste regulation that includes the following provision: This
regulation shall not apply to waste generators where the state authorities determine that the national interest dictates otherwise. Such a provision clearly would
compromise enforceability because it provides a legal means for authorities to
avoid enforcing the law whenever they choose. Stated generally, legal exceptions
or exclusions raise problems of enforceability when they provide for political or
economic expediency to trump legal rules on a case-by-case basis.

The ‘Higher Necessity’ Exception in Poland’s Penal Code
The most prominent example of this kind of broad political exception in Polish law was the ‘higher necessity’ exception of the 1969 Penal Code. Article 23,
section 2, of that Code permitted (and still permits today) the courts to waive
liability where the activity causing the violation furthers some ‘higher necessity.’ In practice, this exception was interpreted to create an economic balance:
if the ‘value’ of the activity causing the violation was greater than the ‘value’ of
the environmental harm, then liability could be waived.14 It was an express and
broad limitation on all criminal liability in People’s Poland, and it constrained
the enforceability of all substantive Penal Code provisions. Most importantly for
our purposes, the ‘higher (economic) necessity’ exception limited the enforce-
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ability of other statutes incorporating the Penal Code, including the 1980 EPDA.
As noted in Chapter 2, the 1980 EPDA expressly incorporated article 140 of the
1969 Penal Code, which criminalized activities causing intentional or negligent
threats to human life, health or property (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 107). The
EPDA also added new penal sanctions for causing ‘potential danger’ (art. 107),
negligently using pollution-control equipment (art. 108), and violating duties with
respect to environmental protection of agricultural and forest lands (art. 109).
Each of these offenses was subject to the ‘higher necessity’ exception provided in
article 23 of the Penal Code, which permitted judges and prosecutors to dismiss
summarily and without judicial review any criminal violation of the EPDA. Polluters could not have known before-the-fact whether they would be saved by the
‘higher necessity’ exception, but the availability of this broad political exception
certainly undermined environmental protection, and not just in theory. According
to one report, the majority of prosecutions for penal violations of the environmental protection laws were discontinued for reasons of ‘higher necessity’ (Mykietyn
and Radecki 1985, 38–40). Few criminal cases even made it into court.
Similar political exceptions from liability were written into the penal codes
of other Communist countries. For example, section 20 of East Germany’s Penal
Code excepted from punishment criminal conduct aimed at fulfilling a ‘higher
duty, that is, conduct that, under the circumstances, was more beneficial for
the socialist society and less harmful to state and social interests’ (discussed in
Radecki 1981, 221). As in Poland, the East German exception subordinated legal
rules to political decisions, with substantial implications for law enforceability. It
is interesting to note, by way of contrast, that such broad political exceptions are
not found in the criminal codes of ‘rule of law’ states. The West German Penal
Code came the closest, perhaps; it included exceptions from criminal liability
in sections 34 and 59. But these were different from the broad political exemptions provided for in the Communist penal codes mainly because the discretion
they provided to courts and prosecutors was clearly and distinctly limited. Section 34 was a typical necessity rule found in most contemporary criminal laws.
It permitted courts (or prosecutors) to excuse an offense, such as trespassing, in
order to avoid an imminent threat to life, limb or property; the perpetrator could
be released from criminal liability if the danger averted exceeded the harm caused
in averting it. Rather than balancing the economic interests of the state, section
34 merely balanced the harm caused against the harm averted. Section 59 of the
West German Penal Code permitted courts to let an offender off with a warning in
cases where (1) a substantial fine had already been incurred, (2) the court reasonably could anticipate that the perpetrator would, from that point on, lead a ‘lawabiding life,’ (3) the circumstances of the case suggested that a warning would
be preferable to punishment, and (4) punishment was not required ‘to defend the
legal order.’ Section 59 did not relieve perpetrators of liability, but gave courts
limited discretion in meting out punishments (see RGBI, S. 127, as revised on Jan.
2, 1975; B.G.B1 ‘I,’ S.1, as amended, as of Dec. 30, 1986).
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Balancing Individual and Social Interests under the Administrative
Procedures Code
The ‘higher (economic) necessity’ exception to environmental law responsibilities was available only for criminal offenses; it did not relieve polluters of civil
or administrative liability. But similar exceptions were provided in the Code of
Administrative Procedure. Articles 7 and 8 of that Code were interpreted in such a
way as to allow the High Administrative Court, in any environmental case, to balance individual interests against the public interest. This was problematic because
in a socialist country such as People’s Poland, the public interest always outweighed the private interest. Moreover, in environmental cases the public interest
commonly was on both sides of the dispute—the public interest in production
and development versus the public interest in environmental protection. How one
public interest prevailed over the other in such cases turned out to be a matter of
pure politics rather than law (or even legal politics).
The Code of Administrative Procedure’s public interest balancing test could
not take violators completely off the hook; it did not relieve them of liability
but was used after the finding of liability to determine the appropriate remedy.
The public interest could dictate that compensation be reduced or even denied.
And this created a disincentive for plaintiffs to sue in the first place, diluting
the enforceability of the environmental rules. Plaintiffs who took the trouble and
expense to bring a suit in administrative court could, and sometimes did, come
away with nothing to show for it but a worthless finding of liability.

Exceptions in the 1980 EPDA
The 1980 EPDA included its own broad political exception from liability.
Under article 82, every legal person and organizational unit was obligated to
do everything possible to protect the environment but, under section 3 of article
82, polluting activities could continue where the environmental harm could not
be prevented by technological or economic means. This exception was limited,
however, by the requirement that the polluter had to contribute to the Fund for
Environmental Protection ‘a sum of money corresponding to the amount of damage resulting from the environmental disturbance.’ Regional Party/state administrators were authorized to determine the amount of compensation based on the
same kind of ‘public interest’ analysis provided in the Code of Administrative
Procedures (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 82, sec. 2). And it was used to similar
effect. Legal standards of environmental protection were sacrificed by the ‘public
interest’ determinations of local bureaucrats. In practice, when polluting enterprises complained that they did not have the technology or money to avoid or
reduce the pollution, local administrators typically would let them off the hook if
they agreed to pay compensation for all environmental harm caused. How much
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did they have to pay? That was a matter for bargaining between the enterprise
and the bureaucrats, with no administrative oversight or judicial review. Article
82 thus undermined the enforceability of virtually all environmental protection
obligations under the 1980 EPDA, reducing them to matters for private negotiation between polluters and local bureaucrats, both of whom represented the same
political master.
Another provision of the EPDA had a similar impact. Article 71 permitted a
polluting activity to continue if it was found to be in the ‘public interest,’ which,
according to Eduard Radziszewski’s (1987, 141) commentaries on the EPDA,
meant that the activity was ‘crucial for the national economy.’ In such cases, the
authorities could (but did not have to) require the polluting facility to construct a
protective zone around its boundaries (1980 Dz.U. No. 3, item 6, art. 71, sec. 1).
This provision undermined the enforceability of environmental protection norms
by giving enterprises, industrial ministries and planners a wedge to use against
complying with environmental standards. True, it applied only to activities ‘crucial for the national economy.’ But in a planned economy where all economic
activities were closely integrated, so that bottlenecks in one sector often would
close down production in all others, what activity was not ‘crucial?’

Exceptions in Regulations
Even when the environmental statutes contained no provisions permitting political (i.e., discretionary) exceptions from liability, exceptions sometimes were fashioned in executory regulations. For instance, article 110 of the 1980 EPDA directed
regional administrative authorities to levy administrative fines on polluters for
violating legal norms under the 1980 EPDA or subsidiary regulations. There were
no statutory exceptions. The Council of Ministers was given responsibility for
determining ‘the amount, the principles, and the procedures for assessing financial penalties’ (art. 110, sec. 2). In its 1980 implementing decree, the Council of
Ministers authorized the environmental protection authorities to reduce administrative penalties on a case-by-case basis, according to some ‘rather enigmatically
formulated’ criteria (Sommer 1990b, 38). Under this regulation, bureaucrats had
complete discretion to reduce or completely rescind fines, thereby undermining
(in some cases completely) the purposes for which fines were imposed.
This is not to argue that administrative discretion in assessing penalties
always or necessarily undermines the law. As we shall see in Chapter 7, in postCommunist Poland the Ministry of Environmental Protection exercises statutory
discretion to waive administrative fines, but only if the polluting enterprise is in
the process of installing environmental protection equipment. If the environmental installations are completed within five years, the penalty is extinguished; otherwise, the penalty is reinstated and doubled (see Sommer 1990b, 38). This kind
of discretion may actually enhance the enforceability of environmental law. So
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it is not administrative discretion per se that undermines enforceability, but the
nature, extent and direction of the discretion.

3.7. Conclusion
Despite the broad political exceptions, the limitations on public participation,
weak penalties and various ambiguities, gaps and conflicts within the environmental laws of People’s Poland, those laws for the most part were enforceable.
They established suitable and achievable goals and legal obligations that were,
with notable exceptions, filled in with mostly (though not uniformly) adequate
administrative regulations. Those regulations were often undercut, however, by
weak financial incentives and penalties. The laws, no doubt, would have been
more enforceable had they been less ambiguous, with stronger and more certain
penalties.
It is interesting, if not particularly instructive, to wonder why Poland’s environmental laws and regulations frequently combined stringent legal standards
with relatively weak economic standards (fees) and penalties (fines). We can
only speculate about the reasons. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, enterprises
and their respective ministries exercised a good deal of influence over the entire
process of environmental regulation, including the establishment of both legal
standards and penalties. That cannot explain, of course, why the legal standards
were high but penalties low. There are, however, a couple of reasons we might
expect enterprises to have had more success influencing the level of penalties
than the substantive legal standards. First and foremost, they may have found it
much easier and more efficient to lobby only for low penalties. Legal norms were
the most visible part of the environmental laws, and the Party/state may have
wanted particularly strict norms to show the world that People’s Poland was at the
forefront of environmental protection. Meanwhile, the impact of those stringent
norms could quietly be cushioned by lax enforcement and low penalties. With
fees and fines set low enough, enterprises and industrial ministries would not
have cared much about relatively stringent legal norms. But this argument proves
too much. If the Party/state was only, or even primarily, concerned with image
(rather than effective environmental protection), it could easily have established
tough-looking penalties along with stringent legal norms. That would have made
Poland’s environmental laws appear even more impressive, but without consequence for socialist enterprises operating under soft budget constraints. (As we
shall see in Chapter 5, §5.5, the Party/state regularly reimbursed penalized enterprises with increased budget allocations.)
Although political efforts to undermine legal norms undoubtedly had some
effect on financial penalties and resource-use fees, there is, I think, a more compelling explanation: the low levels of fees and fines were incidental (and probably
unintentional) consequences of the socialist economic system’s endemic inability
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to price goods and resources accurately. In the absence of markets, it simply was
much more difficult (if not impossible) to determine where fines and fees should
be set to have the desired impact on polluting behavior and resource consumption.15 In theory, the authorities could have kept raising environmental charges
until they effected some change in enterprise behavior, but, given the soft budget constraints under which socialist enterprises operated, they may have been
completely insensitive to price signals at any level. No environmental legislation,
however perfect, could have resolved that problem.
It cannot be maintained, in any case, that the laws themselves were the primary cause of the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland. As we
shall see in Chapter 7, the 1980 EPDA is still on the books; it has been amended
several times since 1989, but remains structurally intact. While work continues
(as of this writing) on replacement legislation, the 1980 EPDA appears to be functioning much better today than it did in the former system. That in itself suggests
that Poland’s environmental protection problems had less to do with what the
laws provided (and failed to provide) than with political, economic and social factors that interfered with law enforcement. The next two chapters on, respectively,
the politics and economics of environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland
confirm this view.

Notes
1. For a concise exposition of the regulatory process in People’s Poland, see Sommer
(1984).
2. It is not possible to compare each and every air quality standard because, for some
standards, the two countries used different time averaging. For instance, in Poland the
maximum permissible annual mean concentration of airborne lead was 2 micrograms per
cubic meter; in the United States, the quarterly standard is 1.5 micrograms per cubic
meter.
3. Polish air pollution emissions standards were most recently amended in 1990 (1990
Dz.U. No. 15, item 92).
4. Of course, in the absence of monitoring capability, it would not matter whether the
limits were rational or arbitrary since they would be perfectly unenforceable in either case.
According to Dr. Jerzy Jendrośka of the Environmental Law Group at the Polish Academy
of Sciences (conversation of July 6, 1992), the lack of monitoring technologies was a major
problem for environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland: ‘the government really
had no means of monitoring emissions or determining when emissions levels from any
single plant exceeded the maximum.’
5. The ideological underpinnings of Soviet and East European laws on the free use of
land and water are discussed in Chapter 6 (§6.4). The Soviet Union finally instituted landuse charges shortly before its disintegration in 1990 (see 1990 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No.
10, item No. 129, art. 12).
6. This assumption seems warranted by the analysis in Chapter 2. It also accords with
the analysis in Mazurkiewicz (1986).
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7. The socialist reward structure and its implications for environmental protection are
discussed in Chapter 5 (§5.4).
8. Fee levels were increased a couple of times during the 1980s (see, e.g., 1987 Dz.U.
No. 41, item 290), but those changes do not affect the analysis.
9. These statistics are discussed in Chapter 5 (§5.3).
10. These reasons are all discussed in various sections of Chapters 4 and 5.
11. For a general discussion of the purposes, methods and uses of administrative sanctions for environmental protection in Poland and the other formerly socialist countries of
Europe, see Radecki (1985, esp. chap. 4).
12. This is not to assert either that America originated these legal forms or that the
American laws discussed here served as models for Polish law drafters (though they have
been generally influential throughout Europe). They are introduced merely to illustrate the
form.
13. On civil liability for environmental harm in Poland, see Radecki (1987).
14. For a more extensive discussion of the ‘higher necessity’ exception from Poland’s
Penal Code, and its economic interpretation, see Radecki (1981, 220–4).
15. On the problem of pricing in the socialist economic system, see Chapter 5 (§5.4).

Chapter 4
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS I: PARTY POLITICS
4.1. The Underenforcement of Environmental Law in People’s Poland
Poland’s environmental laws and regulations were generally enforceable, but that
was not enough to make them effective. Enforceability is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for effective legislation. Enacted laws must actually be implemented and enforced. As the Polish legal scholar Michał Kulesza (1988, 24) has
written, ‘the best law will be a dead letter unless its fulfillment is secured by
appropriate organization, personnel, and financial resources. A legal regulation in
itself has no causative force—neither in terms of its initial implementation or its
continuing application. Organization and proper outlays are indispensable.’ And
they depend, in turn, on the state’s political will; that is, the state must demonstrate a political commitment to enforce its environmental rules.
The failure of environmental protection under socialism was not a failure of
law so much as a failure of environmental law enforcement,1 signifying a lack of
political will, organization and economic investment. As we shall see throughout this chapter and the next, the Party/state did not sufficiently enforce its environmental regulations against violators. Few lawsuits were filed, and fewer still
resulted in judgments against polluters. Party/state authorities failed consistently
to assess and collect environmental fees and fines, which consequently had little
impact on polluting behavior. The limited potential of Poland’s environmental
laws was never realized.
In order to explain the failure of environmental protection, it is necessary to
explain why the laws were underenforced. A conventional explanation is that the
Party simply did not care about environmental protection despite its policy pronouncements and legislative efforts; to the extent the Communists were interested
in environmental protection at all, the argument goes, it was only for purposes of
deception and propaganda. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, this cynical view is
not supported by history. The Party had little reason, aside from genuine health and
welfare concerns, to make environmental protection a national political priority
in the early 1970s. It was under no domestic or international political pressure to
enact serious environmental legislation, yet it took substantial pains to do so. Any
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propaganda gains from those efforts would have been minimal since, at that time,
socialism was widely assumed (including among many capitalist economists) to
be inherently less destructive of the environment than capitalism. This myth was
reinforced at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm, when the capitalist countries of Europe and North America essentially
pleaded mea culpa for contaminating the planet (see Caldwell 1990, 57). Under
the circumstances, the propaganda value of Poland’s environmental laws would
have been disproportionate to the Party/state’s apparent efforts.
This chapter and the two that follow offer an alternative explanation of the
underenforcement of environmental law based on systemic features of the socialist economy, governing ‘principles’ of Party rule, and day-to-day political struggles within the Party/state’s administrative bureaucracy. Relevant economic and
ideological issues are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The present
chapter, meanwhile, focuses on four interrelated ‘political’ impediments to environmental protection under totalitarian socialism. First, there was continual friction between environmental law enforcement and certain ‘legitimacy principles’
that served to justify Party rule, most notably the promise of full employment and
the commitment to ever-increasing levels of industrial production and economic
growth; environmental interests necessarily were sacrificed to the ‘greater good’
of preserving the regime’s legitimacy. Second, those same ‘legitimacy principles’
led to an unbalanced power structure within the Party/state’s administrative hierarchy; industrial ministries and economic planners consistently dominated poorly
esteemed, paid, trained and equipped environmental protectors. This was especially and most unfortunately true at the local and regional levels of state administration, where primary responsibility for environmental law enforcement rested.
Third, the structure of law enforcement and the judicial system—especially the
tremendous (political) discretion of prosecutors and the incompetence of environmental crime investigators—hindered effective enforcement of environmental
laws. Fourth and finally, the Party/state stymied effective environmental protection by tightly controlling the flow of environmental information through state
secret and censorship laws.

4.2. Absolute Power, Environmental Corruption
To this point I have treated the law seriously as an integral component of environmental protection in People’s Poland; indeed, to the extent there was any
meaningful environmental protection at all, it came by way of laws and regulations. The fact remains, however, that law under socialism was a pliable instrument of totalitarian politics and economic policy.2 Without pressure from (real)
competitor parties and (real) public accountability, the significance (or lack of
significance) of environmental laws depended almost entirely on the Polish
Communist Party’s own initiative. As we have seen, the Party/state enacted some
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workable environmental regulations, but for various reasons it lacked sufficient
commitment to enforce them.
This section describes how the Polish Communist Party’s quest for total
power contributed generally to the failure of environmental protection. It begins
with a historical and ideological discussion of totalitarianism in People’s Poland.
In practice, totalitarian rule proved to be functionally incompatible with environmental protection.3 State environmental concerns consistently conflicted with
certain ‘legitimacy principles’ of Party rule, including the promise of full employment, based on the Party’s supposed representation of the working class, and the
ideological commitment to unsurpassed economic productivity and affluence
(defined not only in narrow economic terms but more broadly in terms of overall
quality of life). These ‘legitimacy principles’ trumped environmental protection
concerns when conflicts arose.

‘Socialist Democracy’ and Totalitarianism in People’s Poland
People’s Poland was a totalitarian state founded on the ideological rule of a presumptively infallible party, rather than on the ‘rule of law.’4 The Polish United
Workers’ Party (PZPR) held a virtual monopoly on political and economic power
in the state. As hegemon, it determined not only what the laws said but whether,
and to what extent, they were implemented and enforced. F. J. M. Feldbrugge
(1986, 15) has written that under communism ‘the spheres of law and politics are
not of equal rank; as an instrument of the state, law is subordinate to the Party.
Strictly speaking, there does not even exist any sector of law which is independent
of the Party and consequently the sphere of law is totally within the sphere of the
Party’ (see also Rot 1989, 210). On issues not central to Party concerns, the law
might be permitted to govern without political interference. But what was ‘central
to Party concerns’ could change at any time; new policy directives could override
even well-established laws. The Polish sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis (1992, 81)
has noted the lack of legal ‘permanence’ in People’s Poland, where rules were
‘subject to continual modification depending on the current interests of the prerogative state,’ regardless of parliamentary enactments. This subjugation of law to
politics is an inherent feature of totalitarian rule (see Podgórecki 1996, 12–14). By
definition, totalitarianism cannot coexist with the ‘rule of law,’ which, as Leszek
Kołakowski (1992, 17) has pointed out, ‘simply contradicts the illimitable and
arbitrary power of the Party.’
Ironically, the rule of Party over law was the law in People’s Poland and
throughout the Soviet bloc. The rule of Party was codified in the constitutional
doctrine of ‘socialist democracy’,5 which has been described as ‘[t]he paramount
feature of the Constitution,’ the sum total of all its goals (Sądowski 1976, 81).
‘Socialist democracy’ was a vacuous concept that could justify, however ambiguously, even contradictory Party/state policies. It had nothing to do with ‘democracy’
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as that term is commonly understood. Poles used to joke, What’s the difference
between democracy and socialist democracy? It’s the same difference as between
a chair and an electric chair. ‘Socialist democracy’ became a euphemism for anything the Party leadership chose to do. As the bearers of ideological truth, any path
they chose necessarily led to communism, that is, to perfect democracy. Meanwhile, political activities that deviated from the Party line necessarily led away
from communism and, therefore, from true democracy (see Nowe Drogi, Feb.
1970). So Poland’s Constitution was truly democratic, according to the doctrine
of ‘socialist democracy,’ when it prohibited associations ‘whose aim or activities
[were] directed against the political and social system’ (1952 Dz.U. No. 33, item
232). Adam Łopatka (1980, 35), a PZPR ideologue, explained:
Though the Polish People’s Republic is a democratic state, this does not mean it is
a liberal one which permits emergence in organized form of all political or social
aims and attitudes which actually exist in society. The Polish People’s Republic is
a state ruled by the dictatorship of the working class, it attaches the highest rank
of importance to the aims and interests of the working people which it represents
and fulfills. The state takes all necessary measures to prevent class enemies of the
working people carrying out their aims and purposes, judging them to be socially
harmful and detrimental, not only to the working people, but to the whole nation.
The Polish People’s Republic excludes the possibility of organized opposition to the socialist system and the policy conducted by the state leadership in
any form whatsoever. It also excludes the possibility of opposition groups of any
sort and kind taking over political power from the Polish United Workers Party
and allied parties, in the belief that this would threaten the most vital interests of
the working class and nation as a whole. The people did not take over responsibility for the country’s future by revolutionary means, only to hand it back
again to those classes and social strata which brought the Polish nation to the
very brink of biological extermination—classes and strata which in actual fact
no longer exist today.

If the Party ever discovered that legal rights, such as the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free assembly (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 85), conflicted
with its current conception of ‘socialist democracy,’ it could simply and justifiably
dispense with those rights. Current Party policy, as the embodiment of ‘socialist democracy,’ prevailed over the law (see Kamiński 1991, 28). This was, of
course, consistent with Lenin’s conception of a proletarian dictatorship unfettered
by (inherently bourgeois) legal constraints (see Parkin 1979, 180).
Although the principle of ‘socialist democracy’ justified direct Party governance, the PZPR rarely sought to rule Poland directly; it preferred to operate
behind the façade of the state structures it created and indisputably controlled.
The reasons for this were more instrumental than ideological. By separating itself
from the government while retaining control over government policy, the Party
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could evade responsibility for policy failures. Thus, for example, the Party could
maintain that environmental protection was its—and, therefore, the nation’s—top
priority even while state enterprises and industrial ministries flouted environmental rules. Only in times of political crises—during Martial Law for instance—
did the Party ‘take over’ the government. However, the Party and state never
constituted ‘a dual structure of power,’ as some (such as Groth 1972, 25) have
maintained. It may have been a dual structure of government, but there was no
real bifurcation of power. Even when the Party strategically divorced itself from
day-to-day governance, as it did following Party Plenums in 1963 and 1967 (see
Taras 1984, 83), this did not constitute a delegation of Party power to state authorities; ‘all important political decisions’ continued to be taken ‘outside of the state
organs,’ that is, by the Party (Pusylewitsch 1986, 319). Each government department had a counterpart or mirror in the Party apparatus, and substantive government decisions had to be preapproved by the relevant department of the PZPR’s
Central Committee. So any separation of functions between Party and government was more apparent than real. As Marian Rybicki (1982, 41) has observed,
the Party, in effect, constituted a super-government (see Pusylewitsch 1986, 322).
That is why I refer to the former Communist regimes as ‘Party/states.’
State institutions were well designed to serve the Party’s interest. The institution of central economic planning gave the Party plenary control over the national
economy; high-ranking Party officials ultimately decided all important economic
issues concerning resources allocation, production targets, prices, wages and
bonuses.6 The Party controlled access to a quarter of a million positions at all
levels of government, industry and the media through the infamous nomenklatura system of privilege and promotion;7 anyone wishing to serve in any branch
of government, including environmental protection, could do so only with the
Party’s blessing. Within its own ranks, the Party leadership maintained strict control over the rank-and-file through the pyramidal structure of the Party and the
constitutional principle of ‘democratic centralism.’ To Western eyes, this Leninist principle may appear oxymoronic, as the very concept of democracy suggests
diffused rather than centralized power. However, all political systems, even open
and democratic societies, impose limits on democratic participation to enable
effective governance. In the American and West European systems, democracy is
limited through the process of electoral representation and rules of legislative (or
parliamentary) procedure that control debate, ensuring that decisions ultimately
will be taken. In theory, ‘democratic centralism’ is simply another approach to
the same problem: all members of the Party may participate in policy discussions; these discussions inform decision makers at the highest echelons of the
Party hierarchy (as representatives of the rank-and-file); the Party leaders then
make the decisions, which bind all beneath them in the Party pyramid. However,
the phrase ‘democratic centralism’ is ambiguous at best. It does not tell us how
to balance the two extremes of untempered democracy and complete centralization of decision making. For that, we must look to the practice of socialist coun-
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tries. In People’s Poland and throughout the Soviet bloc, the balance was struck
consistently far to the ‘centralism’ end of the continuum. In the application of
‘democratic centralism,’ the term ‘democratic’ came to mean nothing more than
limited and often meaningless discussion by Party members at various levels.
Decisions were taken at the top, and Party leaders could reach decisions however
they pleased, for any reason or no reason at all. The only effective limitation was
that the decision makers had to be careful to preserve sufficient support within
Party ranks to ward off potential intra-Party rivals. ‘Democratic centralism’ in
practice proved to be a tool of pure authoritarianism (much as Leon Trotsky predicted it would when Lenin first enunciated the principle: see Waller 1981, 28). In
the Soviet Union, it led inexorably to Stalin’s ‘cult of personality.’ In Poland, it led
to what Gramsci called ‘bureaucratic centralism,’ a condition in which the Party
leadership becomes ‘a narrow clique which tends to perpetuate its selfish privileges by controlling or even stifling the birth of oppositional forces’ (Hoare and
Nowell-Smith 1971, 168). This was, in fact, the precise purpose of ‘democratic
centralism.’ Party leaders sought to maximize Party unity by quelling internal dissent that, if left unchecked, might have led to the formation of factions. Chapter 3,
article 19, of the PZPR’s party statute clearly articulated this purpose:
Internal party democracy and the freedom to discuss and criticize cannot be hindered and limited, but equally they cannot be taken advantage of for purposes
conflicting with the ideology and policy of the party as well as its political and
organizational unity. Particularly inadmissible are activities of a fractional character, which depend upon the formation of a formalized group within the party
which popularizes a separate program, political line, or organizational principles
and which forms an autonomous, discretionary center in relation to the statutory
party authorities. (Translated in Stanford 1984, 343)

Factions were considered dangerous because they tended to weaken the Party,
rendering it susceptible to outside challenges. While the Party struggled to extinguish (or co-opt) external political opposition, it could hardly have been expected
to tolerate dissent and opposition within its own ranks. Totalitarian mechanisms
had to be applied internally as well as externally to ensure the Party’s—and the
system’s—survival.

Environmental Protection and the Party’s ‘Legitimate’ Claim to Power
Much has been written about Communist parties and their tendency to devolve
from institutions promoting the advent of communism into giant, self-sustaining
holding companies of political and economic privilege (see, e.g., Clark and Wildavsky 1990, esp. chap. 6). In Poland, the Party’s overriding concern was to perpetuate and maximize its own political and economic rule. All other goals and
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aims of the socialist state, including environmental protection, were subordinated
to that paramount self-interest. This was true, of course, throughout the Soviet
bloc. In the Czech Republic, a 1990 report prepared for the Ministry of the Environment (Vavroušek 1990, 13) concluded that ‘[t]he primary goal of the CPC
[Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], unambiguously superior to all other goals,
was, from the beginning, to build up and consolidate totalitarian power.’
Ironically perhaps, the Party’s overriding concern with self-preservation
imposed certain constraints on what the Party itself could do. As Leszek
Kołakowski (1992, 12) has written, ‘a totalitarian communist regime could not
survive without taking its legitimacy from the ideological principles that established its place in history and its unlimited rights to keep its subjects in eternal
serfdom and to expand as much as feasible.’ The Party could justify its continued monopoly on political and economic power only so long as it adhered to the
ideological principles that legitimized its rule. In this respect, ideology continued to be vitally important in People’s Poland and the entire Soviet bloc long
after almost everyone stopped believing in it (accord Pakulski 1987, 140). Certain
features of the Marxist–Leninist ideology—what I call ‘legitimacy principles’—
continued to serve as justifications for Communist Party rule. They included (at
least) the following three principles: (1) the socialist system’s claimed potential to
achieve greater economic efficiency and levels of production than capitalism; (2)
the promise of full employment, codified in the constitutional right to work; and
(3) the commitment to egalitarianism and social welfare. These principles were
important not so much as ends in themselves but as means to the end of justifying
Party hegemony; they served to legitimize Party rule (at least for the Party itself).
Conflicting social or economic policies simply had to be sacrificed for the greater
good of Party survival. As Hannah Arendt (1973, 462) noted, the higher legitimacy
principles flowing from the totalitarian regime’s ideology trumped ‘petty legality.’
Indeed, that is precisely what happened whenever environmental protection
concerns conflicted with the legitimacy principles of maximal economic production and full employment. Environmental interests simply could not compete—
which is not necessarily to say that the Party was acting disingenuously when it
adopted environmental protection as the nation’s foremost political priority at its
1975 Seventh Party Congress. The addition of environmental provisions to the
Constitution in 1976 and enactment of substantial environmental protection and
land-use legislation in the 1980s suggest, on the contrary, that the Party sincerely
sought to improve environmental protection. And it would be a mistake to view
the ‘legitimacy principles’ of maximal economic production and full employment simply as competing interests of the Party/state, on a par with environmental interests. They were ideological imperatives that constituted the Party’s very
reason for existence.8
To maximize economic production was the paramount goal of the socialist economic system (see Goldman 1972a, 189; Sommer 1991, 109), mandated
(initially) by orthodox Marxist theory that premised the socialist system’s ‘supe-
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riority’ to capitalism, at least in part, on its greater economic potential (see, e.g.,
S. Gomułka 1986, 42; Grundmann 1991, 147). This ideological imperative, as
glossed by Lenin and Stalin, became ‘the Soviet-type development strategy,’
which was imposed on Poland and the Soviet Union’s other Central and East
European satellites at the close of the 1940s. The engine of growth in that strategy was heavy industry (see Fallenbuchl 1970, 458–60). The state became the
‘instrument of the Party par excellence’ (Rensenbrink 1988, 59); its administrative structures and centrally planned economic system were all designed to foster
heavy industrial production.
I have much more to say about the nature of economic production under
socialism and the socialist reward system in Chapter 5, and in Chapter 6 I discuss
some of the ideological bases of socialism’s production bias in the writings of
Marx, Engels and Lenin. For now, the important point is that the supposed productive superiority of the socialist system supported and legitimized, at least initially, the Communist Party’s claim to power. As Barbara Jancar (1987, 123) has
written (of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), ‘[t]he whole concept of the leading
role of the party rests on the premise that the party knows best how to increase
material abundance in preparation for the eventual advent of communism.’
In Poland, up until the mid-1960s, the PZPR could claim some legitimacy
from socialism’s presumed productive superiority, as Poland’s development gap
with the West narrowed. However, Poland’s rate of growth soon began to fall,
and by the middle of the 1970s socialism’s supposed inherent economic superiority was exposed as a myth. Nevertheless, production rates continued to dominate environmental protection interests. Unconvincing Party rhetoric still spoke
to the superior productive potential of socialism, but from that time to the end
of the Communist era the primacy of production was justified by reasons of
national economic necessity (meaning survival) rather than reasons of ideology.
Meanwhile, the various state and administrative structures established during the
Stalinist period to support industrial production remained in place.
The effect of Poland’s industrial production bias on environmental protection
activities was predictable. Environmental law enforcement simply was not permitted to interfere with production that the Party/state considered centrally important (see Gustafson 1981, 115). As I indicated in Chapter 3 (§3.5), the authorities
never closed down or suspended production at enterprises for purely environmental reasons; economic production was always the paramount consideration. This
explains why, for example, socioeconomic plans consistently dominated land-use
plans. As a legal matter, land-use plans were supposed to have equal and, in some
cases, greater weight, but, in practice, they frequently were ignored; many, if not
most, economic development activities went forward without regard for environmental consequences.9 Some (such as Jendrośka 1993b, 105–7) have argued that
this was largely a function of power relations within the administrative hierarchy, where industrial interests dominated environmental interests. However, as
we shall see in the next section of this chapter, those power relationships them-
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selves were consequences of the Party/state’s production bias. And as we shall
see in Chapter 5 (§5.4), the basic reward (wage/bonus) structure of the socialist
economic system also promoted production over environmental protection.
If production was the paramount goal of the socialist economic system, full
employment was the Party’s supreme legitimacy principle, the key platform that
distinguished the self-appointed ‘workers’ party.’ Only the Communist Party
promised employment to each and every citizen. Indeed, one of the few meaningful individual rights guaranteed by Poland’s Communist Constitution was the
right to work (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 68, as amended). Unlike most other
rights supposedly (but not actually) secured by the Constitution, the right to work
consistently was interpreted to impose an actual ‘duty’ on the state to secure jobs
for all citizens (see Matey 1978). People’s Poland labelled itself a ‘workers’ state,’
and its leading political force, the Polish United Workers’ Party, could hardly
claim to represent the working class if it did not espouse the right to work.
The right to work had various consequences for environmental protection
in the Party/state. Although a commitment to full employment need not conflict
with environmental protection, the two goals certainly did conflict in People’s
Poland. In 1983, the Polish government adopted a plan for achieving compliance
with state air pollution standards in the heavily industrialized and polluted Katowice voivodship. In order to achieve compliance, region-wide emissions had to be
reduced by more than 90 percent. According to a report issued by the International
Labour Organization (1989, 11–12), that plan was scrapped after the authorities
determined that it would cost more than 1 million jobs in the region. It simply was
not possible for the Party/government to guarantee full employment while enforcing diligently its environmental laws. To a significant extent, environmental law
enforcement was sacrificed to the ‘greater good’ of full employment.
Throughout the Soviet Bloc, the environmental consequences of the ‘right
to work’ were not just theoretical or statistical. The best illustration comes from
Siberia where, according to the dissident writer Ze’ev Wolfson (Boris Komarov
[pseud.] 1980, 69–70), cities of felled trees were left rotting by the train tracks,
waiting for trains that never came. A Deputy of the Supreme Soviet rationalized
this wastage by raising the constitutional right to work: ‘There are people out
there in the taiga and they have to be paid their wages. We set up the lumber camp
and brought people there. They have the right to work, and they are not responsible for our problems with the railroad cars.’ The effect, for Wolfson, was to
‘pervert the very notion of work,’ persuading the loggers that ‘turning the majestic
cedar woods into mold and rot was a decent job.’

Environmental Protection and the Party’s Illegitimate Abuse of Power
Environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland was hindered not only by
fundamental legitimacy principles of Communist Party rule but by personal and
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bureaucratic corruption. Such corruption is endemic to totalitarian regimes, which,
by definition, exercise power without accountability. Unfortunately, the lack of
accountability also made acts of corruption difficult to trace, but a few cases did
come to light in People’s Poland. One particularly illustrative case, recounted by
Maria Łoś (1988, 162–3), concerned the construction of Poland’s giant Katowice
Foundry in the mid-1970s. The project’s stated goal was environmental: to replace
several obsolete and highly polluting foundries with a single new one that would
be cleaner and more efficient. That ostensible purpose masked ulterior personal
motives of Party leaders in the Gierek Administration. Gierek’s Deputy Minister
of Metallurgical Industry, in particular, was determined ‘to leave a lasting monument to commemorate his triumphant career.’ So he chose his birthplace in the
Katowice region as the site for the new foundry, without regard for environmental
conditions or consequences. In fact, the chosen location was just about the worst
possible from both environmental and economic perspectives. The foundry site
was economically inefficient because it was located far from lines of transportation
connecting it to the mines that supplied its raw materials. And the area was unsuitable environmentally because it was already highly industrialized, congested and
polluted. The new foundry added to existing environmental problems; it ‘deprived
the neighboring, highly populated area of drinking water . . . and devastated the
green belt created purposefully to improve air quality’ in the region. The Deputy
Minister obviously was unconcerned with such details. Not only was the foundry
constructed outside of existing land-use plans, it was not even included in national
or regional socioeconomic plans. The entire 500 billion zloty project was designed
and constructed outside of the law. A similar episode occurred in 1988, just before
the end of communism in Poland, when the Deputy President (Vice-Mayor) of
Warsaw negotiated an agreement with a West German-led consortium to build a
new international airport (Okęcie II). Warsaw city officials agreed, without legal
authority, to waive statutory environmental conditions for the project.10 The Katowice Foundry and Okęcie II Airport episodes were neither unique nor common.
But they exemplified the status of law under communism.

4.3. Industrial Interests versus Environmental Protection
in the Party/State’s Administrative Hierarchy
The Party/state’s predominant concern for industrial production and full employment also helps to explain another contributing factor to the underenforcement
of environmental law in People’s Poland: the utter domination of environmental
officials by industrial ministries and even enterprise managers. Administrative
posts with responsibilities related to the Party’s ‘legitimacy principles’ were quite
naturally more powerful and prestigious than positions in ministries dealing with
issues of secondary concern, such as environmental protection. Environmental
officials were, in comparison, poorly trained, equipped, paid and esteemed. When
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interministerial conflicts or disputes arose—and they arose often—power and
prestige mattered a great deal. Such conflicts were resolved not according to specific legal mechanisms or administrative procedures, but by intra-Party politics,
with the same result in most cases: environmental law enforcement was subordinated to industrial and economic interests. Sometimes the stakes were enormous,
as in 1972 when the Central Water Management Board was abolished in the wake
of a reputed intra-Party rivalry. But in most cases the political subordination of
environmental protection interests may or may not have been deliberate Party
policy. It was, however, a predictable by-product of the Party/state’s administrative structure (see Kabala 1993a, 55–6).
Where environmental protection was concerned, Poland’s industrial ministries most often exercised their clout to avoid economic charges levied under the
1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act. As previously discussed in
Chapter 3 (§§3.3 and 3.4), environmental fees and fines were designed to induce
enterprises to reduce pollution emissions and conserve resources. But collections
often were impeded or undermined by political interference from industrial
ministries, enterprise associations and central planners. Enterprises and their
supporters in the Party/state’s administrative hierarchy frequently lobbied the
Minister of Environmental Protection to waive assessed fees and fines, complaining that they could not avoid violating environmental standards because the central
authorities failed to allocate funding for environmental protection installations.
This was a legitimate complaint. Environmental investments depended, in the
first instance, on administratively allocated resources. If the center did not provide
the necessary funding for environmental improvements, how could enterprises be
expected to comply with stringent environmental standards? In the face of such a
patently reasonable argument, the relatively powerless environmental protection
officials could do little but waive the penalties. Occasionally the Environment
Minister held firm and refused to rescind assessed fees and fines, but even then
the effect often was blunted by planning authorities, who regularly compensated
penalized enterprises with increased budget allocations or tax deductions (see
Taga 1986, 75). Article 110, section 4, of the 1980 EPDA expressly prohibited
the state from compensating self-financed enterprises (rozrachunek gospodarczy)
for environmental charges. But this provision was largely unenforced and, in any
event, it did not apply to the vast majority of polluting enterprises in Poland that
were not self-financed. There is no question that the Party/government could have
made environmental fines stick, for example by applying them against enterprise
bonuses. The fact that the Party/government did not do so signifies its inability or
unwillingness to put its own house in order. It could not (or would not) balance the
powers within the administrative structures it created and indisputably controlled.
The Party could have strengthened environmental protectors within the administrative hierarchy, but perhaps only by renouncing some of its own ‘legitimacy
principles.’ That, however, was unacceptable for the obvious reason that it would
have weakened Party authority.
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4.4. Environmental Law Enforcement and the Judicial System
The Polish judicial system played a central role in environmental law enforcement. The 1980 EPDA created duties and liabilities for environmental protection,
incorporating provisions from the Civil and Criminal Codes (see the discussion
of environmental duties and liabilities in Chapter 2, §2.5), and article 100 of the
EPDA authorized officially sanctioned organizations to file lawsuits against polluters. These enforcement mechanisms presumed a court system that would apply
the laws and penalize violators.
Prior to the 1980 EPDA, Polish courts heard very few environmental cases;
of 4,754 civil cases brought between 1978 and 1980, only 117 were on matters
relating (broadly) to environmental protection (Jendrośka and Nowacki 1991,
46). After the 1980 EPDA was enacted, the number of environmental complaints
received by prosecutors grew, but they did not lead to more criminal and civil prosecutions. In 1982, regional and local environmental protection authorities notified prosecutors of 110 criminal violations of the EPDA and other environmental
laws, but formal charges were filed in only nine cases, and four of those cases
subsequently were dismissed (Mykietyn and Radecki 1985, 27). Even though the
EPDA clearly was intended to increase criminal and civil liabilities for environmental offenses, relatively few cases ever made it into court. This was a combined
consequence of direct and indirect political interference in judicial affairs and the
sheer incompetence of environmental law enforcement investigators.

The Party and the Courts
Politics intruded into the daily conduct of the judicial system by design. Totalitarianism could not, after all, tolerate a truly independent judiciary. As the Italian
legal scholar Mauro Cappelletti (1985, 8) has written, ‘no effective system of
judicial control is compatible with, and tolerated by, anti-libertarian, autocratic
regimes, whether they place themselves at the left or the right of the political
spectrum.’ In People’s Poland, judges were declared by the Constitution to be
‘independent’ (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 62), but that was nothing more
than propaganda. For one thing, it was effectively contradicted by other constitutional provisions stipulating that the courts were to be ‘custodians of the social
and political system of the Polish People’s Republic’ (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36,
art. 58), which implied that the courts had political and social obligations beyond
their nominal judicial responsibilities. Poland’s Constitution also provided that
no right or authority could be exercised contrary to the socialist aims of the Polish state; and those aims were determined exclusively by the Polish Communist
Party, the constitutionally anointed ‘leading political force of society in the building of socialism’ (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, art. 3, sec. 1). Ultimately, it did not
matter whether the Constitution guaranteed judicial independence for, as we saw
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in Chapter 2, the Constitution itself was without direct legal force. Constitutional
provisions were not self-executing, but required activation by parliamentary legislation (see M. Brzezinski 1993a, 167; Frankowski 1987, 1312–13). This was
confirmed in 1955, when the Polish Supreme Court ruled that ‘[c]onstitutional
norms . . . [are] unsuitable for direct practical application in the everyday life of
society without being expanded in ordinary statutes and other normative acts’
(quoted in M. Brzezinski and Garlicki 1995a, 24). Mark Brzezinski (1993a, 168)
has noted that this ruling placed the legal status of the Constitution beneath that
of ordinary legislation and even administrative regulations (also see Frankowski
1988, 743). More accurately, I think, it meant that the Constitution had no real
‘legal’ status at all.
Regardless of the Constitution, the reality was that everyone working within
the judicial system, including judges, was subject to various legal, political and
economic means of Party control. Not only was this true during the Stalinist era,
but it persisted to the end of communism in Poland. All judicial positions were
within the nomenklatura system, which gave the Party substantial leverage over
the entire court system.11 As usual, the main qualification for these posts was Party
loyalty, rather than legal education, acumen or experience. It was possible for
non-Party members to become judges, but one could not become or long remain
a judge without acquiescing to the PZPR. Supreme Court judges were appointed
for five-year terms, renewable subject to a favorable political evaluation by the
Minister of Justice and the Council of State. A judge could be dismissed in midterm if his or her performance or political reliability was found lacking; this was
the Party’s means of disposing of pro-Solidarity judges in the wake of Martial
Law, for example (see Łoś 1984, 196). Politically reliable judges decided cases
not just on the basis of law but also by applying general policy guidelines and,
sometimes, specific instructions from higher Party organs and officials. Party pronouncements were on a par with statutes, regulations and other sources of ‘law’
(Groth 1972, 42; Łoś 1988, 49); any judge who disregarded them was subject
to dismissal and, at least during the Stalinist period, possible imprisonment for
violating ‘the people’s legality.’ Throughout the history of People’s Poland, the
judges’ first responsibility was ‘to conscientiously fulfil their duties to the party’
(quoted in Torańska 1987, 51). To ensure that they did, the Party maintained an
office within each court (and in every other law enforcement body) (Łoś 1988,
154). Court activities were monitored closely so that the Party knew when judges
acted independently of the Party line. Maverick judges were quickly and publicly
reprimanded for deviating from ‘the class approach to the administration of justice’ (W. Gomułka 1959, 147).
In case these political controls proved insufficient, the Party also grasped the
judiciary by the pocketbook. Judges’ incomes were not fixed by law, so they could
be—and were in fact—manipulated according to political criteria (Kurczewski
1993, 70). The salaries of Polish judges were tied to performance indicators,
such as conviction rates and total fines levied in a year (Łoś 1988, 49). Another
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important performance indicator was a judge’s level of servility to Party bosses;
a better-behaved judge was likely to be a better-paid judge. Judicial salaries were
low to begin with, reflecting the relatively low social status of judges in the socialist system. According to government statistics, in the 1980s Polish judges earned
on average 5 percent less per month than middle-level prosecutors and 40 percent
less than the General Procuracy (see Kurczewski 1993, 78). The fact that the system valued prosecutors more highly than judges was entirely consistent with the
socialist theory of justice. As Inga Markovits (1978, 626) has put it, ‘[a] socialist
figure of justice would not be blindfolded, but seeing, and she would show the
way with outstretched arm and pointing finger.’

Direct Political Interference in Environmental Cases
Despite the fact that PZPR controlled the judiciary, it should not be assumed that
the Party habitually interfered with judicial proceedings. In environmental cases,
at least, there seems to have been relatively little direct Party interference. Some
environmental investigations and cases may have been intentionally derailed,
though evidence of tampering is hard to come by. Certainly, Party influence could
have been brought to bear in rather subtle ways. For example, in 1985 the League
for Nature Conservation, an officially recognized but nominally independent
organization, sued a plant in Szczeciń (in western Poland) under article 100 of
the EPDA to enjoin its emissions of toxic air pollutants. The court declared that
it did not know enough about environmental protection to decide the matter, so
it ordered the plaintiff to provide an environmental expert for the court’s benefit.
The League could not afford to hire an expert, so it had to drop the suit. Was this
a case of political interference? Perhaps, if the court knew in advance that the
League could not afford to hire an expert and so would have to drop the case.
Anyway, the court probably should have known that its order would have a chilling effect on other environmental plaintiffs. If the Nature Conservation League’s
case was politically determined, it goes to show just how subtle Party influence
could be in the judicial process. The PZPR never had to announce its position
(if it had one) publicly to ensure a certain result; it did not have to leave a paper
trail of memoranda or letters. A quiet behind-closed-doors comment or phone call
was usually the most that was ever required, and in many cases even that was
unnecessary. The system itself was designed so that judges, prosecutors and law
enforcement investigators simply understood how certain circumstances should
be treated, without shedding the façade of fairness and impartiality.12
In addition, there were purely legal means for resolving political cases. In
Chapter 3 (§3.6), I discussed various exceptions and exclusions from liability
in Polish law. Foremost among them was the ‘higher necessity’ exception from
article 23 of the 1969 Penal Code (1969 Dz.U. No. 13, item 94). A prosecutor
could suspend any criminal suit or investigation, on his own initiative or on the
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recommendation of Party superiors, simply by deciding that the activity causing
the environmental violation was of overriding importance to the national economy. This constituted a final decision terminating all proceedings, usually even
before formal charges were filed. The ‘higher necessity’ ruling was not subject to
judicial review, and it did not have to be published. And though it applied only to
criminal cases, there were other legal mechanisms for avoiding liability in civil
and administrative cases. Specifically, the courts employed balancing tests, which
weighed the individual’s interest in seeking civil or administrative redress against
society’s interest in the polluting activity. These balancing tests served the same
purpose as the 1969 Penal Code’s ‘higher necessity’ exception. With such simple
legal mechanisms for avoiding politically (and economically) troublesome environmental cases, the Party had little need to resort to extra-legal methods.
Still, the extent of (direct or indirect) political interference in the adjudication
of environmental cases should not be exaggerated. Cases that made it into court
usually were decided strictly by the book. Indeed, the very fact that a case made
it into court suggested that the Party was not overly concerned, so the law could
be permitted to govern. Wojciech Radecki (1991a) collected criminal, civil and
administrative environmental law cases from the 1970s and 1980s in a single slim
volume. Some of these cases demonstrated the real potential of Poland’s environmental laws. For example, in 1982 the Supreme Court required a chemical storage
facility to dig a new well for neighboring residents after the plant contaminated
their existing water supply (see Radecki 1991a, 65–6). In 1986, the High Administrative Court upheld a fine against a regional waterworks and sewage company for
water pollution discharges. The company argued that the fine should be rescinded
because it did not generate the sewage in the first place, it was not provided with
funds to install equipment to treat the sewage, and its discharges were necessary
and unavoidable. But the court found those arguments irrelevant because the law
was not fault based; so long as the company discharged the waste that caused the
harm, it was liable (see Radecki 1991a, 17–18). The High Administrative Court
almost never rescinded environmental fines despite repeated protests from polluters that the fines were contrary to ‘social justice’ because they were technically
unable to comply with the regulations (see Radecki 1991a, 22–5).13 In these and
many other cases, the courts dutifully applied and enforced the environmental
laws and regulations. So, Poland’s environmental laws could be effective; the
main problem was getting cases into court.

The Incompetence of Environmental Law Enforcement Personnel
Political interference was neither the only nor the predominant impediment to
judicial enforcement of the environmental laws. A more common problem was
the sheer incompetence of environmental law enforcement personnel and judges.
This was to some extent an indirect (and perhaps unintended) consequence of
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the Party/state’s dedication (for ideological and practical reasons) to industrial
production and full employment. The best and brightest young aparatczyki were
attracted to better-paying and more prestigious positions in the Party hierarchy,
industrial ministries and planning bureaus. Incompetency was also an endemic
by-product of the nomenklatura system, which valued Party loyalty over education, experience and talent. Consequently, many judges, prosecutors and law
enforcement personnel lacked the necessary skills to handle complex and technical environmental cases. We have seen (in the 1985 Nature Conservation League
case) how lack of competence could affect the outcome of environmental lawsuits; the average judge in People’s Poland was poorly equipped to deal with
technical and complex environmental law issues. This added to the plaintiffs’
burden: not only did they have to prove their cases, but they had to educate the
judges about the law and environmental science at the same time. Incompetence
was an even greater problem at the initial law enforcement level. Many of those
responsible for investigating and reporting on environmental complaints simply
lacked the skill and experience to gather evidence carefully for trials, and their
lack of competency killed many cases before they ever reached the courts; reports
were so legally or factually defective that prosecution became impossible. Karol
Mykietyn and Wojciech Radecki (1985) investigated the disposition of 32 criminal complaints filed in 1982 for violations of environmental rules. Among the
legal problems they catalogued were reports of environmental violations based
on repealed regulations and investigations that failed to establish the elements of
a statutory offense. Many reports were factually incomplete, lacking such vital
information as responsible parties, causes and test data on environmental damage.
For example, in 1982 a complaint was filed in Gorzów Wielkopolski about a fish
kill in the Warta River, but the investigator’s report neglected to identify the perpetrator; the prosecutor who subsequently received the report had no idea whom
to prosecute. A similar case in Ostroda could not be prosecuted because investigators failed to take samples of the polluted water or dead fish; there was not enough
evidence for the prosecutor to prove a violation of the environmental laws. In
Cieszyn, investigators filed a report about contamination of the Wisła (Vistula)
River, but failed to include any information about the perpetrator, the extent of
damage or the level of threat posed by the contamination. In none of these cases
did investigators consult the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate, despite
its (supposed) competence and legal responsibility to cooperate with local and
regional authorities in environmental investigations. On the other hand, in the
few cases where environmental inspectors did participate, they too seemed blissfully unaware that the purpose of their investigations was to gather evidence for
criminal trials. These problems so severely impeded effective environmental law
enforcement that in 1984 Poland’s Chief Prosecutor recommended that environmental investigations be taken over personally by regional and local prosecutors, with the assistance, when necessary, of environmental experts (Mykietyn and
Radecki 1985, 27, 30–1, 39). This recommendation was never implemented, but
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it probably would not have made much difference anyway; the number of environmental complaints leading to successful prosecutions would likely have stayed
about the same. Perhaps prosecutors would have done a better job of collecting
evidence for trial, but given their other responsibilities they would have had much
less time to spend investigating and reporting on environmental complaints.
Lack of competence was also a problem within regulated enterprises. Workers with pollution control responsibilities were underpaid and underappreciated,
compared with workers with ‘productive’ responsibilities. Environmental protection activities were not considered ‘productive’ because they did not contribute to
the achievement of plan production targets. On the contrary, environmental efforts
tended to impede the fulfillment of plan targets, jeopardizing enterprise ‘profits,’ in the form of bonuses that could amount to one-half or more of managers’
and workers’ annual salaries.14 In addition to being ‘unproductive,’ environmental
protection activities were largely unnecessary from the enterprise point of view
because penalties for non-compliance almost always could be avoided (through
the political mechanisms already discussed). So environmental protection responsibilities were seen as little more than a nuisance to be avoided.
Pollution control responsibilities typically were given over to untrained functionaries—the less competent the better, from management’s perspective. According to a 1979 report, 25 percent of air-polluting plants in Poland had no employees
with special training in environmental engineering (Wiadomości Statystyczne,
Dec. 1979). John Kramer (1983, 214) tells a story about a worker in Czechoslovakia who was publicly honored for his contribution to energy conservation after he
shut off power to his plant’s pollution-control equipment. That could be a tall tale,
but it contains more than a hint of truth. In fact, during energy shortages in Poland,
when enterprises were required to reduce their power consumption, pollutioncontrol equipment was always switched off first (see Nowe Drogi, July 1980).

4.5. Environmental Information, State Secrets and Censorship
The very nature of totalitarianism determined that the Party/state would strictly
control access to information, including environmental information. After all,
in the history of the world no totalitarian regime ever has coexisted with a free
press. In People’s Poland, the Communist authorities started from the position
that everything was a secret unless publication was expressly authorized. Information was allocated, like other resources in the Party/state, from the center. That
was true even for information circulating within the administrative bureaucracy.
Ministries rarely exchanged information voluntarily; industry officials and enterprise managers certainly did not willingly provide environmental protection officials with information about pollution emissions levels. Barbara Jancar (1987,
163) has referred to this as a ‘game of “territory.”’ Prior to the 1970s, access
to environmental information was largely irrelevant since there was little use-
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ful environmental information worth publishing. The Polish Party/government
first began gathering environmental information during the early 1970s, but the
information obtained in those early studies was distorted by the incompetence of
investigators and the poor quality of their monitoring equipment.15 As we have
seen, the training and skill of environmental investigators left much to be desired,
and the technology they had to work with was vastly inferior to Western environmental equipment. To measure ambient air pollution, for example, they used
mostly hand-held instruments that were not uniformly calibrated (Nowicki 1992,
211). There were no regional or national air and water quality monitoring systems,
although People’s Poland was the first (and only) country in the Soviet bloc to
undertake ‘substantive initiatives’ to create such a network in the late 1970s (see
Kramer 1983, 205; Express Wieczorny, Oct. 15, 1979). Enterprises were responsible for reporting emissions levels, but underreporting was universal and rarely
detected. Environmental inspectors had a difficult time proving underreporting
because enterprise managers typically knew (through channels) when inspectors
were coming. Before investigators arrived, enterprises would alter their production patterns to minimize pollution emissions; then, as soon as the inspectors had
left, ordinary production would resume. Finally, Poland’s environmental protection agencies had no uniform standards for compiling and interpreting the information their investigations did obtain (see Wiadomości Statystyczne, Dec. 1979).
What little environmental information existed was legally treated as a state
secret. A government decree from the 1970s provided that:
All information pertaining to any immediate threat to the life and health of people caused by industry and by chemicals used in agriculture must be eliminated
from all reports on environmental protection and on the threat to the natural
environment in Poland.
This ban applies to specific cases of the pollution of the atmosphere, water,
earth, and food dangerous to life and health. (Quoted in translation in Hauser
1984, 49)

In her book on censorship in Poland, Jane Leftwich Curry (1984, 219–20) quoted
several other Polish regulations limiting the flow of environmental information. One
prohibited the publication of information about Polish water-polluting activities,
while expressly authorizing the publication of information about water-polluting
activities in neighboring Czechoslovakia. Others concerned information about specific episodes, suppressing reports that otherwise might have been taken ‘as evidence of far broader problems’ of environmental degradation in People’s Poland.
One particularly absurd regulation issued in 1975 permanently embargoed information about a denuded forest within Warsaw city limits that many Warsaw residents
saw every day on their journey to work. Nevertheless, information about the forest
was a state secret and publication was a crime. Indeed, it was a crime even to refer
to ‘censorship’ (cenzura) because it too was a state secret (Hauser 1984, 50).
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‘Criminals’ charged with illegally publicizing environmental information
were usually tried before the kolegia, Poland’s notorious lay courts. As we learned
in Chapter 2 (§2.6), the kolegia heard misdemeanor cases brought under the 1971
Petty Offenses Code (1971 Dz.U. No. 12, item 114). Professional judges, attorneys
and prosecutors were prohibited from serving on kolegia by regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs (1959 Dz.U. No. 15, item 81). Consequently, the kolegia
were virtually devoid of legal process and, for all practical purposes, the possibility
of acquittal. By the 1980s, there were approximately 500 kolegia (at various levels
of administration), deciding half a million cases each year. They were by no means
an insignificant part of judicial administration in People’s Poland. Most kolegia
cases concerned ‘public order’ offenses, including illegal assembly and illegal distribution of information, including environmental information. Someone accused
of distributing secret environmental information, however insignificant, could be
fined and thrown into jail; if they used their car to transport and distribute the illegal information, it could be confiscated (see Andrzejewski and Nowicki 1991).
It needs to be stressed, however, that Party/state censorship of environmental information was neither complete nor consistent. Beginning in the late 1970s,
Poles had fairly regular access to detailed accounts of ecological damage and critiques of environmental policy in the popular press. In July 1978, for example, the
Party monthly Nowe Drogi published an article detailing environmental problems,
including statistics on air pollution emissions, water pollution levels and land
degradation. In March 1981, the Warsaw daily Słowo Powszechne reported on
a conference organized by the Scientific Committee ‘Man and the Environment’
of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The article reported on ‘ecological scandals’
threatening the health of Poland’s children, criticized the ‘complete insensitivity
of the decision makers regarding ecological problems,’ and concluded that ‘economic reform in Poland is taking the wrong course because it does not take into
account the ecology crisis that is rapidly worsening in Poland.’ Even during the
period of Martial Law, detailed accounts of environmental problems and policies
continued to appear in Polish newspapers. For example, on November 24 and 25,
1982, the Warsaw daily Życie Warszawy published a series of articles concerning
environmental protection. The reports provided detailed economic and environmental statistics, and referred to ‘ecological disaster’ areas in Silesia, Płock and
Wałbrzych. That same month, Poland’s national newspaper Rzeczpospolita (Nov.
19, 1982) reported on the failure of inspected enterprises to comply with the mandates of the 1980 EPDA. Poles could even view environmental information on
their television sets. In May 1984, for example, Polish television reported on a
Sejm commission’s assessment of the 1980 EPDA. The report noted that the Sejm
commission found ‘an alarming reduction in the quantity of pure surface waters
throughout the country,’ and a 60 percent increase in air pollution emissions. The
broadcast further noted that two-thirds of Polish forests were located in areas of
‘permanent or temporary threat’ (BBC Monitoring Service: Eastern Europe, May
31, 1984). A June 1986 Polish television report on beach closings along the Baltic
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Sea coast near Gdańsk disclosed that enterprises in the province were discharging
270,000 tons of mostly untreated sewage into the Baltic Sea each day (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 19, 1986).
Besides the popular press, specialized environmental publications began to
appear in the 1970s and 1980s. The journal Aura regularly published accounts of
environmental problems and policies (see, e.g., Apr. 1978 on sewage treatment;
Sept. 1978 on water pollution; Nov. 1978 on environmental inspections; Nov.
1979 on air pollution; and Feb. 1981 on lax environmental protection). In 1981,
the officially recognized Nature Protection League published a special edition of
its journal Przyroda Polska (Polish Nature) on the threats to public health posed
by Poland’s environmental problems. The report included ‘the best information
existing in Poland on the extent of the ecological threat to the country and its
people’ (see Kabala 1993a, 53).
Even when the Party/state publicized or allowed publication of environmental
information, that information remained the property of the Party/state; unauthorized republication was prohibited. This policy sometimes led to absurd situations
in which the Party/government denied the existence of environmental problems
that already had been publicized through official (i.e., Party-approved) channels. On August 1, 1985, the Party’s daily newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, reported
that 35 percent of Poland’s population lived in exceptionally bad environmental
conditions which would require at least 25 years to improve. Because the report
appeared in Trybuna Ludu, it obviously had the blessing of Party authorities, and
its appearance provoked no official rebuke. The situation was very different later
that year, however, when the Życie Warszawy daily (BBC Monitoring Service:
Eastern Europe, Sept. 12, 1985) reported on a study conducted by the Polish
Chemical Society, under auspices of the Polish Academy of Sciences’ Committee
on Chemical Sciences. The article summarized the study’s findings, including its
conclusion that ‘Poland leads Europe in atmospheric pollution.’ At a press conference the next day, the Party/government’s infamous press spokesman, Jerzy
Urban, denounced not only Życie Warszawy’s article, but the Polish Chemical
Society’s study, which he called ‘alarmist and exaggerated.’ Urban claimed, contrary to the study, that Poland was not an environmental disaster area; other countries, including (by implication) many in Western Europe and North America,
suffered from more severe environmental problems than Poland. He also noted
the Polish government’s great efforts and achievements on behalf of the environment (Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Eastern Europe, Sept. 11, 1985).
In response to the official rebuke, Życie Warszawy published a follow-up editorial in which it defended its earlier report and, with biting sarcasm, expressed the
nation’s gratitude for the government press spokesman’s keen interest in environmental issues (see Rensenbrink 1988, 168). A similar episode took place a year
later, when Radio Free Europe (RFE) reported on the ‘[a]pocalypse’ of Poland’s
natural environment. Once again the government’s press spokesman denounced
the report, calling it a collection of ‘lies, lies and only lies.’ But this time Urban
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reserved most of his venom for an ad hominem attack on the RFE reporter, a former government economic planner named Stefan Bratkowski:
The alleged remedial measures aired by the RFE commentator are the same rubbish as his diagnoses, while the entire hysterical argument designed to scare
people uses environmental protection as a pretext alone to express a political
view that under the existing rule in Poland our people will die with no one to
come to the rescue because these stupid and inefficient authorities deliberately
aim at society’s destruction.
Free Europe proclaims apocalypse hoping for collective unrest if it manages
to succeed in giving Poles a good scare and arousing each listener’s anxiety. Former economy rationalizer Bratkowski perished for this kind of service, getting
poisoned with political venoms of his milieu, while there was born a hysterical demagogue seeking idiots among listeners. (Foreign Broadcast Information
Service—Eastern Europe, Nov. 10, 1986)

It is not difficult to understand why the Polish Party/state was sensitive about
the publication of environmental information; aside from the fact that censorship comes naturally to totalitarian regimes, Poland’s increasingly severe ecological crisis belied the supposed environmental superiority of socialism, thus
undermining what was, by the 1980s, one of the few remaining sources of Party/
state legitimacy. More difficult to understand is the Party/state’s apparent inconsistency in controlling environmental information, especially during the 1980s.
There seemed little rhyme or reason about what information the Party censored
or authorized for dissemination. Perhaps Party leaders felt that they needed publicly to address environmental problems that were becoming increasingly obvious as they grew more severe. There certainly was increasing political pressure to
provide information about environmental problems. When the Solidarity movement emerged in 1980, one of its first demands was that the Polish government
release classified environmental data (see Ziegler 1987, 150). And throughout the
1980s, Party/state efforts to keep environmental information secret grew increasingly irrelevant as the Polish Ecology Club (PKE) and other non-governmental
environmental organizations conducted their own investigations and publicized
the results in Poland’s irrepressible underground press. These unofficial studies
tended to be methodologically and analytically superior to official Party/government environmental studies. And to many Poles they were inherently more credible than official Party/government studies, which were presumed to be biased to
minimize the extent of Poland’s environmental problems.
The Party/state’s inconsistent censorship of environmental information may
also have reflected the battle for the ‘soul of the Party’ waged during the 1980s. We
have already seen some reflections of that battle. For example, the establishment of
the High Administrative Court in 1980, and the subsequent establishment of a Constitutional Tribunal in 1985, constituted victories for intra-Party reformers, who felt
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that the Party could maintain its ‘leading role’ in society only by loosening (to some
extent) its stranglehold on political, legal and economic power. Finally, we should
not overlook the fact, illustrated in Chapter 2, that the Party (or some influential
group within the Party) was genuinely concerned about environmental protection.
The Party’s lack of consistency on environmental information may have reflected
the ongoing conflict between that concern and the Party’s totalitarian compulsions.

4.6. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has addressed a variety of distinct but closely interrelated ‘political’
impediments to environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland. Factors including the ruling Party’s overriding commitments to full employment and maximal
economic production, the lack of judicial independence and competence, the relative weakness of environmental protection agencies in the Party/state’s administrative hierarchy, and the incompetence of environmental law enforcement agents all
contributed substantially to the underenforcement of Poland’s environmental laws.
From a normative point of view, a crucial question is whether these were unavoidable problems for environmental protection in a ‘Rule of Party’ state. I will reserve
that question for Chapter 8, which deals extensively with the normative implications of the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland. Already it
seems clear, however, that many, if not all, of the ‘political’ problems that hindered
environmental law enforcement could have been ameliorated only at substantial
cost to Party authority. For example, the Party/state might have strengthened the
position of environmental protection officials within the administrative hierarchy,
but only by compromising its commitments to full employment and maximal economic production, which would have eroded the legitimacy of its rule. Ultimately,
behind all the ‘political’ problems of environmental law enforcement lurked a single insurmountable obstacle: the Party’s commitment to self-preservation.

Notes
1. As Jerzy Jendrośka (1993a, 351) has put it, ‘environmental problems were not
caused by the absence of environmental laws, but first of all by the fact that these laws
were not enforced.’ For similar assessments of other former Soviet bloc countries, see, for
example, Goldman (1972a, 26), Ziegler (1987, 81), French (1990, 34), Pryde (1991, 90–1),
and Kramer (1983, 217).
2. Kamiński and Sołtan (1989, 381) refer to a ‘soft-law constraint’ under socialism, as
an analogue to the soft budget constraint that is endemic to socialist economies.
3. In Chapter 8 (§8.5), I address theoretical issues concerning the relationship between
totalitarianism and environmental protection.
4. There is disagreement in the academic literature about what constitutes a ‘totalitarian’ regime. As I use the term, it is not intended to denote a literal attainment of ‘total’
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power, signifying the complete annihilation, suppression or co-optation of actual and
potential opposition. The concept of ‘total’ power is like infinity: it can never be reached.
So there can be no such thing as a perfectly totalitarian society. Even Jozef Stalin, who may
have come closest to fulfilling the totalitarian ideal, was only ‘almost perfect’ (Kołakowski
1977, 284). In the real world, ‘totalitarian’ regimes are denoted by the goal of total rule,
combined with some substantial (but otherwise ill-defined) level of inchoate success, signified by the effective repression or co-optation of actual or potential political, social and
economic opposition. This definition has the virtue of allowing for degrees of totalitarianism, so that the USSR and People’s Poland can both be described as ‘totalitarian,’ though
the extent of repression in the former was far greater than in the latter.
5. Article 7 of Poland’s 1952 Constitution (1976 Dz.U. No. 7, item 36, as amended)
provided that ‘[t]he Polish People’s Republic realizes and develops a socialist democracy.’
6. Central economic planning, and its impact on environmental protection in People’s
Poland, is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (§5.1)
7. The nomenklatura system constituted ‘a major pillar, if not the foundation itself,
of the party centre’s executive authority and the key to its rule over the party as a whole
and the whole framework of non-party institutions—and thus to its domination over Polish
society’ (Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988, 82).
8. In a similar vein, the fact that ‘legitimacy principles,’ such as the commitment to
full employment, hindered economic reform efforts does not mean that the Party did not
really care about improving economic efficiency (see S. Gomułka 1986, 295).
9. On the relationship between land-use planning and socioeconomic planning in People’s Poland, see Kulesza (1987, esp. chap. 6).
10. I have more to say about the Okęcie airport case in Chapters 7 (§7.4) and 8 (§8.6).
11. Under article 50 of the 1952 Constitution, judges were supposed to be directly
elected, but the Party/government disregarded that constitutional provision after determining that the socialist system in Poland was not yet sufficiently ‘mature’ to permit popular
election of judges (see Piękałkiewicz 1970, 370–1). The offending provision was subsequently removed from the Constitution when it was amended in 1976.
12. The relationship between the Party and the courts in the former Czechoslovakia
evidently was much the same. According to Otto Ulč (1972, 61), a former Czechoslovak
judge: ‘[i]n about ninety percent of the court agenda, there was not the slightest sign of
interference in our decision-making. This observation, however, does not warrant the conclusion that some sort of “ninety percent judicial independence and integrity” existed. Both
the sorry experience with the remaining ten percent and the awareness that someone might
at any time inflict his “suggestion” upon us, conditioned all our adjudication.’
13. It should be noted, however, that the courts never disputed the right of the Minister of Environmental Protection to waive or reduce environmental fines. For example, in a
1983 case, the High Administrative Court upheld a fine for water pollution, but noted the
authority of the government to provide exemptions for technical, economic or social policy
reasons (see Radecki 1991a, 16–17).
14. The nature of production and pricing under socialism is discussed more extensively in Chapter 5 (§§5.3 and 5.4).
15. The poor quality of pollution-monitoring equipment in Poland remained a problem to the end of the Communist era (see Nowicki 1992, 211). I have more to say about
such technical problems of environmental protection in the next chapter (§5.4).

Chapter 5
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS II: SOCIALIST
ECONOMICS
This chapter continues the explanation of environmental law enforcement problems in People’s Poland, focusing on economic issues. The analysis is in five sections, beginning in §5.1 with a structural introduction to the socialist economic
system; §5.2 relates the underenforcement of environmental law in Poland to stagnation in the socialist economic system; §5.3 describes the extensive nature of economic production under socialism which led to many of Poland’s environmental
problems; §5.4 explains how the socialist economic system’s pricing mechanism,
which ignored resource scarcity, prevented a switch to more intensive modes of
production; and §5.5 explains how the socialist property rights system created a
conflict of interest for the Party/government, which was responsible for enforcing
environmental regulations against the very enterprises it owned and controlled.
That regulatory conflict of interest led the government to soften budget constraints
on enterprises, reducing the effectiveness of environmental fees and fines.

5.1. An Introduction to Poland’s Socialist Economic System
Orthodox Marxist–Leninist theory posits that the economic ‘base’ of a society
dictates the sociopolitical ‘superstructure’ (including, of course, law). But, as critics of Marxism–Leninism (and some neo-Marxists) have pointed out, the influence is actually reciprocal: politics and ideology greatly influence the structure
and operation of the economy (see, e.g., Kelsen 1955, 26–7). Despite the obvious
interrelation, it is common, and perhaps necessary as an organizational matter, to
separate out economic analysis from political and ideological analysis.
The economic structures of socialism were premised on three ‘architectural
principles’ of Marxism–Leninism: socialist property relations (meaning, primarily, social ownership of the means of production), central economic planning and
‘technological determinism.’ These principles were constants of Poland’s socialist economic system. None of the numerous efforts to reform Poland’s economy
before December 1988 (with the notable exception of the abandonment of forced
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collectivization in 1956) sought to abolish central planning or privatize the means
of production.

Socialist Property
In The Communist Manifesto of 1848, Marx and Engels (1978, 484) wrote that
‘the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.’ In Marx’s view, capitalist socioeconomic relations, based
on private property and the anarchy of the market, alienated people from each
other and from nature. The purpose of the socialist system was to harmonize those
relations, in the first place by abolishing private property in natural resources
and the means of production. This has proven to be among the least contentious
aspects of Marxist socialism among Marx’s contemporaries and later Marxists.1
Consequently, certain fundamental theoretical questions about the nature and use
of socialist property never have been adequately addressed. For example, neither
Marx nor his most influential followers addressed the basic dilemma that arises
with the onset of socialism: ‘who controls the great economic power materialized
in public property and social capital’ (Rusinow 1977, 139).2 In the absence of a
theoretical treatment of that critical question, the Party/state asserted control by
default (see Gouldner 1980, 382).
When the Communists seized power in Poland just before the end of World
War II, they quickly and systematically expropriated land and the means of production. Even before declaring itself the Provisional Government of the Polish
Republic (Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej), the Soviet-sponsored
Polish Committee for National Liberation (Polska Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego) began the process of nationalizing land and the means of production.
And, it is interesting to note, it did so through legislation (see, e.g., 1944 Dz.U.
No. 4, item 17), indicating that Communist rule in Poland would be legislistic,
if not legal. The Constitution enacted in 1952 expressly recognized the ‘socialized means of production’ as an important component ‘in the transformation of
social and economic relations’ (1952 Dz.U. No. 33, item 232). The Constitution
permitted limited private ownership of land, means of production and personal
property (narrowly defined) (arts. 12 and 13). But the extent of private ownership
rights was decidedly limited. The Party/state could seize private property without
compensation ‘in cases established by law’ (art. 74, sec. 3), that is, in accordance
with Poland’s 1964 Civil Code (1964 Dz.U. No. 16, item 93). The Civil Code
established a hierarchy of property categories distinguished by varying levels of
protection from Party/state interference. At the top of the property ladder, state
property (‘all national property’) and cooperative property received the greatest legal protection from expropriation and interference—greater than privately
owned farms, for example. This was nonsense, of course, since ‘all national property’ was owned and controlled by the Party/state in the first place. At the bottom
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of the ladder, ‘individual property of a capitalist character (i.e., involving the use
of hired labor or the ownership of urban land and buildings)’ received virtually
no legal protection. The Party/state could expropriate it at any time and for any
purpose without raising a legal or constitutional issue (Rudziński 1973, 80). By
the mid-1980s, privately owned land received somewhat greater legal protection
against expropriation (see Kordasiewicz and Wierzbowski 1995), but it is doubtful
whether this translated in greater actual security. Aleksander Rudziński’s (1973,
85) description of Poland’s socialist property regime remained fairly accurate:
Far from being a natural human right preceding the rule of law and recognized
and regulated by it, ownership no longer represents an area of freedom of action;
it becomes an authorization granted to the owner to consume the object (personal
property), or even a duty imposed on him to use the object according to the plan
(state property).

People’s Poland did not abolish private property per se, just most private
property rights. From the perspective of the Marxist–Leninists who founded People’s Poland, this was not just a necessary condition for socialism; on a structural
level, Party/state control of property was a precondition to implementing other
socialist ‘architectural principles,’ such as central planning. Social ownership
of the means of production was, as Oskar Lange (1963, 17) put it, ‘the organizational principle’ for productive and distributional relations. Most importantly,
from a Leninist perspective, Party/state control of the means of production served
to maximize the Party’s power over individuals and social groups. By owning
almost all capital assets in the country—more than 85 percent of the means of
production in the late 1970s and early 1980s—the Party/state became Poland’s
primary employer, ‘controlling who would be employed and promoted.’ Through
its control of the economy, the Party/state became ‘the locus of decision making’
(Kamiński 1991, 22).

Central Economic Planning
As owner of the means of production, the Party/state was able to direct Poland’s
economic development. It sought to do this, in accordance with the writings of
Marx, Engels and Lenin, through scientific central planning. The theory was that,
under conditions of social ownership (and state control) of the means of production, central planning was not only a feasible alternative to the market but a more
efficient choice. State planners were supposed to provide better-informed economic decision making than the anarchic marketplace in which millions of independent agents made individualized decisions, admittedly with less than perfect
information about social costs and benefits. Those information constraints led to
market inefficiencies that, by definition, should never exist in a planned econ-
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omy. Furthermore, producers in the capitalist system could only predict demand;
they had to continually adjust production in order to accommodate unanticipated
changes in the rate of demand. Such post hoc corrections rendered the market
system highly inefficient relative to a theoretical socialist economy within which
supply and demand would be preplanned. As Engels wrote in the Anti-Dühring
(1975c, 266), ‘with the taking over by society of the means of productive forces,
the social character of the means of production and of the products will be utilized by the producers with perfect understanding.’ Instead of the economy
controlling societal relations, socialist society would control the economy (see
Engels 1975c, 279).3
The backbone of socialism’s claim to greater rationality and efficiency was
its supposed capacity for ‘full employment of human and material resources’
(Brus and Laski 1989, 6). As Joseph Schumpeter (1976, 194) noted, the planned
economy at least in theory should remain ‘determinate’ in cases where capitalist markets fail, so that resource allocation and production can be maintained at
‘optimal’ levels at all times. In addition, socialism purports to put all economic
resources to work for the full development of the whole society, whereas, under
capitalism, many resources may sit idle as a small group of capitalists accumulates great profits. In this respect, according to Marxist and neo-Marxist dogma,
socialist central planning not only is more efficient than capitalism but also rests
on a higher moral plane.
A detailed assessment of socialism’s claim to greater economic efficiency and
morality is beyond the scope of this project (for the last word, see Kornai 1992a).
But it is clear that the reality never lived up to the promise. Socialist economies
did not prove to be more efficient than their capitalist competitors. On the contrary, they were less efficient, and their chronic and ever-increasing inefficiencies
ultimately led to the downfall of communism in Europe. Nor did socialism prove
to be morally superior to capitalism. True, it put more resources to work; but, as
we shall see later in this chapter, it wasted far more productive resources (per unit
of production) than did its capitalist competitors. The socialist system created ‘a
vast separation’ between the state and the people, and brought about ‘not only a
material but a drastic spiritual impoverishment of the population’ (Clark and Wildavsky 1990, 4). Most importantly for present purposes, socialism brought about
an environmental crisis that, according to Jan Marcinkiewicz (1987, 42), ‘biologically threatened’ the very existence of the Polish nation.
In People’s Poland, as in all the Soviet bloc countries, the Party/state controlled the vast majority of economic activities through Leninist central planning.
Long- and short-term plans allocated investment resources and specified production targets. By design, the entire Party/state apparatus was tied in to the planning
process. The economy was pyramidal in structure, just like the government and
Party (conforming to the Leninist concept of democratic centralism, discussed
in Chapter 4). Socioeconomic plans were imposed from the top down, but they
were premised on information sent up from the bottom. Individual economic
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actors (enterprises) and the administrative units that managed them (associations
and ministries) reported to central planners on production levels and investment
needs, and that information was used to design new plans or refine current plans
to ensure optimal resource allocation and maximal production. Planners implemented the plans by issuing ‘directives’ to administrative units and enterprises.
The number of planning directives was subject to change; in different periods,
enterprises had to comply with more or fewer planning criteria. However, central
planning and resources allocation at all times remained pervasive features of the
socialist economic system.
At the top of Poland’s economic pyramid were the Politburo of the PZPR and
the Council of State which, through their plenary authority over the entire state
apparatus, in effect governed the planning process. Primary legal authority for
designing and implementing economic plans was located in the Council of Ministers’ Planning Commission, which had the incredibly difficult, if not impossible,
task of collecting and digesting information coming up from the various sectors
of Poland’s complex and highly interdependent socialized economy. As the late
Alec Nove (1986, 132) explained it, the planning process ‘requires multimillion
instructions as to what to produce, to whom deliveries should be made, from
whom inputs should be received, and when. All this must be made to cohere with
plans for labor, wages, profits, investment financing, material-utilization norms,
quality, productivity for each of many thousands of productive units.’
Before the computer age it was inconceivable, even to staunch proponents
of socialism, that planners could successfully perform the ‘multimillion’ calculations required for accurate planning. But by the 1960s, many, including the great
theoretician of central planning, Oskar Lange (1969, 158), expressed confidence
that computer technology would not only make accurate planning feasible but
render the market process obsolete ‘as a computing device of the pre-electronic
age.’ Even in the age of computers, however, the ability to effectively plan a large
and diversified economy is doubtful. Time is a crucial variable in planning, and it
is not at all clear that the multimillion bits of economic information could be collected, fed into the computer and calculated within the useful life of the results.
An analogy to weather forecasting may be instructive. Today’s computers are
capable of predicting tomorrow’s weather for a specified location with uncanny
accuracy. However, weather forecasters are forced to sacrifice a certain degree of
accuracy for the sake of utility. It would take more than 24 hours to input and compute all the information needed for maximally accurate forecasts, but those forecasts obviously would be obsolete by the time they became available. The same
problem must also plague efforts to plan an economy centrally (see Arnold 1990,
259).4 Even if plans could be completely accurate, they never would be entirely
‘scientific’ because they depend on economic policies, which inevitably implicate
non-scientific value judgments. For example, as Lange (1938, 85) acknowledged,
the selection of an economic investment rate is inevitably arbitrary and political
(see also Feiwel 1971b, 20; 1971a, 333), though it is a critical variable in plan
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calculations. So planning can never be just a ‘technical’ process. And to the extent
planning decisions unavoidably are political, the institution of central planning
is inherently anti-democratic because planners impose their own production and
consumption preferences on the whole of society (see Hayek 1944, esp. chap. 5).
Planning is also impeded by technological developments in products and processes. With all of the world’s computers at their disposal, planners could never
foretell technological developments that might alter optimal investment, cost and
production levels over a given plan period (Bernholz 1987, 166). In fast-changing
economic circumstances, where markets are quick to adapt, central plans are sluggish and unwieldy. Any change in one part of the plan requires changes to many
others because production activities are highly interdependent.
These problems notwithstanding, Poland’s Planning Commission was supposed to set output levels for all sectors of the economy for each plan period (oneyear, three-year or five-year) based on information received from enterprises,
associations and industrial ministries, and pursuant to policy directions issuing
from the PZPR’s Politburo, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. As
with the rate of investment, the planned level of output was as much a political as
an economic decision. The consistent policy (throughout the Soviet bloc) of investing more in heavy industrial than in consumer-oriented production was a function
of ideology and entrenched political interests rather than of economic ‘science.’
Planners allocated inputs and assigned output targets using what has been
called the ‘Method of Material Balances’ (see Rutland 1985, 114–17). Unlike
capitalist markets in which prices determine resource allocation and production,
socialism’s Method of Material Balances assigns physical units of inputs and outputs without regard for value. Economists have long recognized the drawbacks of
this method. To borrow a well-worn example, the output of a nail factory typically
was based on gross weight of output. On this measure, it did not matter whether
the factory produced millions of tiny nails or one gigantic nail, so long as the
total weight was the same. More importantly, as we shall see shortly, planning by
physical units rather than economic value impeded efforts to conserve resource
inputs. The lack of a (non-arbitrary) pricing mechanism rendered the socialist
economic system irrational-in-fact because planners found no alternative method
of accounting for resource scarcity (see Arnold 1990, 249–50).
After the Planning Commission established output targets, its next task was to
allocate investments among the various sectors, based on the total available supply of resources and planned production. This was also the phase of the planning
process when central planners allocated funds for ancillary (‘non-productive’)
activities, including environmental protection. Once resource allocation decisions were made, the draft plan was submitted to the Council of Ministers for its
approval, and, finally, to the Sejm for its rubber-stamp.5
After the socioeconomic plan was completed and approved, the Planning
Commission was responsible for its implementation and any necessary adjustments during the plan period. As it happened, adjustments were continually nec-

Enforcement Problems II: Socialist Economics

115

essary. Indeed, the frequency and intensity of ‘mid-course corrections’ suggest
that Poland’s economy was not ‘planned’ in any meaningful sense. For this reason, some commentators insist on referring to socialist economies as ‘administered,’ rather than ‘planned’ (see, e.g., Zaleski 1984, 484; Wilhelm 1985, 118–19).
Initial responsibility for plan implementation fell to the various economic
ministries, under the direct supervision of the Council of Ministers. Each economic ministry represented a different sector of production. In 1980, for example, there were 14 branch economic ministries: Mining; Metallurgy; Electric and
Atomic Energy; Chemical Industry; Domestic Commerce and Services; Light
Industry; Machine-Building; Food Industry and Agricultural Purchases; Agriculture; Forestry and Timber; Construction and Building Materials; Administration, Local Economy and Environmental Protection; Foreign Trade and Maritime
Economy; and Heavy and Agricultural Machinery. Other ministries, including the
Finance Ministry, the Ministry of Labor, Wages and Social Affairs, and the Material Economy Ministry, also had substantial responsibilities related to plan implementation, though they did not represent specific economic sectors. The number
and structure of ministries changed frequently beginning in the 1960s, as the
Party/state attempted (or feigned) various economic and administrative reforms.
But the structure of economic decision making always remained highly centralized. The number of planning directives might grow or shrink, but the center
always remained firmly in control.
The branch ministries with initial responsibility for implementing socioeconomic plans were, in some cases, directly responsible for individual enterprises
within their sectors of the economy. After receiving plan targets and investment
allocations from the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, they
would assign specific production targets and allocate resources to each individual
enterprise within their jurisdiction. More often, an intermediate level of management, called an ‘association,’ stood between the enterprise and its ministry. An
association was a legally recognized grouping of enterprises within a given industry. This simply added another layer of bureaucracy in the planning process. The
branch minister would allocate resources and production targets to the associations which, in turn, would allocate resource and production targets among their
member enterprises. At that point, achieving the planned level of output became
the paramount concern of individual enterprises. This did not mark the end of the
planning process, however. As already noted, plans never survived the plan period
intact, but were subject to almost continual revisions and modifications. Often, the
plan did not achieve its final form until the plan period was over.

Technological Determinism and Socialist Economic Development
The institution of central planning did not dictate any particular development strategy. As already noted, decisions to allocate more resources to one sector of the
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economy rather than another was not a technical question for planners but a political and ideological question for the Party. Another principle of Marxism–Leninism
known as ‘technological determinism’ drove an economic development strategy
based on heavy industrial production that prevailed throughout the Soviet bloc.
Technological determinism was an outgrowth of Marx’s preoccupation with
economic development as a primary determinant of societal relations. In the Critique of Political Economy, Marx (1971, 21) wrote that ‘[n]o social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed,
and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.’ On
this theory, the level of productivity determines the prevailing system of socioeconomic relations. Thus, feudalism gave way to capitalism only as its capacity for
further development waned. And, according to Marx, capitalism paves the way
for socialism by increasing productive forces to levels where scarcity is no longer an insurmountable problem. When the economy grows to the point at which
it can provide enough for everyone, regardless of population size, the inequitable
distribution of wealth under capitalism can no longer can be justified objectively.
Meanwhile, according to Marx, as new technology reduces the amount of necessary labor in production, unemployment increases. The rate of profit declines
because machines, unlike the workers they replace, cannot be exploited for surplus value. Firms unable to keep pace with the technological changes become
uncompetitive and are forced from the market, leading to higher rates of unemployment and the further monopolization of capital (see Clark and Wildavsky
1994, 56). This fuels class struggle over control of the means of production, and
the working class ultimately prevails. Thus, the high productivity of advanced
capitalism leads to socialism, which, in turn, creates the necessary preconditions
for even higher levels of production under stateless, conflict-free communism.6
Although Marx’s Russian interpreters necessarily rejected his view that only
advanced capitalism provides the necessary preconditions for socialism,7 they
wholeheartedly agreed with the importance he attached to economic development. In their interpretation, the single most important factor in the course of
human history—explaining human progress from feudalism, through capitalism,
to communism—is the development of productive forces. They condensed Marx’s
entire materialist theory of history into ‘technological determinism,’ according to
which the level of scientific and technological development delimits economic
development, which, in turn, determines socioeconomic relations. Technological
development becomes ‘the primary causal agent of social and political development’ (Ziegler 1987, 8). Although this interpretation of Marx has been disputed,
it is a logical extension of some of Marx’s own writings. For example, in Capital
(1967, vol. I, 386), Marx argued that technology was a prerequisite to production:
‘Just as a man requires lungs to breath with, so he requires something that is work
of man’s hand, in order to consume physical forces productively. A water-wheel is
necessary to exploit the force of water, and a steam-engine to exploit the elasticity
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of steam.’ And in The Poverty of Philosophy (1936, 92), Marx wrote that ‘[t]he
hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the
industrial capitalist.’ Marx apparently believed, as Alan Ryan (1987, 119) has put
it, that ‘the course of history is the course of increasingly effective technology.’
And he ‘expected socialism to create (and not simply to utilize) the conditions of
abundancy, by fully opening the sources of development of the productive forces,
first of all by spurring technical progress’ (Brus 1974, 167; emphasis added).
Marx presumed (or predicted) that socialism would create more favorable conditions for further technological progress, and this warranted his assertion that
socialism would prove to be a more efficient (as well as a more equitable) system
than capitalism (see S. Gomułka 1986, 182). Marx’s influential Russian interpreters believed that technological determinism was both a precondition to and
a consequence of economic development. Technical advances enabled economic
development, which, in turn, led to progressive structural changes in the economy. At each successive stage of historical development, technological advances
multiplied in number and magnitude—just as the rate of innovation under capitalism was unimaginable under feudalism, so, they argued, the rate of innovation
under socialism would eclipse capitalist advances.
Later in this chapter, we will see how experience contradicted the claimed
technological superiority of socialism. For now, the important point is that the
principle of technological determinism played a central role in the development
of socioeconomic policy throughout the history of the ‘People’s Democracies,’
including People’s Poland. In all the countries constructed on the Soviet model,
rapid industrialization, along with high rates of innovation and economic growth,
were political and ideological priorities. From Lenin to at least Brezhnev and
Gierek, socialist leaders displayed a myopic determination to overtake the capitalist economies of the West. To accomplish this, the Soviets instituted, first in their
own country and later throughout the bloc, an intensive industrialization strategy that ‘relied on merciless exploitation (some would say shortsighted plundering) of the countries’ natural resources of land, water and minerals, on processing
these resources in a rather wasteful way to produce poor quality products using
methods of production that appear to have been significantly more capital- and
labour-intensive than need be’ (Brus 1974, 183). This extensive growth strategy
was unsustainable; it rapidly depleted available supplies of both labor and natural resources. Economists in Poland and throughout the Soviet bloc recognized
this problem by the mid-1960s, when they began calling for fundamental reforms
in production patterns to conserve resources and improve dynamic efficiency. In
response, the Party/states attempted on several occasions (if only half-heartedly)
to institute reforms. From the 1960s onwards, Poland’s economy constantly ebbed
and flowed between reforms and retrenchment. But the investment bias favoring resource-intensive and environmentally stressful heavy industrial production
remained throughout ‘a distinct characteristic of communist development strategy’ (Brus 1974, 168).
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The ‘Long History of Short Reforms’ in People’s Poland
The history of People’s Poland was defined by crises: economic, political and
ecological. The Communist Party changed leaders four times in its history, each
time in the wake of public protests and riots. First, in 1956, following riots in
Poznań, Władysław Gomułka came to power, replacing the Stalinist regime. In
1970, following riots in the Baltic seaports, Gomułka was replaced by Eduard
Gierek. The crisis that precipitated the rise of Solidarity in 1980 was so severe
that it prompted successive leadership changes: Gierek’s immediate replacement,
Stanisław Kania, ruled for only a few short months before being removed in favor
of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who promptly overcame Solidarity’s immediate
political challenge by declaring Martial Law. Brute force could not, however,
surmount Poland’s structural economic crisis, which finally caused the system to
collapse at the end of the 1980s.
Crises defined the economic, as well as the political, history of People’s
Poland. Indeed, each political crisis was largely economic in origin. When workers protested in Poznań in 1956, they demanded an increased standard of living as well as an end to Soviet domination. The banners they carried proclaimed
‘BREAD AND FREEDOM’ (Davies 1982, 584). The 1970 and 1980 protests that
brought down Gomułka and Gierek, respectively, were direct responses to government price increases that eroded Poland’s already meager standard of living.
Each crisis produced a new Party/state leader promising economic reforms to
correct the ‘mistakes’ of the past and deliver prosperity. The chronology of major
economic reform packages closely tracked the leadership changes: 1956–8, 1973
and 1982 (see Jermankowicz 1988, 84–6).
The very fact that Poland’s leaders felt the need to make structural adjustments every five to ten years suggested that something was seriously amiss with
the supposedly more rational and scientific socialist economic system. The various reform efforts all shared the goals of increasing economic efficiency, reducing
waste and raising the standard of living. Complete failure was another common
trait. None of the reforms had any kind of long-term positive effect on Poland’s
economic performance. Indeed, it is a misnomer even to refer to them as ‘reforms,’
if we define that term with Włodzimierz Brus (1988, 65) to require ‘a meaningful
change in the operating principles of an economic system,’ as opposed to just any
old modification in the existing framework.
All efforts to reform Poland’s socialist economy failed for essentially the
same reasons: they treated symptoms rather than the diseased system itself; they
were piecemeal, when comprehensive changes were in order; they were blocked
by the self-interested bureaucracy; and they were actually or in effect rescinded
by the Party even before they could be implemented. Consider the remarkably
consistent assessments of major and minor reform efforts from the 1950s through
the 1980s by a varied group of distinguished economists:
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John Michael Montias (1962, 304) on the 1956–8 reforms:
The record for the years 1957–59 reveals that the reforms were gradually eroded
by the central bureaucracy; this trend was merely accelerated by the economic
crisis of the summer of 1959 which impelled the government to retract some of
the concessions granted in the preceding years.

Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski (1989, 62) on the 1968 ‘minor’ reforms:
The failure of most of the reform attempts was explained by the political
resistance of the ruling elites; by the vested interests of the party and state
bureaucracies, coupled with a reluctance on the part of the rank-and-file and
the managers to trade security for stronger incentives linked to efficiency;
and finally by substantive difficulties in devising and implementing a sufficiently consistent and workable reform project.

P. T. Wanless (1980, 50–2) on the 1973 reforms:
These reforms have proved no more successful than earlier attempts. Even
before the economic difficulties of 1975–76, the reforms can be criticized on
various counts: the piecemeal introduction of the reforms; the lack of reforms in
central planning; and the continued supervisory role of the economic ministries.
. . . [A] combination of economic stress and political weakness at the time the
reforms were introduced led to the reforms emerging in partial form, lacking
certain essential elements.

Leszek Balcerowicz (1989, 48) on the 1982 reforms:
[I]t is clear that the system which evolved during the period 1982–1987 did
not achieve the basic objectives stated in the reform proposal: a considerable
increase in economic efficiency and the elimination of chronic shortages. The
basic reason for this failure is to be seen in the fact that the reform has not been
sufficiently comprehensive and radical. There have been many partial changes.
. . . But the problem is that the basic features responsible for the poor performance of the traditionally planned economy with respect to efficiency and market balance have remained, although sometimes in a weakened, modified or
disguised form.8

Jan Winiecki (1991, 23) on the 1987 ‘second-stage’ reforms:
By 1987 the failure of the latest round became glaringly visible even to the ruling group. Consequently, the propaganda apparatus started a campaign for the
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‘second stage’ of economic reforms and the bureaucracy prepared a blueprint
of expected changes. However, the blueprint had all the marks of a counterreformation move. It was quite radical in its verbal encouragement for entrepreneurship, innovation, and enterprise autonomy, the role of prices in the economy,
etc., but the fundamentally unchanged property rights structure and the proposed
policy instruments leaving wide possibilities for both systematic and ad hoc
interventions, made the ‘second stage’ very much like the first.

The reforms all failed to improve efficiency, reduce waste or raise the standard of
living for most Poles. That is not to say they had no effects at all. Efforts to introduce market mechanisms in a marketless economic system managed to combine
the worst features of the capitalist and socialist systems: inflation and shortages
(see Kamiński 1991, 73). Rather than improving the economy’s performance,
these reforms tended to exacerbate existing problems. Most importantly, none of
the reforms (excepting the abandonment of forced collectivization in 1956 and the
dismantling of central economic planning at the beginning of 1989) substantially
altered the political-economic system. The 1982 reform, for example, reduced for
a short time the degree of central control over economic activities, but enterprises
remained dependent on the center for investment funds and subsidies (see Kornai
1992a, 466; Eysymontt 1989, 34). When self-management reforms introduced a
measure of democratic self-government within enterprises, single-party rule continued on the outside, and the Party/state, as owner of the means of production,
retained ultimate decision-making power concerning the ‘self-managed’ enterprises (Kornai 1992a, 464).
Simply stated, the reforms did not succeed because the system was unreformable (see Eysymontt 1989, 30; Prybyła 1988, 359). And the system could
not be reformed because of entrenched interests within the PZPR and the state’s
administrative hierarchy who were unwilling to give up political control and its
perquisites for the sake of improved economic efficiency (see Brus 1988, 76;
Feiwel 1971a, 345). As János Kornai (1992a, 525–7) has pointed out, real economic reform aimed at increasing efficiency would have required a radical shift
from administratively controlled to market-set prices. But such a shift was never
seriously attempted (at least not before 1988), partly because of lingering ideological commitments but mostly because any substantial reductions in administrative control would have meant a loss of property rights (in other words, rents) and
political power among the ruling elite (see Winiecki 1991, 16). As with its commitment to environmental protection, the Party was interested in improving economic performance only to the extent that its control over the economy was not
threatened. Any proposed reforms that substantially reduced central Party control
constituted a direct threat to Party authority, so were rejected as contrary to the
advancement of socialism. In other words, the Party was in favor of reforming
everything but itself. Its consistent attitude toward economic reform, first enunciated by Władysław Gomułka in the 1960s, was based on a contradiction: the
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‘process of decentralization must be accompanied by the consolidation of central
control, especially of financial control’ (quoted in Montias 1962, 319).
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, Poland’s various economic reforms
will be neglected, except insofar as they had direct significance for environmental
protection. For the most part, the socialist economic system will be presented as
an unchanging edifice from the time of its imposition during the Stalinist period
to its eradication at the end of 1988. This portrayal may not be completely accurate, but it surely comes closer to reality than ‘the long history of short reform’ in
People’s Poland (Holland 1988, 135).

5.2. Economic Stagnation and the Underenforcement
of Environmental Law in People’s Poland
The Decline and Fall of Poland’s Socialist Economy
After strong post-war growth during the late 1940s and 1950s, Poland’s economy
began to stagnate in the 1960s. In 1970, the new Party/state leader Eduard Gierek
attempted to revive the economy with a reform program that promised to increase
investment and consumption at the same time. Fully aware that the Party/state did
not possess the stake money to pull off that feat, Gierek looked beyond Poland’s
borders for financial assistance, and he found willing partners in the West. At the
beginning of the 1970s, Western commercial banks were flush; they had more
money than they knew what to do with, so they decided to loan some to countries,
including Poland, in the misguided belief that sovereign debtors could not go
bankrupt. Poland began to borrow heavily from Western governments and commercial banks, receiving US$6 billion in Western credits between 1970 and 1975.
By the end of the 1980s, Poland was the world’s fourth-largest debtor country,
owing more than US$40 billion to Western governments and commercial banks.
The significance of this debt for the subsequent history of People’s Poland can
hardly be overemphasized; it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say
that the loan officers at Citibank had as much to do with the downfall of communism in Poland as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher did.
During the first half of the 1970s, Gierek’s scheme produced what was called
an ‘economic miracle’ in Poland. The capital he borrowed contributed to substantial increases in production, economic growth rates and the standard of living. But
debt-financing growth proved to be a disastrous gamble. In 1973–4, the OPEC
oil embargo quadrupled the price of world oil, shocking the world economy into
recession. In the West, trade deficits and interest rates skyrocketed. As interest
rates rose, the pool of cheap credits dried up. Meanwhile, Poland’s hard currency
export earnings dwindled, as its relatively expensive and low-quality exports
found fewer and fewer buyers in the shrinking world markets. By the end of the
decade, the Party/state could not meet its foreign debt repayment schedules, and
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Table 5.1. Average and annual rates of GNP growth in People’s Poland,
1965–88 (%)
1965–70
1971–75
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

3.0
5.7
4.1
2.8
3.7
–1.9
–2.6
–5.3
–0.6
4.6
3.4
1.1
2.8
–2.4
1.6

Sources: For 1965–75—Alton (1981, 391, table 19); for 1976–87—Fallenbuchl (1989,
103, table 1); for 1988—US Central Intelligence Agency (1990, table C.15).

its domestic economy was approaching collapse. All this at a time when Poland’s
environmental problems were reaching crisis proportions.
Poland’s socialist economy never really recovered before it was abandoned
at the end of 1988. The economy staggered through the 1980s with economic
growth averaging less than 1 percent annually. Table 5.1 provides real average
and annual economic growth rates for Poland from 1965 to the end of 1988 (when
socialist central planning was largely abandoned).

Poland’s Economic Decline and the Rate of Investment in
Environmental Protection
Environmental law enforcement depends in the first instance on financial outlays. This truism explains almost completely how Poland’s economic travails
obstructed environmental protection efforts. The most direct impact was on the
rate of investment in environmental protection, which was hardly lavish to begin
with. Even in times of relative prosperity, central planners allocated only a small
percentage of national income for air pollution scrubbers, sewage treatment facilities, pollution-monitoring equipment, and other environmental protection needs.
For example, in 1971–5, when Poland’s economy was growing rapidly, environmental investments averaged only 0.35 percent of gross national product (GNP)
and only 1.1 percent of total investment outlays.
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Table 5.2. Rates of economic growth, environmental investments and sulphur
dioxide air pollution emissions in People’s Poland, 1976–88
Economic
growth rate
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Environmental
investment as %
of GNP

Environmental
investment as %
of total investment

0.40
0.45
0.38
0.35
0.28
0.20
0.25
0.40
0.50
0.54
0.74
0.80
0.80

1.2
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.0
1.2
1.4
2.2
2.5
2.8
2.8
3.5
3.5

4.1
2.8
3.7
–1.9
–2.6
–5.3
–0.6
4.6
3.4
1.1
2.8
–2.4
1.6

Sulphur dioxide
emissions
(% growth)
10.8
1.2
7.9
NA
7.6a
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
–2.4
0.0
0.0

a. Two-year percentage increase.
Sources: Economic growth rates—Table 5.1; environmental investment as % of GNP—
Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry (1992b, 62, fig.
19); environmental investment as % of total investment—Ochrona Środowiska 1976–90;
Ginsbert-Gebert (1991b, 46, table 6); sulfur dioxide emissions growth rates—1976–8,
Wiadomości Statystyczne, No. 11, Dec. 1979, pp. 7–12, table 1; 1980, Ochrony Środowiska
1989 xxv, table I; 1981–8, Institut Ochrony Środowiska (1991, table 22).

When the economy stagnated, environmental projects were always among
the first budget items to be slashed. Socioeconomic planners considered them
expendable luxuries, and most Polish citizens agreed that in tough times the
country could not afford expensive environmental protection (see Życie
Warszawy, Nov. 24, 1982, at p. 3). In accordance with this perception, the rate
of investment in environmental protection closely tracked economic growth
rates. This relationship is clearly reflected by the data in Table 5.2. Up to about
1987, the rate of investment in environmental protection rose or fell along with
the rate of economic growth. But then the pattern suddenly changed. When the
economy began to decline again in 1987, the rate of environmental investment
continued to increase as a percentage of gross national product. This change
may have been precipitated by economic studies from the mid-1980s showing
that spending on environmental projects was not an expendable luxury but a
critical necessity.
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In the 1980s, Antoni Symonowicz (1988) evaluated economic losses attributable to environmental pollution and resource waste, including all reasonably
ascertainable losses to public health, architecture, industrial equipment, agricultural produce and forests from pollution damage, as well as economic losses due
to the inefficient use of natural resources. According to his studies, economic
losses in 1980 resulting from waste and pollution amounted to approximately
206 billion zlotys. In 1983, according to a different study (Górka and Poskrobko
1987, 89), pollution and resource waste cost between 500 and 600 billion zlotys, or 7–9 percent of national income. A 1985 study by economists from the
Kraków Academy of Economics (discussed in Familiec et al. 1991, 49–50) estimated nationwide ecological losses at 2,216 billion zlotys, more than 25 percent
of national income. The economic costs were even higher in the more heavily
polluted regions of the country. In Kraków, for instance, ecological damage for
1985 was estimated at 34–35 percent of net production. The Kraków economists
rightly concluded that the volume of economic costs from ecological damage
constituted ‘a final argument for active environmental protection’ (Familiec et
al. 1991, 50).
Apparently Poland’s central planners were paying attention because in the
late 1980s the rate of environmental investment increased despite declining production and income levels. It is important to note, however, that the actual rates of
increase in environmental spending never came close to planned levels. Between
1976 and 1980, ‘a bare 40 percent’ of planned outlays for environmental protection were actually expended (Życie Warszawy, Nov. 25, 1982). In 1987, actual
environmental investments were 9 percent lower than stipulated in the annual
socioeconomic plan; and in 1988, environmental expenditures fell 17 percent
short of planned levels (Rusiński 1991, 37). These investment shortfalls exacerbated law enforcement problems, reducing, for example, the Party/state’s ability
to monitor pollution activities. The State Environmental Protection Inspectorate’s
monitoring program provided only about 5 percent of national environmental
data; for the other 95 percent, the Polish government had to rely on notoriously
unreliable enterprise self-monitoring. By way of comparison, state monitoring
produces more than 50 percent of environmental information in Norway and the
Netherlands (Rusiński 1991, 32). Funding shortfalls in People’s Poland also hampered basic environmental research. For example, between 1975 and 1985 Polish
researchers conducted regular epidemiological studies of the health impacts of
pollution on children living near the Katowice Foundry. (As we learned in Chapter 1, children throughout Katowice and Silesia suffer inordinately high rates of
infant mortality, respiratory illnesses, lead poisoning, leukemia, birth defects and
mental illness.) However, these studies were discontinued between 1986 and 1990
solely for lack of funds (Jonderko 1990, 7).
The Party/state’s efforts to increase environmental expenditures in a stagnant
or shrinking economy were laudable, but vain. Poland simply could not invest
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Table 5.3. Average percentage of gross national product invested in
environmental protection in Poland and other selected countries, 1971–85
1971–75

1976–80

1981–85

Bulgaria
France
Great Britain
Hungary
Japan

1.0
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.4

1.1
1.5
1.5
1.1
1.5

1.1
1.6
1.7
1.1
1.6

Poland

0.35

0.37

0.43

Romania
Soviet Union
Sweden
United States
West Germany

1.1
1.3
1.5
1.4
1.8

1.0
1.2
2.0
1.8
1.8

1.0
1.2
1.9
1.8
1.9

Source: Ginsbert-Gebert (1991b, 46, table 7).

enough in environmental protection to begin offsetting the economic harm caused
by accumulating environmental degradation. It was like a dog chasing its tail,
investing 0.5 percent of national income to fight a crisis costing between 10 and
20 percent of national income. The rate of investment in environmental protection
simply could not keep pace with the rate of environmental destruction caused in
the (increasingly futile) pursuit of economic growth. Table 5.3 compares Poland’s
rate of investment in environmental protection as a percentage of gross national
product with investment rates in several other Communist and capitalist countries. Even compared with its socialist allies, Poland’s level of investment in environmental protection appears meager. In fact, Poland did not reach the 1 percent
investment level until 1991, two years after the fall of communism.9

5.3. The Extensive Nature of Economic Production
under Socialism10
Poland’s intertwined economic and ecological crises were neither fortuitous nor
primarily the results of exogenous factors, such as fluctuating world markets.
They were rooted in the socialist economic system. This section focuses on the
extensive nature of economic production under socialism.
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The Symbiotic Relation between Environmental Protection
and Economic Growth
The relationship between economic growth and environmental protection is complex and controversial. Environmentalists traditionally have blamed environmental problems on economic development, while industrialists (as well as third
world politicians) often criticize environmental regulation as an overly expensive
and often unnecessary impediment to growth and development. But, increasingly,
economic development and environmental protection are viewed as interdependent, rather than mutually exclusive, goals. Concepts such as ‘sustainable development’ (see World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) and
the ‘polluter pays principle’ (see Opschoor and Vos 1991) exemplify efforts to
create development policies that combine economic growth with environmental
protection. They implicitly entail the notion that long-term environmental protection is not possible without economic growth and vice versa.
It is easy to see that environmental protection requires economic growth.
Environmental programs are, after all, very expensive. In the United States alone,
environmental protection costs approximately US$115 billion annually (US Environmental Protection Agency 1991, v–vii). Without funds to finance the investigation of environmental problems and the design, implementation, and enforcement
of regulatory measures, a developing country has only two options: become
severely polluted or prohibit all polluting activities. In reality, only the first option
exists; the second is illusory because a country that lacks funds for environmental
protection never could afford to enforce a ban on polluting activities (assuming
agreement could be reached on what constitutes a ‘polluting activity’ in the first
place).
Environmental degradation plagues countries at all levels of economic
development, but is often most acute in poorer, less developed countries. Even
completely unindustrialized countries often suffer from chronic environmental
problems, such as poor sanitation, shortages of potable water, and deforestation
(see Radetzki 1990, 8). The need for environmental protection thus precedes
industrialization. But that need increases dramatically as economic development
and industrialization proceed. In most countries, industrialization begins with
transportation infrastructure and heavy industry (such as steel production). This
type of development creates a high level of environmental stress. And the greater
the level of environmental stress, the more important economic growth becomes
for environmental protection. If the industrializing country’s economy manages
to produce sustained growth along with the higher levels of environmental stress,
then the government can afford to take effective steps to protect the environment.
However, if the economy fails to produce real growth along with the pollution,
then a serious problem arises—high levels of pollution and very little money with
which to combat it. This, in a nutshell, was the situation of People’s Poland and
the other countries of the former Soviet bloc.
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The symbiotic relationship between economic growth and environmental
protection is supported by studies correlating growth in per capita income and
environmental investment. As income rises, so does the propensity to allocate
resources for environmental purposes (see Walter and Ugelow 1979; US Agency
for International Development 1979; United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations 1985; Shafik and Bandaopadhyay 1992). As Marian Radetzki (1990)
explains, rising per capita income spurs consumerism, which (at least in demanddriven markets) causes a shift in production from environmentally stressful heavy
industries to less stressful service industries to meet consumer preferences. In
addition to their material desires, consumers (as voters) state preferences for quality of life, resulting in increased direct investment in environmental protection.
Over time, the amount of environmental stress created per unit of production
tends to decline because of a naturally occurring (at least in capitalist economies)
shift from extensive to intensive patterns of production.
In early stages of economic development, supplies of resources, including
labor and natural resources, are plentiful. They have relatively low economic
value, so they can be exploited with scant regard for waste. Economic growth
will be produced by maximizing investments of these cheap ‘inputs.’ This type
of growth is extensive. As economic development continues, available resources,
including both labor and natural resources, become increasingly scarce. Consequently, they become more expensive to use. As prices for inputs rise, producers will naturally tend to intensify production patterns (at least in the absence of
cheap and suitable substitute inputs). Instead of maximizing sheer numbers of
inputs, they will seek to maximize the productive output from each input, thereby
improving dynamic efficiency. In other words, they tend to practice conservation.
One consequence of this shift to more intensive modes of production is that less
stress is placed on the natural environment per unit of national income produced
(Radetzki 1990, 14).
Empirical studies confirm that economies tend to shift from extensive to
(increasingly) intensive patterns of production (see, e.g., Malenbaum 1978).
This shift is represented in Figure 5.1. The inverted U-shaped curve indicates
that at early preindustrial stages of development, environmental costs are relatively low (though perhaps not insignificant). They grow quickly as countries
enter a middle stage of development dominated by heavy industrial activities,
such as steel production and construction of transportation infrastructure (highways and rail-lines). If efficient, this production leads to high rates of per capita
income growth, which, in turn, leads to a shift in demand away from heavy
industrial production to the environmentally less stressful production of consumer goods and services. In a recent study of the relationship between per capita income and four pollution indicators—urban air quality, oxygen demand in
rivers, fecal contamination of rivers, and heavy metal contamination of rivers—
economists Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger (1995, 369) reached the following conclusion:
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Figure 5.1. Environmental stress at different levels of economic development.
Source: Based on Radetzki (1990, fig. 13A).

[W]e find little evidence that environmental quality deteriorates with economic
growth. Rather, we find for most indicators that economic growth brings an initial phase of deterioration followed by a subsequent phase of improvement. We
suspect that the eventual improvement reflects, in part, an increased demand for
(and supply of) environmental protection at higher levels of national income.
The turning points for the different pollutants vary, but in most cases they occur
before a country reaches a per capita income of $8000. For seven of the fourteen indicators we find a statistically significant positive relationship between
environmental quality and income for a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of $10,000. Only in one case (fecal coliform) do we find a significant
adverse relationship at this income level.

Grossman and Krueger (1995, 371) are quick to point out, however, that ‘there is
no reason to believe that the process has been an automatic one.’ This is important
to bear in mind as we turn our attention to the non-conforming relation between
economic growth and environmental protection in the formerly socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
Western studies of growth patterns were not lost on Party leaders in the former Soviet bloc. In People’s Poland, economic growth was designated an official
strategy for environmental protection. The Party/state cited Western studies linking economic growth to environmental protection in support of its disingenuous
claim that Poland ultimately would outgrow its environmental problems simply
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by revving up its economy to Western levels and beyond (conversation with Dr.
Tomasz Żylicz, Special Advisor to the Polish Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, July 10, 1993). Of course, that never
happened, despite the fact that between 1950 and 1979 Poland’s economy grew
(according to official statistics based on the dubious model of material balances)
at an average annual rate of 4.12 percent, almost 0.75 percent higher than the
average rate of growth in the United States during the same period (Pryor 1985,
76). But the effect of that growth on Poland’s natural environment was anything
but beneficial. As Poland’s economy grew, factor productivity and the condition
of the natural environment both deteriorated. There are at least three plausible
economic explanations for this.
First, despite comparable growth and environmental investment rates, the
younger and smaller socialist economies could not buy as much environmental
protection as the generally larger and more mature capitalist economies. Their
percentage investment may have been the same, but their nominal investment was
much smaller. In other words, they were taking proportional slices from smaller
pies. This is borne out by statistics comparing nominal gross national product in
the former Soviet bloc countries with the capitalist West (see Alton 1981, table
11).
Second, high rates of ‘hidden’ inflation directly devalued environmental
investment increases in the socialist economies, and indirectly impeded the use of
environmental expenditures by reducing (through shortage) supplies of materials
available for use in environmental protection (see Peterson 1993, 170).
Third, structural features of the socialist economy prevented what is, under
capitalism, a naturally occurring shift from extensive to intensive modes of production. And the failure to make that shift, perhaps more than any other feature of
the Communist political economy, was responsible for the massive and chronic
environmental degradation experienced throughout the former Soviet bloc.
The third reason is by far the most important. But a few comments are in
order about the first, which focuses on the size and maturity of the economy. It
is true that the socialist economies were nominally smaller than the advanced
capitalist economies, and they were less developed technologically. But that is not
because they were younger or less developed, as posited in Rostovian ‘stages of
growth’ theories (see Rostow 1990). By the 1970s, the socialist economies were
among the most highly industrialized in the world. Poland ranked as the world’s
tenth industrial power in total output (Sądowski 1976, 49). To what extent, then,
were Poland’s lower national income figures legitimately attributable to its later
economic development, rather than to systemic and ideological factors that,
among other things, impeded the shift from extensive to intensive production patterns? I do not propose an answer to that question. I raise it only to cast doubt on
the claim that the poor environmental performance of socialist economies was
strongly related to their stage of development. That claim is worth doubting for
three reasons. First, factor productivity throughout the Soviet bloc was quite low
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even as compared with countries at similar levels of development (Brus and Laski
1989, 29). More generally, empirical studies suggest that the nature or structure
of the economic system, far more than the level of economic development, determines environmental performance (see, e.g., Bernstam 1991). Finally, the claim
that environmental performance is determined by the stage of economic development implies that economic growth may be a sufficient, as well as necessary,
condition for environmental protection. That implication could be used to support
disingenuous claims that the socialist economies eventually would have outgrown
their environmental problems in time. In fact, the experiences of the socialist
economies—Poland’s in particular—belie the contention that economic growth
and increased environmental investments are sufficient conditions for effective
environmental protection.

The Extensive Pattern of Production under Socialism
Whereas the explanation based on the stage of economic development is problematic and controversial, the explanation based on the nature of economic growth
is neither. Socialist economic development exemplified the extensive pattern of
production and its environmental consequences. The former Soviet bloc countries
displayed a persistent and myopic determination to catch and then surpass the
capitalist West’s level of economic development (see, e.g., Spulber 1964, 35).
And the constant strategy for achieving this goal was to pump massive inputs of
capital, labor and natural resources into large-scale heavy industrial development
(see, e.g., Ofer 1988, 55). Meanwhile, the socialists paid scant attention to factors
such as resource scarcity and productive efficiency, initially for ideological reasons (stemming from Marx’s labor theory of value—see Chapter 6, §6.4) and later
because of entrenched political and economic interests (see Kramer 1973, 373).
Politically and economically dominated by the USSR, and with only limited access to Western capital and technologies, the socialist countries of Central
and Eastern Europe had little choice but to follow the Soviet Union’s extensive
strategy of economic growth. Decade after decade they invested ever higher numbers of inputs to achieve roughly the same economic growth levels as their West
European competitors. Table 5.4 illustrates the relative extensivity of production
in the former Soviet bloc compared with the European Community. Through the
1980s, the socialist countries had to invest more than three times the energy and
almost twice the water to produce the same amount of income as capitalist European countries.
The relative extensivity of production in the Eastern European countries
remained constant to the end of the socialist experiment. Unlike the capitalist
economies, the socialist economies grew increasingly wasteful, that is, less intensive, as time passed; less production, rather than more, was obtained from each
input. Table 5.5 illustrates this by comparing relative productivity per input, over
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Table 5.4. Natural resources invested per unit of national product in
socialist Europe and the European Community in the 1980s
Socialist countriesa

EC countries

Energy intensity of GDP, TOE/$1,000b

0.77

0.23

Water intensity of GDP, m3/$1,000

153

82

a. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania.
b. TOE = metric ton of oil equivalent.
Source: Żylicz (1993b, table 1).

Table 5.5. Share of factor productivity in the growth of output: international
comparison
Average annual rate of change

Country
Socialist countries
Czechoslovakia

Poland

Soviet Union

Capitalist countries
France

Japan

United Kingdom

Share of factor
productivity in
growth of output

Period

Output

[Factor]
productivity

1960–75
1976–80
1981–88
1960–75
1976–80
1981–88
1960–75
1976–80
1981–88

3.0
2.2
1.4
5.1
0.7
0.8
4.6
2.3
1.9

1.0
0.7
0.1
2.4
–0.6
0.2
1.2
0.5
0.5

0.33
0.29
0.07
0.47
–
0.40
0.26
0.22
0.13

1960–73
1973–79
1979–88
1960–73
1973–79
1979–88
1960–73
1973–79
1979–88

5.8
2.8
1.9
10.8
3.6
4.1
2.9
1.5
2.2

3.9
1.7
1.5
6.6
1.8
1.8
2.2
0.5
1.96

0.67
0.65
0.75
0.61
0.43
0.43
0.76
0.60
0.95

Source: Kornai (1992a, 187, table 9.6).
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a three-decade period, for selected socialist and capitalist countries. The statistics
show that factor productivity—production per unit of input—steadily contributed to economic growth in France, Japan and the United Kingdom, whereas in
the socialist European countries factor productivity played a relatively small and
declining role in economic growth. Further evidence is provided by Polish statistics relating net output to material costs. Between 1960 and 1978, consumption of
raw materials in Poland increased by 3.1 percent; and the rate of increase rose to
5.2 percent between 1978 and 1981 (Marek and Kassenberg 1990, 45).
The increasingly extensive production patterns of the socialist economies had
predictable consequences for the natural environment. The scale of waste in the
Soviet Union and its satellite countries was unparalleled. For example, the Soviet
mining industry typically extracted only the most accessible mineral deposits, and
processed only the ores with the highest mineral content; the rest was dumped in
slag heaps (Kramer 1973, 371). Table 5.6 shows the inordinately high percentage
of mineral resources lost in the extractive process in the Soviet Union. Similarly,
in People’s Poland, about 60 percent of recoverable coal was wasted. By way of
comparison, in other countries with similar geological circumstances only about
30 percent of recoverable coal is lost in the extractive process (S. Gomułka 1986,
184). Overall, the material intensity of production in the socialist European economies was 55 percent higher than in capitalist countries (Staniszkis 1992, 91–2).
Excessive pollution was another by-product of the extensive pattern of production. Obviously if one country has to burn more coal than another to achieve
the same level of income production, it will produce more air pollution to achieve
the same level of income production (assuming coal with similar properties,
equivalent abatement technologies, etc.). Table 5.7 presents comparative statistics
on the pollution intensity of GDP—the amount of pollution produced per unit of
national income produced—for the formerly socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the European Community countries. The socialist countries
produced 2.5 times the solid waste, discharged more than three times the wastewater, and emitted more than twice the gas and 13 times the dust of European
Community countries to produce the same amount of national income.
Given that economic growth in the socialist European countries was purchased at comparatively great expense to the natural environment, it should not
be surprising to find that environmental protection in those countries was comparatively unsuccessful, even though their rates of economic growth were quite
high. And while the extensive pattern of production took its toll on the environment, environmental degradation took its toll on the economy, costing between
10 and 20 percent of national income. The economies of all the Soviet bloc countries stagnated in the 1970s and 1980s as inputs, including natural resources,
grew increasingly scarce (see, e.g., Herer and Sądowski 1990, 126). The question becomes why the socialist Party/states did not (or could not) cultivate more
intensive modes of production. Earlier I suggested that the shift from extensive
to intensive production patterns was naturally occurring, but it did not naturally
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Table 5.6. Percentage losses of natural resources in the extraction process in
the USSR
Natural resource

% loss

Coal
Potassium salts and oil
Non-ferrous metals
Mica

30
50–60
20
90

Source: Kramer (1973, 371, table 3).

Table 5.7. The pollution intensity of GDP in socialist European countries
and the EC in the 1980s
Solid waste, metric ton/$
Wastewater, cubic metres/$1,000
Gases, kg/$1,000
Dust, kg/$1,000

Socialist Europea

The EC

1.0
83
51
13

0.4
24
24
1

a. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania.
Source: Żylicz (1993b, table 1).

occur in People’s Poland or the other countries of the Soviet bloc for a variety of
systemic reasons.

5.4. Systemic Impediments to Resource Conservation
In the 1960s, economists in Poland and throughout the Soviet bloc began calling
for reforms to improve economic efficiency and conserve investment resources
in the socialist economic system (see Becker 1986, 23; Fallenbuchl 1973, 235).
Their motivation was economic, rather than ecological. In the Soviet Union, for
example, billions of tons of wasted resources were costing the national economy
up to 6 billion rubles each year (Peterson 1993, 129). Numerous reforms designed
to increase factor productivity were implemented, but they were uniformly ineffectual. Various system-specific features of the socialist economy obstructed them.
In this section, I will review two of the most important impediments to increased
conservation of natural resources (including clean air and water) under socialism:
first, the socialist pricing mechanism, under the influence of Marx’s labor theory
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of value, failed to account adequately for increasing (relative) resource scarcity;
second, the socialist reward (wage and bonus) system did not provide adequate
incentives for technological innovation, resulting in a 10–20-year environmental
technology gap between the Soviet bloc and the capitalist West.

The Socialist Pricing Mechanism and Resource Scarcity
In addition to determining resources allocation patterns and output levels, the
centralized socialist administration controlled prices for producer and consumer goods. Prices were set to achieve a wide array of goals, ranging from the
ideological—meeting Marx’s ‘average price of production’ standard—to the
politically pragmatic—quieting popular discontent. Unfortunately (from the point
of view of economic efficiency), prices only rarely (and then coincidentally) were
set at market-clearing levels. Most importantly, central planners paid virtually no
attention to relative scarcity when setting prices. Their chronic and often intentional undervaluation of inputs, especially natural resources, was substantially
responsible for the steady decline in factor productivity.
In the socialist economic system, natural resources were provided to producers virtually free of charge (Peterson 1993, 16). As Robert W. Campbell (1991,
117) has expressed it, environmental goods had ‘zero prices.’ This was, on one
level, just another subsidy, softening the budget constraint for state-owned enterprises. But it was more than a mere subsidy. The policy of providing natural
resource inputs free of charge had strong ideological roots in Marxist theory, specifically in the labor theory of value (discussed in detail in Chapter 6, §6.4), which
became a cornerstone of the socialist economic system, governing the economics
of natural resource use until the very end. So when Soviet economists began calling for resource-use fees, they were opposed by conservative forces, including
lawyers, who argued that natural resources, as socialist property, could not be
bought and sold as commodities (see Goldman 1972a, 40). And the conservative
forces prevailed. Into the 1980s, the official view in the Soviet Union was that
free use of land was ‘one of the greatest achievements of the October Revolution’ (DeBardeleben 1985, 244). This sentiment was reflected in Soviet economic
policy, codified in legislation (see 1968 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 51, Item No.
485 and 1970 Vedomosti SSSR, Issue No. 50, Item No. 564), and exemplified in
Soviet industrial practice. For instance, when planners developed a hydroelectric
project that would flood valuable agricultural lands, the cost of lost agricultural
production from those lands was ignored (see Campbell 1991, 54). Similarly,
when whole forests were felled, tons of rotting wood lay wasted because there
were not enough trains to carry them to market; but this technically did not constitute a cost to the Soviet economy (Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 70). Extraction costs
were incurred, of course, but the value of the wood itself was not considered. The
consequence of neglecting the scarcity value of timber was predictable: in the
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Soviet Union during the 1980s, 40 percent of wood was wasted in the production
process, amounting to 100 million cubic meters each year (Peterson 1993, 130).
Pollution, likewise, was defined as cost free to society because it did not
result in the production of goods from human labor. To borrow Peter Magg’s
(1985, 359) vivid example:
the steel produced in a steel mill would be valued as the sum of the values of
the coal and iron ore used as inputs plus the labor cost of the steelworkers. The
coal and iron would be valued at the cost of their extraction. Yet, no value or cost
would be attached to the destruction of farmland or scenery by open pit mining,
to the exhaustion of the country’s best energy and mineral reserves, or to the pollution of the air, water and land by the steel mill, since none of these resulted in
the production of goods incorporating human labor.

Adherence to Marx’s labor theory of value was not absolute and uniform
throughout the Soviet bloc, however. In the 1930s, the influential socialist economic theorist Oskar Lange (1937, 138; 1935, 189) condemned the theory as
obsolete and insufficient because it failed to account for the scarcity of resources
other than human labor. East Germany, usually among the more doctrinaire of the
Marxist–Leninist regimes, was the first to impose nominal resource-use fees in
the late 1960s (see DeBardeleben 1985, 242). As we learned in Chapter 2, Poland
enacted its first resource-use fees in the 1974 Water Law. Poland’s 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act then created the most extensive system
of resource-use and pollution fees in the world. This constituted tacit repudiation
of Marx’s labor theory of value and implicit recognition that, although natural
resources might be provided free of charge, they could not be provided free of
cost.
Pollution and resource-use fees were poor substitutes for scarcity pricing but,
of course, they were never intended as substitutes. As Joan DeBardeleben (1985,
246) has noted, resource-use fees were never based on supply (i.e., relative scarcity), demand and the marginal costs of development. For example, in People’s
Poland the price of coal never even approached the marginal costs of production. The predictable consequence was excessive coal burning (see Kabala 1990,
62). The Polish Party/government occasionally raised the price of coal, but price
increases were always combined with offsetting subsidies to users (see, e.g., Montias 1962, 289). This practice undercut any incentive users otherwise might have
had to increase factor productivity.

Technological Innovation and the Socialist Reward System
In his pioneering studies of economic growth, Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets
investigated the shift countries make from extensive to intensive modes of pro-
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duction as their economies mature. The high rates of economic growth produced
during middle levels of development, when heavy industrial production is dominant, lead to high rates of growth in what Kuznets (1971, 322–3) called ‘the stock
of useful knowledge.’ This includes knowledge of pure and applied sciences—
the kind of knowledge that spurs technological innovation. Innovation, in turn,
results in increased factor productivity and shifts in production patterns, permitting economic growth to continue even as supplies of available inputs, including
natural resources, decline over time. Kuznets’s theory developed from his studies
of economic growth and structure, over long historical periods, in a variety of
countries. He reached the ‘inescapable conclusion’ that high rates of growth in
per capita product during ‘modern economic growth’ are attributable primarily
to increased factor productivity, rather than increases in inputs (specifically manhours and capital accumulation) (Kuznets 1966, 80–1). The tremendous increase
in factor productivity needed to generate substantial rates of economic growth is
provided by ‘the high and accelerated rate of technological change’—‘the hundreds of minor inventions and thousands of improvements which by their cumulative impact drastically reduce relative cost’ (Kuznets 1971, 307, 326).
As Gur Ofer (1988, 22) has pointed out, the former Soviet bloc countries
never conformed to Kuznets’s definition of modern economic growth. Kuznets
(1971, 329) himself recognized the socialist economies as anomalies under his
theory, and he explained them away by noting that growth in ‘useful knowledge’
and technological innovation are not automatic consequences of economic development in every political-economic context; an important prerequisite is ‘a social
and ideological framework within which science can prosper.’ The lack of a conducive atmosphere for science in the former Soviet bloc explained for Kuznets
why economic growth there was driven not by increasing factor productivity but
by the continuous ‘forced draft of resources’ (Kuznets 1966, 84n35). A number of
other scholars (e.g., Ammon and Cooper 1986, 1982; S. Gomułka 1986; Hanson
and Pavitt 1987; Poznański 1987) have analyzed the political-economy of science
and technological development in the former Soviet Bloc. Their findings confirm
that the socialist economies were unable to generate the kinds of scientific and
technical innovations needed for the shift to more intensive and, therefore, less
environmentally stressful patterns of production. Indeed, they contradict the suppositions of Marxist writers that socialism would provide more, rather than less,
conducive conditions for innovation (accord Stanisław Gomułka 1986, 54–5).
They socialist economies lagged behind the West at each stage of the innovation
process, from research to application to diffusion (Smith 1981b, 242). According
to Soviet economists, technology development activities in their country took, on
average, 50–100 percent longer than in the United States. Where Japan required
only 3.6 years to put new technology into commercial use, it took the Soviets 6.4
years (Linz 1992, 66). The time-lag was even greater for environmental technologies. For example, Soviet pollution-control technologies for the chemicals
industry were ‘at least twenty years behind world standards’; while American air
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pollution scrubbers were removing 85 percent of sulphur from emissions, the best
Soviet technology could remove only 10 percent (Peterson 1993, 39).
In the entire Soviet bloc, according to Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz
Laski (1989, 32), there was ‘not a single case of leapfrogging into frontier technologies like electronics, plastics, man-made fibres, or new pharmaceuticals; the
usual picture is that of following with a time lag’ (see also Kornai 1992a, 298–
300, table 12.6). The numbers bear out their observation. In the late 1970s, the
OECD11 countries produced three times more domestic patent applications and 33
times more foreign patent applications than the CMEA12 countries (S. Gomułka
1986, 177–8).
The technology gap between East and West persisted despite the socialist
‘fetish’ for technological development. As noted earlier, the socialist economic
system was founded on the Russian Marxist concept of technological determinism, according to which technology delimits economic development which, in
turn, determines socioeconomic relations. Technological innovation, on this
theory, is an important precondition for the march from capitalism, through socialism, to communism. To that end, research and development (R&D) investments
in the former Soviet bloc countries were always substantial. In the 1970s and
1980s, R&D expenditures in the Soviet Union ranged between 4 and 5 percent of
national income (Linz 1992, 65). This generated considerable technological progress, but typically not the kind that contributes to economic growth, for instance
by reducing production costs. Like the rest of the Soviet economy, the science
economy was characterized by high rates of investment and low rates of productivity (Kornai 1992a, 183). Fully 86 percent of all Soviet innovations resulting from R&D investments yielded no economic return at all (Linz 1992, 66).
The Soviets accomplished tremendous technological feats in military and space
applications, but they had difficulty producing the ‘hundreds of minor inventions
and thousands of minor improvements’ to increase economic efficiency.13 Soviet
factories increasingly resembled museums of technological history. In the 1980s,
for example, steel mills in Poland and the former Soviet Union still used grossly
inefficient and highly polluting open hearth furnaces built in the nineteenth century (see Peterson 1993, 13).
The reasons for the slow pace of growth-oriented technological innovation
in socialist economies were largely systemic. The socialist property system created a disincentive to innovate because all innovations became socialist property,
and the innovator’s compensation was rarely worth the effort (see Linz 1992,
74–5). Central planners exacerbated this problem by rewarding enterprise managers and workers only for fulfillment of plan production targets, with little regard
for efficiency.
Socialist enterprises, like capitalist firms, made investment and production
decisions—including decisions to invest in cost-saving innovations—with an eye
toward the bottom line. But the bottom line was very different under socialism. It
had nothing to do with the firm’s ability to sell what it produced at a profit; it had
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everything to do with the firm’s achievement of plan production targets and its
political clout with the central administration. As far as socialist enterprises were
concerned, the bottom line was the bonus. Managers and workers received substantial bonuses—potentially amounting to more than half their annual incomes—
for fulfilling physical plan production targets. The bonus was not, however, a
profit substitute. Unlike the profit motive, the bonus motive created little incentive to innovate, except to reduce supply shortages and speed production. Innovations that might have reduced costs and conserved resources were irrelevant to
the bonus. Planners rewarded production, period; the efficiency or inefficiency of
production was generally irrelevant. According to Józef Wilczyński (1972, 234),
the central planning system emphasized ‘the quantitative fulfilment and overfulfilment of targets, and the system of incentives was such that cost reduction and
improvement in quality were largely ignored.’14 In fact, the reward structure created disincentives to design and implement cost-saving innovations. Any technical or process change that delayed or impeded the achievement of production
targets jeopardized the bonus. In other words, efficiency improvements could not
help, but could harm enterprises. Under the circumstances, managers quite rationally refused to implement innovations that would have reduced production costs,
conserved resources and improved product quality (see Campbell 1991, 44–5).
Enterprise managers also manipulated information in the planning process
to avoid environmental protection duties. Central planners allocated resources to
enterprises on the basis of the predicted costs of achieving plan targets, which
included environmental protection goals as well as output levels. These cost predictions primarily were based on information provided by the enterprises, and
managers rationally distorted information in order to maximize their allocations
and minimize their targets. By overestimating environmental costs, they created a
win–win situation: if they received all they asked for, it would constitute a windfall profit after making required environmental investments; if not, they would
have a legitimate excuse for not making environmental investments and for failing to comply with any emissions limits specified in their operating permits.15
The production-based socialist reward system also disabled the most important contributor to cost-saving innovations under capitalism: the buyer. In the
capitalist economy, the market itself creates the chief incentives for innovation.
Buyers purchase new products that fill their needs better than old ones; they select
for quality; and they buy from the producers with the lowest prices, given the
same level of product quality. Manufacturers in competitive markets innovate to
create new products, to improve the quality of existing products and to lower
production costs. These types of innovations increase competitiveness, leading
to increased market share and higher profits. The socialist economy was, by contrast, a sellers’ market in which goods were produced and priced according to
directions from above rather than demand from below. Buyers without access to
alternative sources of goods (excluding the sizeable black market) or substitutes
had no influence on product quality or price. If they simply refused to purchase
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a product because of low quality or high price, the producer typically was unaffected. An enterprise that met production targets was fully compensated even if
no one bought what it produced, that is, regardless of profit (see, e.g., Clark and
Wildavsky 1990, 245).16 Consequently, there was no upward pressure to innovate,
as there is in capitalist economies.
The Party/state subsidized prices as well as costs. As a result, prices for available goods often did not accurately reflect production (let alone social) costs. As a
result, buyers did not receive the kinds of price signals necessary to make rational
market decisions. It is unlikely, therefore, that buyers could have impelled innovation even if they had been empowered to choose among competing products.

5.5. Socialist Property Relations, Regulatory Conflicts of Interest
and Soft Budget Constraints
The socialist property rights system (previously discussed in §5.1) vested in the
Party/government nominal ownership of virtually all the means of production in
Poland (excluding agriculture, which was left predominantly in private hands
after the abandonment of forced collectivization in 195617). This created an insurmountable conflict of interest with respect to environmental regulation: the Party/
government was supposed to regulate (for environmental protection) the same
enterprises it owned and controlled. The predictable result was that environmental
regulations were chronically underenforced.

The Party/State’s Regulatory Conflict of Interest
As owner, the Party/state financed, allocated resources to, set production parameters for, and determined wages and bonuses of managers and workers in all state
enterprises. As regulator, the Party/state was supposed to enforce environmental rules against those very same enterprises. The implications of this conflict of
interest may appear obvious to us, but according to orthodox Marxist–Leninist
theory there should have been no conflict. The unification of social forces under
the common control of the workers—represented exclusively by their (selfappointed) Party—supposedly constituted a profound improvement over the fractious management of competing social forces under capitalism; environmental
restrictions should have been much easier to impose on state-owned enterprises
because industrial managers and environmental regulators were both agents of the
same principal, the Party/government. As a Romanian government official once
put it, ‘our Socialist system . . . enables us to resolve pollution problems without
conflict. . . . The state represents the people’s interest in reducing pollution from
industrial plants, and since the state owns the factories, the people are assured that
adequate pollution measures are always taken’ (quoted in Leonard 1988, 210).
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Existing studies strongly suggest, on the contrary, that a little adversity
between the regulat-or and the regulat-ed can be a very good thing. In the 1980s,
the French jurist Laurent Cohen-Tanugi studied government regulations in France
and the United States and found that regulations tend to be more successful where
the regulator does not participate directly in the economic risks generated by its
regulations, that is, where the state has no direct financial stake or ownership
interest in the regulated firms (Cohen-Tanugi 1985, 140–4; also see Jancar 1987,
310–11). The separation of regulatory authority from ownership of the means of
production results in more effective environmental regulation. In the absence of
this separation, governments typically are unable to divorce their regulatory functions from their ownership interests. This conflict of interest tends to influence
the content and enforcement of economic regulations, including environmental
regulations. The result is less effective environmental protection.
This was precisely the consequence in People’s Poland, and throughout the
socialist world. As Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski (1989, 30) have written, ‘[t]he Janus-faced state—as the presumed protector of the environment on
the one hand, and the allocator of resources and the owner of the offending enterprises on the other—found itself in a schizophrenic position, without the possibility of effective use of even the habitual means of fighting environmental abuse
(fines and the like).’
The Party/state’s conflict of interest as owner and regulator took a number
of forms. Enterprises in People’s Poland were, for all practical purposes, government agencies (accord Malinowski 1984, 143; Madey and Rybicki 1971, 146).
They were integral components of Party/state administration. Their primary mission was to implement Party/state socioeconomic policy, as expressed in central plans. But they were more than mere economic producers; they also served
important political and social functions. Enterprises served as the basic unit of
rank-and-file Party organization. Indeed, most citizens who belonged to the PZPR
did so through their place of work. Larger enterprises, in particular, provided
social services for their employees, including housing, shopping facilities, sports
clubs, local cultural centers, vacation resorts, schools and day care centers. All of
this gave socialist enterprises a tremendous, literally governmental, presence in
the lives of their employees.
As agencies of government, state enterprises played a major role in economic
and environmental policy making. That helps to explain why environmental fees
and fines in People’s Poland tended to be set too low to deter non-compliance (as
we saw in Chapter 3). Enterprises also exercised considerable political influence
over environmental law enforcement. Although this is also true of private firms in
capitalist economies, the influence of socialist enterprises was of a different order
of magnitude. As Marshall Goldman (1972a, 188) has written, government officials and enterprise managers in the socialist system had ‘an identity of interests;’
both suffered when funds were diverted from ‘productive’ activities to ‘unproductive’ environmental protection efforts (including pollution control and resources
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conservation). In capitalist economies, by contrast, the interests of firms and government are diverse. And this diversity serves to dilute the influence of industry
on such issues as environmental law and enforcement.18
One question that arises when the state owns regulated enterprises is who
regulates the regulator. One of the first arguments for governmental regulation
of environmental protection is that the state possesses far more coercive authority
than private citizens or social organizations. Industrial concerns that could easily avoid or manipulate private claims can easily be made to comply with state
mandates.19 If the state possesses the political will to regulate for environmental
protection, it certainly has enough power to enforce it. And according to CohenTanugi’s theory, the state is much more likely to have the political will to enforce
compliance with environmental regulations against firms it does not own. This
has been confirmed by comparative studies of countries with varying degrees of
state control over economic production. In countries such as Spain and Mexico,
with a high percentage of state-owned industries, governments historically have
shown little inclination to enforce compliance with pollution-control regulations
(Leonard 1988, 213). On the contrary, state ownership has created inducements to
shield enterprises from public scrutiny and accountability.
The Ukrainian writer Zhores Medvedev (1990a, 264–5), in a comparative
study of nuclear energy regulations, found that the highest number of reported
nuclear mishaps have occurred in the United States because it is ‘the country that
is most open about nuclear-related accidents.’ Medvedev noted that most American nuclear power stations are privately owned but regulated by a government
agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That governmental authority is supplemented by non-governmental watchdog groups, including anti-nuclear, consumer and environmental groups, making it very ‘difficult to cover up even minor
mishaps.’ The state, as independent regulator, has the power and is more likely to
have the political will to force private nuclear power plants to keep records, make
reports and open facilities to public inspection. But in countries such as Great
Britain and France, where the state owns and fully controls nuclear power plants,
the state tends to use its coercive force to avoid detection and public scrutiny, primarily by restricting the flow of information. This same problem also persists in
the United States to the extent that the federal government owns nuclear facilities.
Indeed, both sides of Medvedev’s thesis are nicely illustrated by reference to the
American experience.
Private nuclear plants in the USA are subject to stringent regulation by
the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). By contrast, publicly owned nuclear facilities, managed by the Department of Energy (DOE),
are largely exempt from NRC licensing and enforcement. The DOE has often
been accused of withholding information, falsifying documents and underreporting threats (see Federal Contracts Reports, Aug. 27, 1990; Energy Daily, Apr.
16, 1993). For example, when the US government’s Hanford nuclear reservation emitted 340,000 curies of radiation into the air above Washington and Ore-
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gon between 1944 and 1947, tens of thousands of exposed residents were never
warned. They did not even learn of their exposure until 40 years later; the first
public disclosure came in 1986, and then only after environmentalists filed a lawsuit to open classified government records (see UPI, July 13, 1990). By contrast,
the 1979 accident at the privately owned Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power
plant in Pennsylvania was attended by massive media coverage, which led to a
public outcry about nuclear safety, federal investigation of the accident and new
nuclear safety regulations. As Dan Reicher (1993, 583–4) has written, ‘[t]he most
significant fallout from the TMI accident was institutional. . . . Since the accident there has not been a single new order for a nuclear power plant.’ However,
Reicher (1993, 564–6) also argues that the government suffers from a substantial
conflict of interest even with respect to privately owned nuclear power because
the federal government has been a major proponent of nuclear power since World
War II. This position is borne out, for example, by Congress’s enactment of the
1957 Price-Anderson Act (42 U.S.C. §2210), which greatly limited the financial
liability of energy companies for nuclear accidents. It seems clear, nevertheless,
that the US government has policed private nuclear power far better than its own
nuclear facilities.
In countries where government ownership of polluting industries generates
regulatory conflicts of interest, the question becomes whether there exists any
independent authority with sufficient coercive power to force the state to comply
with its own regulations. The implicit assumption is that governments cannot be
expected to regulate their own activities effectively. There is ample evidence to
support this assumption from virtually all countries, including the United States.
For example, as Thomas J. DiLorenzo (1992, 111) has noted, the US Department
of Defense ‘now generates more than 400,000 tons of hazardous waste a year—
more than is produced by the five largest chemical companies combined. To
make matters worse, the Environmental Protection Agency lacks the enforcement
power over the public sector that is possesses over the private sector’ (also see
Bettigole 1994; Gelpe 1989). However, the problem is not completely intractable.
In some countries, governments have given up their monopolies on environmental law enforcement. In the United States, for example, any private citizen or non-governmental organization can use the judicial system to compel the
government to comply with its own environmental regulations (see Wald 1992).
Private individuals and groups have successfully exercised this authority on many
occasions to, among other things, require the Army to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act,20 force the Navy to obtain a Clean Water Act discharge
permit,21 and require the EPA Administrator to comply with statutory directives.22
As a result, problems arising from regulatory conflicts of interest have been
reduced (though never eliminated). It must be stressed, however, that this method
of reducing regulatory conflicts can be effective only in states committed to the
rule of law; the legal empowerment of citizens and non-governmental organizations is meaningless unless the government truly is subject to their power.23
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The formerly totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe could not,
by definition, give up their monopolies on environmental law enforcement. To
totalitarians, political (including, in this context, legal) power is a zero-sum game.
Giving up substantial law enforcement powers to non-governmental organizations and private citizens would have entailed an unacceptable reduction in Party
authority. More to the point, it would have required the Party/state to render itself
legally accountable for environmental law enforcement. In other words, it would
have required the institution of the rule of law. But that was unthinkable.
Even in People’s Poland, where citizens and non-governmental organizations had limited legal authority to participate in environmental decision making
(under the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act and the 1984
Land-Use Planning Act), the Party/state could not be held accountable for implementing its own environmental rules. Private citizens could challenge individual
land-use decisions in the High Administrative Court; they could seek compensation for pollution damage in civil court; and officially recognized social (environmental) organizations could participate in administrative permitting and land-use
decisions. But no one could force the Party/government against its will to take
action against environmental violators. Poland’s High Administrative Court had
no jurisdiction to require administrators to promulgate or enforce environmental regulations. The Constitutional Tribunal, which was appointed in 1985 to
assess the constitutionality of laws and the legality of regulations (1985 Dz.U.
No. 22, item 98), likewise had no jurisdiction to order the Party/government to
issue or enforce environmental mandates.24 Even if there had been some legal
mechanism for non-governmental environmental law enforcement in People’s
Poland, it would not have been effective because, in the end, the law did not
rule in People’s Poland, the Party did. Given this political-economic fact of life,
there is little else the Party/government could have done to avoid or substantially
reduce its conflict of interest as environmental regulator and nominal owner of
the means of production. So there was no way for it to avoid or minimize the
environmental consequences of that conflict.
The Party/state’s conflict of interest as owner and regulator of the means
of production was replicated at the ministerial and lower levels of state administration where development responsibilities were frequently combined with
environmental protection mandates. In the 1950s, the Forestry Ministry, which
had primary responsibility for forest development activities, was charged with
implementing the 1949 Nature Protection Act. The 1962 Water Law made industrial ministries responsible for imposing water pollution control conditions on
their own development activities. And in the 1980s, the lead agency for environmental protection had economic development responsibilities that compromised
its environmental mission: the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water
Management, instituted in 1983, was responsible for ensuring water supplies for
industrial use and irrigation. At the regional level of administration, governors
(wojewodowie) were responsible for both environmental law enforcement and
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fulfilling regional development plans, but their performance in office was judged
solely on their record of political obedience and plan fulfillment. They had little
to gain and potentially much to lose from strict environmental law enforcement;
on the other hand, they stood to lose little or nothing from ignoring environmental
mandates (see Jendrośka and Sommer 1994, 186–7).
To this day in post-Communist Poland, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry remains substantially responsible for
water use, forest development and mining activities. As a result of these intraministerial conflicts of interest, environmental responsibilities are still frequently
compromised. As Olimpiad Ioffe and Peter Maggs (1987, 277) have noted, ‘the
agency assigned both to exploit and protect a resource is unlikely to do a good job
of protecting the resource against its own depredations.’25

Soft Budget Constraints in the ‘Shortage Economy’
The Party/state’s conflict of interest as regulator and owner of the means of production was reflected in the budget constraint. Implicit in the ‘production for production’s sake’ mentality of socialist economics was what the Hungarian economist
János Kornai (1986a) calls the ‘soft budget constraint’. A firm’s budget constraint
is hard or soft depending on its degree of economic independence and self-reliance.
It is said to be (relatively) hard if the firm must profit in the marketplace to survive,
but ‘soft’ if the firm is (relatively) oblivious to profits and costs because its survival
is determined not economically, but politically or administratively through the use
of subsidies, tax breaks, relaxed environmental standards, etc.
In the former socialist economies, budget constraints were chronically soft
(despite occasional and inconsistent efforts to harden them). We already have
seen that the bonus structure for enterprises was completely oblivious to profits and losses; only physical production levels mattered. Given that, it is hardly
surprising to find that socialist enterprises rarely went out of business; those that
did were comparatively small and unimportant to the national economy. The best
guarantor of survival for socialist enterprises was not profit, but size and political influence. The larger an enterprise—the more jobs it provided and the more
it produced—the greater its political clout and the higher its level of subsidization. So every enterprise’s first priority was to grow by using all the political
clout it could muster to maximize its allotment of inputs from the center (Clark
and Wildavsky 1990, 192–3). Socialist enterprises, which were large to begin
with, grew larger. The larger they grew, the less efficient they became (reflecting diseconomies of scale in production) and the more subsidies they required. A
vicious cycle was created. In Poland, the least profitable industries—usually coal
mining and food production—regularly received the largest annual ‘investment’
gains from the center. This led to the perverse result that the leading loss makers (and polluters) in the economy ended up with the highest final ‘profits’ after

Enforcement Problems II: Socialist Economics

145

subsidies (Nuti 1990, 176). Indeed, in 1982 subsidies for ‘financially troubled’
enterprises in Poland amounted to 44 percent of total enterprise profits, and ‘represented the largest single item in the government’s civilian budget expenditures’
(Prybyła 1989, 198–9). Even profitability was negotiable in the socialist economy
(see Kamiński and Sołtan 1989, 381). So enterprises had little incentive to conserve investment resources, including natural resources; on the contrary, they had
every reason to maximize their use.26 Resource inputs were available to producers
virtually price free and, with every enterprise maximizing resource use, shortages
of producer goods became a chronic problem. In the closely intertied socialist
economy, shortages in one sector created production bottlenecks that reverberated
throughout the entire economy.27 Enterprises rationally responded to production
bottlenecks and input shortages by hoarding resource inputs, which led to further
shortages and production bottlenecks.
Shortages reinforced the goal of maximizing production, further exacerbating the Party/state’s regulatory conflict of interest and increasing the leverage of
industrial enterprises and ministries over environmental protectors in the Party/
state’s administrative hierarchy. Who would dare complain of pollution coming
from a paper factory (to take a realistic example) in the midst of a toilet paper
shortage? Of course, if some unthinking sanitation or environmental inspector did
try to penalize or shut down the factory, the Party/state always could intervene
and either curtail the action (for reasons of ‘higher necessity’) or compensate for
penalties, that is, further soften the budget constraint.

5.6. Conclusion
Given the various endemic obstacles to environmental law enforcement created
by the socialist economic system, it is easy to understand why environmental
protection was largely ineffective in People’s Poland. Indeed, we may well ask
whether environmental protection could ever be successful in any socialist economy, at least if regulatory conflicts of interests and other inducements to soften
budget constraints are as inevitable as they appear to be. I take up that question
in earnest in Chapter 8. At this point, it is enough to recognize that the obstacles
discussed in this chapter were structural. They were not intended or designed to
obstruct environmental protection, but that was their effect. And they lend support to the argument that environmental protection failed in People’s Poland (and
throughout the Soviet bloc) not because of negligence but primarily because of
the Communist political-economic system.
That system was, of course, premised on ideological principles of Marxism–
Leninism, some of which have been addressed in this and earlier chapters. Chapter 6 takes a closer look at the ideological origins of communism in the writings
of Marx, Engels and Lenin to see if they provide some clues as to why the system
was so poorly suited to the task of environmental protection.
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Notes
1. A few neo-Marxists, such as Jan Tinbergen (1969, 593–5), have argued that state
ownership of the means of production is not a necessary attribute of socialism (also see
Lerner 1970).
2. Polish theorists only began addressing this question in the 1970s (see KożyraKowalski 1977).
3. It is interesting to note the symmetry between this Marxist view of the relationship
between society and economy and the Marxist view of the relationship between society
and nature. According to Marx, the history of economic progress has, in essence, been
the struggle to reverse nature’s control over man. For more on this, see Chapter 6 (§6.1.).
4. James Gleick (1987) suggests that completely accurate long-range weather forecasting would be impossible even with a computer of unlimited processing power because
of ‘chaotic’ interactions in the atmosphere. This also may have implications, of course, for
socialist central planning.
5. Only five-year and one-year plans had to be approved by the parliament. All other
plans and plan revisions could be promulgated as regulations by the Council of Ministers.
6. On Marx’s historical materialist theory of production, see Cohen (1978, 206).
7. Indeed, some of Marx’s own writings (e.g., Marx and Engels 1978, 471–2; 1967,
78–9, 443–4) seem to support the notion that socialism might be successfully established
in countries at lower levels of economic development.
8. The 1982 reforms were also hindered by the Jaruzelski regime’s contradictory
efforts at ‘normalization’ (meaning the reestablishment of PZPR control) during Martial
Law (see Bielasiak 1988, 103).
9. For more on Poland’s post-socialist environmental protection efforts, see Chapter 7.
10. This section and the next are revised versions of Cole (1995c).
11. OECD stands for Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
It is a consortium of highly industrialized capitalist countries, including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany (i.e., the former West Germany), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since the fall
of communism, three former Soviet bloc countries—Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary—have joined.
12. CMEA stands for Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, a group created in
1949 to facilitate international trade and relations between Communist countries. Before
its break-up in 1991, the CMEA included Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Yugoslavia was a
‘limited participant.’
13. It may seem anomalous that Soviet military and space innovations had so few
applications in the civilian economy, but it was predictable given the Soviets’ preoccupation with external and internal security and their economic system’s structural disregard
for economic efficiency.
14. But see Poznański (1980, 243), concluding that environmental protection requirements did induce enterprises to make some technical changes in production.
15. I am grateful to Tomasz Żylicz for pointing this out.
16. This is not to say that profit was without consequence for enterprises. Profits
were an important secondary source of investment funds (see Crane 1992, 62). However,
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the very concept of ‘profit’ is suspect in a system where prices are administratively determined; the earning of profits is no indication of economic efficiency (see S. Gomułka 1986,
167). As Jadwiga Staniszkis (1992, 41) has noted, ‘profit is not a synonym for rational economic action, even at a micro level.’
17. Even though most agricultural lands remained privately owned in Poland, it
should be noted that agricultural production remained subject to Party/state planning and
control. Party/state agricultural policy was designed to discriminate against private farmers
and encourage their ‘voluntary’ socialization. However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful (see Wilkin 1989).
18. In Chapter 7 (§7.5), I explain how the influence of economic enterprises over
environmental protection has waned in post-Communist Poland because of privatization,
increased competition and the imposition of harder budget constraints throughout the
economy.
19. Historical analyses of private tort actions against polluters indicate how difficult
it was for plaintiffs to obtain compensation for, let alone prevent, pollution damage (see,
e.g., Dewees 1992).
20. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Weinberger, 610 F.Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1985).
21. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981).
22. See, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 411 F.Supp. 864
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), requiring the EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards for
lead under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7408), after the Administrator found that lead
emissions posed a pervasive threat to public health and welfare.
23. The importance of the rule of law for effective environmental law enforcement is
discussed in Chapter 8 (§8.6).
24. On Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, see generally M. Brzezinski (1993a).
25. Of course, this problem is not system specific. One needs only consider the travails of the US Forest Service, in the Department of Agriculture, to realize that this conflict
of interest arises just as easily in the management of public resources in capitalist countries.
On the normative implications of such regulatory conflicts of interest, see Chapter 8 (§8.4).
26. This obviously relates back to the discussion in §5.4 about systemic impediments
to increased resource conservation under socialism.
27. On endemic shortages in the socialist economic system, see Kornai (1992a, esp.
chaps. 11 and 12; 1980). Interestingly, Jozef Stalin may have been the first to comprehend the phenomenon of the shortage economy. The following quote is attributed (in Pryor
1973, 355n40) to Stalin: ‘in the capitalist countries . . . the errors of single capitalists, trusts,
syndicates, or this or that capitalist group are corrected through the elementary force of the
market. . . . No really important error, no considerable overproduction, no appreciable discrepancy between production and . . . demand can occur in the capitalist countries without
the mistakes, errors, and discrepancies being corrected by this or that crisis. . . . With us it is
quite different. Every important disturbance in trade or in production, each error in calculation in our economy does not end with just a partial crisis, but affects the whole economy.’

Chapter 6
THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION: MARXISM AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
Many of the legal, political and economic contributants to the underenforcement
of environmental law in People’s Poland discussed in preceding chapters had roots
in Marxist–Leninist ideology; indeed, we have already touched on some important
ideological issues in Chapters 3–5. The purpose of this chapter is to further elucidate ideological underpinnings of the socialist system that contributed to the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland. The intent is not to lay ‘blame’
at the feet of some long-dead political theorist (who, after all, never claimed to be
an environmentalist), but merely to draw legitimate connections between Marx’s
ideas and the ecological consequences of their (actual) implementation. Without
those connections, the analysis of institutional impediments to environmental law
enforcement under socialism would be incomplete (see North 1984, 10).
The nature of the connection between Marxist theory and the Communist
regimes of the former Soviet bloc has always been controversial. Some Marxist
and neo-Marxist scholars have argued (and continue to argue) that the regimes of
the former Soviet bloc were not ‘Marxist’ in any meaningful sense of that term;
Marx’s theories, they contend, were fundamentally inconsistent with Soviet-style
totalitarianism (see, e.g., Abel 1990). It seems clear, however, that Marx’s most
influential Russian interpreters at least intended to implement and believed they
were implementing Marx’s theories. As Martin Krygier (1994a, 139) has written,
the Communist revolution in Russia ‘was not simply the victory of a group of
power-hungry thugs, but of zealous, driven, often brilliant people deeply committed to implementing a body of ideas, which they knew as Marxism.’ Whether or
not Marx was in any way ‘responsible’ for Soviet-style totalitarianism, Leninism
and Stalinism were logical applications, if not the only logical applications, of
Marx’s theories (see Kołakowski 1978a, 419).
This chapter, in any event, concerns the contributions of Marxist theory to
the failure of environmental protection in Poland and throughout Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. Because Marxist ideology was universal and fundamental in all these countries, this chapter takes a somewhat broader approach,
focusing on the entire region, rather than on Poland exclusively.1
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6.1. Introduction
Marx, Engels and Lenin wrote little on specifically environmental matters, but
much of what they wrote about economics, politics and law indirectly (and sometimes directly) contributed to the failure of environmental protection efforts in
People’s Poland and the rest of the former Soviet bloc. This chapter analyzes
four elements of orthodox Marxism related to environmental protection that were
institutionalized throughout Central and Eastern Europe: (1) the Marxist attitude
toward nature; (2) the concept of socialist property; (3) the labor theory of value;
and (4) Marxist theories of law and state.
The reader should bear in mind that the arguments and analyses in this chapter are not about the theory of socialism. There are many different socialist theories. Marx’s was neither the first nor the last; it was only one theory or, more
accurately, one family of socialist theories. If socialism were an item of manufacture, Marxism would be a vast, socially owned conglomerate with numerous highly independent subsidiaries, each producing its own distinct brand. It is
important, therefore, to distinguish the Marxism of Marx from the Marxism of
the Marxists (see Kołakowski 1978a, 182–218). My analysis is restricted to what
has been called ‘orthodox’ or ‘classical’ Marxism: the Marxism of Marx, his colleague Engels and, to a lesser extent, Lenin. Their Marxism was, in fundamental
respects, intellectually incompatible with environmentalism and, as institutionalized in Soviet-style communism, impeded effective environmental protection.
This is not to say that one can no longer claim to be both a ‘Marxist’ (of some
sort) and an environmentalist (see, e.g., Pepper 1993). But it would be a Marxism
fundamentally different from Marx’s own. In other words, an environmentally
friendly socialism or ‘eco-socialism’ is necessarily post-Marxian.

6.2. Marx, Engels and Lenin on the Relationship between
Humans and Nature
Since the 1970s, historians, environmentalists and political commentators have
shown intense interest in what Marx, Engels and Lenin thought about the relationship between humans and the natural environment. This is somewhat ironic
because for Marx, Lenin and, to a lesser extent, Engels, the natural environment
was not a particularly interesting subject, except insofar as it provided a necessary basis for socioeconomic relations among people.2 Despite efforts by later
Marxist writers, such as Howard Parsons (1977), to portray Marx and Engels as
early environmentalists, it is clear that they were nothing of the kind. Parsons’
book catalogues virtually every writing by Marx or Engels that touches, however
tenuously, on nature. Along the way, Parsons provides commentary, explanations and apologies. His ardent desire to view Marx and Engels as early environmentalists unfortunately leads him too frequently into untenable or incredible
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interpretations. To take just one example, Parsons (1977, 55) quotes the following language from a letter Engels wrote to his friend Pyotr Lavrov: ‘the idea of
solidarity could finally . . . grow to a point where it will embrace all mankind and
oppose it, as a society of brothers living in solidarity, to the rest of the world—
the world of minerals, plants, and animals.’ The first problem with this passage
as proof of Engels’ environmentalism is that the language was not Engels’ but
Lavrov’s; Engels was quoting from Lavrov’s earlier letter to him (see Engels
1975d, 369). That problem aside, Parsons’ interpretation of the passage strains
credulity. He interprets Engels’ use of the word ‘oppose’ to mean ‘united with.’
Even if we accepted this interpretation, against all reason, it hardly would qualify
Engels (or Lavrov) as an early environmentalist.3 In fact, the writings of Marx
and Engels display a consistent economic/utilitarian and anthropocentric attitude
toward nature. Several of their theories are implicitly or explicitly hostile to the
environment. While recognizing that humans are part of nature, Marx and Engels
describe the entire course of human history as an effort by ‘man’ to gain dominion over nature and, thereby, become truly free. They foresaw that this would
happen under communism.
The concept of human domination of nature recurs throughout their writings.
In Volume I of Capital, Marx (1967, 514) wrote, ‘[i]t is the necessity of bringing
a natural force under the control of society, of economising, of appropriating or
subduing it on a large scale by the work of man’s hand, that first plays the decisive
part in the history of industry.’ Engels (1940, 306), in Dialectics of Nature, added
that ‘it is precisely the alteration of nature by men, not solely nature as such,
which is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought, and it is in the
measure that man has learned to change nature that his intelligence has increased.’
This interaction between humans and nature occurs regardless of the means and
relations of production, but Marx and Engels maintained that humans would gain
complete dominion over nature only under socialism. In the Anti-Dühring (1975c,
270), Engels wrote:
With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the
producer. Anarchy in social production is replaced by systematic, definite organization. The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then for the first time
man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom,
and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones.
The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have
hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for
the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he has now
become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action,
hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him.
Man’s own social organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed
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by nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control
of man himself. (cf. Marx 1967, vol. III, 820)

These are not the words of a nature lover. On Engels’ view, the entire history of
the human race is the struggle to overcome the external forces of nature that bind
it, and to subordinate nature to serve human purposes.
Unlike nineteenth-century preservationists, such as John Muir, Marx and
Engels expressed no special reverence for nature, or contempt for human activities that altered it. Rather, Marx and Engels wrote in the language of mainstream
nineteenth-century European intellectuals, reared in modernism, scientism and
the Judeo-Christian value system. They displayed an immense faith in science
and the conviction that humans had to subdue nature for their own purposes.
This hardly distinguished them from capitalist writers of the same era who,
like Marx, viewed contemporary man as homo-oeconomicus, driven by needs,
wants and productive relations. Even Parsons (1977, 67) concedes that ‘Marx
and Engels agreed with the capitalist “strategem” to “subdue” nature for “human
requirements.’ ”
Lenin, like Marx and Engels, wrote little specifically about the natural environment, but he certainly agreed that the primary purpose of nature was to serve
human needs. His writings on the subject of natural resources development displayed, in the words of Zigurds Zile (1971, 85), a ‘rather crude economic utilitarianism,’ suggesting that ‘if one only digs, dams, drains, plants, breeds, and
irrigates, he can satisfy humanity’s needs.’ Lenin embraced the Marxist notion
that human history is the story of the struggle to, first, grasp the laws of nature
and, then, consciously and rationally manipulate nature for the benefit of society.
This conception of nature ‘justifies classification of animal and plant life into useful and useless,’ as Zile (1971, 86) suggests; ‘[i]t can doom the wolf as nothing but
trouble and elevate the carp and lamprey for their high protein yield.’
One could hardly pick up a Soviet publication on nature during the past
half-century without reading a tribute to Lenin as the father of Soviet conservationism. However, this reputation was undeserved. Lenin’s actions, like his writings, showed that he was far less interested in preserving than in fully exploiting
natural resources. Although it is true that several nature conservation laws were
enacted during his lifetime, and relatively few for decades after his death (see
Goldman 1972a, 16), the laws enacted while Lenin lived are better characterized
as natural resources use laws, rather than nature preservation laws (see Zile 1971,
95). Those that genuinely were preservationist merely restated, for the most part,
pre-revolutionary statutes. And there is scant evidence that Lenin personally was
involved with any of the legislation. The most that can accurately be said is that
Lenin thought conservation a laudable goal so long as it did not hinder economic
development (see Goldman 1972a, 18). This hardly distinguished Lenin’s utilitarian view of nature from Marx’s.
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6.3. Property Relations in Natural Resources
and the Means of Production
Marx’s property theory related to his conception of nature. Capitalism, by advancing the forces of production, takes society a long way toward subduing nature, but
at great cost. Marx viewed capitalist social relations as inherently antagonistic,
creating conflicts among people, and between people and nature. Communism,
according to Marx’s theory, would provide ‘the genuine resolution of the conflict’
(Marx 1964b, 135), first and foremost by abolishing the primary determinant of
capitalist socioeconomic relations: private property. By abolishing private property
entitlements and the exploitative relations they create among people and between
people and nature, communism supposedly would provide the necessary preconditions for humans to work together in ‘solidarity,’ as Engels (quoting Lavrov
1975d, 369) put it, in opposition ‘to the rest of the world—the world of minerals,
plants, and animals.’ Freedom consists in ‘socialist man,’ Marx wrote (1967, vol.
III, 820), ‘the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with
Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by
the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy
and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of their human nature.’
Marx and Engels were concerned mostly with capitalism’s private property
entitlements as they affected relations among people, but they also pointed to the
negative environmental effects stemming from private ownership of the means of
production. In The Condition of the Working-Class of England in 1844, Engels
(1958, 110) wrote of life in the squalid quarters of the urban working poor, surrounded by dung-heaps that poisoned the air and waters:
The way in which the vast mass of the poor are treated by modern society is truly
scandalous. They are herded into great cities where they breathe a fouler air than
in the countryside which they have left. They are housed in the worst ventilated
districts of the towns; they are deprived of water because this is only brought to
their houses if someone is prepared to defray the cost of laying the pipes. River
water is so dirty as to be useless for cleansing purposes. The poor are forced to
throw into the streets all their sweepings, garbage, dirty water, and frequently
even disgusting filth and excrement. The poor are deprived of all proper means
of refuse disposal and so they are forced to pollute the very districts they inhabit.
(cf. Marx 1967, vol. I, 661–3)

Marx and Engels reviled the environmental failings of nineteenth-century capitalism’s private property-based regime. They intuited that the abolition of private
property entitlements would end the squalor; pollution and other environmental
problems would cease once natural resources were socially owned and managed
not to maximize profits for the few but to maximize welfare for the masses. Neither Marx nor Engels ever made this claim explicitly, but it is implicit in their con-
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demnations of the capitalist system. Aside from a few general statements about
socialism’s capacity for reconciling people and nature (under human dominion
of course), they made no claims about the specific environmental effects of the
socialist system they advocated. Nevertheless, throughout the twentieth century,
supporters of Marxist socialism have proclaimed socialist ownership of natural
resources self-evidently more protective of the environment than any private
property regime (see, e.g., Parsons 1977, 92; World Marxist Review, June 1972).
It may have been self-evident in theory, but it was not borne out in practice.
As we saw in Chapter 1, People’s Poland suffered from a chronic environmental crisis as bad or worse than any in the experiences of the capitalist West,
despite social ownership of most property, natural resources and the means of
production. The same was true throughout the former Soviet bloc. The persistence
of acute and chronic pollution problems in centrally planned economies vexed
ardent socialists, whose attempts to explain them away grew increasingly dubious as the evidence of environmental destruction mounted. Into the 1970s, they
routinely claimed that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe simply did not suffer
from the environmental problems that plagued the capitalist West (see Komarov
[pseud.] 1980, 116–17). When news began leaking out about environmental problems in socialist countries, Party/state officials and their Western supporters alternately claimed that (1) the problems were ‘accidental’ and far less serious than
environmental problems in the West (see Parsons 1977, 101; Ziegler 1987, 26);
(2) the problems were fundamentally different in kind from environmental problems in the West because social ownership and rational central socioeconomic
planning could quickly and painlessly resolve them (see Parsons 1977, 92; Gerasimov 1975, 11), and (3) the environmental disorders in socialist countries were
caused by international capitalism—the USSR and Eastern European countries
were forced to industrialize rapidly and single-mindedly in order to deter attack
and destruction from the West (see Parsons 1977, 91). The evidence, however,
suggested otherwise. The chronic environmental problems of the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe were not different in kind from those of Western countries; if anything, they were more severe. Allegations of capitalist conspiracies
aside, there was plenty of evidence of simple neglect and malfeasance. Examples
abounded of environmental problems that, once discovered, were not quickly
and painlessly remedied by rational central planning. Indeed, the combination of
social ownership of the means of production and central socioeconomic planning
may have created many more environmental problems than it solved. The destruction of the Aral Sea, in former Soviet Central Asia, provides a perfect illustration.
The Aral Sea is a large, shallow and saline lake in Central Asia. In 1960, it
was the world’s fourth-largest lake by area, measuring 68,000 square kilometers.
By 1987, it was only the sixth-largest lake in the world; its area had diminished
by 40 percent, and its volume had fallen by 66 percent. The reason for the change
was centrally planned irrigation. Soviet planners concluded that the fresh waters
flowing into the Aral Sea were more valuable for irrigation than for preserving
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the region’s ecosystem, despite continued warnings from scientists of serious
environmental repercussions. Over the course of three decades, beginning in the
1950s, irrigation in the Aral Sea basin increased by more than 40 percent, from 5
to over 7 million hectares, and water consumption doubled. As the sea receded,
75 percent of its native fish species were lost, taking with them a formerly lucrative commercial fishing industry. The newly exposed bottom lands were high in
salt content, which made them resistant to vegetation and susceptible to erosion.
The winds blew up great dust storms, which deposited the toxic salt on valuable
agricultural lands, killing crops. Meanwhile, the region’s climate changed so dramatically, becoming so much warmer and less humid, that area farmers could no
longer grow traditional crops (see Pryde 1991, 221–5).
The destruction of the Aral Sea, like dozens if not hundreds of other largescale environmental catastrophes throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, belied the apologetics of socialist governments and their supporters.
First of all, it was no accident. It resulted from the conscious decisions of socialist
central planners guilty of the same kind of economic shortsightedness that caused
so many environmental problems in the West. Once environmental problems
appeared in the Aral Sea basin, central planning (combined with bureaucratic
inertia) proved singularly incapable of ameliorating them. It is doubtful that planners believed they had to sacrifice the Aral Sea in order to boost production, so
that the USSR could continue competing economically with the capitalist West.
But even if they did, that hardly denotes an international capitalist conspiracy to
destroy the Soviet Union. Decisions to divert waters from the Aral Sea evidently
were based on domestic considerations stemming from the Soviet Union’s preoccupation with large-scale economic development to fulfill Marx’s promise of
perpetual economic progress under socialism.
How could this have happened under centrally planned socialism? The problem was that Marx, Engels and many of their followers simply assumed that socialization of property rights would automatically improve environmental protection
by facilitating scientific socioeconomic planning. What they did not consider, and
what most economists understand very well today, is that social ownership of
resources can actually make environmental problems worse. In Capital, Marx
(1967, vol. I, 732–3) wrote of the ‘robbery of the commons’ under capitalism, but
he apparently failed to consider the potential for even greater despoilation of the
commons under social ownership. In theory social ownership means that everyone owns and is responsible for preserving resources; but in practice it has meant
that no one owns or is responsible for anything. More than 2,000 years ago, Aristotle (1941b, at 1262b34–35) wrote ‘that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.’ Today this observation is known as the
‘tragedy of the commons.’ In 1968, Garrett Hardin (1995) published his classic
article by that title, which described the free-rider problem of ‘common’ property
(by which he clearly meant non-property or res nullius4) resources. Hardin posits
a pasture open to all herdsmen for cattle grazing. Assuming that each herdsman
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is rational, they will seek to maximize their individual benefits from the pasture.
Each will ask, ‘[w]hat is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’
In other words, they will undertake a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether
adding an additional animal to their herd on the commons will provide a net gain
or loss. The benefit side of the equation is ‘a function of the increment of one animal.’ According to Hardin, ‘[s]ince the herdsman receives all the proceeds from
the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.’ The cost side
of the equation is ‘a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more
animal.’ But these costs would not be borne solely by the herdsman who adds the
additional animal; rather, they would be spread among all the herdsmen who use
the pasture. Thus, ‘the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of –1.’
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his
herd. And another; and another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each
and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—
in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (Hardin 1995, 133)

Unregulated common ownership or non-ownership thus can lead to rational overuse and even destruction of scarce natural resources. It also can lead to problems
of pollution. According to Hardin (1995, 135), ‘[t]he rational man finds that his
share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost
of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we
are locked into a system of “fouling our own nest,” so long as we behave only as
independent, rational, free-enterprisers.’5
The environmental tragedies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
conformed to Hardin’s thesis. Indeed, the environmental history of socialism in the
former Soviet bloc can be seen as one giant ‘tragedy of the commons’ (see Goldman 1972, 74). Although some Marxist scholars (such as Parsons 1977, 236) reject
Hardin’s theory out of hand as a ‘[s]uperficial dismissal of Marxism,’ it is, in fact,
neither superficial nor necessarily dismissive of Marxism. Hardin’s theory raises
doubts about the ability of any society, including a Communist one, to regulate
itself, but it does not proscribe common ownership of property (res communes); it
only repudiates unregulated common ownership or non-ownership of property (res
nullius). For Hardin, privatization is only one (though, perhaps, a preferred) solution to the tragedy of the commons; regulated common (public, social or group)
ownership, for example through the use of entry and use restrictions, is another.
Given the ideological premises of communism, privatization was not a viable
option for avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in socialist economies; govern-
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ment regulation was the only alternative. As we saw in Chapter 2, People’s Poland
undertook serious and substantial legislative efforts to regulate the environment.
But, as we saw in Chapters 3–5, those efforts failed to avert ecological tragedy;
they were obstructed by various institutions of Communist political economy.
At least some of those institutions were premised on other important features
of Marx’s political-economic theories, particularly his labor theory of value and
theories of state and law.

6.4. Marx’s Labor Theory of Value
The labor theory of value is a logical outgrowth of Marx’s utilitarian approach to
nature—what distinguishes humans from other animals and brings about human
mastery over nature is labor. As Engels (1940, 291) explained in Dialectics of
Nature, ‘the animal merely uses external nature, and brings about changes in it
simply by his presence; man by his changes makes it serve his ends, he masters
it. This is the final essential difference between man and other animals, and once
again it is labour that brings about this distinction.’ In The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx (1964b, 145) concluded that the entire history
of the world is defined by human labor. Along with the social ownership of property (natural resources and the means of production), the labor theory of value was
central to Marx’s entire political-economic system, and a major source of Marxism’s popular appeal to workers (Maggs 1985, 359). Marx first outlined his labor
theory of value in Capital to explain the exploitation of workers under nineteenthcentury capitalism. Although recognizing that material wealth is the product of
both labor and the base materials provided by nature (Marx 1967, vol. I, 41–3;
see also Marx 1973, 472), Marx maintained that only labor invested the product
with real economic value; nature’s contribution, like capital’s, was economically
insignificant. In volume I of Capital, Marx (1967, 603) wrote, ‘[i]n the extractive
industries, mines, &c., the raw materials form no part of the capital advanced.
The subject of labour in this case is not a product of previous labour, but is furnished by Nature gratis, as in the case of metals, minerals, coal, stone, &c.’ Later,
in volume III (1967, 745), he added, ‘[n]atural elements entering as agents into
production, and which cost nothing, no matter what role they play in production,
do not enter as components of capital, but as a free gift of Nature to capital, that
is, as a free gift of Nature’s productive power to labour, which, however, appears
as the productiveness of capital, as all other productivity under the capitalist mode
of production.’ The same sentiments appear implicit in Marx’s Grundrisse (1973,
706): ‘Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs,
self-acting mules, etc. These are products of human industry; natural material
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation
in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the
power of knowledge objectified.’
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Marx was not the first, of course, to posit a labor theory. In his Second Treatise of Government (1963, 1–12), John Locke wrote,
Land which is wholly left to Nature, that hath no improvement of Pasturage, Tillage, or Planting, is called, and indeed is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of
it amount to little more than nothing. . . . Labour makes the far greatest part of
the value of things, we enjoy in this World; And the ground which produces the
material is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it.
. . . Tis Labour . . . which puts the greatest part of Value upon Land.

But Locke’s labor theory is different from Marx’s. From Locke’s perspective,
labor creates ‘the greatest part of Value’—perhaps as much as nine-tenths or even
ninety-nine hundredths—but not quite all the economic value of a thing. Locke
did not maintain, in contrast to Marx, that natural resources and capital contributed nothing to economic value. More importantly, Locke did not intend his labor
theory as a complete theory of economic value; his claims about the relative contribution of labor to value are ‘subsidiary’ to his efforts to justify private rights
in property by virtue of labor-mixing (Christman 1994, 51). Marx obviously had
a very different (virtually opposite) end in mind for his labor theory of value;
and unlike Locke’s labor theory, Marx’s was intended to determine (completely)
exchange value. This distinction turns out to be critical from the point of view of
environmental protection.
Marx’s labor theory of value had implications for the economic concept of
scarcity. For economists, natural resources have value because they exist in limited supplies, which are depleted over time by demand; the greater the rate of
demand, the faster the supply is depleted. But, according to economic theory,
as the supply of a certain resource falls, its value (denoted in markets by price)
increases, reducing the rate of demand and, thereby, preventing (in theory at least)
resource exhaustion. But by claiming that only human labor creates economic
value, Marx implicitly rejected the economic theory of scarcity; under the labor
theory of value, either resources could not be scarce or their scarcity could not
make any difference in their (economic) valuation.
Marx’s repudiation of scarcity value is not just implicit in his labor theory of
value; it is also explicit in his attempts to refute Thomas Malthus’s theory of the
economic effects of population growth.6 For Marx, the environment and natural
resources were constants. Any differentiation in social or economic value—for
instance, the belief that gold was more valuable than lead—was mere commodity ‘fetishism’ (Marx 1967, vol. I, 71–5). Marx was right, of course, to recognize
that social convention and culture influence economic valuation, but he was either
naïve or disingenuous to suppose that there was nothing more to it. Clearly if
gold were not scarce to begin with, that is, if supplies of gold were everywhere
large enough to satisfy all potential demand, gold would have no economic value
regardless of convention and culture; no one would be willing to pay anything
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for it, so no market for gold would develop. Nor would there been a need for
legal rules to protect property rights in gold. As with all natural resources (at least
those that are useful in production and for which markets can be created), gold
receives its economic value in the first place from its physical scarcity. But, as
Charles Ziegler (1987, 10) has written, the notion of scarcity simply does not ‘fit
into Marx’s framework.’ Marx presumed that central planning and high rates of
technological innovation under socialism would ensure an adequate supply of air,
water, land and minerals for any size population.
We saw in Chapter 5 (§§5.1 and 5.4) that Marx’s faith in technology was
excessive. This was partly because of his denial of scarcity value. Scholars today
realize what Marx apparently ignored: ‘technology alone cannot sustain an economy if erosion of the natural resource base deprives it of the materials required
for meeting human needs’ (Caldwell 1990, 307). More to the point, technology
cannot be expected to alleviate problems of scarcity in a political economy, like
Marx’s, that fails to value scarcity in the first place. In the former Soviet Union,
People’s Poland and the rest of the Eastern Europe, there was insufficient economic incentive to innovate in response to increasing (relative) resource scarcity.
And, as we have seen, the economic and environmental consequences of that failure to innovate were disastrous.
As a cornerstone of Marxist economic theory, the labor theory of value
attained a dominant position in the socialist countries. The result, as several
authors have noted (for instance, Maggs 1985, 359–60; Kramer 1973, 364–73;
Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 40; S. Gomułka 1986, 103), was massive waste and
wanton destruction of the natural environment. Many ideologues in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe nevertheless maintained almost until the very end of
the Communist era that ‘nature has no value until human labor is added’ (see
DeBardeleben 1985, 212–13). Consequently, as we saw in Chapter 5, the real
costs of resource waste and environmental degradation were ignored in determining official costs and prices. To the extent that natural resources used in production were provided free of charge under the labor theory of value, industry had no
incentive to conserve them (Ziegler 1987, 35–6). In addition, pollution and other
environmental costs of production were externalized; they were not reflected in
the prices of goods. So enterprises had no economic incentive to avoid waste,
conserve resources or limit pollution (see, e.g., Goldman 1972a, 110). The free
use of resources was neither a tacit policy nor a ‘legitimizing cloak for other
motivations’ (DeBardeleben 1985, 260), but a specific and express goal of natural
resources legislation in the former Soviet bloc.7

6.5. Marxist–Leninist Theories of Law and the State
Marx’s labor theory of value and other economic principles certainly were not the
only reasons for the failure of environmental protection under socialism. As previ-
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ous chapters have shown, the dominant political, economic and legal institutions
bear a large measure of the blame for wasting natural resources and polluting the
environment. Laws were poorly drafted and laxly enforced (when enforced at
all). Planners and bureaucrats jealously guarded administrative turf and clung to
environmentally destructive practices and methods of analysis that secured their
authority. Most importantly, the party in power acted first and foremost out of
concern for its continuing ‘leading role.’ The lack of political and legal accountability on the part of Party/state authorities and their tight grip on the flow of
environmental information were major factors in the failure of environmental protection in People’s Poland and throughout the former Soviet bloc.
No doubt many of the political, social and legal institutions of Soviet-style
socialism would have disappointed Marx and Engels. They might have been
shocked by the oppressions committed in Marx’s name. More to the point, had
Marx lived in Stalin’s USSR, he might well have been among the victims of those
oppressions. Nevertheless, the political, social and legal institutions of the former
socialist countries all had some basis in Marxist theories of state and law. To some
extent, Marx’s theories legitimized the practices.

The Marxist–Leninist Concept of Law
Throughout the twentieth century, scholars have debated whether there is or
even can be a Marxist theory of law (see Tay and Kamenka 1985, 217). Marx
and Lenin were legally trained, and each wrote fairly extensively, if thinly (see
Krygier 1994a, 154), about the law—mostly about its failings under capitalism.
Neither believed law to be an independent determinant of social relations; it was
merely part of the ideological ‘superstructure’ erected upon the economic ‘base’
of society.
In his earliest writings, Marx actually displayed a certain reverence for the
law. For example, in his 1842 Debates on Freedom of the Press (1975b, 166), he
wrote:
Laws are in no way repressive measures against freedom, any more than the law
of gravity is a repressive measure against motion, because while, as the law of
gravitation, it governs the eternal motions of celestial bodies, as the law of falling
it kills me if I violate it and want to dance in the air. Laws are rather the positive,
clear, universal norms in which freedom has acquired an impersonal, theoretical
existence independent of the arbitrariness of the individual. A statute-book is a
people’s bible of freedom.

However, as Marx’s political-economic theories matured, he either abandoned
this liberal bourgeois view of law or failed to reconcile it with the more instrumental view of law he espoused later works.8 In his 1859 Contribution to the
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Critique of Political Economy (1971, 20–1), for example, Marx wrote that legal
relations were ‘rooted in the material conditions of life. When the economic foundation changes, the entire immense superstructure is sooner or later transformed.’
In Marx’s base and superstructure model, the economic foundation determines
social relations. Legal (and other ideological) institutions are erected upon the
economic base to reinforce the prevailing order. So legal relations are neither
autonomous nor objective. The law’s natural and inevitable purpose is to reinforce the power of the ruling class.9 Marx illustrated this in Capital (1967, vol.
III, 89–90) with stories of capitalists plying their influence in bourgeois parliaments, manipulating legislation to support their interests, and defying laws that
diminished their profits. The notion of a ‘rule of law,’ applying equally to rich
and poor, powerful and powerless, was for Marx a dangerous myth propagated to
obstruct the rise of class consciousness (see Collins 1982, 139). Law had little, if
anything, to do with justice. As Engels argued in The State of Germany (1975a,
29), ‘equality before the law’ meant only ‘equality in spite of the inequality of
rich and poor—equality within the limits of the chief inequality existing—which
means, in short, nothing else but giving inequality the name of equality.’ For Marx
and Engels, then, law was an inherently coercive instrument of power. As James
L. Hildebrand (1972, 47–8) has noted:
In Marxian theory, law is viewed as an emanation of the ‘state’ and is therefore
fundamentally determined by economic relations. . . . Since the state is the product of the struggle of classes, dominated by the ruling class, law is viewed as a
political means for maintaining the economic interests of the ruling class. Law
is an ideological superstructure of society, constructed upon the economic basis,
which reflects the materialistic outlook of the ruling class. Law is not oriented to
the idea of ‘justice;’ rather it is a means of dominance and a tool of the exploiters
or ruling class who use it in their own interests.

On occasion, the law might be used against the interests of the ruling class. Marx
(1969–70) suggested in The Class Struggles in France, 1948–50 that there were
moments when the workers could achieve real, if limited reform through the legal
process that the bourgeoisie had set up for its own protection. But, he maintained,
the law in bourgeois society never could serve as a neutral determinant of social
relations. Engels at first was completely pessimistic about the usefulness of law as
a mechanism of social reform. In The Condition of the Working-Class in England
in 1844 (1958, 257–8), he argued that the law, as a creation of the bourgeoisie,
ultimately benefits only that class:
The middle classes certainly are all in favour of the sanctity of the law. That is
not surprising. They have made the law; they approve of it; they are protected
by it and they gain advantages from it. The bourgeoisie appreciates that, even
although some particular enactment may injure their interests, the whole body of

162

Chapter 6
laws protects their interests . . . . [T]he worker knows from long and bitter experience that the law is a rod which the bourgeoisie has in readiness for him. The
worker has no confidence in the law and, if at all possible, he avoids it.

By 1890, however, Engels apparently had come to share Marx’s more optimistic
view that bourgeois law might prove to be a useful, even decisive tool in the hands
of the proletariat. In a letter to J. Bloch (1969–70, 487), he wrote:
The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the
superstructure—political forms of the class struggle and its consequences, constitutions established by the victorious classes after a successful battle, etc.—the
forms of law—and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the
brains of the combatants, political, legal, philosophical theories, religious ideas
and their further development into systems of dogma—also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate
in determining their form.

So, did Marx and Engels believe in the positive value of law? The answer is
unclear. There was no resolution of the apparent inconsistency between Marx’s
base and superstructure model and the idea that legal and political institutions
could positively influence economically determined social relations. Even contemporary neo-Marxist scholars sometimes interpret orthodox Marxism as taking
a generally cynical approach to laws that appear to be against the interests of the
ruling class. Hugh Collins (1982, 75), for example, has noted:
[t]he . . . suggestion that some legal rules cannot be explained on a class basis
at all, for example that laws prohibiting rape and assault further the interests
of other kinds of groups or perhaps benefit everyone equally, is often casually
dismissed as naive or the product of false consciousness. It is said that the dominant ideology portrays such laws as universally valuable in order to legitimate
their authority, while in fact they form part of the general state apparatus for the
oppression of subordinate classes.

On this view, simple legislation never could resolve society’s problems because
they are rooted in the economic base of the system. To eradicate them, the entire
system has to be changed. Merely changing the law has the same effect as treating
the symptoms of an illness: the patient might feel better for a short time, but he
would not be cured, and his illness might even be prolonged.
In The Communist Manifesto of 1847–8 (1978, 490–1), Marx and Engels
expressed confidence that the entire legal and political structure of the state would
collapse soon after the workers’ revolution radically altered the economic base
of society. But in his later writings, Marx conceded that the transition period to
communism might be protracted and that, in the interim, bourgeois law might
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prove useful or even necessary ‘for proletarian purposes, until relative abundance
was created and people formed new social habits’ (Tay and Kamenka 1985, 224).
However, Marx never created a positive theory of what bourgeois law would
become along the socialist road to communism (see Pashukanis 1951b, 270–1).
Following Marx, Lenin conceded that bourgeois legal institutions would have to
be maintained after the revolution in order to secure the road to communism.10
But, unlike Marx, Lenin showed no philosophical trepidation about the role of law
in a socialist state. The pragmatic Lenin realized that law could be just as effective
a tool for repressing enemies of the new social order as it was for repressing workers under bourgeois capitalism. Hugh Collins (1982, 91) has written that Lenin’s
legal system was a coercive organization which issued orders backed up by
threats in the form of criminal codes. Together with the remainder of the state
apparatus the law ensured that the wishes of the dominant class were carried out.
Legal rules were in the basic form of commands addressed to the masses to do
or to abstain from doing something, and the significance of the law in a society
depended entirely upon its potential to affect behaviour by threats of sanctions.

In State and Revolution (1932, 23), Lenin wrote, ‘[t]he proletariat needs state
power, the centralised organisation of force, the organisation of violence, both
for the purpose of crushing the resistance of the exploiters and for the purpose of
guiding the great mass of the population—the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie,
the semi-proletarians—in the work of organising Socialist economy.’ Lenin held
no illusions that the law would become an instrument of real justice under socialism; on the contrary, his skepticism about legality exceeded Marx’s. For Lenin,
the law was simply a tool to be used in the revolution. A patina of legality could
bolster the new regime’s international legitimacy, but be quickly discarded as the
needs and goals of the revolution dictated (see Tay and Kamenka 1985, 234, 236–
7). Following Lenin, the Soviet jurist Yevgeny Pashukanis (1951b, 279) argued
that socialist legislation must ‘possess maximum elasticity;’ ‘we cannot fetter ourselves,’ he wrote, ‘by any sort of system.’ For Pashukanis, as for Lenin, the law
necessarily occupied ‘a subordinate position with reference to policy.’
Given Marx’s instrumental view of law and Lenin’s contempt for and cynical use of legality, it is not at all surprising that scholars, lawyers and judges in
socialist states had persistent difficulties reconciling Marxist–Leninist legal theories with increasingly formalistic legal procedures and practices. As Hugh Collins
(1982, 139) has pointed out, ‘to be a Marxist and a lawyer promises to be a contradictory or schizoid experience.’ Socialist lawyers have searched incessantly
for some balance between Marxist–Leninist legal theories and practical realities;
between historical materialism and pragmatism; between bourgeois legality and
the ongoing revolution, leading to stateless and classless communism.
But what does all of this have to do with environmental protection in the
formerly socialist countries of Europe? The answer has been foreshadowed in
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earlier discussions concerning law enforcement, particularly in Chapter 4. The
inconsistencies of Marxist law, especially its ambivalence about legality, severely
hampered environmental protection efforts in the socialist countries. We saw in
Chapter 3 that most of the environmental laws in People’s Poland were mere
declarations, without specific standards or penalties. Such ‘details’ were left to
planners, ministers, managers and other Party/state officials. And, true to Marxist–
Leninist theory, administrators felt free to ignore or avoid environmental regulations in cases where enforcement would have been economically or politically
inconvenient. In actuality, the environmental regulations of the socialist countries
were not ‘laws’ at all, as liberal societies understand the term, but mere abstractions or ideals to be achieved gradually, if at all, from one five-year plan to the
next (see Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 21). As a result, environmental protection (or
the lack of it) in socialist countries had relatively little to do with what the laws
said or did not say. As Peter Maggs (1985, 363) has written:
The environmental protection measures taken in the Soviet Union depend not
upon the language nor upon the enthusiasm with which they are enforced, but
upon the decision of state planning officials to order the construction, installation
and operation of pollution control equipment and upon the incentives planners
create to implement their orders. Thus, to find the applicable law of environmental protection in the Soviet Union is to look first at the internal guidelines of the
State Planning Committee and second at the incentives and sanctions provided
to ensure that environmental protection plans are fulfilled.

Legislative enactments thus had less ‘legal’ effect than the political and economic
decisions of Party/state functionaries. This was true both in fact and by definition.
In the 1930s, the Soviet Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences defined the
term ‘law’ ‘in complete accord with the Marx–Lenin methodology’:
Law is the aggregate of the rules of conduct expressing the will of the dominant
class and established in legal order, as well as the customs and rules of community life confirmed by state authority, the application whereof is guaranteed
by the coercive force of the state to the end of safeguarding, making secure and
developing social relations and arrangements advantageous and agreeable to the
dominant class. (Vyshinsky 1951, 336–7)

In Soviet society, the workers were said to be the dominant class. In reality, of
course, it was their self-appointed ‘vanguard,’ the Communist Party. And, as the
Marxist–Leninist definition of law ordained, the laws reflected that party’s interest. Charles Ziegler (1987, 95) has noted that in the Soviet Union, laws were
enacted in accordance with Party preferences (1) to serve as general state policy
statements, vaguely guiding (but not compelling) the actions and decisions of
state agencies and individual citizens, and (2) to educate the citizens in the ‘spirit
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of communist ideology.’ Like all laws in socialist Eastern Europe and the USSR,
environmental legislation primarily served a coercive political function, rather
than a substantive environmental protection function.
Was this necessarily a function of Marxism–Leninism, or might the absence
of the ‘rule of law’ in the former Soviet bloc be attributable to other factors, such
as cultural history? The ‘rule of law’ certainly was not common currency in prerevolutionary Russia and Eastern Europe. But, in this respect, Polish history is
exceptional. As early as the sixteenth century, Poland had a well-developed parliamentary system of government that guaranteed civil and religious liberties
including some, such as habeas corpus, that were not guaranteed elsewhere in
Western or Eastern Europe for another 200–400 years (see, generally, Wagner
1988). Even if traditional cultural values did influence the conceptions of law in
other East European countries, the Communists’ instrumental view of law was,
nevertheless, consistent with the teachings of orthodox Marxism.

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat
Marx implicitly rejected the ‘rule of law’ concept in his conception of a ‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Marx 1938, 18, italics in original). The
concept of ‘dictatorship,’ Marxist or otherwise, implies a merger of legal authority and political power that is incompatible with the rule of law. This is nicely
illustrated by an infamous event that took place in the Soviet Union shortly after
the Bolshevik Revolution, an event that for decades has been cited as proof of
Lenin’s ardent commitment to nature protection. A man called Vever was caught
felling trees, which was in fact his job, near Lenin’s summer home on the Gorky
government estate. Lenin had Vever arrested and summarily sentenced to one
year in prison. As Ze’ev Wolfson has written (Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 63), this
story accurately reflects the ‘fundamental property’ of the Soviet system of justice: ‘power and the law are in the same hands.’ Ironically, the moral Wolfson
draws from the Vever story is the same lesson that Marx drew, more than a century
earlier, from a remarkably similar episode, when the German Landstag debated a
law revoking the peasants’ customary right to gather wood in the forests. Marx at
that time concluded that control over the state and the law should not be merged
in the dominant class (see Kołakowski 1978a, 122). Apparently, he did not consider the merger of law and power inappropriate when it came to the proletarian
dictatorship.
In The Communist Manifesto (1978, 500), Marx and Engels called for the
workers to rise up, overthrow the capitalists and establish the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat to lead society to communism. Marx never precisely
defined his use of the term ‘dictatorship,’ and that failure itself may have contributed to totalitarianism in the former Soviet bloc countries. Nevertheless, it
is fairly clear from the context of his theory of politics and power that Marx
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did not use the term in contradistinction to democratic rule. In fact, he viewed
proletarian dictatorship as a more democratic regime than so-called democratic
capitalism partly because it was a means for instituting full democracy under
stateless communism. While Marx’s conception of ‘dictatorial democracy’ may
appear oxymoronic, it makes sense within Marx’s theory of politics and the
state. According to Marx’s theory, all states are class-based dictatorships. If there
were no classes (defined in the domination or repression of one by another), the
state would be unnecessary and disappear. Therefore, ‘every state is a dictatorship in content’ (Ehrenberg 1992, 52). On this view, the label ‘dictatorship of
the proletariat’ is just a euphemism for the workers’ state, while the label ‘liberal democratic republic’ is a euphemism for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
Once we recognize that all states are dictatorial by nature, the question becomes
why a society should prefer any given state, including the workers’ state. Marx
says it is not a matter of preferring the state that is not coercive since all states,
as such, are naturally and unavoidably coercive; rather what makes one state
preferable to another is the aim of the coercion. The dictatorship of the proletariat is said to be preferable to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie because it is, by
nature, more democratic. For Marx, the ‘liberal democracies’ were democratic
in name only; in reality, they constituted a tyranny of the minority (the owners
of the means of production) over the majority (the producers). The workers’
state would simply reverse the order. It would be a tyranny of the majority over
the small minority of capitalists (Ehrenberg 1992, 52). And that tyranny should
be only temporary because, as the new socialist state would be so much more
productive than the preceding system, all class antagonisms would sooner or
later disappear, and democracy then would be fully extended; the socialist state,
its purpose fulfilled, would disappear with the advent of communism. So, as
Joseph Femia (1993, 70) has pointed out, for Marx ‘communism’ was a virtual
synonym for ‘democracy.’
This apparently Utopian strain in Marx’s theory of the dictatorship of the
proletariat notwithstanding, there is some evidence that Marx intended the word
‘dictatorship’ quite literally. He never said that a workers’ dictatorship would be
less repressive or coercive than other forms. He foresaw that the coercive powers of the state would be needed to consolidate the proletariat’s gains and to repel
counterrevolutionary efforts that might recur until all class antagonisms were
extinguished (see Ehrenberg 1992, 5–6). Marx was also enough of a realist to
understand that the working class at large could not effectively operate the coercive apparatus of state authority. As John Ehrenberg (1992, 154) has noted, Marx
and Engels both identified the proletariat’s struggle for power with ‘the struggle
of its party for exclusive political domination’ (see also Femia 1993, 123). They
supposed that a vanguard party would wield dictatorial power as a means of establishing real democracy, though this supposition obviously required a great deal of
optimism (perhaps overoptimism) about human nature. Certainly it was more than
Marx’s rival, the anarchist Nikolai Bakhunin, could bear. In Statism and Anarchy,
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Bakunin (1971, 331) presciently predicted that ‘as soon as [the workers] become
the rulers of the representatives of the people, [they] will cease to be workers and
will look down at the plain working masses from the governing heights of the
State; they will now no longer represent the people, but only themselves and their
claim to rulership over the people.’11 Indeed, almost from the very start, the chief
motivation for Communist Party activities in the ‘People’s democracies’ was not
the achievement of full democracy in communism, but the perpetuation of power
and its perquisites (see Vavroušek 1990, 13).
The history of Soviet-style totalitarianism proved Bakhunin right, of course,
but was he inevitably right about Marx’s theory? Was the concept of ‘dictatorial
democracy’ an oxymoron, or were Lenin and Stalin to blame for abusing Marx’s
theory? The answer is, of course, debatable. But when Lenin (1960–70, 216)
wrote that ‘[d]ictatorship means unlimited power based on force, and not on law,’
this was not logically inconsistent with Marx’s view, expressed earlier, that dictatorial use of the state’s coercive powers would be necessary following the proletarian revolution. Marx apparently had few misgivings about tyrannical means so
long as they furthered the democratic end, and that end was reflected in the social
basis, rather than the legal basis, of class rule (see Ehrenberg 1992, 108). Since
Lenin claimed power on behalf of the workers (and the peasants), his dictatorship
presumably would have satisfied, at least initially, Marx’s criteria (though Marx
later might have come to regard it as a failure of democracy).
However Marx might have assessed Lenin and Stalin’s implementation of
the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, there is no doubt that it had serious
implications for environmental protection. These implications may have been
unintended, and they may (or may not) have been related to the nature or aim of
the dictatorship. From a historical perspective, however, it is clear that dictatorial rule, with is concomitant lack of governmental accountability and limited
public participation in decision making, impeded effective environmental protection. In many cases, the totalitarian instinct for self-preservation simply prevented
Party/governments from taking any action against pollution because, as Ze’ev
Wolfson has noted (Komarov [pseud.] 1980, 108), such steps could have led to
‘major changes in the system of power.’ As discussed in Chapter 4 (§4.2), taking
action on the environment might have required reductions in industrial output and
employment that would have undermined the legitimate claim to power of the
so-called ‘workers’ ’ parties (see Jancar 1987, 123). Environmental problems consequently tended to be marginalized, when they were not ignored entirely. Even
good faith efforts to protect the environment were hindered by the Party/states’
conflicts of interest as regulators and owners of regulated industries.
We also saw in Chapter 4 (§4.5) how the ‘proletarian’ democracies
undermined environmental protection efforts by their close control over the flow
of environmental information; that is, by censorship of the press. In his early
years, Marx was an outspoken advocate of a free press. In his 1842 Debates on
Freedom of the Press (1975b, 166), he wrote:
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The essence of a free press is the characterful, rational, moral essence of freedom. The character of the censored press is the characterless monster of unfreedom; it is a civilised monster, a perfumed abortion.
Or does it still need to be proved that freedom of the press is in accord with
the essence of the press, whereas censorship contradicts it?

A free press was for Marx an important attribute of the ‘moral state’ (1975a, 120).
Censorship, on the other hand, was based on an immoral premise that undermined the moral basis of the state: ‘Laws against frame of mind are based on an
unprincipled frame of mind, on an immoral, material view of the state. They are
an involuntary cry of a bad conscience’ (Marx 1975a, 120–1). ‘Censorship,’ Marx
wrote (1975b, 159), ‘converts a struggle over principles into a struggle of principle without power against power without principle.’
It is not clear, by the way, whether Engels shared Marx’s veneration for a
free press; his writings display ambivalence. On the one hand, in The State of
Germany (1975a, 28–9), written in 1845–6, Engels wrote that ‘the liberty of the
press is, of itself, a middle-class privilege, because printing requires money, and
buyers for the printed productions, which buyers must have money again.’ But
a generation later, in The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers’
Party, Engels (1975b, 77) expressly recognized that freedom of the press was
indispensable for the workers’ movement.
Despite Marx’s principled defense of freedom of the press, he planted the
seeds of the very ‘immoral’ censorship he deprecated when he called for a proletarian dictatorship. Empirically, censorship has resulted whenever dictatorial rule
(whatever its social basis) has been combined with state ownership of the means
of production. Moreover, it is not entirely clear that Marx would have opposed
any and all uses of censorship by the revolutionary workers’ movement. Communist governments frequently justified censorship on the grounds that it was
necessary to preserve the proletariat’s hold on power; negative press about the
‘workers’ state’ might have fueled counterrevolutionary efforts. It is difficult to
see how Marx could have rejected that argument, given what he wrote about the
proletariat’s legitimate use of coercive state powers to consolidate its gains and
prevent counterrevolution.
Regardless of the possible political and ideological justifications, the Communist governments controlled the flow of information through the law and by
their ownership of the means of production. In doing so, they displayed the very
‘anti-state frame of mind’ that Marx had written about and, as he had predicted,
their censorship fueled a struggle between principle without power and power
without principle. It is the ultimate testimony to the strength of principle that, in
the end, power was defeated.
As we saw in Chapter 4 (§4.5), the Communist governments for decades
withheld information about environmental conditions in order to avoid
troublesome political pressure at home and to score propaganda points in the
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Western press. Environmental statistics were, as Ze’ev Wolfson wrote (Komarov
[pseud.] 1980, 17), ‘the property of the government, just like the earth, the rivers,
and the forests and their denizens of animals.’ In Poland, beginning in the late
1970s, the press grew more open in its consideration of environmental issues,
but information remained privileged. Polish citizens could learn something about
environmental problems and how the Party/government was reacting to them, but
further investigations usually were blocked (see Jancar 1987, 259, 270). The flow
of environmental information was even more restricted in other Soviet bloc countries. In the former Soviet Union itself, as late as 1989, the press complained about
limitations on access to information concerning accidents affecting the environment: ‘Amongst others, we still cannot find out information about accidents and
fires at energy and building installations at the Ministry of Energy of the USSR,
about equipment being put out of action when this entails material losses, human
victims or even non-catastrophic contamination of the environment’ (Izvestiya,
Apr. 26, 1989, quoted in Z. Medvedev 1990a, 288). The Soviet government to the
very end retained firm control over the flow of information.
The 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exemplified how,
even in the age of glasnost, the Soviet press was ‘free’ to publish only that information the government deemed appropriate. As Zhores Medvedev (1990a, 64)
has written, ‘the Chernobyl catastrophe . . . was born of secrecy,’ and ‘many of
the mistakes and miscalculations which were made afterwards and which significantly increased the human and economic cost were also the result of secrecy.’
The explosion and subsequent meltdown and radiation release at Chernobyl
occurred on Saturday, April 26, 1986. The first ‘brief’ public report of the accident in the Soviet Union was not published until Monday, April 28, and then only
because of pressure from the Swedish government, which had detected the accident (from the radioactive cloud hovering over Scandinavia) and established its
source (Z. Medvedev 1990a, 56). For ten days following the accident, the Soviets
maintained a ‘news blackout,’ only occasionally releasing terse statements that
treated the incident—among the world’s worst nuclear accidents and the costliest industrial accident in world history—as ‘minor’ (Z. Medvedev 1990a, 57,
65, 289). The primary reason for the news blackout was to prevent the domestic
population of the Soviet Union from realizing that the socialist government was
‘helpless’ to prevent the accident and control its effects. The government had
not prepared for such a massive nuclear accident because it was supposed to
be impossible in the Soviet Union (see G. Medvedev 1991, 101). In the words
of one Chernobyl official, ‘the accident wasn’t in the plan’ (quoted in Z. Medvedev 1990a, 52). Throughout the episode, the press was fed a steady diet of
misinformation. When accurate reports, based on data collected by American
and West European intelligence services, appeared in the Western press, Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev called them ‘an unrestrained anti-Soviet campaign
with mountains of lies, most dishonest and malicious lies’ (Pravda, May 15,
1986, quoted in Z. Medvedev 1990a, 70). This same sentiment appeared virtually
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every time some Western news organization reported on environmental problems
anywhere in the socialist world.12
Almost to the very end of the socialist era in Eastern Europe, unfettered
press coverage of environmental issues remained unacceptable because it tended
to expose Party/state officials to the informal political accountability that public
scrutiny brings. A free environmental press was at odds with the Communist Parties’ main goal: maintenance of power.

6.6. Conclusion: From Marxism to Eco-Socialism
Old myths die hard, and that is certainly true of the myth of Marx as an early
environmentalist. Marx was not an environmentalist. Some of his ideas directly
or indirectly contributed to the failure of environmental protection in People’s
Poland and throughout the former Soviet bloc. It was not just a matter of misinterpretation, either; at least in some cases, there clearly were problems with Marx’s
theories. This is most obviously true of his labor theory of value, which, by denying that natural resources have any real economic value (but only use value),
directly obstructed efforts to conserve resources and reduce pollution. We should
not be surprised, however, that some of Marx’s theories turned out to be environmentally harmful. Marx was, after all, a creature of his times. Despite his intention to create a political-economic theory that would witness and explain the end
of history, his ideas reflected the period and culture in which he lived (see Raskin
and Bernow 1991, 92). As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Marx’s ideas
had many traits in common with nineteenth-century capitalism, including faith in
boundless technological and economic progress and an anthropocentric/utilitarian
view of nature. Marx’s views and nineteenth-century capitalism were both firmly
rooted in Judaeo-Christian worldview (see DeBardeleben 1985, 80).
Over the past century, capitalist economic systems have evolved considerably.
Although capitalist economists continue to quote Adam Smith (much as contemporary socialists continue to look to Marx), hardly a ‘free’ market exists anywhere
in the world today. As Karl Popper (1966, 140) wrote in 1945, ‘laissez-faire has
disappeared from the face of the earth.’ The countries of the industrialized West
have long since abandoned the free-wheeling capitalism of the nineteenth century with its Social Darwinist overtones. The market’s ‘invisible hand’ has been
sheathed in a thick glove of regulation designed to alleviate at least some of its
grosser iniquities. This is true especially in the field of environmental protection, where even the staunchest proponents of free markets, such as Milton Friedman (Friedman and Friedman 1980, 214), have acknowledged a legitimate role
for (limited) government intervention and regulation. Capitalism today—what
Popper (1966, 335n9) called ‘interventionism’ or ‘democratic interventionism’—
bears little resemblance to the capitalism of Marx’s time—which Popper referred
to as ‘unrestrained capitalism.’
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There is no reason to expect that Marx’s socialist theories would be any more
relevant today than nineteenth-century capitalist notions. If anything, we might
reasonably expect Marx’s ideas to have proved more fragile and, less amenable
to alteration and adaptation than capitalism, for his was a jealous, even theological ideology that, unlike capitalism, purported to resolve comprehensively
the ills of civilized (European) society. His conception of socialism claimed to
be both scientific and historically inevitable. The sheer weight of these claims
may have made it more difficult for Marxism to adapt to new political or cultural
circumstances.
Marxism has not, however, remained stagnant in the century since Marx’s
death. His theories have been subject to continual interpretation and reinterpretation as followers have sought answers to questions Marx never considered (as
with the continuing quest to enunciate a coherent and internally consistent socialist concept of law), and practice at least occasionally has forced theory to heel (as
with the eventual complete repudiation of the labor theory of value). However,
contemporary Marxists seem always to be constrained by the need to ‘legitimize’
their claims by reference to the writings of Marx and Engels. As with the Bible,13
many groups with diverse agendas have found something in Marx to cling to—a
sentence, a phrase, an implicit theme. As Leszek Kołakowski (1978a, 3) suggests,
they all may be entitled to call themselves ‘Marxists,’ but at some point Marx and
Marxism part company.
Ecology is one clear point of divergence. That Marxist theory is fundamentally at odds with environmentalism is a view shared by liberals and many socalled ‘eco-socialists,’ such as Rudolf Bahro (1982) and Andrew McLaughlin
(1990). Eco-socialists reject central tenets of both Marxist socialism and capitalism, calling for a wholly new ideology based not on markets or class conflict but
on the needs of the biosphere. They discard fundamental precepts of orthodox
Marxism, such as the labor theory of value, the aspiration to material abundance
based on ever-increasing levels of technological sophistication, and the historical
materialist view of the relationship between people and nature. In so doing they
reject, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, the economic, class-based foundations
of Marxism (see Routley 1981, 241). Paul Raskin and Stephen Bernow (1991, 90)
have written that ‘the ecological critique of Marxism is fundamental.’
Marxism stresses conflict within the mode of production—the contradictions
between the relations and forces of production and among social classes. Ecology stresses the conflict between the human enterprise and the natural environment. Put starkly (and too simply), the debate is about which set of conflicts
should be viewed as more fundamental: class against class or humanity against
nature.

From the perspective of social ecology, Raskin and Bernow continue (1991,
90–1), ‘Marxism has become obsolete.’
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Too narrow in its theoretical framework, too committed to the primacy of class
relations, and too imbued with nineteenth-century imagery or progress through
the technological domination of nature, conventional Marxism has become irrelevant at best. At worst, it is seen, along with capitalism, as promoting dangerous
modes of development around the globe.

What eco-socialists retain of Marxism—social ownership and central planning—
rests on an almost entirely new program: to create an ecologically sustainable
steady-state society. This program is unapologetically Utopian, and its merits
are debatable.14 Nevertheless, eco-socialist theory has certain significance for an
environmental critique of Marxism. Specifically, it shows that Marxist theory is
fundamentally incompatible with environmentalism.

Notes
1. This chapter is a revised version of Cole (1993).
2. Engels (1940, 291–2) recognized, at least, that nature is not simply a passive material base for human activities: ‘[l]et us not, however, be very hopeful about our human conquest over nature. For each such victory, nature manages to take her revenge.’ But Engels
never developed an ecological theory (see Parsons 1977, 24). He subscribed, with Marx,
to the view that human domination of nature was both necessary and natural, going so far
as to assert that the struggle against nature constitutes the basis of human thought. Indeed,
Engels (1975c, 106) defined ‘freedom’ in terms of human control over external nature.
3. Parsons is not alone in viewing Marx and Engels as early environmentalists. Donald
C. Lee (1980, 3) argues that Marx’s theories promote ‘a rational, humane, environmentally
unalienated social order,’ which existing socialist states simply have failed, so far, to implement. Even that pillar of capitalism, the Wall Street Journal (Nov. 25, 1991, at 1), has
annointed Marx as an early environmentalist.
4. Property-rights scholars who are not legally trained often confuse property categories. Hardin (who is a biologist) referred to ‘common’ property (res communes) when
he clearly meant to describe non-property or open access property (res nullius). (On the
important distinctions between ‘common property’ and ‘open access,’ see Bromley 1991,
29.) Hardin’s confusion is understandable, however, since ‘open access’ resources often are
referred to as ‘common pool’ resources or simply as ‘commonses.’ In any case, Hardin’s
terminology does not get in the way of his analysis, which, on my reading, is fairly neutral
as between individual ownership and public or social ownership.
5. Hardin’s use of the term ‘private-enterprisers’ may be misleading. Given Hardin’s
belief in privatization (‘or something formally like it’) as a solution to the ‘tragedy of the
commons,’ he clearly does not mean to indict economies based on private property. Hardin
evidently believes that privatization would stem the destruction of resources by internalizing the costs (as well as the benefits) of use. But he fails to acknowledge that even individually owned property could be exploited to the point of destruction, if time horizons are
sufficiently short, discount rates sufficiently high, and substitute investment possibilities
sufficiently plentiful (see Clarke 1973a, 1973b). I discuss some normative implications of
this analysis in Chapter 8 (§8.4).
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6. On Marx’s dispute with Malthus, see generally Meek (1953) and Kołakowski
(1978a, 413–4).
7. In light of the problems created for environmental protection by Marx’s labor
theory of value, I argue in Chapter 8 (§8.5) that scarcity pricing is prerequisite of effective
environmental protection.
8. Marx’s supporters continue to grapple with the problem of reconciling Marx’s earlier statements about law with his later dismissal of law as a secondary ideological component of the state, determined by economic relations (see Cain and Hunt 1979).
9. Lenin (1932, 40) and Engels (1958, 514–15) wrote in a similar vein (also see Tay
and Kamenka 1985, 231).
10. This concession to bourgeois legality has created a permanent predicament for
Marxist legal scholars. If they accept orthodox Marxism’s instrumental view of law as an
institution for class oppression, then clearly the law can have no place after the Communist
revolution abolishes class distinctions and antagonisms. But if they reject the ‘withering
away’ of law as unacceptably Utopian, as Lenin did, then they admit by implication that the
law is, in some important respect, autonomous, so that legal institutions cannot be viewed
as mere ideological constructs upon the base of economic relations. As a consequence, the
entire base and superstructure model of historical materialism falls apart (see Collins 1982,
70). This paradox has ‘been among the factors leading to the intellectual disintegration of
Marxism as a coherent system of thought’ (Tay and Kamenka 1985, 218). Contemporary
neo-Marxist scholars, such as Christine Sypnowich (1990), have continued the effort to
construct an acceptable and internally consistent theory of socialist law. The fact remains,
however, that any theory of socialist law that posits law as an autonomous feature of social
relations deviates in important respects from orthodox Marxism. And, after all, the present
study is not about what legal theories are possible under Marxism, but about the theories of
law that Marx and his most influential colleagues and followers actually held.
11. Kołakowski (1978a, 256) credits Bakhunin with being the first to infer Leninism
from Marxism. The implication is that, even if Marx did not imagine socialism as a despotic system, despotism was nonetheless a natural and predictable consequence of revolutionary dictatorship.
12. See the discussion in Chapter 4 (§4.5) of the Polish government’s official response
to unauthorized publications of environmental information.
13. This biblical allusion is hardly novel (see Toynbee 1946, vol. I, 400). Kołakowski
(1992, 13) maintains that the comparison of Marxism to religious faith is ‘apt only in part,’
because, in his view, Marxism represents more of a ‘parody of religion, than a religion
proper.’
14. Liberals and neo-Marxists alike have condemned eco-socialist theories as hopelessly Utopian. From a liberal perspective, eco-socialism, like all Utopian schemes, tends
toward despotism. I have more to say about this in Chapter 8 (§8.6). Neo-Marxists assert
that the eco-socialist goals can be realized only within a Marxist (or, more accurately, neoMarxist) framework, focusing on the environmentally destructive features of capitalism,
such as private property and the profit motive (see Pepper 1993).

Chapter 7
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN TRANSITION
7.1. Introduction
When communism collapsed in 1989, Poland’s first post-Communist government, led by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, inherited a combined economic and ecological crisis of immense proportions.1 At the beginning of 1990, it
initiated an unprecedented political-economic transformation designed to establish liberal democratic institutions and a market-based economic system. These
reforms were generally expected to promote improved environmental protection, for example by hardening budget constraints on polluters.2 But there were
also fears that free markets might aggravate existing environmental problems
and spawn new ones, if the Polish government did not implement a deliberate
and forceful policy of environmental protection (see, e.g., Nowicki 1993, 173–5;
Żylicz 1993b, 11).
Looking back half a decade later, even the most optimistic proponents of
systemic change appear to have underestimated the beneficial effects for environmental protection of Poland’s jump to the market. Pollution levels have fallen by
more than 40 percent, while Poland’s economy has achieved the highest growth
rate in all of Europe. By 1994, economists were referring to Poland’s economy
as ‘Europe’s tiger’ (see, among others, The Economist, Apr. 16, 1994; Australian
Financial Review, Nov. 3, 1993; Financial Times, Oct. 6, 1995; Sunday Times,
June 11, 1995). At the same time, the environmental group Greenpeace dubbed
Poland the ‘Green Tiger of Europe’ (see PAP News Wire, Sept. 6, 1995; The Warsaw Voice, Oct. 30, 1994).
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how Poland has managed to impress
Wall Street and Greenpeace at the same time. It focuses on the dynamic relationship between environmental policies and systemic reforms, such as privatization of the means of production, the development of competitive markets and the
establishment of a constitutional Rechtsstaat (‘law state’). The analysis begins in
§7.2 with a brief description of the revolutionary changes that have taken place
in Poland since 1989. Section 7.3 then describes the dramatic environmental
improvements that have accompanied those changes. In §7.4, I rebut the wide175
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spread misperception that those improvements are merely transitory symptoms
of economic recession. A review of economic growth, industrial production and
environmental protection statistics up to 1994 shows that pollution levels have
continued to fall, despite the fact that Poland’s economic recession ended in 1992.
Environmental policies and systemic reforms combined to reduce pollution emissions and spur resource conservation. To some extent, improvements in environmental policies have been driven by Poland’s maturing environmental movement.
Section 7.5 examines the growth and influence of that movement. Section 7.6
points to lingering problems for environmental protection in Poland: parts of the
country remain highly polluted; Poland’s environmental laws and policies still
suffer from gaps and weak spots; perhaps most significantly, the current government, which is dominated by former communists and their allies, has shown
little interest in environmental protection and has slowed the pace of the systemic
reforms that have driven environmental improvements since 1990. Nevertheless,
there is reason for optimism about the future of environmental protection in Poland
mainly because of the Polish government’s desire for inclusion in Western political, financial and security structures, including the European Union. Whether that
will spur sufficient environmental protection in Poland rather depends on one’s
subjective determination of what constitutes adequate environmental quality. At
least in a democratic Poland, the voters and consumers will have the ultimate say.

7.2. Poland’s Political-Economic Transformation
The Death of the Second Republic and Birth of the Third
Poland was the first Communist country to begin transitioning to market democracy. The biggest changes occurred in stages between January 1, 1989 and January 1, 1990. First, in December 1988, the Sejm enacted a Law on Economic
Activity (1988 Dz. U. No. 41, item 324) that radically altered economic institutions in People’s Poland. This marked the final economic reform effort of the
Communist era, and it in effect ended the socialist experiment in Poland. When
it took effect on January 1, 1989, the new law opened markets by immediately
releasing most sectors of the economy from central economic planning and centralized resources allocation. Despite the radical changes it made to Poland’s economic institutions, the 1988 Law on Economic Activity has received very little
attention from the scholars and journalists who have been following Poland’s
political-economic transformation. They have focused almost exclusively on the
1990 Balcerowicz Plan of ‘shock therapy’ economic reforms (named after Leszek
Balcerowicz, Vice-Premier and Finance Minister in Poland’s first Solidarity-led
government). In fact, it was the 1988 Law on Economic Activity that provided the
biggest shock. That law, not the Balcerowicz Plan, brought virtual laissez-faire to
Poland, precipitating hyperinflation, unemployment and economic recession. The
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1988 Law on Economic Activity was also responsible for certain environmental problems that mistakenly have been attributed to the Balcerowicz Plan. For
example, critics have blamed the Balcerowicz Plan for deregulating hazardous
waste imports to Poland (see Manser 1993, 101–2). But that problem clearly was
caused by the 1988 Law on Economic Activity, which, in the course of deregulating most economic activities, inadvertently repealed existing regulations on waste
imports, including permit requirements and dumping restrictions, thereby opening Poland’s borders to hazardous waste shipments. Garbage began flowing into
Poland in January 1989, a full year before the Balcerowicz Plan went into effect.
To its credit, the Sejm quickly recognized and responded to the problem with an
amendment to the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act (EPDA),
closing the borders to hazardous wastes only four months after the 1988 Law on
Economic Activity opened them (see Radecki 1992b).3 Before, during and after
the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan in January 1990, the Polish government
rigorously enforced that ban. According to reports published by the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate, in 1990 importers attempted to bring 18 million tons of illegal waste into Poland, but only about 60,000 tons actually made it
across the border. In 1991, the Polish government reported that out of 3.7 million
tons of waste destined for Poland, none made it into the country (Żylicz 1994a,
97). In 1992, Polish border guards intercepted 1,332 improper waste shipments
from the West (Washington Post, Mar. 23, 1994). These numbers must be taken
with a grain of salt, however. Outright bans are never completely enforceable; it
is quite likely that some small illegal waste shipments crossed (and still cross)
Poland’s borders undetected. The important point, however, is that Poland’s waste
import problems were caused not by the Balcerowicz Plan, but by the Communist
Party/state’s final efforts to reform the economy.
As Poland’s economy faltered in the late 1980s, the Party/state came under
increasing pressure to reform Poland’s political and governmental structures.
Waves of strikes throughout 1988 forced the government into formal negotiations with Solidarity, the independent trade union outlawed since 1981. Those
negotiations culminated in April 1989 with the famous ‘Round Table’ accords,
which set the stage for political reforms, including the end of single-party rule
in Poland. The accords called for semi-free parliamentary elections, which were
held in June 1989. The elections were only ‘semi-free’ because 65 percent of the
seats in the lower house of parliament (the Sejm) were reserved for candidates
backed by the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the elections were viewed as a
referendum on Communist Party rule in Poland, and the results were staggering: Solidarity-backed candidates won every seat open to them in both houses
of parliament, except for one in the newly established upper house (the Senate)
won by an independent candidate. Even more humiliating for the Party was the
failure of many of its unopposed candidates to win election. Election rules under
the ‘Round Table’ accords specified that all candidates, including those running
for uncontested seats, had to be elected by a majority of votes cast; Polish voters
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defeated unopposed Party candidates simply by crossing out their names on the
ballot. The June 1989 elections exposed to the whole world the illegitimacy of
Communist rule in Poland.
Two months after the elections, the Party-led government collapsed and the
Party itself disintegrated. In September 1989, the first Solidarity-led coalition
government took office, and Poland’s ‘Third Republic’ was born. But even after
the Communists were vanquished, many of their institutions, including huge and
inefficient state-owned enterprises, the 1952 Constitution and the nomenklatura,
persisted. Much of the real work of political-economic transformation remained
to be done. It began in December 1989 with the enactment of the ‘December
Amendments’ to the 1952 Constitution (1989 Dz. U. No. 75, item 444). Those
amendments defined the new Polish Republic as a democratic state based on the
rule of law (art. 1), repealed article 6, which had based Poland’s economic system on the ‘socialized means of production,’ and amended article 7 to protect and
fully guarantee private property rights. As amended, article 7 included a ‘takings’
provision, modeled on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
expropriation is permitted ‘only for a public purpose and for just compensation’
(art. 7).4 These amendments provided a (minimal) constitutional foundation for
the market economy that emerged in Poland at the beginning of 1990.

Poland’s Jump to the Market: The Balcerowicz Plan of
Economic Reforms
The enormous political changes of 1989 intoxicated many Poles, anesthetizing them, though only partially and briefly, to the painful economic situation in
which they lived. When the first Solidarity-led government of Prime Minister
Tadeusz Mazowiecki came to power, Poland’s economy was in dire straits (see
Cole 1991, 217–19). Gross national product, which had fallen by 1.6 percent in
1988, was falling even faster in 1989; by 1990, the annual rate of decline was
expected to reach 3 percent (United States Central Intelligence Agency 1990,
table 1). National income did not come close to matching expenditures, so that
by 1989 the deficit amounted to 30 percent of Poland’s total budget (see New
York Times, Oct. 23, 1989). Poland’s budget deficit was largely due to foreign
debt burdens—by 1989, Poland owed foreign governments and international
banks US$40 billion, making it the world’s fourth-largest debtor nation (see
Portes 1981, 4–10; New York Times, Apr. 23, 1989). But the main causes of deficit were government price supports and subsidies to inefficient industries. To
cover those expenditures, the government printed worthless money, sparking
hyperinflation. Up to the end of 1989, the prices of basic commodities rose by
‘more than 50 percent per month, and in some cases by several hundred percent’
(see New York Times, Sept. 12, 1989). In July 1989, aggregate costs increased
by 10 percent over the preceding month and by 85 percent over the first seven
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months of 1988; food deliveries were down 20 percent from the previous year;
industrial deliveries fell by an average of 11 percent from 1988; and total available housing, already in short supply,5 fell by 5 percent (Financial Times, Aug.
30, 1989). Producers routinely withheld commodities from market, anticipating
further price increases from hyperinflation, which also continually devalued the
wages of working Poles. Annual disposable income, which had been declining
throughout the 1980s, fell below US$100 in 1989 (United States Central Intelligence Agency 1990, table C–14). Government price controls did not help at
all, merely making more affordable on paper what did not exist on store shelves.
According to a report prepared for the US House of Representatives (United
States House of Representatives, House Committee on Small Business 1989,
8) in 1989, 60 percent of Polish wage earners could not make ends meet. As
1989 ended (just before the Balcerowicz Plan took effect), inflation in Poland
reached an astronomical annualized rate of 3,200 percent (Hajduk 1994, 72n13).6
Poland’s economic crisis did not afford the Mazowiecki government the luxury of time in developing a strategy to transform the political-economic system. Immediate action was required to stem hyperinflation, stabilize the currency
and curtail shortages of food and other necessities. As a first move, in October
1989 the National Bank of Poland devalued the zloty by 15 percent against the
US dollar. Two months later, on December 17, 1989, then-Vice-Premier Leszek
Balcerowicz introduced his ‘shock therapy’ program to a parliament still dominated by former members of the defunct Communist Party.
The Balcerowicz Plan was designed, first and foremost, to curtail runaway
inflation and convert the Polish economy to a market base. It sought to accomplish
this by immediately slashing all state subsidies by one-half, decontrolling prices
for most consumer goods, limiting wage increases to reduce inflationary pressures, and reducing government inflation compensation from 100 to 80 percent.
The program also sought to establish a fully convertible currency, and included
provisions, not immediately implemented, for restructuring industries and privatizing state-owned enterprises.
This is not the place for a detailed assessment Poland’s so-called ‘shock therapy’ program, but it is worth clarifying some widespread misconceptions. First,
contrary to what some critics have written (such as Manser 1993, 12, 41–2, 151),
the Balcerowicz Plan was intended to institute not a laissez-faire economy in
Poland, but a modern welfare state complete with social security, state financed
unemployment compensation and environmental regulations. The Balcerowicz
Plan did not end state subsidies; it merely cut them in half; it did not end government inflation compensation for pensioners and wage earners, but merely reduced
the level of compensation by 20 percent. These changes, although vitally important for curbing hyperinflation, only marginally reduced the Polish government’s
social commitments. In fact, between 1989 and 1992 (i.e., during the initial implementation period of the Balcerowicz Plan), state spending on social security actually doubled as a percentage of GDP to 18 percent (see Polish News Bulletin,
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Aug. 10, 1993), and environmental investments nearly doubled (see Table 7.7 on
p. 198). These are hardly the trends one would expect to see from a government
intent on establishing laissez-faire.
The Balcerowicz Plan did not magically cure Poland’s economic problems,
but no one really expected that it would. As Balcerowicz himself admitted in
an April 1990 interview, ‘[r]ecovery cannot occur quickly. It is a process. It is
important that it should begin’ (quoted in Gazeta International, Apr. 26, 1990).
At the outset, his austerity program made life even more difficult for most Poles.
In the first 24 hours after the Balcerowicz Plan was launched on January 1, 1990,
the price of coal rose 600 percent, electricity costs quadrupled, the price of gasoline doubled, food prices skyrocketed, and even the price of a simple bus ticket
rose by 250 percent (see New York Times, Jan. 8, 1990, Jan. 2, 1990). By the end
of 1990, Poland’s GNP had declined (on paper) by 12 percent and industrial production had fallen by 24 percent (see Table 7.1). But these depressing statistics
must be taken with several grains of salt. For one thing, according to Andrew
Berg (1994, 398–9) of the International Monetary Fund, Poland’s actual GDP
decline in 1990 probably was closer to 5 percent than the official estimate of 12
percent because:
the entire statistical and information-collecting apparatus of the state was geared
towards measuring physical output in large state enterprises, exclusively by
obtaining information from every enterprise as an adjunct to the planning apparatus. With liberalization, information-collecting agencies were overwhelmed
and, at least initially, were unable to measure the growth in output from the hundreds of thousands of new small private firms, especially given the new interest
in tax evasion.

But even if analysts had been better able to track the growth in output, comparisons of post-Balcerowicz Plan economic performance with pre-Balcerowicz
Plan economic performance still would be inherently problematic. The marketclearing prices instituted by the Balcerowicz Plan simply are not comparable with
the ‘fictitious prices’ established arbitrarily by economic planners before 1990.
As Wacław Wilczyński (Polish News Bulletin, June 22, 1993) has written, ‘it is
groundless to treat 1989 prices as a suitable reference for surveying changes in
the economy.’ It makes better sense to look at levels of consumption and savings. Between 1989 and 1992, real savings doubled and consumer sales in Poland
rose 5.8 percent after adjusting for inflation. In addition, the number of cars on
Polish roads increased dramatically, and the sale of gasoline remained constant
despite steeply rising prices. By 1992, there were more television sets per capita
in Poland than in Italy, Portugal, Ireland or Greece. And by 1993, the number of
inhabitants per Warsaw apartment had fallen to half of what it had been in the
late 1980s. Thus, according to Wilczyński, ‘[n]othing corroborates a thesis on
the recent across-the-board pauperization of society’ under the Balcerowicz Plan.
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Other supposed consequences of that plan, such as inflation and unemployment, were largely inheritances from the previous system. According to Zbigniew
Fallenbuchl (1993, 14), the rampant inflation that accompanied ‘shock-therapy’
reforms at the beginning of 1990 was ‘a corrective increase,’ the conversion of
a hidden into an open inflation. Communist governments had hidden inflation
through the use of price controls, which, as already mentioned, kept prices low
but precipitated constant supply shortages. It was not uncommon for consumers to
spend long hours in line waiting for goods that were only rumored to be available.
By freeing prices, the Balcerowicz Plan exposed this hidden inflation. ‘It eliminated shortages and other market distortions, and helped to adjust demand to the
existing limited supply.’ Similarly, according to Fallenbuchl (1993, 14, quoting
Janusz Beksiak), the initial rise in unemployment, which reached 6 percent at the
end of 1990 (16 percent at the end of 1994), was not caused by the reforms; it was
‘an inheritance from the old system, not a pathology of the new one.’7 Unemployment officially never existed in People’s Poland; according to the logic of socialist
legality, it could not exist because it was unconstitutional. But, in fact, unemployment did exist in the form of overemployment—several employees were assigned
a task that could have been done by just one. Socialism’s hidden unemployment
also was reflected in low rates of labor productivity. As Polish workers used to
say, You pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.
Whether the Balcerowicz reforms caused or merely exposed Poland’s economic recession of 1990–92, the suffering experienced by many Poles during the
initial months of transition was very real. Nevertheless, the relationship between
economic reforms and their consequences is more complex than many observers
have acknowledged. They cannot be adequately treated outside their systemic and
historic contexts. Specifically, the Balcerowicz Plan must be assessed in light of
the preexisting problems of socialism. The same is true, as we shall see later, of
the impact of political and economic reforms on environmental protection.
The Balcerowicz Plan managed to achieve all of its primary objectives with
surprising speed. Shortages of food and other goods vanished in a matter of
days. The word ‘hyperinflation’ was not seen or heard after February 1990.
By May, the inflation rate stood at only 4 percent (New York Times, June 7,
1990).8 Just as quickly the zloty had become fully convertible on the internal
market, and throughout 1990 it held its own against the American dollar (New
York Times, July 14, 1990). Perhaps most importantly for present purposes, the
Balcerowicz Plan substantially hardened budget constraints throughout most
sectors of the Polish economy. One common method for measuring the hardness
of the budget constraint is to correlate pre-tax and pre-subsidy business profits
with post-tax and post-subsidy profits. As we saw in Chapter 5, under socialism
the industries with the lowest pre-tax profits (or highest losses)—usually coal
mining and food production—often ended up with the highest ‘profits’ after tax
subsidies. The Balcerowicz Plan ended this practice. Between 1989 and 1991,
the correlation between pre- and post-tax profits for a sample of 1899 large
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industrial enterprises ‘rose dramatically and significantly’ from .38 to .71 (Berg
1994, 393).
The Balcerowicz Plan was the decisive first step in Poland’s ongoing efforts
to construct a modern market democracy. Since 1990, economic policies have
ebbed and flowed with political and social tides, but progress has remained
remarkably steady. Poland’s economy started to grow in 1992, and since then
growth has increased each year. In 1993 and 1994, Poland’s economic growth
rate was among Europe’s highest; in 1995, it reached 7 percent; and economists
predicted that economic growth would average 4.9 percent for the last five years
of the century (see Polish News Bulletin, Feb. 16, 1996; EIU Country Forecasts,
Sept. 6, 1995). Meanwhile, consumers who used to line up for hours, waiting
for whatever goods were available, suddenly had choices of producers, brands,
stores and quality. And although large-scale privatization of Poland’s state-owned
enterprises has proceeded at a snail’s pace, the privatization-from-below of smallscale industrial, commercial and retail businesses has driven economic growth
in Poland. By 1995, private firms were contributing 56 percent of Poland’s gross
national product; they produced 38 percent of industrial output and accounted for
60 percent of national employment (Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1995).
All this is not to say that Poland’s political-economic transformation is complete. A good deal of restructuring remains to be done. Thousands of state-owned
enterprises still await privatization; Poland’s banking and financial institutions
require intensive reorganization and modernization; Poland’s tax system is unstable; various industrial sectors, such as mining, require fundamental restructuring
simply to survive in competitive world markets; and the legal framework for a
market economy remains underdeveloped. Poland’s economy circa 1996 still is
best described as a transitional market economy (see Fallenbuchl 1993).

7.3. Systemic Transformation, Economic Recession and
Environmental Protection in Post-Communist Poland
Whereas much has been written since 1989 about political-economic reforms
throughout Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Slay 1994; Sachs 1993; Rychard
1993; S. Gomułka 1994; Clague and Rausser 1992), accounts of post-Communist
environmental restoration and protection efforts have been scarce and generally
inadequate. In 1993, Roger Manser (1993, 15, 17) wrote of the ‘failure’ of environmental protection in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe: ‘In spite of
curbing some of the excesses of communism’s pollution economy, the nascent
market economy has so far failed to bring fundamental improvements and in the
future is likely to reinforce old threats as well as create new ones.’ A New York
Times reporter similarly concluded, in a 1994 article, that ‘[t]he onset of capitalism has not cleaned the region’s foul air, soil or water. . . . What’s more, capitalism
is bringing its own problems—more traffic pollution, less public transportation,
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more plastic foam, more clashes between environmentalists and the peddlers
of consumerism’ (New York Times, Nov. 3, 1994). Similar stories appeared in
the Polish press. The August 1994 issue of the Polish weekly Wprost carried an
alarming cover story, entitled ‘Death in the Air,’ about the growing problem of air
pollution. The article’s author never bothered to mention that air pollution emissions in Poland declined by more than 40 percent between 1990 and 1994 (see
Table 7.1). But, of course, good news does not sell magazines.
More difficult to understand is why the same misperceptions have infected
the academic literature. For instance, Joan DeBardeleben (1995, 3–4), a noted
scholar of environmental protection in Central and Eastern Europe, recently concluded that environmental problems now ‘pose even greater hazards than earlier’
for a whole host of reasons: resources for combatting pollution are scarcer; international cooperation among former socialist allies has been replaced by economic
and ‘environmental competition and conflict’; and ‘regulatory mechanisms have
deteriorated, rather than improved.’ In addition, ‘[p]ervasive corruption, resource
shortages, and technological decline make even previously-existing structures
for pollution control less effective.’ Meanwhile, environmental concerns are
‘low on the scale of priorities’ because of immediate economic problems. Like
other analysts who share her pessimistic view of post-Communist environmental
protection in Central and Eastern Europe, DeBardeleben explains away inconvenient facts about dramatic pollution reductions as mere transitory symptoms of
economic recession. Another noted expert on environmental protection in Central and Eastern Europe, Barbara Jancar-Webster (1995, 59), argues in a similar
vein:
In the opinion of environmental professionals, governments do not consider
the environment a first priority. With an apathetic public, there is no popular
domestic force pushing legislatures or executives to take action, and there is
little money to carry out improvements. All predictions foresee a worsening of
environmental conditions in the 1990s before the economic situation will have
sufficiently improved so that governments can turn to the environment.

But the facts do not support these gloomy assessments and predictions,9 at least
not in Poland’s case.
Since 1990, environmental conditions in Poland have improved significantly,
and not solely or predominantly as a result of economic recession. Deliberate
environmental policies have made a major contribution to pollution reductions
and increased conservation. And those policies have been facilitated by systemic reforms, most notably the institution of the rule of law and the imposition
of substantially hard budget constraints throughout the economy. The significant environmental improvements resulting from this combination of improved
environmental policies and systemic reforms are structural; they have not been
reversed by Poland’s return to economic growth.
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Table 7.1. Percentage change in GDP, industrial production and air
pollution emissions in Poland, 1990–5
GDP

Industrial
production

Dust

Carbon
oxides

Nitrogen
oxides

Sulphur
dioxide

1990

–12

–24

–23

–17

–18

–21

1991

–7

–12

–21

–28

–6

–8

1992

2

4

–26

–15

–8

–10

1993

4

7

–13

–21

0

–3

1994

5

13

–12

0

0

–3

1995

7

9

–18

–12

1

–5

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest point.
Sources: GDP and industrial production figures, 1990–1993—Bossak (1994, 34, table 3;
53, figure 1); Polish News Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1995 and Feb. 16, 1996. Pollution emissions—
GUS (1997, 1996, 23, table 1; 1995, 23, table 1; 1991, 123, table 4.1).

Evidence of Structural Environmental Improvements in Poland
Pollution levels in Poland declined dramatically after the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan in January 1990. Table 7.1 highlights Poland’s annual rates of economic growth and pollution emissions from 1990 to 1995 (the last year for which
environmental statistics are available). By 1994, aggregate industrial pollution
had fallen by 40 percent (PAP News Wire, June 5, 1994). As already noted, some
analysts (including Jendrośka and Sommer 1994, 187; DeBardeleben 1995b, 4)
viewed these pollution reductions merely as by-products of Poland’s economic
recession. Roger Manser (1993, 75) predicted that a return to economic growth
would quickly reverse the emissions declines. But other analysts rightly maintained that the recession was only one factor, and maybe not even the most important one. Poland’s preeminent environmental economist, Tomasz Żylicz (1994d,
81n3), pointed out that the pollution reductions had to be ‘due to economic
restructuring, and improved enforcement’ because they exceeded ‘what could be
explained in terms of GDP decline.’ The journalist Eugeniusz Pudlis wrote (in The
Warsaw Voice, Oct. 3, 1993) that the Polish government’s ‘deliberate’ environmental policies deserved more credit than the recession for lower pollution levels.
And in a May 1994 interview, Poland’s Chief Environmental Protection Inspector,
Andrzej Walewski, declared that data collected by the Inspectorate ‘prove’ that
pollution reductions have resulted from ‘investment in environmental protection,
and improved discipline among ecological installation users’ (quoted in The Warsaw Voice, May 1, 1994).
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Data provided in Table 7.1 show that Poland’s economic recession ended
in 1992, when gross national product increased by approximately 2 percent, and
industrial output was 4 percent higher than the previous year. In 1993, the economy grew by 4 percent (the highest economic growth rate in all of Europe) and
industrial output rose by 7 percent. Since then, Poland’s economy has continued to grow at an average annual rate of 6 percent, and industrial production has
increased each year by an average of 11 percent.
This impressive economic recovery made it possible finally to test the alleged
connection between the recession and lower pollution levels. Had the recession
been the sole or even the predominant cause of reduced emissions, as many have
claimed, we logically would have expected to see pollution emissions increasing
along with production levels beginning in 1992. But that has not happened. In
1992, emissions of major air pollutants declined by an average of nearly 15 percent from 1991 levels (despite the 4 percent hike in production). Interestingly, that
was the same percentage emissions reduction Poland experienced in 1991 (from
1990 levels), when the economy was still shrinking (by 7 percent). Between 1992
and 1995, as Poland’s economy grew by 18 percent and industrial production
increased by 35 percent, emissions of major air pollutants fell by an average of 9.1
percent. As air pollution emissions have fallen, so have water pollution discharges
in Poland. During the recession in 1990 and 1991, discharges fell by 14 percent
(from 1989 levels); when Poland’s economy started growing again in 1992 and
1993, water pollution continued to decline by 8 percent (from 1991 levels) (GUS
1991, 25, table 1; 1995, 22, table 1). And the rate of resource consumption has
fallen along with the pollution levels. In 1993, industry and consumers used 2.4
percent less water than in 1992, 19.5 percent less than in 1989 (Business News
from Poland, Sept. 30, 1994). Meanwhile, according to Tomasz Żylicz (1994a,
99), ‘1990 was the first year after the World War II that harvests in Polish forests
were down-sized to the sustainable level.’
These statistics belie the contention that pollution reductions were solely or
predominantly tied to Poland’s economic recession. Other factors, most notably Poland’s deliberate environmental policies, have contributed substantially to
environmental improvements since 1989. And those policies have been facilitated
by various systemic reforms.

7.4. Environmental Policies, Systemic Reforms
and Pollution Reductions
The ‘Round Table’ Environmental Protocol
The history of post-Communist environmental law and policy in Poland actually
began before the Communists gave up power. The ‘Round Table’ accords, signed
in April 1989 by the Jaruzelski regime and the Solidarity opposition, included an
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important environmental protokol, which called for the appointment of a special
commission of legal experts to overhaul Poland’s failed system of environmental
regulation by the end of 1990. The protocol specified six provisions to be included
in new comprehensive environmental legislation: (1) freedom of access to environmental information; (2) the right freely to conduct and publish environmental
research; (3) the right to sue to protect the environment; (4) the establishment,
in each community, of a freely elected environmental ombudsman authorized to
inspect and collect information from local government agencies and polluting
enterprises; (5) annual publication of reports on the state of the environment; and
(6) exclusion of all environmental information from the state secret laws (Protokol Podzespołu d/s Ekologii Okrągłego Stołu 1989). Most of the specific mandates
of the environmental protocol have yet to be instituted by statutes or regulations.
Nevertheless, the mere inclusion of environmental issues in the historic ‘Round
Table’ negotiations was an important step toward environmental law and policy
reform in Poland.

A New Environmental Policy for a New Government
When Solidarity took over from the Communists in September 1989, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, in his first public statement as prime minister, discussed the need
to transform environmental protection along with the political-economic system (Gazeta Wyborcza, Sept. 14, 1989). As his government prepared to launch
the Balcerowicz Plan of economic reforms, it also began working on administrative and legislative reforms for environmental protection. Before the end of
1989, all environmental and nature protection responsibilities were consolidated
within a single new ministry, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural
Resources and Forestry (1989 Dz. U. No. 73, item 433), which set about developing a national policy to restore and protect Poland’s environment into the twentyfirst century. Its new National Environmental Policy (NEP) was published a year
later (November 1990), and received parliamentary approval in May 1991 (Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 1991). The
NEP was based on fundamental principles of environmental protection, including ‘sustainable development’ and ‘the polluter pays principle.’ It established
short-term (3–4-year), mid-term (3–10-year) and long-term (25–30-year) goals
to be achieved through a combination of market mechanisms and administrative regulations. The immediate short-term goal was to eliminate environmental
hazards posing imminent threats to human health. Over the mid-term, the NEP
sought to reverse declining environmental trends by ratcheting-up Polish environmental standards to Western levels. This goal was designed, in part, to satisfy
a critical precondition for Poland’s eventual membership in the European Union.
The NEP’s long-term goal was to implement sustainable development practices
throughout the Polish economy.
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An Old Law in the New System
While the Environment Ministry was busy preparing its new National Environmental Policy, the Mazowiecki government appointed an independent Environmental Law Reform Task Force, as called for in the environmental protocol to
the 1989 ‘Round Table’ accords, to prepare comprehensive new environmental
legislation. The Task Force prepared several drafts of an ‘omnibus’ environmental law, but none of them proved to be satisfactory. Eventually, the Task Force
concluded that the goal of completely reformulating Poland’s system of environmental law was overly ambitious and perhaps unnecessary; existing laws could
be improved sufficiently by amendment, rather than replacement (see Jendrośka
1992, 534). Consequently, Poland’s 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act (EPDA) has survived the transition structurally intact, though it has
been amended seven times (so far) since 1989 (1989 Dz. U. No. 26, item 139;
1989 Dz. U. No. 35, item 192; 1990 Dz. U. No. 34, item 198; 1990 Dz. U. No. 39,
item 222; 1991 Dz. U. No. 77, item 335; 1991 Dz. U. No. 101, item 444; 1993 Dz.
U. No. 40, item 183). The most important of these amendments banned hazardous
waste imports,10 strengthened Poland’s environmental impact assessment procedures for new economic developments, and established an innovative new Environmental Protection Bank (Bank Ochrony Środowiska) to provide low-interest
loans for environmental protection projects. Some analysts (e.g., Jendrośka 1990,
21) have criticized these ‘piecemeal’ reforms, claiming that the EPDA, as a relic
of the old system, should be completely replaced by legislation better adapted to
the new political-economic climate. It is certainly true that the 1980 law remains
deficient in several respects (some of which are described in Cole 1995a, 338–41),
and replacement legislation is in the works.11 But in some respects the old law is
actually better suited to the new system than it was to the old.
As we saw in Chapter 2, Poland’s 1980 statute was among the world’s earliest
environmental laws to rely primarily on market mechanisms—resource-use and
pollution fees—for environmental protection (1980 Dz. U. No. 3, item 6, parts V
and VII).12 Its various regulatory standards, fees for resource use and pollution
emissions, and non-compliance fines are today among the world’s highest and
most extensive (see Summers 1994). The EPDA mandates charges for just about
every major economic activity that uses or pollutes any environmental medium,
including air pollution emissions, water use and pollution discharges, timber harvesting, waste storage and disposal, use of agricultural lands for non-agricultural
purposes, and use of automobiles in areas under special environmental protection, such as National Parks (1980 Dz. U. No. 3, item 6, art. 86). In Chapter 3
(§3.3), I mentioned that Poland’s broad application of pollution and resource-use
fees substantially predated the move toward economic means of environmental
protection throughout the rest of the industrialized world. It was a truly progressive approach to environmental protection, or would have been but for the fact
that market mechanisms require markets to be effective. As we saw in Chapter 5,
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the Polish Communists were trying to stimulate pollution control and conservation with prices in an economic system where prices were essentially meaningless because resources and rewards were allocated according to production levels
rather than profit, competitive markets virtually were non-existent, and polluters
were insulated from price stimulation by endemic soft budget constraints stemming from the Party/state’s regulatory conflict of interest. Using prices to control
pollution in Poland’s socialist economy was something like using water to control
an electrical fire.
Poland’s systemic transformation to an economy based on private property
and free markets, while still incomplete, has already substantially ameliorated
this problem. The government’s regulatory conflict of interest has been reduced.
As previously noted, in 1995 private firms contributed 56 percent of Poland’s
gross national product, produced 38 percent of industrial output and accounted
for 60 percent of national employment (Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1995). Budget constraints throughout this growing private economy are substantially hard.
Private firms in post-Communist Poland operate in competitive markets, where
performance determines survival. They naturally are inclined to limit the costs
arising from inefficient production as well as regulatory costs. Under the circumstances, pollution charges can be expected to induce changes in production and
pollution patterns, assuming fees are set at levels that alter firms’ marginal cost
calculus. In Poland’s case at least, that assumption is warranted. According to
a recent study, emissions charges for dusts and effluent charges for sewage in
nine industrial sectors of the Polish economy now approximate or exceed average abatement costs (Poskrobko and Cygler 1993, 200–1).13 As Tables 7.2 and
7.3 disclose, it is now cheaper for firms in those sectors to reduce pollution emissions than to pay the fines.14 And in a policy that proves Poland’s environmental charges are not intended simply as a source of revenues for the government,
environmental penalties may be suspended for polluters who pledge to invest in
environmental protection equipment or process changes within five years. If they
keep their pledge, the penalty is extinguished; if not, the penalty is doubled (see
Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17, 1995).
Regulated firms in Poland increasingly are finding that environmental investments can pay dividends. For example, a pharmaceutical plant near Warsaw
recently invested 60 million (old) zlotys to reduce its ammonia use by more than
half; this one process change increased annual net profits by about 300 million
(old) zlotys (The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 8, 1995).15 A coke-chemical complex near
Zabrze implemented a change in its coking gas process at a cost of 3.5 billion (old)
zlotys; this investment is expected to pay for itself in energy savings over 10 years
(The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 8, 1995). And engineers from the Electro-Mechanical
Factory in Leszno designed a method for reducing waste by-products from chromate treatment; the new method costs 36.5 million (old) zlotys to implement, but
its pay-back period is only 2.1 months (The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 8, 1995). It is worth
stressing that these are voluntary process changes designed to improve profitability
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Table 7.2. General structure of expenses for environmental protection in
nine sectors of the Polish economy, 1990 and 1991 (%)
Type of cost

1990

1991

Abatement costsa

62.2

38.7

Ecological chargesb

37.8

61.3

a. Includes all environmental protection costs not associated with pollution charges,
including the costs of installing, running and maintaining pollution control equipment.
b. Including environmental fees and fines under the 1980 EPDA, as amended.
Source: Poskrobko and Cygler (1993, 200, table 1).

Table 7.3. Percentage cost increases for environmental protection in nine
Polish industries from 1990 (mean values) to the first term of 1991

Industry

Abatement
costsa

Ecological
charges

Remaining
environmental
protection costs

Total costs of
environmental
protection

Fuels–mining

152.0

612.0

207.6

342.4

Power

160.7

942.8

633.3

516.8

Metallurgy

140.5

453.8

151.1

258.5

Electrical–metal

171.4

329.0

157.0

215.5

Chemical

199.6

331.0

236.0

275.4

Mineral

169.6

405.9

165.3

223.6

Wood–paper

196.8

420.5

177.3

315.9

Light industry

167.4

428.0

180.4

332.7

Food processing

142.0

268.8

100.0

243.4

a. Includes all costs associated with reducing pollution emissions.
Source: Poskrobko and Cygler (1993, 201, table 2).

by, among other means, reducing production costs and exposure to environmental
liability; they were not mandated by the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate or any other government agency. Most importantly, they indicate that price
stimuli (under the 1980 EDPA) are internalizing production costs in Poland’s new
market economy by inducing firms to alter their production habits voluntarily.
The same phenomenon has been observed to a more limited extent in agriculture. Although that sector enjoys softer budget constraints than the rest of Poland’s
private economy, many agricultural subsidies have been slashed or abolished. For
instance, the Polish government no longer underwrites fertilizer and pesticide
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Table 7.4. Pollution intensity of electricity generation in Poland, 1989–91
(tons/GWh)
Air pollutant

1989

1990

1991

SO2

15.1

12.6

12.0

NOx

3.5

3.0

3.2

Dusts

5.5

4.6

3.8

Source: Fiedor et al. (1993, 94, table 15).

use (see Brocka-Pałacz 1994, 58). As a result, between 1988 and 1993, farmers
reduced their (over)use of general (NPK) and calcium-based inorganic fertilizers
by 63 and 32 percent, respectively; pesticide use fell by 66 percent(calculated
from GUS 1995, 54, tables 18 and 19; 1990, 14, tables 17 and 18). This entails
obvious benefits for the environment (especially surface water quality) and public
health, so long as it does not result in food shortages.16
As we might predict, budget constraints remain softer for enterprises still
owned by the state, but they are harder than they used to be. State-owned enterprises that used to avoid environmental fees and fines with ease are now being
forced to pay up. From 1990 to 1991, government revenues from pollution and
resource-use charges increased by a factor of 13 (Manser 1993, 117). By 1993,
Poland’s various environmental funds were ‘annually collecting and spending
15–20 times more in real terms than in 1990’ (Wajda 1993, 19; but see PAP News
Wire, Apr. 7, 1994). As a consequence, even the largest, most heavily subsidized
state-owned enterprises have become relatively cost conscious (at least as compared with the 1980s). Consider, for example, Poland’s energy industry. In a
recent World Bank-sponsored study of the effects of environmental charges on
that industry (Czaja et al. 1994, 47), economists from the Oskar Lange Academy
of Economics in Wrocław found that increased fees have ‘caused’ pollution reductions and increased conservation efforts. The data provided in Table 7.4 show that
between 1989 and 1991, Polish power plants significantly reduced the pollution
intensity of their activities, reducing per unit emissions by 20 percent on average.
These improvements cannot be explained by economic recession because they are
not tied to production levels. Rather, the researchers concluded that the reductions
were due to the heightened cost consciousness of power plant managers resulting from increased emissions charges, higher per unit energy costs, and hardened
budget constraints.
So, as Stanisław Wajda and Jerzy Sommer (1994, 190) have concluded,
Poland’s environmental fees and fines have finally become ‘what they should
be—a heavy burden for polluters.’ Further proof of this comes from the political
battle that took place in 1992, when the Polish government announced dramatic
fee increases for air pollution emissions (1991 Dz. U. No. 125, item 558) (those
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Table 7.5. Changes in emissions fees for selected air pollutants (zlotys/kga
and approximate US$ values)
Date of imposition

Lead

Sulphur dioxide

Benzene

Fluorine

Jan. 1, 1991

36,000
($3.79)

680
($0.07)

1,800
($0.19)

3,600
($0.38)

Jan. 1, 1992

500,000
($38.46)

1,100
($0.08)

1,000,000
($76.92)

3,000
($0.23)

Oct. 1992 (retroactive
to Jan. 1, 1992)

50,000
($3.85)

770
($0.05)

100,000
($7.69)

2,100
($0.16)

Jan. 1, 1993

500,000
($31.25)

1,100
($0.07)

1,000,000
($62.50)

3,000
($0.19)

a. Prices are denominated in old zlotys.
Source: Manser (1993, 94, table 5.6).

changes are shown in Table 7.5). Affected enterprises—mostly state-owned
dinosaurs—exerted their residual political muscle to roll back the charges, and
in late 1992 the government caved in to their demands, slashing pollution fees by
up to 90 percent (1992 Dz. U. No. 79, item 400; also see Polish News Bulletin,
Nov. 19, 1992). Fortunately that was not the end of the story. Polish environmentalists predictably were outraged. Their protests were joined by private firms and,
most surprisingly, a few state-owned enterprises (such as the Jaworzno III power
plant) that had already invested heavily in environmental improvements—the fee
reductions greatly devalued their investments while rewarding enterprises that
had done nothing to reduce pollution (see Zechenter 1993, 121). Together, this
collection of strange bedfellows persuaded the government to reverse its decision
and reinstate the higher fees (as shown in Table 7.5) (1993 Dz. U. No. 9, item
44; also see Polish News Bulletin, Jan. 27, 1993; Reuter Textline/Rzeczpospolita,
Feb. 1, 1993). The fact that this fight took place at all, let alone its outcome
(with the environmental side prevailing), indicates how much budget constraints
have hardened since 1989, at least for many economic actors. And those hardened budget constraints have, among other benefits, splintered previously unified
industrial interests.
Besides higher fees, polluters are also subject to higher fines for violating
environmental standards. The data in Table 7.6 show that between 1990 and
1993, the collection of non-compliance fines in Poland increased by a factor of
12, despite an equally dramatic decline in the ratio of collected to assessed penalties during the same period. The majority of uncollected fines are owed by the
financially strapped (state-owned) mining sector which in 1991 alone racked up
environmental penalties amounting to 4 trillion zlotys (approximately US$300
million) (see PAP News Wire, Apr. 7, 1994; Polish News Bulletin, June 14, 1993).
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Table 7.6. Environmental fines, 1990–3
Collected fines
(billion zlotys)

Percentage of assessed but uncollected fines

17.9

32

1991

95.0

59

1992

140.7

78

1993

215.4

84

1990

Source: GUS (1995, 379, table 21).

The Ministry of Industry, under pressure from mining concerns, attempted to have
the charges rescinded, but the Ministry of Environmental Protection refused (Polish News Bulletin, June 14, 1993). The charges have become debts owed by the
mines to the Polish government. However, a current plan for restructuring the
mining industry calls for a substantial reduction in accumulated debts, including
unpaid environmental charges (Polish News Bulletin, Apr. 4, 1995). This reflects
the continuing impetus to soften budget constraints for state-owned enterprises.
But the mining industry’s compliance problems also reflect a legitimate policy
dilemma. Regardless of the level of environmental charges, polluters can be
expected to improve their environmental performance only if they possess sufficient capital to invest in pollution-control equipment or process changes. Poland’s
mining industry apparently lacks the capital either to abate emissions or to pay
environmental charges. Under the circumstances, the state has only three options:
(1) close down the industry, (2) soften its budget constraints (i.e., forgive the environmental fees and fines) so that the industry can continue operating at existing
(unlawful) pollution levels, or (3) subsidize environmental improvements at the
mines. The first option is unthinkable, and the second just barely thinkable. Only
the third option seems a realistic alternative.

Environmental Liability and Privatization: Work in Progress
While hardened budget constraints throughout most of Poland’s economy have
facilitated improved environmental protection, privatization of Poland’s mammoth, pollution-belching state enterprises has proceeded at a snail’s pace, plagued
by financial scandals and political/ideological debates over the state’s proper role
in the economy. As of December 1994, only 36 percent of the more than 8,000
state-owned enterprises in Poland had been privatized or were in the process of
privatization (see United States General Accounting Office 1995, 46–59).17 Paradoxically, many ‘privatized’ firms in Poland are not privately owned. One privatization track in Poland is called ‘commercialization.’ Commercialized enterprises
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are subject, like private companies, to Poland’s Commercial Code, but they
remain wholly owned by the State Treasury. In other words, enterprises privatized
on the commercialization track are really not privatized at all (see Polish News
Bulletin, Aug. 26, 1994). More than 500 state-owned enterprises have been subject to this form of ersatz privatization. It is the preferred approach of the current
Polish government, which is comprised of former Communist Party members and
their Peasant Party allies. A large-scale Mass Privatization Program, which was
initially planned in 1991, did not get off the ground until the middle of 1995; and
even after its implementation some 5,000 enterprises remain owned by the state
(see Polish News Bulletin, Aug. 26, 1994).
Environmental issues arise frequently in the process of privatization; many
industrial sites in Poland are contaminated, and most industrial enterprises are
heavy polluters. However, when privatization first began, the Polish government
had no policy for dealing with environmental issues, including allocating liability for past contamination. The Privatization Ministry initially addressed environmental protection issues only when potential Western buyers raised them,
and then on an ad hoc basis. Scholars and environmentalists (among others,
Kruszewska 1993; Stodulski and Starczewska 1993; Bell and Kołaja 1993) criticized this approach and called for the institution of regular procedures for conducting environmental audits and allocating liabilities. In fact, the Privatization
Ministry had (and still has) no legal authority to conduct environmental audits
or allocate environmental liabilities (see 1990 Dz. U. No. 51, item 298). Since
1992, however, a process for introducing environmental considerations into the
privatization process has been evolving within the Polish administration. In May
of that year, the Privatization Ministry and the Environmental Protection Ministry
established an Interministerial Environment Unit (IEU) responsible for developing policies and procedures for resolving environmental issues in privatization
(Porozumienie między Ministrem Ochrony Środowiska, Zasobów Naturalnych
i Leśnictwa a Ministrem Przekształceń Własnościowych w sprawie powołania
międzyresortowego zespołu do spraw uwzględnienia zagadnień ekologicznych i
usprawnienia procesów własnościowych, 1992; also see East European Business
Law, May 19, 1992). Since its inception, the IEU has had a substantial positive
impact on the resolution of environmental issues arising in privatization transactions. According to Susan Cummings (1994, 605–8), an American attorney who
has worked for Poland’s Privatization Ministry and served on the Interministerial
Environment Unit, the IEU has improved communications between the Privatization Ministry and the Environmental Protection Ministry, developed a consistent
policy with respect to environmental issues in privatization, and introduced innovative procedures for resolving those issues (including the creation of contractual
clauses providing for conditional indemnification from liability and cost-sharing
between investor and state). In addition, the IEU has helped to educate the Privatization Ministry on environmental issues, increasing its awareness and ability to
account (economically) for environmental problems in privatization transactions.
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Despite these process improvements, we might argue that the Polish government should have foreseen the environmental implications of privatization at the
outset of the systemic transition; certainly some issues and controversies might
have been avoided. But it is important to bear in mind that there was no preexisting blueprint for Poland’s political-economic transformation; no country ever
before has attempted such a broad privatization of the means of production. We
should not be surprised or overly dismayed by the Polish government’s failure
to foresee every issue, no matter how significant. It is more important that the
government has recognized and responded effectively to problems as they have
arisen; that is how the reform process evolves and progresses. The Polish government’s response to environmental protection concerns in privatization has been
pragmatic. Some environmentalists would prefer a more radical approach. Roger
Manser (1993, 105), for one, has called for the imposition of retroactive environmental liability on investors purchasing state properties, noting correctly that this
is the law in many Central and East European countries. Indeed, under Poland’s
1990 Privatization Act, the privatized firm assumes all of the rights, duties and
liabilities, including environmental liabilities, of the state-owned enterprise (1990
Dz. U. No. 51, item 298, art. 8, sec. 2). However, neither the privatization law
nor any other statute expressly prohibits the alienation or contractual allocation
of environmental liabilities. Therefore, they probably fall within the general freedom of contract provision of Poland’s 1964 Civil Code (1964 Dz. U. No. 16,
item 93, art. 72; also see Wajda and Sommer 1994, 180). In any case, negotiating environmental liabilities has become an accepted practice in Poland, and that
certainly is the best policy. A contrary rule that would automatically and irrevocably impose retroactive environmental liability on buyers in privatization would
be unfair and inefficient. Such a rule would have made sense under socialism,
when enterprises literally were administrative agencies, and ‘ownership’ transfers
constituted little more than administrative reforms; in every case, the ‘buyers’
and ‘sellers’ were both agents of the same principal, the Party/state. However,
in Poland’s new political-economic system, buyers in privatization often have
no ties to the previous ‘owners’ who caused the contamination, and so it would
be substantially unjust to impose liability on them (see Boyd 1994, 65). More
than unjust, it would be pointless. The practical effect would be to discourage
potential buyers of state-owned properties (especially in cases where the environmental liabilities approximate or exceed total enterprise assets). So the entire
privatization process would simply grind to a halt. That would be disastrous for
environmental protection in Poland, where private firms, subject to hard budget
constraints, are leading the environmental and economic recovery. Indeed, the
analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that the greatest threat to continuing environmental
improvements in Poland may be the perpetuation of large and inefficient stateowned enterprises, subject to governmental conflicts of interest and soft budget
constraints (see Czaja et al. 1994, 42, asserting that the acceleration of privatization in the electric power industry should contribute to environmental protection).
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This has important implications for ‘commercialization’ and other forms of ersatz
privatization that would maintain state ownership and control indefinitely.

Improved Environmental Law Enforcement in Post-Communist Poland
In the first part of the transition period (from 1990 to 1992), Poland’s parliament
was quite active in the field of environmental protection. In addition to amending Poland’s 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act, it enacted
and amended a number of other important environment-related statutes. In 1991
alone, the Sejm enacted a new preservation-oriented nature protection law (1991
Dz. U. No. 114, item 492),18 a maritime administration law with oil spill prevention and clean-up provisions (1991 Dz. U. No. 16, item 73), amendments to the
forest protection law that mandated ecologically sustainable forest management
(1991 Dz. U. No. 101, item 444), and new enabling legislation for the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate (1991 Dz. U. No. 77, item 335).19 The Inspectorate law, in particular, has had a momentous impact on environmental protection
in post-Communist Poland. It was designed to improve environmental monitoring
and law enforcement, long considered the weakest links in Poland’s environmental protection regime (see Jendrośka 1992, 533; 1993a, 351), by increasing the
authority and independence of the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate.
Prior to 1991, the Inspectorate was a small and almost powerless agency
attached to the Environmental Protection Ministry. Its 400 poorly paid, poorly
equipped and poorly trained employees were charged with monitoring environmental compliance at some 43,000 polluting enterprises nationwide. But they had
almost no power actually to enforce the law against violators. As Jerzy Jendrośka
(1993a, 352) has written, the Inspectorate was an environmental ‘watchdog
without teeth.’ But then the 1991 Law on the State Environmental Protection
Inspectorate gave that watchdog sharp new dentures. The new law empowered
the Inspectorate to impose non-compliance fines, shut down dangerous polluters and ban the import or sale of environmentally harmful raw materials, fuels,
machinery and technologies. Inspectors can impose environmental mitigation
measures on new plants, which cannot begin operations until they are certified
in compliance. And the Inspectorate now exercises oversight authority over all
environmental monitoring in Poland; it sets the standards for all other monitoring agencies and laboratories. Consequently, monitoring procedures that used
to be haphazard have become consistent. The Inspectorate operates a national
database for environmental information collected by regional monitoring agencies and laboratories; and it serves as a clearinghouse providing environmental
information to other government agencies, non-governmental organizations and
the public. Finally, the 1991 law ensured improved funding and staffing so that
the Inspectorate could carry out its new and expanded responsibilities. Today,
the agency employs 3,000 environmental inspectors operating out of 50 offices
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(including the Warsaw headquarters and a branch office in each of Poland’s 49
wojewódstwa [administrative regions]).20
The increased power of the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate has
led directly to improved environmental monitoring, compliance and enforcement
in Poland since 1991. For example, among the near-term priorities of the Environmental Ministry’s National Environmental Policy (1991) was to reduce emissions from Poland’s 80 largest polluters, which collectively were responsible for
an estimated 80 percent of all industrial pollution (see Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17,
1995). Pursuant to that program, by 1993 the Inspectorate had issued more than
3,000 decyzji requiring polluters on the ‘list of 80’ to install pollution-control
equipment; it completely shut down 7 plants; it closed parts of 25 plants, and it
temporarily halted production at 22 others. These actions have resulted in substantial pollution reductions. According to information from the Chief Inspector’s office, dust emissions from cement plants on the list declined by 60 percent;
lead and copper emissions from foundries on the list fell by 60 and 32 percent,
respectively; and carbon dioxide emissions from listed power plants decreased
by 40 percent (see Bureau of National Affairs, International Environment Daily,
May 28, 1993). By 1995,, the volume of wastewater effluent discharged by listed
factories had declined by about 37 percent, and toxic waste by about 42 percent
(Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17, 1995). These significant pollution reductions are not
temporary by-products of economic recession but the direct effects of deliberate environmental law enforcement activities. As of 1995, 14 plants had been
removed from the original list of 80—3 of them had gone out of business, while
the other 11 had reduced their pollution emissions to such an extent that they no
longer qualified for the ‘list of disgrace’ (Rzeczpospolita, Feb. 17, 1995).
The greatest testament to the increased power and effectiveness of the State
Environmental Protection Inspectorate comes from those who now seek to dismantle it. In a recent meeting with central administrators, regional (voivodship)
authorities and city ‘presidents,’ acting on behalf of their own provincial economic interests, called for the abolition of the Inspectorate (see Biuletyn Niecodzienny BORE, May 31, 1995). This seems unlikely to happen, but the point is that
no one would bother with the Inspectorate were it not having a significant impact.
Of course, the Inspectorate would not be having a significant impact, regardless of its increased statutory authority, were it not for systemic reforms, most
notably the institution of a constitutional Rechtstaat (literally ‘law state’) in
Poland. As we saw in Chapter 4, during the socialist era, environmental statutes,
like all laws, were mere policy instruments that the Party/state simply disregarded
(under the vacuous constitutional doctrine of ‘socialist democracy’) whenever
they proved inconvenient. That no longer is the case. There has been a profound
change in Poland’s legal culture that has received far too little attention.
One good example of how much the legal culture has changed is the fight
over environmental protection equipment at Warsaw’s Okęcie II airport. As discussed in Chapter 4 (§4.2), in the mid-1980s (before the fall of communism) War-
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saw city officials entered into an agreement with a West German-led consortium
to build a new international airport. The 1980 EPDA required the airport, as a new
development project, to install all environmental protection equipment deemed
necessary by the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate. Inspectors ordered
the airport to install sewage treatment and incineration plants, noise monitors and
acoustic barriers. However, in an agreement that typified the status of law under
Communism, Warsaw city officials summarily waived the environmental rules.
This was done behind closed doors, without any public comment. And, of course,
at that time, the Inspectorate had no independent authority to enforce compliance
with its own orders. So Okęcie II was built without the required environmental
installations. However, by the time the new airport was ready to open in 1992, the
political-economic system had changed; the law was no longer subordinate to politics and the airport’s non-compliance with environmental requirements was headline news all over Poland (see The Warsaw Voice, July 5, 1992; Super Express,
June 29, 1992; Gazeta Wyborcza, June 29, 1992). The regional environmental
protection inspector from Warsaw threatened to prevent the airport from opening
(see Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 25, 1992). The Chief Inspector ultimately decided
that the airport could open, but only if the airport authorities agreed to retrofit all
of the originally required environmental protection equipment within 18 months
(see Reuter Textline/Rzeczpospolita, June 29, 1992). His decision was later ratified in the High Administrative Court (see PAP News Wire, May 21, 1993). Thus,
the law was substantially (if imperfectly) enforced. The story of Okęcie II shows
that the law in post-Communist Poland is becoming a real source of social control; politicians, administrators and managers can no longer simply ignore it.

Investing in Environmental Protection
Environmental spending in Poland has increased greatly since 1989, primarily
because of increased collections of environmental fees and fines. Table 7.7 shows
that Poland’s rate of investment in environmental protection throughout the 1970s
and 1980s closely tracked the performance of the economy. As we saw in Chapter
5 (§5.2), when Poland’s economy stagnated or declined (as it did through much of
the 1980s), environmental projects always were among the first budget items cut.
Socioeconomic planners considered them expendable luxuries, and most Polish
citizens agreed that in tough times the country could not afford expensive environmental protection. To the end of Poland’s socialist ‘experiment,’ environmental protection investments never even approached 1 percent of GNP.
As the data in Table 7.7 show, within two years after the first Solidarity government took power, Poland’s environmental protection budget doubled. In 1991,
Poland spent 1.1 percent of GNP on environmental protection. This marked the
first time that Poland ever ‘reached a relative level of environmental investment
effort commensurate with what is spent per unit of GDP in the OECD countries’
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Table 7.7. Economic growth and environmental investments in Poland,
1976–93
Environmental investments
Economic growth
rate (%)

As % of GNP

As % of total investment

1976

4.1

0.40

1.2

1977

2.8

0.45

1.4

1978

3.7

0.38

1.3

1979

–1.9

0.35

1.2

1980

–2.6

0.28

1.0

1981

–5.3

0.20

1.2

1982

–0.6

0.25

1.4

1983

4.6

0.40

2.2

1984

3.4

0.50

2.5

1985

1.1

0.54

2.8

1986

2.8

0.74

2.9

1987

–2.4

0.80

3.5

1988

1.6

0.80

3.5

1989

–1.0

0.80

2.9

1990

–11.6

0.70

3.7

1991

–7.0

1.10

5.4

1992

1.9

1.30

6.5

1993

4.0

1.30

6.4

Sources: Economic growth rates, 1976–87—Fallenbuchl (1989, 103, table 1); 1988–93,
Bossak (1994, 34, table 3); environmental investment rates—GUS, Ochrona Środowiska
(various years).

(Żylicz 1994a, 98). And it was an especially remarkable achievement considering
Poland’s deep economic recession—in most countries, during periods of declining (real) per capita income, expenditures on ‘quality of life’ concerns such as
environmental protection remain stagnant or fall (see Cole 1995c, 298–9). Poland
managed to increase environmental investments despite the economic recession
by legally divorcing collected environmental charges from general budget revenues; environmental fees and fines were earmarked for environmental purposes
only (see Jendrośka 1996b).
Poland’s increased environmental protection budget provided direct funding for badly needed environmental improvements, especially sewage treatment
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plants. In 1989, 44 percent of Poland’s cities—including its two largest, Warsaw and Łódź, with a combined population of 2.5 million—were without operational sewage treatment facilities; fully 100 percent of their municipal wastes was
dumped completely untreated into surface waters. Between 1989 and 1991, 866
new sewage treatment plants were put into operation, increasing daily national
treatment capacity by 2,467,000 cubic meters (Żylicz 1994a, 100, table 4). As a
result, the amount of treated waste increased from 62 to 70 percent in the fouryear period from 1988 to 1991. Meanwhile, the amount of municipal and industrial wastewater requiring treatment decreased by 700 million tons (Żylicz 1994a,
101, table 6). In nominal terms, this meant that Poland dumped 130 million fewer
tons of untreated sewage into surface waters in 1991 than in 1988. As more wastewater treatment plants come on line, further improvements are expected. In 1993,
341 more sewage treatment plants were completed (Polish News Bulletin, Sept.
1, 1994), and hundreds more plants currently are under construction throughout
Poland (PAP News Wire, Feb. 22, 1994). In addition to sewage treatment plants,
funds from the environmental protection budget also have been used to install
advanced pollution-control technologies at Poland’s two biggest air polluters, the
Belchatów and Turów coal-fired power plants. As a result of these investments,
sulphur dioxide emissions from the two plants will be cut by 90 percent (The Warsaw Voice, Oct. 3, 1993).
Environmental investments have increased at the local and regional levels of
administration as well. Each region gets to keep 60 percent of the environmental
fees and fines it collects for local environmental improvements (see Miłaszewski
1993, 118). And these funds are being put to good use. For instance, in 1995,
Wrocław (Poland’s fourth-largest city, with a population of half a million) modernized its 25 district heating boiler houses, cutting their aggregate air pollution
emissions in half (Reuter Textline/Rzeczpospolita, Jan. 31, 1996).
In addition, Poland’s environmental protection budget now supports several
independent financial institutions for public and private environmental projects,
including the National Fund for Environmental Protection (supported by collected
environmental charges), the Eco-Fund (supported by a debt-for-nature swap
arrangement with Poland’s sovereign ‘Paris Club’ creditors), and an Environmental Protection Bank (Bank Ochrony Środowiska) that provides low-interest loans
for environmental improvement projects. At their founding, each of these institutions was unique, the first of its kind in the world.
Poland’s parliament created the National Fund for Environmental Protection (National Fund) in articles 87 and 88 of the 1980 Environmental Protection
and Development Act (EPDA) (1980 Dz. U. No. 3, item 6). The Fund receives
40 percent of collected environmental fees and fines, which it invests in public
environmental projects. In 1992, it invested a total of 12 trillion zlotys (about
US$880 million), accounting for 40 percent of all environmental investments in
Poland (Rzeczpospolita, July 13, 1993; also see Polish News Bulletin, July 13,
1993). Among its various investments, the National Fund has financed projects
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near Nowy Targ and Pyrzyce to tap geothermal water deposits ‘large enough
to heat a third of the country;’ and the Fund is currently financing the production of unleaded gasoline at the Gdańsk petrochemical enterprise (The Warsaw
Voice, Jan. 29. 1995). The National Fund is widely viewed as ‘the most innovative environmental financing program in Europe.’ Indeed, when a delegation of
Chinese officials recently traveled to the United States to learn more about funding environmental protection, American officials from the Export–Import Bank
recommended that they study Poland’s National Environmental Protection Fund
(Warsaw Business Journal, Jan. 19, 1996).
A separate Eco-Fund (Eko-Fundusz) was established in 1991, pursuant to
Poland’s debt reduction agreement with the Paris Club of sovereign creditors.
At the time, Poland owed the Club’s 17 member countries approximately US$32
billion, and the debt reduction agreement signed in April 1991 called for a net
debt reduction of 50 percent. On top of that agreement, Poland’s then-Prime Minister Jan Krzystof Bielecki proposed a long-term debt-for-nature swap: if Paris
Club members would forgive an additional 10 percent of Poland’s debt, the Polish
government would devote proportionate resources to an internationally managed
Eco-Fund that would finance internationally significant environmental projects,
such as projects to protect the Baltic Sea, preserve biological diversity and reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases and other transboundary air pollutants. This deal,
if fully adopted, could yield an additional US$3 billion for environmental projects
in Poland over 18 years, while significantly reducing Poland’s foreign debt. So
far, however, only the United States, Switzerland, France and Italy have agreed to
participate in the Eco-Fund, bringing its total base operating budget to approximately US$450 million. In its first year of operation, the Eco-Fund contributed
145 billion zlotys or about 6.5 million 1993 USD to 18 projects, including sewage
treatment plants, air pollution control equipment, forest preservation and national
parks (The Warsaw Voice, July 18, 1993; Polish News Bulletin, June 18, 1993).
Poland’s Environmental Protection Bank is the first commercial bank in the
world established for the sole purpose of supporting environmentally sound projects. The idea originated in the 1989 ‘Round Table’ agreements, and the bank was
chartered by parliamentary amendment to the 1980 EPDA. The bank’s founder,
organizer and main shareholder is the National Fund for Environmental Protection, which earmarks a percentage of its earnings from collected environmental fees and fines to subsidize the bank’s low-interest loans. Loans provided by
the bank have been used to build sewage treatment plants (e.g., near Warsaw,
Bydgoszcz and Płock) and to convert factories from electric to natural gas heating (see The Warsaw Voice, Jan. 24, 1993). Most impressively, the Environmental
Protection Bank happens to be one of the most secure financial institutions in
Poland today. In 1992, it earned a gross profit of 85 billion zlotys (over 6 million 1992 USD), and ranked third in capital holdings among Poland’s private and
cooperative banks (The Warsaw Voice, Feb. 21, 1993, Sept. 13, 1992). It now has
10 branch offices throughout Poland.
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Competition and Technological Innovation in the New Buyers’ Markets
Poland’s market reforms have provided long-awaited outlets for pent-up consumer demand. As we saw earlier in this chapter, between 1989 and 1992 (i.e.,
during Poland’s deep economic recession), consumer sales increased by 5.8 percent (after adjusting for inflation); the number of cars on Polish roads increased
dramatically, and demand for gasoline remained constant despite steeply rising
prices. By 1992, Poland had more television sets per 1,000 inhabitants than Italy,
Portugal, Ireland or Greece (Polish News Bulletin, June 22, 1993).
For Poland’s environmentalists, this evidence of burgeoning consumerism
is cause for grave concern. Some of that concern is legitimate; consumerism can
generate great ecological stress. But it is not an unmitigated environmental evil.
Indeed, consumerism is bringing tangible environmental benefits for Poland. Specifically, it is driving Poland’s economy away from more highly polluting heavy
industrial production to the production of consumer goods and services; and that
shift is reducing the total level of environmental stress produced by Poland’s
economy.
It is an axiom of market economics that consumer preferences drive production patterns. As consumers specify preferences for goods and services, production shifts away from more environmentally stressful heavy industrial production
(Radetzki 1990, 26). This trend is evident in post-Communist Poland. According
to the World Economy Research Institute at Warsaw University (Brocka-Pałacz
1994, 53–4), the 7 percent rise in industrial output Poland experienced in 1993
was ‘chiefly a matter of consumer demand.’ Retail sales that year increased by 11
percent in real terms. The lion’s share of the growth was in the manufacturing,
light industry and food-processing sectors. By contrast, output was stagnant in
metallurgy and actually declined in the mining and energy sectors. It is also interesting to note that virtually all of the growth in industrial production was recorded
in Poland’s private economy. In 1993, private sector GDP grew by a whopping 13
percent, whereas public sector GDP declined by 4.1 percent; in value terms, the
private economy grew by 39 percent, while the public economy fell by 6 percent
(United States General Accounting Office 1995, 47, 128). There is no doubt that
these consumer-driven changes away from heavy industrial production are good
news for Poland’s natural environment.
Consumerism also spurs environmentally beneficial technological innovation, as the fight for shares of competitive markets impels firms to improve quality and reduce costs by, among other means, increasing factor productivity (the
productive output from each input unit of labor, capital and natural resources).
The result is greater conservation of resources in production. As we saw in
Chapter 5, this phenomenon, which has been observed in virtually all advanced
capitalist economies, did not occur in Marxist socialist economies because they
lacked competitive markets, scarcity pricing for resource inputs (other than labor)
and adequate intellectual property rights (see generally Cole 1995c). In post-
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Communist Poland, aggregate efficiency indices have been improving steadily
thanks largely to higher resource prices, hardened budget (and law) constraints,
the institution of competitive markets, and the profit motive. Between 1992 and
1994, the labor intensity of Polish GDP declined by 5 percent; the capital intensity of GDP fell by 6.7 percent; and, most importantly for environmental protection, the energy intensity of GDP dropped by 13.6 percent (Polish News Bulletin,
May 16, 1995).
As we learned in Chapter 5 (§5.4), the former Soviet bloc countries lagged
decades behind the West in technological development, including for environmental protection (see, among others, Peterson 1993, 47). For example, Polish
environmental protection inspectors used to rely on hand-held ambient air quality monitors that were not uniformly calibrated (see Nowicki 1992, 211); they
were vastly inferior to Western monitoring equipment. Today, Poland is bridging
the technology gap with foreign technology transfers and domestic innovations.
Poland’s environmental inspectors now utilize monitoring and laboratory equipment that meets European Union standards (The Warsaw Voice, May 1, 1994).
And it is not too wild an exaggeration to say that, in the past half-decade, Polish scientists have come up with almost as many technological innovations for
environmental protection—including new coal cleaning technologies (see The
Warsaw Voice, Nov. 21, 1993), a new alcohol-based gasoline (see Polish News
Bulletin, Mar. 7, 1994), and a new nuclear-based emissions reduction technology
(see Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 31, 1993)21—as in 40-plus years of (real existing) socialism. These and other technological improvements are contributing to
increased factor productivity in post-Communist Poland.

International Cooperation for Sustainable Development
In February 1995, the Constitutional Commission of Poland’s Parliament
approved language for article 5 of a new (yet to be adopted) constitution:
The Republic of Poland safeguards the independence and inviolability of its territory, guarantees the human rights and liberties, ensures the security of its citizens, safeguards the national heritage, and ensures the protection of the natural
environment guided by the principle of sustainable development. (Quoted in Polish News Bulletin, Feb. 9, 1995)

This provision is consistent with the Environmental Protection Ministry’s
National Environmental Policy (1991), which established the goal of achieving
sustainable development throughout the Polish economy within 30 years. The
concept of sustainable development is famously fuzzy; no one is quite sure what
level or mode of development (if any) is sustainable. This serves to make the
phrase ‘sustainable development’ a convenient reference point for empty politi-
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cal rhetoric.22 But the Polish government, at least, has backed up its rhetoric with
some meaningful actions.
Poland has been active in pursuing international arrangements to promote
sustainable development. It has established ‘euro-regions’ along its borders with
Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Belarus, where joint environmental protection and conservation projects are planned (see, e.g., BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Nov. 2, 1993; The Warsaw Voice, Apr. 4, 1993; PAP News
Wire, Aug. 20, 1993). In April 1994, Poland and Germany signed an environmental treaty that, among other things, provides for joint monitoring, collaboration in
environmental investigations, and information exchanges in the border regions.
Most significantly, the treaty gives Polish citizens the right to participate in public
hearings concerning proposed developments and environmental projects on the
German side of the border (The Week in Germany, Apr. 22, 1994). The Polish government also has initiated what is being called ‘the greatest cooperation project in
environmental protection’ in all of Europe (PAP News Wire, Feb. 11, 1993): the
‘Green Lungs of Europe.’ The idea is actually an extension of a preexisting program, the ‘Green Lungs of Poland,’ initiated more than a decade ago by a forester
and hiker from Białystok named Krzysztof Wolfram (now a member of Poland’s
parliament). The goal of the international program is to ensure ecologically sustainable development of a vast unspoiled region of Central and Eastern Europe,
covering 760,000 square kilometers and including parts of seven countries—
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. In March 1992,
environmental officials from those countries met in Poland to sign the ‘Wigry
Declaration,’ which established the ‘Green Lungs of Europe.’ In February 1993,
they signed the final accord in Warsaw. Poland’s national commitment to the
‘Green Lungs’ project is sizeable—50,000 square kilometers, comprising 18 percent of the country’s territory. According to the agreement, all future economic
development in the region must be ‘undertaken in harmony with nature, making
it possible to preserve the natural environmental intact for future generations’
(The Warsaw Voice, Apr. 4, 1993). This commitment entails substantial political and economic risks for the Polish government because the protected region
already suffers from the highest rate of unemployment in the country.23 But it is a
far-sighted and innovative program, extending far beyond traditional ‘end-of-thepipe’ environmental policies.

7.5. The Fragmentation and Maturation of Poland’s Independent
Environmental Movement
Some of the credit for Poland’s environmental improvements over the past halfdecade must go to its growing and maturing independent environmental movement. As discussed in Chapter 2, the movement took root in People’s Poland
at the beginning of the 1980s, during the dawn of Solidarity that preceded the
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darkness of Martial Law. Tolerated by the Communist Party/state, groups such
as the Polish Ecology Club managed to effect limited political change and influenced environmental policy. By 1988, Poland had an officially registered but
poorly organized Green Party; and by 1989, there were approximately 200 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), groups and foundations in Poland concerned wholly or partly with environmental policy (see Czajkowski 1990, 1–11;
Gliński 1989, 31).

The Fragmentation of the Movement
As the Communist system collapsed, Poland’s environmentalists, with years of
political activity under their belts, appeared well positioned to play a prominent
role in the new democratic Polish Republic. But the emergence of democratic
pluralism in Poland revealed philosophical, political and social divisions among
environmental groups, and between those groups and their former opposition
allies. Those divisions always existed, of course, but during the 1980s they had
been masked by an ‘us versus them’ mentality fostered by their united opposition
to socialist totalitarianism (see Gliński 1992, 267). In the first years after the end
of communism, Poland’s environmental movement broke with other segments
of the former opposition movement, including the Solidarity trade union and
Farmers’ Solidarity, which represented the less- or non-ecologically motivated
interests of workers and farmers, respectively. Divisions also developed within
the environmental movement, as groups positioned themselves along Poland’s
sociopolitical continuum. Many environmental groups, including the Polish Ecology Club, splintered. After just two months of existence, Poland’s Green Party,
which allegedly had been infiltrated by the secret police (Gliński 1996, 199), split
into ‘three mutually hostile groups’; consequently, it did not participate in the
1989 elections (Gliński 1992, 267).24 It survived only as a ‘sofa party’ (partia
kanapowa), a party so small that its entire membership could fit on a single sofa
(Gliński 1996, 209–11).
Divisions within the environmental movement were magnified by Poland’s
systemic transformations. When the Mazowiecki government came to power in
September 1989, environmental groups affiliated (or previously affiliated) with
Solidarity had a unique opportunity not just to influence but to fashion environmental law and policy. However, many environmentalists were ambivalent. For
one thing, they retained a vestigial distrust of law and the state from 40-plus years
of Communist rule. Many environmental groups scorned the new government’s
focus on market-oriented economic reforms, which they viewed as a ‘voracious
economization’ of the country (Gliński 1996, 109–211); to them totalitarian
socialism and market capitalism were virtually equal in their menace to the natural environment. Some of these groups formed the core of a new anti-government
protest movement, while others chose to divorce themselves entirely from politics

Environmental Protection in Transition

205

and government in order to live alternative lifestyles outside the mainstream of
Polish society (Gliński 1993, 146–7; 1994, 148–9).
There were, however, some environmental groups that supported market
reforms as a practical necessity for improving environmental protection. Their
members went to work within the government or tried to influence policy from
without. Over the past half-decade, these groups have grown increasingly capable, professional and, not inconsequentially, influential. They have learned how
to cooperate and consolidate their forces to gain maximum leverage to influence
government environmental policy making. Their efforts have been facilitated
by a ‘Service Office for the Environmental Movement’ (SOEM), which acts as
an information center for non-governmental environmental organizations (of all
stripes) throughout Poland. SOEM provides professional and legal assistance, and
facilitates contacts between Polish NGOs and compatible international organizations (see The Warsaw Voice, July 30, 1993).
The inability of Poland’s environmental movement to remain unified after
the fall of communism certainly is understandable. As the experience of Solidarity itself shows, broad-based social movements typically do not remain united
for long after their unifying catalyst—in this case, the Communist Party/state—
is removed (see generally Bugajski and Pollack 1989). So the fragmentation of
Poland’s environmental movement probably was inevitable. Nevertheless, the
sheer size of the movement—as of 1995 more than 700 environmental groups
were operating in Poland, and that number swells to more than 1,000 if local environmental clubs and branches of national organizations are counted—has empowered Poland’s environmentalists to assert substantial, if inconsistent, influence
over state environmental policy. And, despite its fragmentation, the movement
has recognized the need for greater cooperation, as evidenced by well-organized
and well-attended annual meetings of environmental groups that have taken place
in Poland since 1990. There has been at least enough cooperation within the
movement to foster successful protest actions and litigation designed to publicize
and promote environmental issues.

Traditional Forms of Environmental Activism
In 1989 and 1990, environmental groups successfully protested against the country’s first planned nuclear power plant at Żarnowiec (see Box 7.1). The support
of Poland’s Greens was also instrumental in getting the ‘Green Lungs of Poland’
project off the ground (see Nagy et al. 1994, 254).
Traditional environmental activism has not always proven successful, however. A series of protests in 1991 against a planned hydroelectric dam project at
Czorsztyn failed to deter construction. But neither was it a complete failure. The
protestors did persuade the government to supplement the dam project with funds
to build a sewage treatment plant in the basin; the government even agreed not to
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Box 7.1. The Story of Poland’s Żarnowiec Nuclear Power Plant
Poland’s first nuclear power plant was to be built in the small northern town
of Żarnowiec. Construction began in 1982, and was expected to be completed in 1993. But, as with so many large-scale projects in the socialist economy, construction dragged on for several years. Progress was also hampered
by the protests of environmentalists from the Polish Ecology Club and other
groups, which gained strong public support especially following the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Ukraine. Government officials tried
to play down the similarities between Chernobyl and the Żarnowiec plant,
but without success. Nevertheless, the Party/state pushed forward with construction. In 1989, the Żarnowiec plant was only about 40 percent completed,
when it became a major topic of conversation at the ‘Round Table’ negotiations between Solidarity and the Party/government. Public opinion polls at
that time showed that 86 percent of those living in the plant’s vicinity were
opposed to the project. When Poland’s first post-Communist government
took office in September 1989, it declared a 10-year moratorium on nuclear
power and immediately suspended construction at Żarnowiec. The government later proposed to ‘liquidate’ the power plant and convert its existing
facilities into a potato-processing plant and a brewery. In 1991, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended
that Poland introduce nuclear energy by the year 2005. But successive Polish
governments have shown no signs of renewed interest in nuclear power. In
fact, in June 1994, the government sold nuclear equipment designed for the
Żarnowiec plant to Hungary, for use in a nuclear power training center.
Sources: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 19, 1986; Oct. 5, 1989;
Feb. 20, 1989; Mar. 6, 1989; Nov. 3, 1995; U.S. News & World Report, Dec.
8, 1986; Reuter Textline/Rzeczpospolita, Sept. 1, 1990; Polish News Bulletin, Sept. 4, 1990; European Energy Report, Sept. 21, 1990; PAP News Wire,
Feb. 16, 1993, June 28, 1994; The Warsaw Voice, Mar. 7, 1993.

operate the dam until the sewage treatment plant was ready. In addition, the protests fostered public debate about the development project, and more generally
contributed to public awareness of environmental issues. Finally, the Czorsztyn
dam experience led at least one environmental group to change its approach; it
began to supplement its direct protest actions with ‘more rational and moderate’
negotiations with political and administrative officials. The price of this, however,
was even greater fragmentation and dissent within the movement (see Gliński
1996, 148).
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Legal Changes for Greater Public Participation in Environmental
Policy Making
Poland’s more sophisticated environmental groups all along have used legal and
political mechanisms to influence environmental policy. They have used lawsuits to stop polluters. For example, in 1989, a non-governmental organization
in Łódź (Poland’s second-largest city, with a population of about 1 million) sued
the local municipal transportation company for violating air pollution norms.
The court ordered the company to install pollution-reducing filters on each bus
(Gliński 1996, 148). Even more important for long-term environmental protection
in Poland, environmentalists have lobbied successfully for changes in administrative procedures that, in turn, have increased their access to influence environmental policy making. As we saw in Chapter 3 (§3.5), before the fall of communism,
public rights to participate in environmental decision making were quite limited. Since 1989, the situation has been improving slowly. Public access remains
restricted, but there have been several symbolic and a few real improvements.
Among the symbolic improvements are provisions in the environmental protocol to the ‘Round Table’ accords, new constitutional amendments and provisions
in the 1991 National Environmental Policy. The environmental protocol to the
1989 ‘Round Table’ accords, signed by representatives of Poland’s last Communist government and the Solidarity opposition, called for the expansion of public
rights to sue to protect the environment and complete public access to environmental information, but these policies have not yet been legally enacted. Poland’s
Constitution was amended in 1992 to extend citizens’ rights to (1) ‘participate in
exercising social control, in consultations and discussions upon important issues
concerning the development of the country,’ (2) ‘approach all organs of the State
with complaints and grievances,’ and (3) have appeals heard ‘without delay and
justly’ (1992 Dz. U. No. 75, item 367, art. 86).25 These new constitutional rights
are not particularly meaningful, however, because State agencies still have complete discretion to ignore citizens’ requests without judicial review (Nagy et al.
1994, 238). Poland’s 1991 National Environmental Policy incorporated into its
statement of principles a similar provision calling for greater public participation
in environmental decision making and access to environmental information. This
statement of principles carries even less—that is to say, no—legal force. Nevertheless, these symbolic provisions concerning public participation in administrative decision making have induced the Environmental Protection Ministry to
afford slightly more real public participation in its administrative processes.
Since March 1992, the Minister of Environmental Protection has held monthly
meetings with representatives of the environmental NGO community. Both sides
perceive some benefit from these meetings. NGOs have an opportunity to influence environmental policy directly, while the ministry can drum up support for its
policies (see Gliński 1996, 153). Also in 1992, the Minister of Environmental Protection established a 75-member Environmental Impact Assessment Commission
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(EIA Commission) to review proposed development projects that would create
‘especially harmful’ environmental hazards. The EIA Commission is comprised of
individuals from the ministry, academia and ecological organizations. Whenever a
proposed project would have severe environmental impacts, the EIA Commission
convenes a 15–25-member panel to review it. The panel announces its opinion at
a public hearing, and then forwards it to the Minister of Environmental Protection,
who has the final say. The minister’s decision does not have to conform to or even
consider the EIA Commission’s opinion—in other words, the Commission’s opinion is advisory only—but the minister’s decision must be published in the Commission’s Bulletin, which is open for public inspection (Nagy et al. 1994, 247–8).
This adds some much needed transparency to the administrative decision-making
process, helping to constrain politically (if not legally) ministerial discretion.
The most promising development for increased public participation in environmental decision making also happens to be the most recent: in May 1995,
Poland’s parliament enacted a new law that expanded the jurisdiction of the High
Administrative Court, making it easier for environmental groups to obtain court
review of agency actions (1995 Dz. U. No. 74, item 368). Among its numerous benefits, the new law permits environmental organizations to complain
about agency actions even without participating (as parties) throughout the entire
administrative process (see Jendrośka 1995, 6). This is a crucial change in the
law. Prior to the 1995 Act, groups could not seek judicial review of administrative
decisions unless they had participated from the outset of the administrative process, which greatly hampered the ability of citizens’ groups to mount challenges.
For example, when authorities proposed to develop a hazardous waste incinerator
near Chojnów, local residents banded together informally; but as such they had no
legal authority to participate as a party in administrative proceedings concerning
the proposed incinerator. Only later did the Chojnów residents formally associate with the regional chapter of the Polish Ecology Club, which was authorized
to intervene in administrative proceedings. But by that time the administrative
proceedings already were well advanced. And because the residents had not participated as a party from the beginning, the High Administrative Court refused
to hear their complaints. Under the new law, the residents would have been permitted to intervene as a party at any point in the proceedings. The new law also
permits the High Administrative Court, for the first time, to hear complaints concerning administrative rules as well as adjudicatory decisions. According to Jerzy
Jendrośka (1995, 6–7), this heralds ‘a major breakthrough in legal practice, opening immense new possibilities for successful “green access to justice.’”

7.6. The Future of Environmental Protection in Poland
Poland’s record of environmental protection since the fall of communism is commendable, especially considering the deep economic recession of 1989–1992.
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Deliberate environmental policies of the Polish government, facilitated by systemic reforms, have brought structural environmental improvements. But they
have not yet ended the ecological crisis. Some regions of Poland remain severely
contaminated.26 At the beginning of 1993, national air pollution levels were still
six times higher than the European Union’s legal limit (Guardian, Mar. 6, 1993).
Many of Poland’s larger cities, including Poznań, Szczeciń, Kraków and Łódź,
still were without operational sewage treatment plants (The Warsaw Voice, Jan.
31, 1993). As a result, many Polish waterways were so polluted that ‘you could
develop film’ in them (Guardian, Nov. 21, 1993). Poland’s industries were still
annually producing millions of tons of hazardous wastes, most of which was
dumped at sites with no protection against groundwater contamination (Polish News Bulletin, Oct. 21, 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 11,
1993). Meanwhile, public health continued to suffer. For example, in 1993, infant
mortality in the heavily polluted region of Upper Silesia was 30 per 1,000 live
births, twice the national average and five times the average in countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
(Guardian, Mar. 6, 1993).
These facts simply confirmed what most observers understood quite well in
1989: cleaning up the environmental mess created during 40-plus years of (real
existing) socialism would not be quick, easy or cheap. Six years into the transitions, it is no surprise to find that Poland still has a long way to go. As Tomasz
Żylicz (1994d, 86) has admonished, there will be no ecological miracle in Poland.
But acknowledging this obvious truth should not prevent us from recognizing that
very real progress has been made.
Environmental protection in Poland has improved significantly since 1989.
These improvements have not been reversed or curtailed by the resumption of
economic growth. And although it is true that successive Polish governments
since 1992 have shown little or no interest in environmental protection, there
remain two overriding reasons to expect continued improvement. First, on August
8, 1994, Poland applied for full membership in the European Union (EU), with
the hope of joining by the year 2000 (see Reuter East European Report, Apr.
8, 1994). As a precondition to membership, Poland must ‘harmonize’ its laws,
including its environmental laws, with EU Directives (see Wajda 1994). Harmonization will require more than simply enacting nice-looking laws. Mere paper
changes unaccompanied by implementation and enforcement efforts are unlikely
to impress current EU members; Poland will have to show continued actual progress in environmental protection (see Ryland 1995, 333). And just in case extra
incentives are needed, the Polish government needs only consider the tremendous economic costs of excessive pollution and resource waste, which during the
1980s amounted to between 10 and 20 percent of annual GNP (see Radio Free
Europe/Report on Eastern Europe, Oct. 5, 1990). For Poland, a stringent and
costly environmental protection regime is likely to be much less expensive than
doing nothing at all. Prudent environmental investments should yield substantial
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economic returns. In 1995, Poland’s Finance Minister, Grzegorz Kołodko, implicitly acknowledged this point when he declared that stabilizing pollution emissions
is just as important for Poland’s economy as stabilizing the zloty (PAP News Wire,
Mar. 20, 1995).
The question remains whether ‘harmonization’ with EU Directives is enough,
given Poland’s serious environmental problems. Some have argued that Poland
should pursue more ‘[r]adical environmental policies,’ including immediately
closing down all inefficient (and dirty) state enterprises and setting raw materials
prices at levels reflecting the true social costs of their use (Manser 1993, 149–56).
In theory, these suggestions are economically and environmentally attractive, but
they are not feasible politically. Given the employment concerns of voters and the
still potent political force of Poland’s trade unions, it would be political suicide
for any Polish government even to suggest such draconian measures.27 Consider
what happened in 1991, when the government attempted to close down the inefficient and highly polluting pig iron section of the Sendzimir steel mill in Nowa
Huta; workers from the ‘Solidarity ’80’ trade union went on a hunger strike until
the order was rescinded (see PAP News Wire, Dec. 29, 1991). In 1990, when the
Ministry of Environmental Protection tried to introduce an ad valorem fuel tax of
4 percent to be earmarked for the environmental protection budget, the Solidarity
trade union issued the following statement: ‘While the union is for environmental
protection, it will not approve any such burden laid on the impoverished society’
(quoted in Żylicz 1994a, 105). More recently, the Solidarity union defeated government plans to make the mining industry cleaner and more efficient (see Polish News Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1994, Apr. 27, 1994). Although we might deplore the
fact that Poland’s trade unions are fighting against environmental protection, their
concern over the potential socioeconomic consequences of environmental policies is not illegitimate, especially considering that Poland’s environmental taxes
are already among the world’s highest. Consider what the impact would be on the
ordinary Pole’s quality of life if environmental fees were set at true social cost
levels and all inefficient state enterprises were immediately closed. Are the benefits of a quick and dramatic reduction in air pollution emissions worth the costs?
Ordinary Poles already have suffered from successive resource price increases;
at the beginning of 1992, coal prices in Poland were 18 times higher than they
had been at the end of 1989, and gas prices for the average household were 80
times higher (see Czaja et al. 1994, 27). And there are unavoidable trade-offs
between environmental protection and employment. For instance, closing down
the unprofitable mines in the Walbrych region, which already suffers from one
of the highest unemployment rates in the country, would put an estimated additional 15,000 Poles out of work (see Czaja et al. 1994, 36–7; The Warsaw Voice,
Sept. 12, 1993).28 It is certainly understandable that workers would protest against
environmental protection policies that might cost their jobs. And it is far from
clear that environmental concerns should trump labor concerns, notwithstanding
Poland’s ecological crisis.
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Like everyone else in Central and Eastern Europe, Poles want improved
environmental protection, but how much? Consider if Polish cities improved air
quality during the next decade or so to the level of, say, Los Angeles. Would this
be cause for celebration or recrimination? Los Angeles, as everyone knows, has
the worst smog problem in the United States; it is the only city in the country
designated ‘extreme’ non-attainment for ozone (the primary constituent of smog)
under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7511). But Los Angeles actually meets the
federal smog standards more than 99 percent of the time (Washington Times,
May 19, 1992). As those standards are set at levels to protect public health with
‘an adequate margin of safety’ (42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1)), the health of Angelenos
is presumably at some non-zero level of risk from smog less than 1 percent of
the time. Consider, by contrast, the Polish city of Bytom, where public health
is threatened by air pollution literally every hour of every day. According to a
recent documentary on risk produced by public television station WGBH in Boston (1992), air pollution in Bytom on an average day is six times worse than in
Los Angeles during a smog alert. Would Bytom’s residents consider it a disappointing failure to achieve only the same levels of air pollution as Los Angeles?
Given their extreme situation, we might suppose that they, more than others in
Poland, would support draconian measures to reduce air pollution. But they too
want to keep their jobs, homes and cars.29 What could possibly persuade them
that breathing (marginally) cleaner air is more important than earning a paycheck
to support their families?
Although all Poles want improved environmental protection, there is little
agreement on how much. This is not particularly surprising; after all, there is no
scientific or sociopolitical consensus anywhere in the world on what constitutes
adequate environmental quality. Perceptions of environmental risk and demands
for environmental quality are often relative to other needs and concerns. Improving environmental protection is hardly the sole concern in post-Communist
Poland. Whereas the needs of Polish society are vast and varied, resources are
scarce. Ultimately, in a democratic Poland the people will decide with their votes
and their pocketbooks how much environmental protection they desire.

Notes
1. This chapter is a revised and updated version of Cole (1995b). On Poland’s economic crisis at the end of the 1980s, see, for example, Kondratowicz and Okolski (1991)
and Clarke (1989). On Poland’s environmental crisis, see Chapter 1.
2. The budget constraint, which was discussed in Chapter 5 (§5.5), will be further
discussed in relevant sections of this chapter.
3. Subsequently, in August 1993, Poland’s Minister of Environmental Protection
issued a list of 106 categories of hazardous waste and toxic substances that could not
be imported into Poland (see Pesticide Action Network North American Updates Service,
Nov. 24, 1993).
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4. For assessments of the ‘December Amendments,’ see M. Brzezinski and Garlicki
(1995a, 32–3; Gray 1993, 96).
5. In some parts of Poland, the waiting period for housing then exceeded 50 years (see
New Yorker, Nov. 13, 1989).
6. Poland’s severe economic crisis at the end of the Communist era distinguishes it
from Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia, and complicates the comparison of transition paths. As Leszek Balcerowicz (1994, 195) has explained, ‘[t]he initial economic conditions do matter, as far as the pace and effects of the transition are concerned. Therefore one
should frame assessments of the results of this process in the context of initial conditions.’
7. Actually, I suspect it was both. As already noted, there was ‘hidden’ unemployment
under socialism. But some level of unemployment (so-called ‘structural’ unemployment)
must be considered a pathology of market capitalism.
8. But the inflation rate rose quickly again towards the end of the year after austerity
measures were relaxed in response to intensifying public criticism and in view of impending presidential elections. Balcerowicz (1992, 170–1) later admitted that it had been a
mistake to relax anti-inflationary measures at that crucial juncture. Nonetheless, since the
introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan, inflation in Poland has never approached ‘hyper’
levels; in fact, it has declined fairly steadily. For 1994, the inflation rate was around 35
percent; in 1995, the rate fell below 30 percent.
9. For a more balanced, but still overly negative account of post-socialist environmental protection efforts in Poland, see Zechenter (1993).
10. This was in response to the hazardous waste import problems discussed earlier.
11. On September 13, 1995, the Environmental Law Group of the Polish Academy of
Sciences in Wrocław convened a conference to begin the process of designing a new comprehensive environmental law to replace the 1980 EPDA.
12. Part IV of the EPDA also included provisions for civil and criminal liability, but,
in practice, these were of secondary importance (see Cole 1995a, 334–7).
13. The nine examined sectors were mining, power, metallurgy, electrical–metal,
chemical, mineral, wood–paper, light, and food. Poskrobko’s and Cygler’s study has been
criticized for focusing only on Poland’s largest polluters (Conversation with Bogusław
Fiedor, Chair, Department of Economics, Wrocław Academy of Economies, Wrocław,
Poland, August 14, 1995). However, it would seem that, if emissions charges exceed
abatement costs for the largest polluters, they certainly should exceed abatement costs for
smaller polluters, who do not benefit from the same economies of scale in pollution control
as larger polluters.
14. But see Wprost, Aug. 21, 1995, claiming that ‘businesses were much better off
paying for polluting the environment rather than preventing it,’ based on an unpublished
report by Poland’s Supreme Chamber of Control.
15. On January 1, 1995, the Polish zloty was redenominated; one new zloty was worth
10,000 old zlotys (see Polish News Bulletin, Dec. 28, 1994; PAP, Jan. 2, 1995).
16. In fact, production of major food crops (grain, potatoes, rape and sugar beet)
in Poland declined by about 15 percent between 1990 and 1993. However, according to
analysts from the World Economy Research Institute at the Warsaw School of Economics
(Brocka-Pałacz 1994, 58–60), this was due mainly to declining rates of demand for foodstuffs. Of course, the declining rate of demand for foodstuffs would also explain some, but
not all, of the reductions in fertilizer and pesticide use. On the environmental and economic
effects of reducing pesticide use, see Pimental et al. (1991).
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17. These figures do not include the hundreds of thousands of small retail businesses—
hotels, restaurants and shops—that were quickly privatized under a separate ‘small privatization’ program.
18. This law is discussed in Cole (1995a, 354–5).
19. The Sejm also enacted some allegedly anti-environmental legislation in 1991.
Specifically, it deleted provisions of Poland’s foreign investment law that authorized the
Foreign Investment Council to deny permits on environmental grounds (1991 Dz. U. No.
60, item 253). However, as Elżbieta Zechenter (1993, 120n166) has noted, the Council
retains authority to revoke the permits of foreign investors whose activities cause significant environmental damage. She nonetheless concludes that ‘the 1991 FIL (Foreign Investment Law) appears to be symptomatic of the current trend to disregard environmental issues
among the Polish legislators who have ‘more pressing concerns to attend’ given the current
political situation.’ However, those same legislators apparently were not too preoccupied
with other political concerns to enact the four pro-ecological statutes discussed here.
20. See Radecki (1992a) for a complete overview of the 1991 Law on the State Environmental Protection Inspectorate.
21. The nuclear-based emissions reduction technology, in particular, has sparked great
interest in the West and Japan. It involves the use of an electron beam fired into damped
gases laced with ammonia. The process reportedly can be easily retrofitted even onto old
plants at 30 percent lower cost than traditional emissions control technologies, and it consumes much less energy. It will reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 90 percent and nitrogen oxide emissions by 80–90 percent (Polish News Bulletin, Mar. 31, 1993).
22. As a Polish economist recently explained it to me, the primary meaning of ‘sustainable development’ is sustainable research for scholars.
23. For more on the ‘Green Lungs’ program, see The Warsaw Voice, Apr. 4, 1993;
Greenwire, Feb. 9, 1993; Bureau of National Affairs, International Environment Daily,
May 12, 1993; PAP News Wire, Feb. 11, 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb.
16, 1993.
24. The Green Party (and three other green parties organized just prior to the elections) did run in the 1991 elections, but lost badly because of poor campaign strategies and
a lack of support from the environmental movement (see Gliński 1996, 212–25).
25. For a translation of the Polish Constitution, including recent amendments, see
International Institute for Democracy (1995).
26. At the same time, we should bear in mind that the majority of Polish territory is
not significantly polluted. Indeed, Poland contains some of the most pristine areas left in
all of Europe, many of which are protected as national parks, nature reserves or landscape
parks. Poland also is home to five world biosphere reserves (see, e.g., The Warsaw Voice,
Apr. 2, 1995).
27. On the employment concerns of Polish voters, see Polish News Bulletin, Feb. 15,
1994.
28. The trade-off between jobs and environmental protection is more pronounced in
Poland than many other countries for economy-specific reasons (see International Labour
Organization 1989).
29. But see Hughes (1992, 70), arguing that the perceived trade-off between jobs and
pollution reductions in Eastern Europe is illusory.

Chapter 8
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
8.1. Introduction
In the last chapter, we saw that environmental protection has improved markedly
since Poland began the transition to market democracy. This supports the view,
elaborated in earlier chapters, that the failure of environmental protection under
socialism was systemic, that is, caused by various legal, political, economic and
ideological institutions and organizations of (real existing) socialism. That surely
was not their purpose, but that was their effect. Since the fall of communism, as
old institutions have been replaced by new ones, the improvement in environmental protection (particularly in environmental law enforcement) has been dramatic.
The analysis suggests that there may be institutional preconditions to successful environmental protection. The purpose of this chapter is to adduce, in brief,
some of those preconditions. I am mindful, however, that the analysis has focused
predominantly (though not exclusively) on the experiences of a single country.
Extrapolating from Poland’s case to draw broad normative implications about
political-economic prerequisites for environmental protection requires additional
justification, which I attempt to provide in §8.2. In addition, the suggestion of
legal, political, economic and ideological preconditions for successful environmental protection presumes an adequate and accepted measure for determining
environmental success or failure. Section 8.3 addresses the conceptual problems
of judging, in any objective way, the success or sufficiency of an environmental
protection regime. Poland’s predominantly negative experiences with environmental protection under socialism cannot tell us what combination of political,
economic and legal institutions would ensure sufficient environmental quality. At
best, they imply that certain institutions (or types of institutions) may be necessary because without them environmental protection is likely (if not certain) to
fail. In §8.4–8.6, I outline three institutions that Poland’s case suggests are necessary (though not sufficient) for minimally effective environmental protection: (1)
a property rights structure that minimizes regulatory conflicts of interest by disaggregating the interests of polluters and government regulators; (2) a pricing mechanism that values resource scarcity, thereby inducing economic actors to conserve;
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and (3) an institutionalized rule of law ideology that supports environmental regulations. Finally, the book concludes in §8.7 with an assessment of prospects for
an environmentally friendly socialism in light of these institutional prerequisites.

8.2. Extrapolating from the Polish Case
Drawing normative conclusions from a single-country case study is presumptuous, but maybe warranted if the case is fairly representative. The systemic failure
of environmental protection in People’s Poland was fairly representative of the
Soviet bloc as a whole. The Soviet Union and its Central and East European satellites shared common ideological commitments and political-economic structures;
their histories of environmental regulation, while not identical, were roughly
similar, and none had even minimal success in protecting the environment.1 This
work’s systemic analysis of environmental protection in People’s Poland would
broadly fit any of the other former Soviet bloc countries (compare DeBardeleben 1985; Goldman 1972a; Ziegler 1987; Jancar 1987). There were, of course,
differences in culture, history and institutions that undoubtedly had significance
for environmental protection; the Communist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe were not nearly homogeneous. But even their differences tend to justify
extrapolating from the Polish case.
As noted in the Introduction, People’s Poland combined a relatively weak
version of Soviet-style communism with Eastern Europe’s most well-developed
system of environmental protection. This should make Poland the best case for
assessing the failure of environmental protection under socialism. If environmental protection failed for systemic reasons in People’s Poland, those same reasons
must substantially explain the failure of environmental protection in other former
Soviet bloc countries.

8.3. The Ambiguous Goal of ‘Effective’ Environmental Protection
The normative prescriptions offered in this chapter are intended to stand as
political-economic prerequisites for effective environmental protection anywhere.
But that raises an important preliminary question: What constitutes ‘effective’
environmental protection? A facile answer is that an environmental protection
regime is ‘effective’ if it achieves its stated goals. But on that test, any country
could ensure ‘effective’ environmental protection simply by setting its goals low
enough.2 To have any real utility, the measure of effectiveness must refer not only
to the attainment but also to the sufficiency of environmental protection goals.
The question then becomes: What constitutes sufficient environmental quality?
As I have written elsewhere (Cole 1995b, 319; 1995c, 296), that question has no
objective answer. There is no scientific or social consensus on what constitutes
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sufficient or adequate environmental quality; we may not even know it when we
see it. Still, there does seem to be some fact of the matter concerning environmental protection; at least, we seem to recognize when it is not effective enough.
Environmental protection in People’s Poland may have been an objective
failure, that is, a failure by any standards. But determining objective success
seems a much trickier (if not impossible) task. Take the United States, for example. It is easy to argue that American environmental regulations have been comparatively successful; there is nothing at all controversial in asserting, at least,
that they have been far more successful than environmental regulations in the
former Soviet bloc. But to say they have been objectively successful—implying
the achievement of a clearly sufficient level of environmental quality—is another
matter. Critics from all points on the political spectrum blast away at real or perceived failings of American environmental policy: environmental rules are too
stringent or not stringent enough; insufficiently enforced or overly enforced; not
cost effective or too constrained by economic considerations. Objective success
cannot be claimed except, again, in the lesser sense that subjectively determined
goals have been achieved.
Because the quest for an objective measure of environmental success seems
fruitless, this chapter focuses on what is realistically determinable: minimal and
comparative effectiveness in environmental protection. With respect to these measures, the negative lessons from People’s Poland have something to teach us; they
may even show how programs that already are minimally or substantially effective can be improved. Still, we need to be cautious in drawing inferences from
Poland’s case. Specifically, we must distinguish inferences that are supported by
Poland’s experiences from those that are merely permitted or not contradicted by
them.3
Finally, I do not claim that the institutional prerequisites discussed in this
chapter are enough to ensure even minimally effective environmental protection.
It is perfectly conceivable that a country might institute all of the prescriptions
discussed here but still fail to protect its environment because of a lack of political will, insufficient finances, or both. It makes more sense, I think, to view the
institutional suggestions in this chapter as means of avoiding known pitfalls for
environmental protection. Efforts to protect the environment are more likely to be
effective—or, stated even more cautiously, less likely to be ineffective—in countries that guard against regulatory conflicts of interest, adopt pricing mechanisms
that account for relative resource scarcity and establish the rule of environmental
law over politics.

8.4. Property Rights and Regulatory Conflicts of Interest
In Chapter 5 (§5.5), we saw how regulatory conflicts of interest hampered environmental law enforcement in People’s Poland. The Party/state, as owner of the
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means of production, subverted the regulations it promulgated and was obliged,
as regulator, to enforce. This same conflict of interest persists to greater or lesser
extents in all countries, but it can be minimized by (1) privatizing polluters and
resource users, (2) decentralizing environmental law enforcement powers, and
(3) disseminating environmental information among government agencies, nongovernmental organizations and the public at large.

The Utility of Adversity: Private Polluters and Public Regulators
As we saw in Chapter 5, Poland’s regulatory conflict of interest stemmed from the
Party/state’s ownership of the very enterprises against which it was supposed to
enforce environmental regulations. The predictable result was lax to non-existent
enforcement. Intuitively, this problem should be soluble by privatizing regulated
industries.
When the state privatizes the means of production, it gives up its direct financial stake in their economic performance. It retains an indirect interest, of course,
to the extent it relies on tax revenues and economic growth. But in a private economy, the state is not primarily responsible for, or substantially affected by, the
individual performance of each and every firm. And it does not participate directly
in the economic risks imposed on those firms by its environmental regulations. All
other things being equal, the government should be more willing and better able
to enforce those regulations.
Privatization of the means of production, as a method of improving environmental law enforcement, is also supported by János Kornai’s theory of budget
constraints (discussed in Chapter 5, §5.5). Soft budget constraints were endemic
to the socialist economic system; enterprise survival depended not on profits
earned in the market but on gross material output and political criteria, such as
employment levels. The central administration allocated resources and rewards
for maximal, rather than efficient, production. This rendered enterprises oblivious to price signals—including environmental fees and fines—that otherwise
might have induced them to conserve resources and reduce pollution emissions.
Kornai’s theory implies that privatization and marketization should substantially
harden budget constraints. Privatized firms operating in competitive markets must
attend to costs and profits. They naturally will incline to eliminate productive
inefficiencies. And they should be sensitive to price signals, including environmental charges; any firm that ignores them should find itself at a competitive disadvantage. Of course, states can (and sometimes do) soften budget constraints on
private firms (the prime American example being the bail-out of Chrysler in the
1970s), but budget constraints are, without exception, harder in market economies
than in administered economies. This was confirmed in Chapter 7, where we saw
that budget constraints have hardened in Poland’s transitional economy thanks to
privatization (mainly from below) and the establishment of competitive markets.
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Privatization and marketization also have contributed to the improvement
of environmental regulation in post-Communist Poland. Under socialism, enterprises were, for all practical purposes, government agencies. As such, they participated in developing and implementing government environmental policy, with
the predictable result that environmental regulations tended to be lax, ambiguous
and poorly enforced. In post-Communist Poland, firms no longer are agents of
the government, and their influence over environmental policy has waned. This is
not to say that firms in market democracies do not influence government policy,
but their influence is comparatively slight primarily because they are subject to
greater political and economic competition. We saw evidence of this in Chapter
7 (§7.4), when industrial concerns in post-Communist Poland tried to roll back
environmental fee increases. They were successfully opposed by a unique (in
Poland’s experience) aggregation of environmentalists, private firms and stateowned enterprises. Companies that had already invested heavily in environmental
protection (in order to reduce their exposure to regulatory costs) naturally objected
to fee reductions that would have devalued their investments, while providing a
significant market advantage to competitors that had done nothing to reduce pollution emissions. The institution of competitive markets thus has served to disaggregate industrial interests, so that Polish industry no longer presents a united
front on (or against) environmental policy.

Privatize Economic Producers and Resource Users, but Not Necessarily
Natural Resources
In the United States, economists known as ‘free market environmentalists’ have
argued that the environmental failure of socialism proves that natural assets
(including commodities such as oil and non-commodity resources such as air)
would benefit from privatization (see, e.g., Stroup and Goodman 1992, 427). They
claim that forests, parks, wilderness areas and other resources currently under
public ownership (in the United States as well as in the former socialist countries
of Central and Eastern Europe) would be better cared for under private (more specifically individual or corporate) ownership and management. This argument may
or may not have merit, but the history of environmental protection in People’s
Poland does not support it.
The Polish Party/state owned and managed all natural resources, including
nature reserves and national parks, but without suffering the same regulatory conflicts of interest that were endemic to Party/state ownership of economic producers and resource users.4 To be sure, some Party/state-owned resources were
mismanaged and damaged, especially those located in fallout areas for industrial pollution. But, as we saw in Chapter 1 (§1.5), many national parks and
nature reserves, especially those located in the northeastern part of the country,
were not substantially damaged by pollution or ruthlessly (over)exploited for
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their development potential. Today, Poland’s national parks and nature reserves
include some of the most pristine places left in all of Europe. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (1995, 88), an organization not known
for its socialist leanings, recently concluded that ‘[t]he environmental legacy of
central planning in Poland is not all negative. . . . In 1991, while 11 percent of
Poland was considered to be “severely environmentally threatened,” 27 percent
was in natural or close to natural state’ (emphasis in original). The Polish environmental economist, Tomasz Żylicz (1995a, 64–5), explains:
because the communist industrialization concentrated in areas of traditionally
high intensity of production, vast regions remained largely underdeveloped.
These regions and their almost intact natural capital represent an asset which is
becoming increasingly scarce in Europe . . . about 8.5 percent of the area of the
country remains relatively unscathed by development. Commercial forests and
farms operating within sustainable and ecologically accepted principles include
about 19 percent of Polish territory. Hence over a fourth of Poland represents an
asset that many areas of Europe no longer have.

Although Poland’s experiences do not support the claim that public (or state)
ownership of natural resources per se creates regulatory problems, it does support lesser claims about regulatory problems that can result from ambiguous
and inconsistent resource management policies. When a state lodges control of
resources (such as national forests) in a single agency or ministry, with instructions to administer the resource for ‘multiple uses’ (including mining, timber,
wildlife, recreation) that are not compatible, or for multiple values (including
environmental, aesthetic, economic) that are incommensurable,5 administrative
problems are bound to arise (see Blumm 1994). Indeed, the free market environmentalist literature is filled with horror stories of regulatory mismanagement
resulting from ‘multiple use’ mandates (see Anderson and Leal 1991). But when
state-owned resources are subject to clear and consistent management policies,
administrative problems are unusual. One rarely reads about government mismanagement in publicly owned wilderness areas, for example, where preservation
mandates are not compromised by development mandates.6 This is because the
agencies responsible for wilderness areas operate under clear and consistent rules
that only infrequently generate internal administrative conflicts.
This is not to say that ‘multiple use’ management is inherently bad policy; it may even be the best policy for resources amenable to various productive and non-productive uses. The real problem may lie in its implementation. In
the United States, as well as in Poland, multiple use management responsibilities traditionally reside in a single government agency.7 This creates an internal
administrative conflict as the agency seeks to promote economic development
and environmental protection at the same time. Production mandates tend to overwhelm environmental protection mandates, especially when the agency’s budget
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depends on revenues generated by its development decisions. This is not the place
to speculate about solutions to the administrative problems of ‘multiple use’ management, but one implication may be that management responsibilities should be
split between two or more agencies, each with a singular productive or protective mandate. One clear advantage of this is that the budget for the agency with
protective responsibilities would not depend upon development decision making (as is currently the case, for instance, in the US Forest Service). The idea
of reducing mismanagement through segregating protection and development
responsibilities has not been lost on free market environmentalists. It is implicit,
for example, in Richard Stroup and John Baden’s (1982) suggestion that the government appoint a wilderness endowment board, with a single narrowly defined
mission to protect and enhance environmental values of unique environmental
assets, such as wilderness areas. However, this solution leaves open the question of how inter-agency management disputes would be resolved. It may be that
regulatory conflicts of interest and resulting inefficiencies are simply among the
costs unavoidably entailed by the selection of a multiple use management regime.
If those costs are unacceptably high, then multiple use must be forsaken for some
form of dominant or singular use regime. In this context, it should be noted that
privatization would, for all practical purposes, constitute a shift from multiple
use management to dominant use management; only the preferences of a private
owner, rather than government bureaucrats, would determine the dominant use.
Free market environmentalists suggest that mismanagement of multiple
use resources is inevitable under state ownership because bureaucrats are motivated not to maximize social welfare, but only to maximize their own power and
resources (see Anderson and Leal 1991, esp. ch. 5). On the other hand, it would
strain credulity to suppose that private owners might actively manage natural
resources for their non-economic values after investing large sums of money to
acquire them. But let us assume for the sake of argument that they might. We
would still be left with the question of how to privatize state-owned resources.
To free market environmentalists, the answer is easy: sell them to the highest
bidders.8 But as with all allocation methods, this market-based approach creates
winners and losers, which means that it is bound to be politically controversial.
Consequently, the selection of a privatization method is no simple matter. History,
both in Poland and in the United States, bears this out.
In Poland, privatization (of the means of production) has been an integral component of the transition to market democracy. However, as discussed in Chapter 7
(§7.4), privatization (from above) in Poland took a long time to get off the ground,
and has progressed very slowly because of constant political disputes about the state’s
proper role in the economy and the appropriate privatization mechanisms, as well
as allegations of corruption. By the end of 1994, privatization had virtually ground
to a halt, with several thousand large enterprises still under state ownership. Is there
any reason to expect that Poland (or the United States for that matter) could privatize
national parks and other resources without encountering similar difficulties?
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The history of resource privatization in the United States hardly provides more
hope for efficient privatization. The US government has been in the business of
privatizing natural resources virtually since its inception. Sometimes it has sold land
and other resources to the highest bidders. But on many occasions it has allocated
resources according to non-market (i.e., political and administrative) criteria. Following the Revolutionary War, for example, Congress ‘forsook the profit motive
when it rewarded Revolutionary War veterans and refugees with bounty warrants or
scrip entitling them to select lands from the Military Reserves in Ohio’ (Coggins et
al. 1993, 56). Throughout the nineteenth century, federal homesteading laws, such
as the 1862 Homestead Act (43 U.S.C. §§161 et seq., repealed in 1976, 43 U.S.C.
§§1701 et seq.), gave away millions of acres of land for nothing or next to it. The
robber-barons of the same era did not pay market value for their railroad land grants;
the allocation mechanism in their case is best described as cronyism.9 To this day,
the federal government gives away valuable mineral resources for only the tiniest
fraction of their market value;10 it leases public land for grazing at below-market
prices (see Wilkinson 1992, 81); and it sells timber from some (but not all) National
Forests at prices that do not even cover the costs of administering the program (see
Repetto 1988). In each of these cases, the federal government allocates property
rights on political, rather than market, criteria. Those who criticize these programs
for being inefficient often miss this important point: they are not designed to be
efficient. To the extent that the Forest Service engages in below-cost timber sales
for example, at least part of its express purpose is to subsidize communities that rely
on the timber industry for their economic survival (see Repetto 1988, 373–6). Thus,
below-cost timber sales (and many other non-market allocations of publicly owned
resources) are just another vehicle of government largess, like welfare, school lunch
programs, tobacco subsidies and tax deductions for charitable donations. One can,
of course, disagree with the policy of subsidizing discrete groups with allocations
of public resources, but then that changes the argument from whether government
management unavoidably is inefficient to whether government management should
(or should always) be efficient (on some definition of the term ‘efficient’). Free
market environmentalists implicitly argue that resource management should always
be efficient, but should efficiency be the only, or even the predominant, goal in all
cases? As Colin Clark (1973a, 1973b) has shown, ‘efficient’ resource management
can sometimes lead to resource extinction. Specifically, where discount rates are
high, growth rates are low, and available substitute investments offer higher rates
of return, the ‘efficient’ management decision may be to use up or extinguish the
resource. Clark’s study concerned blue whale populations, and he concluded that
‘extermination of the entire population may appear as the most attractive policy,
even to an individual resource owner.’ Thus, the assumption that individual owners
will always conserve resources does not hold in economic theory, let alone in practice (consider, as an empirical example, the Oklahoma ‘dustbowl’). Privatization,
the profit motive and ‘efficient’ management do not guarantee resource conservation
any more than public ownership guarantees resource depletion and despoilation.
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Even if economic efficiency were taken as a proxy for proper resource management and private ownership was found to be more efficient than public ownership, that still might not justify the privatization decision in all cases. Privatization
itself can be costly, and those costs need to be factored in before determining the
relative merits of private versus public ownership of natural resources in individual cases. As we have seen, governments do not act solely (and sometimes
not at all) from economic motives; politics, justice and morality always are factors. When a government decides to privatize publicly owned resources, it has a
variety of allocation mechanisms to choose from and it does not always select a
market-like competitive bidding process. Different allocation mechanisms lead
to different allocations, favoring different economic and political interests. So
we certainly should expect those interests to lobby, before the fact of privatization, for the allocation method(s) they prefer. We could not reasonably expect,
then, that Poland, the United States or any other democratic country would be
able to privatize natural resources without running into exactly the same kind of
costly political squabbles that have plagued Poland’s efforts to privatize its means
of production. Supporters of privatization of publicly owned natural resources
have not adequately assessed the likely costs (economic and non-economic) of
privatization arising from alternative allocation mechanisms. Terry Anderson and
Donald Leal (1991, 167) concede that ‘[p]roperty rights are costly to define and
enforce.’ Yet they have not attempted to estimate the cost of privatization.11 Without that information, how are we to conclude, as a matter of reason rather than
mere faith, that the outcome would be more efficient than under the status quo of
public ownership and management? After all, ‘[i]t is possible to create a system
which is so costly to implement that it overwhelms the benefits to be gained from
control’ (Hanna, Folke, and Máler 1995, 18; also see Runge 1984).

Regulating the Regulators: Public Participation in Environmental
Policy Making and Enforcement
When the state suffers from a regulatory conflict of interest, as People’s Poland
did, environmental law enforcement is likely to suffer unless enforcement power
is decentralized. Some independent agent(s) must be empowered to enforce the
environmental laws against polluters and against the state itself. In People’s
Poland, as we learned in Chapter 3 (§3.5), private citizens and environmental
groups had little authority to enforce environmental laws against polluters, and
none at all to enforce them against the Party/government. But in most advanced
market democracies, legislatures have decentralized regulatory power, for example
by authorizing so-called ‘citizen suits.’ A typical provision is found in §304 of
the American Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7604(a)), which authorizes ‘any person’
(broadly defined) to bring a civil action in federal district court against (1) the
United States government or its agencies for violating emissions standards or
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administrative orders, (2) government administrators for failing to perform nondiscretionary duties under the Act, and (3) any person (again broadly defined) who
is polluting without a permit or is in violation of permit conditions.12 The citizen
suit has proven to be a powerful tool for the private enforcement of public law.
Individual citizens and environmental groups have sued polluters to enforce compliance with regulatory standards, and government administrators for failing to
perform non-discretionary statutory duties (see Miller 1987; Boyer and Meidinger
1985). Citizen suits have also thwarted sporadic efforts to undermine federal law
enforcement, as in 1981 and 1982, when the Reagan administration slashed the
budget of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Those budget cuts forced
the agency to reduce its staff of enforcement attorneys from 200 to 30 (Feller 1983,
554), greatly reducing its ability to identify, monitor and prosecute non-complying
polluters. The number of EPA enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act, for
example, fell from 184 in 1979 to just 47 in 1982 (Naysnerski and Tietenberg 1992,
114). Individual citizens and environmental organizations filled the void, however,
taking on the role of private attorneys-general to enforce the federal environmental
laws. Between 1970 and 1978, when governmental enforcement of environmental
laws was robust, a total of only 25 citizen suits were filed; after the Reagan budget
cuts decimated the agency’s enforcement capabilities, the number of citizen suits
exploded, from 41 in 1982 to 266 in 1986 (Naysnerski and Tietenberg 1992, 114).
Today, in post-Communist Poland, citizens and environmental organizations
have greater authority to enforce environmental laws than they had under communism (see §7.5). Indeed, they may have even more power than environmental
NGOs in other European Rechtsstaats, including Germany. But that still may not
be enough. As Susan Rose-Ackerman (1995) has shown in her admirable book
comparing environmental law in Germany and the United States, German citizens and environmental organizations have relatively little legal leverage over
regulators. Unlike their American counterparts, for example, German environmentalists cannot force government regulators to comply with non-discretionary
statutory mandates. If a German administrator fails to promulgate an emissions
standard as required by a certain statute, private citizens have no administrative or
judicial recourse. This lack of public access to environmental policy making and
enforcement in Germany led Professor Rose-Ackerman to conclude, rightly in my
view, that the American approach is ‘more conducive to good policy and is more
democratically legitimate’ (Rose-Ackerman 1995, 66). This is not to say that the
German system of environmental protection has been ineffective, or even that it
has been less effective than the American system.13 However, to the extent that
the American system permits citizens to more closely regulate the regulators, we
might say that it is more likely to be effective (or less likely to prove ineffective)
over the long run. Certainly, Poland would be better off following the American
rather than the German model, given its history of regulatory conflicts of interest
and the still slow pace of privatization, which is likely to keep thousands of enterprises under state ownership and control for years to come.
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Access to Environmental Information
Regardless of which model Poland chooses, its citizens will not be in a position
to exercise their legal rights unless they have access to useful information about
environmental conditions, regulatory standards and violations (see Futrell 1993,
90). The collection and dissemination of environmental information is a prerequisite to effective environmental law enforcement, whether the enforcer is a state
agency, an NGO or an individual citizen. This lesson is clear from Chapter 4’s
(§4.5) discussion of the effects of state censorship on the flow of environmental
information and environmental law enforcement.
In People’s Poland, the public was woefully underinformed about general
environmental conditions and polluting activities. There were several reasons for
this, the first being inadequate information collection. Poland’s system of environmental monitoring and information collection may have been better developed
than those of other Soviet bloc countries, but it was not nearly adequate. As noted
in Chapter 4 (§4.4), environmental inspectors were poorly trained and equipped;
monitoring procedures were haphazard; monitoring equipment was substandard
and not uniformly calibrated. Most environmental information came from the
polluters themselves, and it was every bit as reliable as the economic information
they supplied to socioeconomic planners—which is to say, completely unreliable.
Poles could, of course, collect a certain amount of useful environmental
information with their own senses; it was relatively easy to smell a poisoned
stretch of river. Even then, efforts to identify and prosecute those responsible
often were hampered by the incompetence of Party/state investigators.
Poor environmental monitoring and reporting in People’s Poland was a combined consequence of technological, political and economic factors. First and
foremost, environmental monitoring requires sophisticated equipment and welltrained personnel, both of which cost money. But in People’s Poland, funds were
always in short supply (especially for environmental protection purposes). In
post-Communist Poland, environmental funding problems have been alleviated
by international assistance and a larger domestic environmental protection budget (afforded by increased collections of environmental fees and fines, resulting
primarily from hardened budget constraints). And the environmental information
obtained from monitoring today is more reliable because a larger percentage of it
comes from state monitoring, rather than enterprise self-monitoring.
One environmental information problem persists, however, in postCommunist Poland: censorship. In the socialist era, the Party/state regularly censored environmental information under state secret laws. As we saw in Chapter
4 (§4.5), this was chiefly a consequence of the Party/state’s regulatory conflict
of interest as owner and regulator of polluting enterprises; the Party/state had
a direct financial stake in avoiding environmental law enforcement against the
enterprises it owned and controlled. The solution to that problem, as already noted,
is to structure property rights so that the interests of polluters and government
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regulators are dis-aggregated, for example by privatizing resource users. But
privatization and marketization in post-Communist Poland have not, so far, led
to increased public access to environmental information. On the contrary, public
access actually has been reduced in some respects. Information about individual
polluters, which the Party/state used to publish regularly, today is embargoed out
of professed concern for privacy and trade secrets (see Polish News Bulletin, Dec.
23, 1992). To make matters worse, in 1994 the Polish government (dominated by
former Communists and their allies from the Peasant Party) proposed a sweeping new censorship law, specifying 71 ambiguously worded categories of state
secrets, including:
Materials of the Council of Ministers concerning the appraisal of the strategic
potential of the state and strategic government orders and their implementation;
Research and development projects of particular importance to the economic interest of the state, ordered by supreme state authorities;
Information concerning technical, technological, and organizational arrangements whose disclosure could jeopardize important economic interests of the
state. (Quoted in Polish News Bulletin, Sept. 16, 1994)

Any of these ‘bottomless pits’ could easily have swallowed most environmental
information. Under the draft law, bureaucrats would have had unfettered discretion to decide what information should be kept secret; the draft law contained no
provision for judicial review. Anyone found guilty of publicizing censored information would have faced imprisonment for up to ten years (Polish News Bulletin,
Sept. 16, 1994). According to the Helsinki Human Rights Foundation, this draft
law was even more restrictive than the old censorship law dating from the period
of Martial Law (Polish News Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1994).14 Not surprisingly, Polish
journalists, members of the pro-reform opposition in parliament, and the Solidarity trade union rabidly opposed the bill. But Poland’s ruling coalition defended it
on grounds reflecting habitual ways of thinking. Then-Sejm Speaker (later Prime
Minister) Józef Oleksy stated that the law was necessary because the media’s ‘disavowal of Parliament has damaged the public imagination concerning the dignity
of this institution’ (quoted in PAP News Wire, Sept. 22, 1994). Another legislator,
Jerzy Dziewulski, defended the law by stating, ‘[y]ou journalists can’t have greater
rights than the police’ (quoted in New York Times, Sept. 18, 1994). The lower
house of parliament (the Sejm) approved the law on September 15, 1994 (Polish
News Bulletin, Sept. 16, 1994). President Lech Wałęsa threatened to veto the bill,
but it never reached his desk. The weight of public opinion led the upper house
of the parliament to reject the bill almost unanimously on October 7, 1994; the
vote was 74 to 5 (Reuters, Oct. 7, 1994). Subsequently, the leader of the formerCommunist forces that had introduced the legislation, Aleksander Kwaśniewski
(now president of Poland), did a complete about-face and announced that his Party
would no longer support the measure (Business News from Poland, Oct. 14, 1994).
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Polish environmentalists, meanwhile, have been working in the opposite
direction to increase public access to environmental information. The Wrocławbased Polish Environmental Law Association, under contract with the Ministry of
Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, recently drafted a new
comprehensive environmental protection law that would (among other things)
prohibit the censorship of, and guarantee citizens access to, virtually all environmental information. Unfortunately, given the current composition of the Sejm, this
draft law’s chances for parliamentary approval are rather slim. But in view of the
need to regulate the regulators, some kind of Freedom of Environmental Information Act (with appropriate limitations for legitimate trade secrets, etc.) certainly
would enhance environmental law enforcement.

8.5. Valuing Scarcity
The lack of scarcity pricing was a systemic problem for environmental protection under Marxist socialism. Throughout most of the history of People’s Poland,
land, air and water were provided to economic users virtually free of charge.
As we saw in Chapter 6, this policy was ideologically motivated. According to
Marx’s labor theory of value, natural resources had use value but no real economic value because they were not products of human labor; to price them, as
capitalist economies did, was mere commodity ‘fetishism.’ It was only in the mid1970s that the Polish Party/state began to deviate from Marx’s labor theory. First,
the 1974 Water Law imposed a nominal charge on water use (consumption and
pollution). Then the 1980 Environmental Protection and Development Act introduced a price schedule for most economic uses of most natural resources. These
charges were intended to induce resource conservation among economic users,
but they failed to significantly affect the rate of resource use and pollution for
several reasons. The fees were not based on supply (relative scarcity), demand
and the marginal costs of development. Consequently, it was impossible to determine how much (if any) conservation a given price would yield. The Party/state
was shooting blindfolded at rapidly moving targets. To the extent environmental
fees successfully induced any conservation at all, it was sheer luck. Even then, the
impacts were blunted by endemic soft budget constraints. As we saw in Chapter 5,
price increases routinely were offset by subsidies for resource users. This relates
back, of course, to the Party/state’s conflict of interest as environmental regulator
and owner of resource users/polluters. Resolving that conflict (by privatizing the
means of production and hardening budget constraints) is a prerequisite to instituting effective scarcity pricing.
Since competitive markets and (relatively) hard budget constraints have been
introduced in post-Communist Poland, scarcity pricing of resources has become
a more effective means of inducing conservation and pollution control. Fees for
using and polluting natural resources have increased—in some cases by a factor
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of ten (see Table 7.3 in Chapter 7). And those charges are on top of market prices
for commodity resources, such as coal and oil, that have risen in some cases by
more than 1,000 percent since 1989 (see Czaja et al. 1994, 27). Firms (including
state-owned enterprises) have responded by reducing resource use (per unit of
production) and, consequently, pollution emissions (see Table 7.1 in Chapter 7).
This constitutes a structural improvement in environmental protection resulting
from a combination of policy instruments—in this case, increased environmental
charges—and systemic changes—the introduction of competitive markets, harder
budget constraints and scarcity pricing.
This is not to say that scarcity pricing alone can ensure sufficient environmental quality. It never has. No country’s resource charges even approximate the
(estimated) social cost level. Tomasz Żylicz (1993a, 37) has written that Poland’s
resource-use and pollution charges, which already are among the world’s highest,
would have to be increased by a factor of eight to come close to the social cost
level. And his estimate did not even attempt to quantify and incorporate noneconomic values, which arguably must be included to identify the appropriate
scale of environmental charges at varying rates of resource supply and demand.15
For reasons specified in the concluding section of Chapter 7, it would be politically unfeasible for the Polish government to raise already high resource prices
to social cost levels. And as an economic matter it would price most (if not all)
Polish resource-based products out of world markets since other countries do not
price their resources accordingly.
Another issue related to scarcity pricing concerns the national income
accounting system which countries use to quantify national income and production
(GDP). As we saw in Chapter 5 (§5.3), the socialist economies regularly outpaced
the Western capitalist economies in economic growth, at least (and probably only)
on paper. However, their costs of producing growth were far higher. The socialist
economies produced growth extensively, that is, by maximizing resource inputs.
This resulted in relatively and absolutely high rates of resource depletion and pollution emissions. But because resource depletion, pollution emissions and attendant damage were not counted as costs to the economy (let alone to Polish nature,
society and culture), they had no statistical effect on national income (although
they inevitably had a real effect). Poland’s economic growth statistics were artificially inflated by the intentional exclusion of real environmental costs, so much
so that the recorded increases in national income likely masked real decreases in
welfare.16 The problem of accounting for resource depletion and environmental
damage also plagues capitalist economies, but to a lesser extent. In the United
States, for example, the national income accounts exclude the real costs of environmental degradation and resource depletion mainly because of computational
difficulties (see Cairncross 1995, 106). As a result, pollution damage generates
statistical growth, while inflicting real costs on the economy. For example, when
people become sick from air pollution, that contributes to production in the health
care industry; and it further contributes to GNP by creating problems for envi-
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ronmental industries to clean up. From the perverse perspective of the national
income accounts, more pollution is better than less. This result is ameliorated,
however, in market economies by the institution of scarcity pricing. Even though
scarcity is not factored into the national income accounts, it is reflected in the
prices firms must pay to acquire resources. As resource inputs grow increasingly
scarce over time, the price for those inputs rises, and firms in competitive markets
respond by, among other things, increasing factor productivity (i.e., the amount of
production squeezed out of each input). Consequently, rates of resource consumption and pollution decline (on a per unit basis), regardless of the fact that those
trends do not (directly) enhance GDP growth.
The failure to incorporate the costs of environmental degradation and resource
depletion in computations of national income nevertheless skews perceptions of
the costs and benefits of environmental protection, often making environmental
measures appear more costly than they really are. This plays into the hands of
critics of environmental policy, who point to slower GDP growth as ‘proof’ that
regulations are too costly. For instance, in 1991, a Harvard economist reportedly
told a tax policy group that environmental regulations would cost the American
economy 3 percent of GNP annually by the year 2005, mainly by consuming
capital stock that otherwise could be invested in ‘productive’ activities (Bureau of
National Affairs Daily Report for Executives, Sept. 13, 1991). But this says less
about the social costs and benefits of environmental policy than it does about how
GNP is computed. It certainly cannot be taken as proof that environmental regulations create a net loss in social welfare because, again, GNP is not a proxy for
social welfare.17 Fortunately, the United Nations, the OECD and individual countries are working on methods for incorporating environmental costs and benefits
into the national income accounts (see, e.g., Prince 1993). Those efforts will, it is
hoped, lead to more accurate assessments of the costs and benefits of environmental protection, giving sorely needed content to the, as yet, vacuous slogan ‘sustainable development’ (see Cole 1996).

8.6. The Rule of (Environmental) Law
For environmental protection to be effective, environmental laws must be both
enforceable and actually enforced (on this distinction see Chapter 3, §3.1). Above
all, this means that environmental regulations must have the force of law; they cannot be subordinated to political expediency or the arbitrary power of government
officials, bureaucrats or industrial managers, as was the case in People’s Poland
(see Kozłowski 1993, 152). Although this may seem obviously true, it raises two
significant questions. First, can environmental law enforcement be insulated from
political and economic expediency? This question, at bottom, concerns the meaning and utility of the rule of law concept. Second, assuming environmental law
enforcement can be insulated from political and economic expediency, to what
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extent should it be? This question implicitly recognizes that law enforceability
and enforcement are variable, and asks what level of each is required for (minimally) effective environmental protection.

The Rule of Law: Fact, Myth and Aspiration
The normative assertion that environmental law should rule over politics entails
a commitment to the rule of law concept. This commitment requires elaboration
because, for reasons that are difficult to fathom (especially in light of analysis
from Chapter 4), the rule of law concept remains stubbornly controversial.18 Much
of the controversy, however, stems from ideological commitments that obstruct
a realistic assessment of its utility and, perhaps, necessity as an organizing principle for democratic society. The rule of law is valuable not because it is some
magical neutral principle that solves all political and economic conflicts justly and
efficiently, but simply because there is no acceptable alternative. If not the rule of
law, then the rule of what or, more appropriately, of whom? A good Marxian (or,
as likely these days, a post-modernist, radical libertarian or anarcho-capitalist)
might respond that this question presents a false choice because the rule of law
itself is only a myth concocted to mask the rule of the capitalist class (or the rule
of special interests); the only real choice is between contending persons or parties
(see, e.g., Cain and Hunt 1979, ix–xi). There is some truth in this radical critique
of the rule of law, but it is not the whole truth. The rule of law is not just a myth;
there is some fact of the matter.19 But to understand that fact-of-the-matter, we
need to have a clear idea of what the rule of law concept concerns and what it
does not concern.
First, we must distinguish between the rule of law and legal rules. The rule of
law does not entail a belief that legal rules are neutral, apolitical or even just. In
fact, the rule of law does not imply much of anything about the normative content
of the laws; as H. L. A. Hart (1961, 157) has pointed out, a general rule of equal
application can be quite compatible with unjust legal rules. The history of the rule
of law concept extends to sixth-century BCE Athens, when Solon gave the people
‘equal laws for the noble and the base,’ which provided ‘not so much control of
public policy as the certainty of being government legally in accordance with
known rules’ (Hayek 1975, 7–8).20 Like the Greek concept of eunomia (but unlike
isonomia, which provides for substantial political equality), the modern rule of
law specifies little if anything about the normative content of laws, but only the
relationship between those laws, power and politics. The French political theorist
Blandine Kriegel (1995, 63) has summed up that relationship this way:
politics becomes an object of law, and political rights are juridified, just as individual rights are. The deviation from Roman Law is clear: no longer is the division of things law’s sole object but rather constraints on power and limitations

Institutional Implications

231

on human uses of things and of other human beings. Law is no longer the coin of
a politics of strength, and force and power are no longer to be regarded as brute
facts. They are all henceforth subjected to law, while law itself becomes a power,
a force. The state adopts the rule of law. To make politics an object of law is
impossible without the subjection of power itself to the law, the juridification of
proprietors as well as of property, of the powerful as well as of power.

The rule of law concept, thus, is a constraint (though not an absolute one) on
political discretion (compare Raz 1979, 224). It entails an ethical injunction that
the laws be consistently applied and enforced, without regard to parties, classes or
personalities. And it is this implicit ethical commitment that distinguishes the rule
of law, as a practical matter, from the arbitrary rule of persons or parties. It offers
an enforceable expectation that the lawmakers and their favorites will be bound
by the same rules that apply to others similarly situated;21 to the extent that this
expectation is not enforceable, the state simply fails to adhere to the rule of law.
The enforceable expectation is what I take to be the fact-of-the-matter of the
rule of law. It allows us to observe and even measure the extent to which laws
are enforceable and actually enforced, including against the rulers themselves.22
There may be no bright line of enforceability and actual enforcement to distinguish societies that adhere to the rule of law from those that do not. But we can
judge the extent to which societies are achieving (or failing to achieve) the (never
completely attainable) rule of law goal. Most importantly, to the extent they fail,
the problem is not that the rule of law concept is somehow flawed, but that the
law does not rule enough. So when a state fails to live up to the rule of law, the
solution is not to abandon the rule of law concept as a myth, but to demand greater
adherence to it. And when a state’s laws are unjust, the answer is not to abandon
the rule of law, but to demand different, more just laws. As E. P. Thompson (1975,
266) put it in his famous passage from Whigs and Hunters:
[w]e ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath
this law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon
power and the defense of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems to
me an unqualified human good.23

Alexandr Zinoviev (1979, 574–5), among many others, specifies a second
condition for the rule of law. In addition to requiring equality under the law, he
argues that the rule of law invokes a principle of legality, according to which no
one should be prosecuted for any act that has not previously been declared, by
legitimate (i.e., legally prescribed) procedures, to be illegal. However, this requirement would appear to require the conclusion that the United States and the states
of the British commonwealth are not rule of law states to the extent that their common law courts often declare what is illegal only upon passing judgment (see Denning 1949). But if there are any rule of law states existing in the world, the United
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States, Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia surely are among them. We
might conclude with Michael Oakeshott (1983, 155) that there is such a thing as
the rule of law, but no existing states conform to it. But then we would be forced to
adduce some new concept to explain the very real distinction between states where
politics and power rule without constraint and states where politics and power
have been substantially subordinated to the law. It hardly seems worth the trouble,
especially when considering that the familiar rule of law concept is capable of
serving as both the unattainable goal and the measure of relative attainment.

The Enforceability and Enforcement of Environmental Law
Even if a state generally adheres to the rule of law, its environmental laws may not
be effective if they are either unenforceable or unenforced. To be enforceable, the
laws must provide sufficiently unambiguous standards (or directions for setting
standards), specify responsibilities and establish penalties for responsible parties
who fail to comply with the standards or directives. Actual enforcement depends
largely on factors outside of the laws themselves, most notably political will and
state finances. However, as we saw earlier in this chapter (§8.4), legislation itself
can affect prospects for actual enforcement. For instance, citizen suit provisions
enhance actual enforcement as well as the enforceability of environmental laws
by expanding the universe of agents authorized to enforce the laws and by providing rewards for their enforcement efforts. Such provisions increase the likelihood
that the laws will be actually enforced. Their very inclusion within legislation is
evidence of political will to enforce the laws.
As a normative matter, a law that is either unenforceable or not actually
enforced might as well not exist.24 On the other hand, something less than perfect enforceability and enforcement must be sufficient because, in the first place,
perfection is unobtainable. In the second place, the rule of law demands not that
laws be completely insulated from political considerations but that they be clear
and generally applicable, regardless of the persons or parties involved. Third and
finally, even if environmental laws could be insulated from practical political and
economic considerations, they probably should not be. The purpose of environmental law, after all, is to solve (or resolve) problems that never are purely legal,
but always combine social, political and economic considerations. Applying legal
rules rigidly to such problems may not always yield the best results; some amount
of flexibility is desirable for reasons of justice, efficiency and, in some cases, both.
This is just Aristotle’s familiar point about the need to temper law with equity in
order to promote justice. But this does not indicate any fault in the law or with the
legislator because the law, by its nature, must be general. And general legal rules
cannot be expected to fit each case precisely (Aristotle 1941a, 1137b9–37b24).
Aristotle’s notion of equity is not irreconcilable with the rule of law. As Lawrence
B. Solum (1994, 145) has written:
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The practice of equity by a virtuous judge does not ignore the genuine importance of achieving regularity, publicity, and generality in the law. Fidelity to the
letter of the law is part of the virtue of judicial integrity, but respect for legal rules
is not the whole of judicial excellence. There are situations in which a judge with
practical wisdom will perceive that adherence to the spirit of the law requires a
departure from its letter. Sometimes justice and the rule of law require the practice of equity. (Emphasis added)

Having ruled out the desirability (indeed, the possibility) of either zero or perfect enforceability and enforcement, we must at least inquire (even if we cannot
answer) what level of enforceability and enforcement is necessary for minimally
effective environmental protection. Perhaps the only practical way is to assess
the impacts the laws are having at existing levels of enforceability and enforcement. If they are not measurably improving environmental quality or avoiding
environmental degradation, then current levels of enforceability and enforcement
are insufficient. How much of an impact they should be having depends, to some
extent, on each country’s specific environmental, fiscal and policy circumstances.
Any more abstract definition of sufficient enforceability and enforcement probably would be about as meaningful as the slogan ‘sustainable development’ in
current usage—which is to say, not very meaningful.
In Chapter 3, I concluded that the environmental laws of People’s Poland
were sufficiently ‘enforceable’ (to the extent any laws subject to the Leninist doctrines of ‘socialist democracy’ and ‘socialist legality’ can be said to have been
enforceable), excepting certain statutory provisions that failed to specify responsible parties, standards and/or penalties. Poland’s Council of Ministers and various agencies with environmental protection responsibilities complied, for the
most part, with the statutory directives by promulgating strict and clearly enforceable standards. The main problem in People’s Poland, as pointed out in Chapters
4 and 5, was lax to non-existent enforcement. The Polish government failed to
provide a sufficient level of law enforcement to ensure (minimally) effective environmental protection. In post-Communist Poland, most of the political, economic
and ideological causes of lax enforcement have been reduced or eliminated. Consequently, as we saw in Chapter 7, environmental law enforcement has substantially improved since 1989.
This is not to say that Poland’s environmental laws now are perfectly
enforceable and enforced; that clearly is not the case. The most important issue,
however, is whether Poland has achieved a sufficient level of enforceability and
enforcement for effective environmental protection. The statistical improvements
described in Chapter 7 at the very least suggest that Poland is moving in the right
direction. Poland’s environmental laws are now having a significant and measurable positive impact on pollution emissions and overall environmental quality.
Some Polish environmentalists complain that the environmental laws are
still being sacrificed to political and economic expediency, pointing to the case
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of Warsaw’s Okęcie II airport. As we saw in Chapter 7 (§7.4), the airport was
permitted to open in 1992, even though it was in violation of environmental rules
that required the installation of environmental protection equipment before opening. The Chief Environmental Protection Inspector compromised by allowing the
airport to open on the condition that airport authorities would retrofit all required
environmental protection installations within 18 months. Environmentalists
alleged that this compromise sacrificed the legal rules for the sake of political and
economic interests. That is true to some extent; the law was not enforced to its last
letter, and to the extent that this was for reasons of political and economic expediency, we might conclude that the rule of law was violated. But it is equally clear
that the purpose of the legal rule ultimately was fulfilled. Environmental protection equipment was retrofitted at Okęcie II. And the importance of that can hardly
be overemphasized. In the first place, the outcome of the case certainly would
have been different under Communist Party rule; in People’s Poland, the State
Environmental Protection Inspectorate had no enforcement power, and the courts
were unlikely (to say the least) to countermand a decision of Warsaw Party/city
officials. Even more importantly, the Okęcie II case does not establish a precedent
for future economic developments to avoid environmental protection requirements. On the contrary, it creates an incentive for them to comply in full from the
start because it almost always is cheaper to design in environmental installations
rather than retrofit them later. Had the developers of Okęcie II known before-thefact that a court would order them to retrofit environmental equipment within 18
months after opening, they surely would have installed the necessary equipment
in the first place. In the final analysis, environmental protection in Poland was
improved as a result of the Okęcie II case.

The Eco-Totalitarian (Non-)Alternative
As we saw in Chapter 4 (§4.2), the Polish United Workers’ Party ruled as a
totalitarian regime, unconstrained by the rule of law. It is important to recognize,
however, that this entailed no necessary implications for environmental protection.
Operating according to the principles of socialist democracy, democratic centralism
and the nomenklatura system, the Party theoretically could have asserted as much
(or as little) control as it desired (or thought necessary) over any area of social
concern, including environmental protection. And that control might have been
exercised either positively or negatively; that is, the Party might have acted either
to protect or destroy the natural environment. As we saw throughout Chapters 4
and 5, the Polish Communist Party maintained policies that resulted in less environmental protection than the law apparently required. But, in theory, it might
have instituted policies providing more environmental protection than the law
required. A totalitarian regime might, after all, be founded on an ecological ideology. Indeed, some writings of the ecology movement seem to promote a platonis-
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tic (totalitarian) republic, ruled by ecologist-kings (rather than philosopher-kings)
(see, e.g., Ophuls 1977, 159–63).
My purpose here obviously is not to condone eco-totalitarianism (or any
other form of totalitarianism), but simply to make the point that totalitarianism is
not logically or theoretically inconsistent with environmentalism or environmental protection. Conceivably such a society could attain quite high levels of environmental protection even in the absence of the rule of law, assuming those who
govern have the will and the means to implement and enforce pro-environmental
dictates. Indeed, at first glance it appears that eco-totalitarians should have an easier time implementing their environmental policies than democratic leaders, who
always are constrained by political competition, public opinion and the potential
fallout from unpopular policies. It should be far easier, for example, for a dictator
to shut down polluting factories and institute draconian environmental protection measures. Theoretically, all the dictator needs is the political will (which
is assumed in the case of an eco-totalitarian regime) and the public finances to
implement and enforce the rule. The real world, of course, is more complicated
than this. And there are reasons to doubt whether totalitarian regimes (or other
states not adhering to the rule of law) could adequately protect their environments
over long periods of time. First of all, totalitarian regimes are never fully insulated
from political and economic pressures that could erode their commitment to ecological preservation. As Hannah Arendt (1973, 306) and others have pointed out,
totalitarians typically seek to minimize opposition by cultivating mass support.
This is amply demonstrated in the history of People’s Poland, where every single leadership change was precipitated by public unrest.25 So, an eco-totalitarian
regime might be forced to compromise on its ecological values. Moreover, as a
matter of practical economics, it is unrealistic to assume that a pro-ecological
totalitarian steady-state would be able to produce enough revenue to enforce its
environmental dictates against dissenters. Environmental protection, after all, is
very expensive. In the absence of sufficient finance to support the state’s coercive apparatus, ecologist-kings would be forced to rely on the inherently less reliable enforcement mechanisms of ideological, social and moral suasion.26 From a
political perspective, Roger Congleton (1992) argues that totalitarians are likely
to produce less environmental protection than democratic regimes because they
have uncertain career paths, shorter time horizons, relatively lower risk aversion
and higher marginal costs of pollution control. But Congleton neglects the ideological dimension, which is crucial to understanding the politics of environmental
protection, especially in an eco-totalitarian regime (see North 1984, 10). Nevertheless, an ideological commitment to environmental protection may not always
prevail over other practical considerations for the totalitarian, such as maintenance of power.
There is growing empirical evidence that environmental protection tends to
be more successful in democratic states. Indeed, the failure of environmental protection throughout the Communist world—in contrast to the, at least, modest suc-
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cess of environmental regimes in the democratic states of Western Europe and
North America—may provide the most compelling evidence to date. Even if we
conclude cautiously that the environmental case for democracy remains underdetermined, there are strong reasons (many of which are discussed in Payne 1995)
for suspecting a positive correlation between democracy and ecology. First, environmental information is more readily accessed in democracies that guarantee
free speech and freedom of the press, and this facilitates environmental education.
Democratic states also permit and even encourage open debate about environmental problems and policies. And those debates can influence the state’s environmental protection regime. However, such institutions are antithetical to totalitarianism.
Given the weight (slight though it may be) of historical experience, combined with
the sound theoretical reasons for expecting democracies to provide more environmental protection than less open forms of government, it appears doubtful that
eco-totalitarianism would be a feasible, let alone preferable, alternative.

8.7. Is There a ‘Capitalist Imperative’
for Environmental Protection?
The various institutional prescriptions set forth in this chapter—from private property rights in the means of production to scarcity pricing and the rule of law—
characterize advanced capitalist democracies. The analysis generally supports the
claim, advanced by Martin Lewis (1992) among others (including Mikhail Bernstam 1991), that there is a ‘capitalist imperative’ for environmental protection. The
argument is not that capitalism is environmentally benign, but that it provides an
institutional framework within which environmental protection efforts can succeed. This may be true, but the argument proves too little.
Lewis shows only how capitalist institutions adjust to achieve environmental
protection goals. But to prove the thesis of a capitalist ‘imperative,’ he must also
show that only capitalist institutions are capable of making the necessary adjustments.27 To that end, Lewis (1992, 163–6) points to the failure of environmental
protection under real existing socialism. He is quite right about that failure, but
wrong to suppose that it proves a ‘capitalist imperative’ for environmental protection. The environmental failure of real existing socialism hardly proves that
environmental protection would not succeed under any and all conceivable socialisms; neither does the analysis in this book prove that. However, the failure of
environmental protection under (real existing) socialism in Poland and throughout the ex-Communist world raises serious questions for Marxian, non-Marxian
and post-Marxian advocates of socialism for environmental protection. The biggest question may be whether and how future socialist states might avoid the
institutionally generated impediments to environmental protection that plagued
earlier socialist states. More specifically, how might socialist property institutions
and central planning be structured to avoid (in practice as well as in theory) the
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regulatory conflicts of interest that hampered environmental protection efforts in
previously existing socialist states? How might a non-market economy be structured to supply the kind of budget discipline needed to coerce resource users and
polluters into conserving resources and limiting emissions? And, in the absence
of competitive markets, how might future socialist societies spur technological
innovations for environmental protection? Finally, who would be able to enforce
the environmental laws against non-compliers if the state, as owner and regulator
of the means of production, decided not to? These questions place a heavy burden
on proponents of neo-, non- and post-Marxian eco-socialism. At the very least, it
seems that an environmentally feasible socialism would have to be founded on
principles and institutions quite different from those of the orthodox Marxist–
Leninist model.

Notes
1. On the environmental problems of other former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, see, among other works, Carter and Turnock (1993), Alcamo
(1992), Peterson (1993), Feshbach and Friendly (1992), National Geographic (June 1991),
Vavroušek (1990), Komarov ([pseud.], 1980), International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (1990), French (1990), Goldman (1972a).
2. This was not the problem in People’s Poland where environmental quality goals (in
the form of ambient standards) were quite stringent. The problem in Poland was that no
progress was made toward achieving them; in fact, Poland’s environmental laws did not
succeed even in stemming the progress of degradation.
3. The importance of this distinction is highlighted in the discussion of property rights
in §8.4.
4. To be fair, I should point out that free market environmentalists are not particularly interested in improving regulatory enforcement. In addition to privatizing natural
resources, they would deregulate environmental protection, leaving it to the workings of
the free market and the common law (see, generally, Anderson and Leal 1991).
5. For an interesting discussion of incommensurability problems in environmental
protection, see Sunstein (1993). Richard Epstein (1995) argues that incommensurability
problems should not deter society from maintaining policies that maximize utility. But,
as far as I am aware, no one has raised the incommensurability problem to promote the
abandonment of utility maximization as a goal. The incommensurability problem really
concerns the measurement of utility. How do we calculate utility (or welfare) given diverse
factors that are evaluated in different terms or even different languages? How do we (or can
we) measure the ‘value’ of endangered species or the ‘cost’ of their extinction in assessing policies that affect them? Do we simply consider their presently estimated economic
costs, which would be tantamount to assigning zero prices to non-market goods? Or do we
also factor in non-economic aesthetic or moral values? If so, how are those non-economic
values factored in? Conversely, how do economic values factor into policy decisions based
primarily on non-economic goals?
6. Of the dozens of tales of government mismanagement recounted in Anderson and
Leal (1991), not one concerns resources, such as wilderness areas, that are subject to single
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or dominant use (as opposed to multiple use) management. In another study, John Baden
and Dean Lueck (1984, 41–2) found that the opportunity cost in preserving most wilderness
lands is ‘zero,’ and that the bureaucratic bungling is avoided by the requirement of ‘passive management.’ Nevertheless, Baden and Lueck claim that public ownership ‘leaves the
future of the wilderness on very shaky ground.’ The ‘real threat,’ they argue, ‘could come
from governmentally mandated exploration and mining in the event of politically induced
constraints on the supply of strategic minerals.’ It is unclear, however, whether privatization would reduce the threat of exploration and mining, especially if the wilderness lands
were privatized according to a competitive bidding system, which would advantage wellendowed mining companies over environmental groups.
7. For instance, the US Forest Service, in the Department of Agriculture, is responsible for managing National Forests for multiple uses, including timber, mining, recreation
and wildlife (see, e.g., the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §528). In
Poland, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry is, in
various ways, responsible for resource use and development, as well as preservation.
8. The free marketeers claim that non-profit environmental groups are rich enough to
compete against for-profit corporations in acquiring property rights to public lands. They
point out that the 13 largest environmental groups in the United States possess a combined
annual budget of over US$400 million (Anderson and Leal 1991, 94). However, as William
Funk (1992, 514) has pointed out, two oil companies, Exxon and Mobil, earn more than that
in a single day—US$493 million a day on Funk’s estimate, which is based on combined
annual gross revenues from sales of more than US$180 billion. So initial endowments are
far from equal. And it is hardly surprising that those who profit from exploiting natural
resources on public lands have more money with which to purchase further resources (for
exploitation) than those who ‘profit’ from preserving resources. This reflects a built-in bias
of the market-based allocation system the free-marketeers promote. Of course, that is not
the only available mechanism for allocating publicly owned resources.
9. This is not to say that the railroad land grants were inefficient or unprofitable to
the nation. Some commentators have argued that the United States government, and the
public-at-large, received good value for the railroad land grants (see, e.g., Wilner 1981).
Be that as it may, it remains clear that the government allocated land to the railroads not by
market criteria but by political and even personal considerations.
10. In 1995, for example, the federal government was forced, under the terms of the
1872 General Mining Law, 17 Stat. 91, to convey more than US$3 billion worth of publicly
owned minerals to the ASARCO Corporation for a grand price of US$1,745. That comes
to only 0.000058 percent of market value (Bureau of National Affairs, National Environment Daily, Dec. 5, 1995). On the 1872 General Mining Law, see generally Leshy (1987).
11. Critics of free market environmentalism, such as James E. Krier (1992, 332–3)
and William Funk (1992, 513–14) have focused much-needed attention on the allocative
problems entailed by privatization. And property rights economists are only beginning to
develop models of transaction costs in privatization (see Jung et al. 1995).
12. Certain procedural limitations apply. For example, citizen plaintiffs must give 60
days’ notice to the EPA Administrator, the state where the alleged violation occurred, and
the alleged violator before filing suit (42 U.S.C. §7604(b)).
13. If there is a shortcoming in Rose-Ackerman’s book, it is that she does not adduce
any empirical information to support her conclusion that broader public participation rights
are ‘more conducive to good policy.’ If that statement is true, we should be able to predict
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that, in the long run, Germany would have lower environmental standards and more lax
enforcement than other countries with broader public participation rights.
14. The 1981 Censorship Law was repealed in 1990 (1990 Dz.U. No. 29, item 173).
15. Some would maintain (as Ricardo and Malthus did) that resource supplies can
only decline. This certainly is true as a physical matter—there is only a finite amount of
land and other resources on or in the earth—but not as an economic matter. Economic scarcity always is relative to the rate of demand and the dynamic efficiency of the economy.
Especially under conditions that facilitate technological innovation for resource conservation, the ultimate physical barrier to growth can be avoided. That does not mean, of course,
that physical scarcity can be ignored. Indeed it is the recognition of that scarcity that drives
resource prices and spurs efforts to increase factor productivity, for example by technological innovation (see Arrow et al. 1995). This is what makes possible the counterintuitive,
but fortuitous, result that most (commodity) resources are less (economically) scarce today
than they were a century ago (see Simon 1981).
16. The environmental journalist Frances Cairncross (1995, 98–9) has noted that the
purpose of GDP is merely ‘to measure transactions that pass through the market’; it is not
an indicator of net social welfare or quality of life. Unfortunately, GDP often is taken as a
proxy for net social welfare, including by critics of environmental policies.
17. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between environmental regulations and productivity, see Haveman and Christainsen (1981); also see Cole (1996).
18. For recent examples of attacks (from different perspectives) on the rule of law,
see, for example, Hasnas (1995) and Mootz (1993).
19. Arguably, the rule of law would still be a useful, even critical, myth for democratic
societies were it entirely mythical. All cultures, after all, are founded upon myths. Even
the culture of science, which supplies the most concrete ‘facts’ of contemporary Western
civilization, is founded ultimately on (very useful) myths (see Popper 1963).
20. Hayek mistakenly refers to the Solonian reforms by the term isonomia. The correct term (indeed, Solon’s own term for his reforms) was eunomia. Isonomia first appeared
several decades later to describe the Cleisthenian reforms, which went well beyond Solon’s
reforms in providing for substantial political equality (including equal access to political
office and equal opportunity to participate in policy making) as well as equality before the
law. Indeed, the word isonomia became virtually synonymous with the (later appearing)
term demokratia (see Vlastos 1953, 1971). Nevertheless, Hayek was on the right track in
defining the rule of law on the basis of general application rather than normative content.
However, in other writings, Hayek (1960) seemed to take a broader view of the rule law,
something closer to isonomia than eunomia.
21. What it means to be ‘similarly situated’ is, of course, contestable. There is no foolproof formula for determining the class of similarly situated persons for all legal rules. At
the very least, the rule of law requires the best effort to apply the rules as consistently and
even-handedly as possible, allowing for legitimate distinctions.
22. Interestingly, companies that measure investment risks abroad utilize a Rule of
Law index. The International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) Rule of Law index measures,
among other things, the extent to which a given country has ‘a tradition of depending on
physical force or illegal means to settle claims.’ The ICRG implicitly defines the Rule of
Law more broadly than I do. In fact, the ICRG’s Rule of Law variable used to be labelled
‘law and order tradition,’ a title more appropriate to the panoply of institutional considerations it reflects. It is nonetheless interesting to see how the international business commu-
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nity has seized upon the rule of law concept as a practical and measurable factor indicating
a state’s commitment to a certain relationship between law, politics and power (see Keefer
and Knack 1994, 6, 23).
23. If I understand Thompson correctly, his critics, including Morton Horwitz (1977),
miss the point when they complain, for example, that the rule of law cannot be ‘an unqualified human good’ because ‘[b]y promoting procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the
calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own advantage.’ Horwitz’s
criticisms prove at most that the rule of law is not a sufficient condition for social justice.
But Thompson’s reference to ‘shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath the
law’ clearly indicates that he did not consider the rule of law a sufficient condition for a just
society; he only thought it a necessary condition. That is what makes it, in his words, ‘an
unqualified human good.’
24. Of course, laws may also serve non-normative purposes. They may articulate a
society’s goals and aspirations. Thus, for example, section 101 of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §4331) of the United States is completely unenforceable but
articulates a national environmental ethic symbolizing a clear (if limited) commitment to
environmental protection and resource conservation.
25. In 1956, worker riots in Poznań contributed to the elevation of Władysław
Gomułka as Party First-Secretary. In 1970, when Gomułka attempted to raise food prices
during the Christmas holidays, workers rioted, and he was replaced by Eduard Gierek,
who immediately rescinded the price increases. Gierek was deposed a decade later, after
his efforts to raise prices in 1980 led to strikes in Warsaw and Radom, and ultimately to
the emergence of the Solidarity movement in Gdańsk. He was replaced temporarily by
Stanisław Kania, who proved unable to quell the public unrest. Kania was soon replaced
by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who did not attempt to placate the unrest, but stifled it by
declaring Martial Law in December 1981 (see Davies 1982, ch. 23; 1984, chs. I, VI, VII;
Leslie et al. 1980, ch. 11 to Epilogue).
26. This would be especially problematic if the eco-totalitarian country operated with
competitive markets because ‘firms under the pressure of competition can be assumed
to pay attention to arguments without a legal or economic content only when their costs
of reducing pollution are negligible’ (Bohm and Russell 1985, 454). But then, an ecototalitarian country without competitive markets would have its own problems with
environmental protection, given soft budget constraints and slow rates of technological
innovation that seem endemic to centrally planned or administered economies.
27. I am assuming here (and I believe it is a fair assumption) that Lewis really means
democratic capitalism when he uses the term ‘capitalism.’ Much of his argument for a
capitalist imperative certainly seems to presume democratic political institutions, as well
as capitalist economic ones.
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